block-house No. 14, so built that it intercepted and commanded the Cingalon Road, hereafter mentioned, also another highway, these two roads being the only approach to Manila from this district.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE SPANISH TRENCHES.

The Spanish trench is always about the same. There is a ditch in front about six feet wide and three feet deep, and the earth back of this is thrown up five feet high. They are five to seven feet thick on the top, and slope from this outward to the ground. They are usually covered with sandbags, between which are loopholes. Sometimes the breastwork is made entirely of sandbags. The approach to the trench at block-house No. 14 is a swamp, almost impassable, and brush. South of this trench along the Calle Real Road, and reaching to the trench, is the Spanish cemetery. The wall has a stone base and was a good protection against an assault. Adjoining this on the south is the American cemetery, where our soldiers are interred. South of this last trench, at an average distance of 1100 feet, runs a highway extending eastward at right angles from the Calle Real

both sides of this road were Spanish trenches commanding open spaces where attacks could be made. South of the above intersection of the highway was another line of entrenchments extending from the Calle Real Road to the beach, the distance being 650 feet. This was the last Spanish outpost entrenched in front of the American line. All these fortifications, under the plan of battle of August 13th, were to be attacked and overcome by Gen. Greene's Brigade, known as the 2d Brigade of the division, with Gen. MacArthur's Brigade in supporting distance to the right. Gen. MacArthur's Brigade, under the plan of battle, was to move directly against other Spanish strongholds, with Greene's brigade in supporting distance on the left. These fortifications remain to be noticed. For this purpose we go back to block-house No. 14. The distance of block-house No. 13 from block-house No. 14 is 425 yards, air-line, varying north by ten degrees east, and between these two were a number of short trenches and rifle-pits, and a stone house and barricades, all so situated as to enfilade the approaches from different directions. This was a formidable place.

Block-house No. 13 rested on the west side of the Cingalon Road and was strongly built, and from this eastward and extending across the highway to an impassable swamp was a strong barricade. On the west of this fortified line was also a swamp. The only traveled way between these two blockhouses was the Cingalon Road, which ran eastward from blockhouse No. 14 255 yards and thence turned at right angles to block-house No. 13, 360 yards. Between this highway and the

LANDING OF TROOPS AT CAVITE.

fortified line were cultivated fields. Back of block-house No. 13 and extending northeast towards block-house No. 12 were numerous trenches which gave protection against an advance from the south by a swamp and slough. The distance between these two block-houses is 750 yards, and between them there is no direct traveled way. The only connection is by highway eastward to Cingalon, where it is intersected by a road leading past block-house No. 13, and thence extending to Paco. The distance from Cingalon to block-house No. 12 is 440 yards, and from block-house No. 13 to Cingalon 600 yards. The highway continues from Cingalon to Paco and intersects the main highway from Malate to Paco, a distance of 830 yards. From this intersection to Paco bridge is 180 yards. The main traveled highway to the walled city gates from this locality intersects this highway 80 yards from the bridge, and this would be the line of approach to the south gate of the city. On this line of road lies the Paco cemetery, distant from intersection 700 yards. From Paco cemetery there are two ways to the city gates. By direct way to the south gate it is 1200 yards; the other makes a circuit northward. The gate also may be reached by a road going west to Ermita and thence north. The extent of the fortifications held by the Spaniards against the American troops was from the city wall to the south line of the entrer.chment, two miles, and from east to west at the furthest point in width, one mile.

THE FILIPINO INSURGENTS.

In front of the Spanish fortifications, and surrounding the city, the Filipinos had thrown up trenches, many of them skilfully constructed, and were occupying them on the arrival of the American forces. They were very deficient in military discipline, and did not hold the trenches with any regularity. The trenches were often inadequately guarded, and at times an entire trench might be vacated. It was evident to our commanders that the Filipinos would be utterly unreliable as an auxiliary, or even a supporting force. In the event of their entering Manila with our forces it was evident that neither their own officers nor the Americans could control them. There were arms and equipments but for a small part even of the actual soldiers, and in case of success there would be no limit to the number of vengeful and bloodthirsty followers who would rush into the city, and who could not be distinguished from those actually under military discipline, or from the inhabitants of the city. It was certain that under such circumstances it would

be impossible for the small American army to prevent the sack and burning of the city, with accompanying horrors such as the world has not seen since the days of Attila, and for which, if permitted, America would be held responsible.

FILIPINOS NOT TO SHARE IN THE ATTACK.

It was determined from the first, therefore, that the Filipinos should have no part in the attack, or recognition as an army in entering and occupying the city. Not the least difficult of the tasks assumed by the American commanders, was the inducing of Aguinaldo and his army to peacefully assent to this program. On the other hand they were doubtless aided in the negotiations for the final surrender by the fear of the Spanish and foreign residents of Manila of the terrible scenes which would follow the entrance of armed Filipinos, and the knowledge that the American commanders would probably not be able to restrain them if the city were taken by assault. Spanish military tradition, if not law, forbids the surrender of a fortified place, no matter what the force brought against it, until there has been such an exercise of that force as to actually demonstrate the futility of resistance. Some bad things have been done in the Philippines, as in all wars, but too much praise cannot be given to the American commanders for the care and tact displayed in so managing, in the interest of humanity, that open rupture with the Filipinos was avoided, while giving to the brave Spanish officers in command the opportunity to save themselves from the rigor of Spanish military law, while assuring to non-combatants in Manila the protection which civilization demands.

