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until, what he deemed a sufficient occasion arising, he is said to have sent, in connection with a protest against an improper action, a request to Admiral Von Diederich to be informed “Whether Germany and the United States were at peace or at war, in order that he might take measures accordingly," with the added notification that “If Admiral Von Diederich wanted a fight he could have it right now." No official report of any such message has been published, but unquestionably some message was sent which relieved the situation, for there was no more trouble from that source. What instructions Admiral Von Diederich may have had, or what designs, if any, the German government may have had, is not likely to be known, but so far as we can now see, whatever trouble there was grew out of the fact that the German commander was an impertinent and foolish man. At any rate he was quietly recalled by his government.
RUMORED COMING OF CAMARA'S FLEET. In addition to this cause of anxiety, and the strain of managing the Filipinos, there was a very possible danger from a Spanish fleet. The battle-ships of the American navy were all in the Atlantic, while Spain had at home a good number of formidable vessels, from which a squadron, far more powerful than that of Dewey, might easily be fitted out, and reach Manila, by way of the Suez Canal long before any American battle-ship, even if it could be spared from the Atlantic, could reach there. In anticipation of this, and as the only thing possible to be done, the monitors Monterey and Monadnock, then lying in San Francisco, were fitted out for the Philippines, and the Monterey was promptly got off. As a matter of fact, as is well known, a squadron, including the battle-ship Pelayo, was made up in the Mediterranean, and despatched eastward under Admiral Camara. Dewey knew this, and also that the Monterey had sailed to his assistance. The anxiety and strain which grew out of this situation is well described in the following language of Gen. F. V. Greene:
“We had been thirty days without news from the outer world. The Boston brought us the latest information by way of Hongkong, which was dated July 2d, and consisted of a few brief telegrams, to the effect that Admiral Camara's fleet had passed through the Suez Canal, was coaling in the Red Sea, and as soon as this was completed would continue its voyage to Manila; and that Gen. Merritt had sailed from San Francisco in the steamer Newport on June 28th.
"These telegrams showed that a most interesting race was in progress on two sides of the globe, each of the contestants with about 7000 nautical miles to go. Camara was coming east, and Merritt was coming west; and the monitor Monterey, which
CAPTURED SPANISH GUNS.
we had left coaling at Honolulu, and the arrival of which was of such vital importance to Dewey, was also coming west, all having the same objectiveManila Bay. As we steamed down the coast of Luzon, I spent several hours figuring on a time table to see who would come in first. Allowing the Monterey six knots, Camara's fleet ten knots, and the Newport twelve knots, I figured out that Camara would reach Manila July 26th, Merritt July 28th, and the Monterey August 4th. Would Camara come straight to Manila ? Would he sail east to intercept Merritt ? Would his arrival be delayed beyond August 4th ? Would he come at all ?
"I handed the time table to Admiral Dewey, and he spent most of the night and the following day studying over it. On the morning of the third day (July 19) he came to the China in his barge, and asked me to go ashore with him to see Gen. Anderson,
who, with 2500 men of his expedition, was
quartered in the barracks at Cavite. The
Admiral was convinced that if Camara
continued his voyage he would reach
Manila before the Monterey. Having no
battle-ship in his command, he was out
classed by the Pelayo. The safety of the army
and the transports, at such an enormous
distance from America, depended upon
keeping his fleet intact. He therefore
came to the determination, in case news
was not received in less than a week that
Camara had turned back, to take his fleet
and the transports to the north of Luzon,
and then to cruise eastward until he met
the Monterey and the Monadnock, which
was following her; then he would return
and destroy Camara's fleet. He felt reasonNOST.
ably confident that he would be gone not
longer than August 10th, and he asked BONES OF THE DEPARTED.
Gen. Anderson, who was the senior officer, what he would do. The latter promptly replied that he would take thirty days' rations, march into the hills about twenty miles east of Cavite, entrench and await the return of the fleet. My opinion was asked, and I fully concurred in the wisdom of the departure of the fleet, and the propriety of taking the troops inland to await its return.
“If Camara's nerve had held out, the result would have been a very interesting campaign in the Philippines. Merritt arrived three days ahead of schedule time, and the Monterey arrived on the very day calculated, but Camara did not come at all. Definite information that Camara had turned back reached the Admiral on July 22d, just as it was becoming necessary to take steps to carry the above plan into operation.”
Such is the fortune of war. Conceding the arrival of Camara with the Pelayo and his fleet as expected, the destruction of the transport fleet, with Gen. Merritt,
MAJOR GENERALS IN THE EIGHTH ARMY CORPS. 1. WESLEY MERRITT, first Governor-General of the Philippine Islands; resigned, August 26, 1898, to go as Peace Commissioner to Paris. 2. ELWELL S. OTIS, present Governor-General, Philippine Islands, succeeding General Merritt. 3. THOMAS N. ANDERSON, commanding First Division, resigned, March 18, 1899. 4. ARTHUR MACARTHUR, commanding Second Division. 5. H. W. LAWTON, commanding First Division, succeeding General Anderson. 6. HENRY C. MERRIAM, commanding Dept. of California, relieved, January 19, 1899.
Copyrighted by P. E. Lamar. MAP SHOWING POSITION OF AMERICAN, SPANISH AND FILIPINO TROOPS IN THE
BATTLE OF AUGUST 13, 1898.
was among the probabilities. Among the certainties would have been the Spanish occupation of all the fortifications from Corregidor to Manila, the American forces, twenty miles inland, the insurgents driven out of every fortified place in and about Manila, and this powerful Pelayo and the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay under the protection and support of the heavy guns on the fortified walls of Manila. But none of these things happened.
THE PLAN OF ATTACK. On the arrival of the second expedition Gen. Anderson and Gen. Greene deliberated on the plan of attack, Greene having brought information to Ander
son from Gen. Merritt that, if he was certain of success, he might make the attack before his (Merritt's) arrival; otherwise, to await
his coming. Gen. Anderson and a Gen. Greene had under con
sideration two plans of attack. One, to make San Pedro Macati the base, and the other to proceed direct against the Spanish position on the Manila Bay side. In this there were two considerations. From the San Pedro Macati base, the eastern and less fortified part of the city could be easily reached. On the east, the insurgents already held the city water-works, and effectually blockaded the city from all egress into the interior. But to attack from the San Pedro Macati base involved the great difficulty of hauling the artillery by hand to the place, and moving the army so that it would practically be detached from the present base, while the San Pedro Macati base would be out of effective range of the fleet, and without its support. Gen. Anderson, according to Gen. Greene, favored the San Pedro Macati base, while he favored the bay side attack. In any case, it was considered that the attack should be