CAMP DEWEY ESTABLISHED.

The first duty of Gen. T. N. Anderson, upon the arrival of the first expedition, was to reconnoiter the position of the enemy, and decide upon his base of operations, and the nature of his campaign. His base must be under the protection of the fleet, in the most healthful position possible, and easily accessible with supplies and reinforcements to the trenches, where the fighting must be done. For this purpose he settled upon a place, afterwards called Camp Dewey, by wagon road twenty-one miles from Cavite, and by boat six miles. The place was formerly a peanut field; the soil is sandy loam and about four feet above sea level. It was a mile and a quarter in length, by two hundred and fifty to three hundred yards in width. The place was protected from sea winds by trees and

at Cavite. Camp Dewey was located on the now famous Calle Real Road, which continued its way south from the place we last left it on the Spanish

line. The distance from headquarters northward towards the Spanish line to the entrenchments occupied by the insurgents was one mile and a half, these extended from the beach to the Calle Real Road, the length of the trench being three hun

the line was advanced by the Americans from fifty to one hundred and fifty yards, and a new line constructed, extending from the beach to a highway westward, and thence to a swamp seven hundred yards. It was built for enfilading, and to cover approaches from the north. The left rested on the bay, and the right was covered by an impassable swamp.

POSITION OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS.

At the time of the advance on Manila, Gen. Greene's Brigade held this line of entrenchments with his reserve within supporting distance. Two hundred and fifty yards north on the Calle Real Road, is the intersection of the highway to Pasai, the distance being 700 yards. At Pasai, the road turns at right angles and extending northward, forms the Cingalon Road. Along this road were the trenches held and covered by MacArthur's Brigade, at the time of the advance, the first of which is 700 yards from Pasai. The trench here extends west 300 yards and 100 yards east from the road. The west approach is covered by a swamp, and the left by a trench held by Greene's Brigade. All along this highway were a number of short earthworks extending northward a distance of 650 yards to another main trench 200 yards long. Here was a strong barricade built for enfilading. This was north and east of Greene's last trench, and in advance of it 350 yards, and 300 yards south of block-house No. 14, occupied by the Spanish force. In front of this was a strong outpost about 60 yards distant. Here began the insurgent trenches, extending northeast 350 yards. Their left had for support the American line and their right an impassable swamp. These were strong earthworks and would be effective in making an assault on the strong Spanish position which was supported by the block-houses. It was these trenches which our forces wished to occupy before making the advance on Manila. Our operations prior to this advance taking Camp Dewey as a base, covered three-quarters of a mile east and west, and two

and a half miles north and south. The west was protected by the bay and the east by an impassable swamp, and the whole was covered by the guns of the fleet.

EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE AMERICAN COMMANDERS.

The position of the American commanders, previous to the arrival of a military force sufficient to make them masters of the situation, was very trying. There were large foreign interests in Manila, and the well known temporary lack of power on the part of the Americans to give due protection to non-combatants and their property from the possible excesses of the Filipinos was a legitimate cause of anxiety to the governments whose citizens were in Manila. The result was a speedy gathering of British, French, Japanese and German war-ships to observe events, and afford such protection to their own citizens and other non-combatants as the exigencies of the case might require.

MISCONDUCT OF THE GERMAN ADMIRAL.

The number of German ships, however, was unnecessarily large. * There were five in all, two of which were armored and outclassed any ship of Dewey's fleet; and considering their number and size the German squadron in Manila Bay

CRAVES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN PACO CEMETERY.

almost constituted what is called a "naval demonstration," a term which is used to describe a naval force sufficient in strength to control an existing situation, and which is very seldom displayed under such circumstances, except for the purpose of a warning against some possible action. The actions of the German squadron were very peculiar. The rules of naval etiquette in a blockaded port, or in the presence of belligerents, are very closely drawn and perfectly understood by all naval commanders. It was the constant practice of the ships of the German squadron to strain these rules to the utmost, and in some cases they certainly overstepped them. There was a studied discourtesy, which could apparently have no object except to irritate the Americans and engage them in a controversy. As naval commanders are always presumed to be acting in pursuance of instructions, it was difficult for Admiral Dewey to interpret the actions of the German admiral except upon the supposition that he desired to provoke a contest which would serve as an excuse for Germany's intervention in affairs in the Philippines. Admiral Dewey endured these petty annoyances with such patience as he might,

* Mr. Stickney's account of this matter has already been given, (see page 16) but it seems proper to make the narrative complete in this place,