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postponed until the arrival of Gen. Merritt, and he, upon his arrival, ordered the attack on the Greene plan. At that time, the reputed strength of the Spanish force was 10,000 men, but Gen. Greene says that at the time of the surrender it was found to be 13,000.

Opposed to this force was that of the insurgent forces which, while not allowed to co-operate with the Americans in their aggressive movements, still held strong defensive positions against the Spaniards. Gen. Anderson was the ranking officer prior to the arrival of Gen. Merritt, and the American forces being formed into a division, Gen. Anderson was placed in command, and upon the arrival of Gen. MacArthur with the third expedition, the whole command was divided into two brigades, Gen, MacArthur being assigned to the command of the 1st Brigade and Gen, Greene to the 2d Brigade.

ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN FORCES.

The formation of the force into brigades and the assignment of the different regimental and other organizations for the brigades was made by Gen, Merritt, by general order, August 1st, as follows:

GENERAL Orders,
No. 2.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC
AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
MANILA BAY, P. I., August 1, 1898.

I. The United States forces assembled at Cavite, Camp Dewey and in transports off Cavite are hereby organized as the 2d Division of the 8th Army Corps, composed of two brigades. Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., is assigned to the command of the division:

The brigades are organized as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE-Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., commanding: 23d U. S. Inf., two battalions; 14th U. S. Inf., one battalion; 13th Minnesota Volunteer Inf.; 1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf., two battalions; 1st Idaho Volunteer Inf., two battalions; 1st Wyoming Volunteer Inf., one battalion; Astor Battery.

SECOND BRIGADE—Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, U. S. V., commanding: 18th U. S. Inf., two battalions; battalion four-foot batteries, 3d U. S. Art.; Company A, Battalion U. S. Engineers; 1st California Volunteer Inf.; 1st Colorado Volunteer Inf.; 1st Nebraska Volunteer Inf.; 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Inf.; Light Battery A, Utah Volunteer Art.; Light Battery B, Utah Volunteer Art.

II. The 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf. and detachment of California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, now at Cavite, will remain at that place on their present duties, the commanding officers reporting direct to division commander.

III. The Signal Detachment will remain at Cavite, and will report to the chief signal officer at these headquarters.

By command of Major-General Merritt.

J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General.

THE NATURE OF THE GROUND COVERED BY OUR ARMY.

The first expedition under Gen. Anderson, had arrived in the bay on June 30, 1898, and landed next day at Cavite. This city and fortifications are on a narrow neck which connects with the main peninsula. This neck is a mile long to a point where it is so narrow that only a single wagonway connects with the peninsula. This road always overflows at high tide. The large peninsula to

which this neck connects, is five miles long to a point where it connects with the mainland, and here there is only room for a single wagonway, and during the rainy season this roadway is quite impassable. In the interior, and north and east of the Cavite peninsula, and extending

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FLAG RAISED OVER FORT SAN ANTONIO, AUGUST 13, 1898.

to within a short distance of where Camp Dewey was afterwards located, the country is composed largely of swamps and rough, uneven ground, through which many small streams flow, which have their sources in the innumerable swamps, the larger ones taking their rise in the mountain range, which lies inland near the Lake Laguna de Bombon, and thence flowing westward and emptying into Manila Bay. Over this whole region was a rank tropical vegetation. Luckily this district, at the time of the first debarkation, had been cleared of the Spaniards by the insurgents, and thus all possibility of opposition in landing prevented. There is practically but one wagon road through this region from Cavite northward towards Manila, to a place where Camp Dewey was subsequently established, and this, most of the year in an almost impassable condition. The distance is about twenty miles. The Spaniards on their official maps, designate their public travel ways as "roads," "bridle paths" and "paths." The first is something of an improved way, the streams bridged or supposed to be so, and the road-beds thrown up much after the manner of our Western country roads, and averaging about twenty-five feet in width. The "bridle path" is a way over which a carabao may haul a sled. The 'path' is suitable only for travel by foot or on horseback. From the roads, notably that which leads from Cavite to Manila, there are many of these bridle paths and paths leading back into the interior. This interior, after leaving the plain south and east of Manila, over which the campaign was made, consists of foothills merging into a mountain range, the highest peaks of which are from 5000 to 7000 feet, and this range extends from the southwest border of Lake Laguna de Bombon to the Pasig River, making a circuit much in the form of a half moon. It became at once evident to Gen. Anderson that Cavite could not, for the reason stated, be made a base of operations in an active campaign against Manila, and, luckily again, to enable him to establish his base as he desired, the insurgents had driven the Spaniards out of the locality which he wished to occupy. That is to say, at the time of the arrival of the first expedition, the insurgents occupied San Francisco de Malabon, Cavite Viejo, Imus, Bacoor, Las Pinas, Paranaque and Malibay. After a further reconnaissance, Gen. Anderson selected as a new base of operations in the active campaign a plot of ground near Paranaque. The plan of his campaign had for its objective, first, the capture of the entrenchments and strongholds of the Spanish positions south and eastward

of the walled city, many of which, owing to the obstacles shutting them from view of the fleet and other causes, could not be bombarded successfully by the fleet, and second, the capture of the walled city.

DIFFICULTIES IN LANDING TROOPS.

Debarkation when once begun on the part of the troops, was pushed with vigor, although under unpropitious conditions. The rainy season was on.

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are built of heavy timbers, with Without any material

outlying riggers and towed from one position to another. mishaps the expedition was thus landed at Cavite, as were likewise the second ard third expeditions, the only troops which took part in the campaign of Manila.

THE HEALTH OF THE COMMAND.

Few can realize the conditions at the time that the first expedition cast anchor in Manila Bay. With the best that could be done, it was impossible, in the hurried departure from the States, and the many hindrances unavoidable in securing transports, to properly equip and supply the troops. As a consequence, the members of the first expedition endured many discomforts which were largely avoided in the subsequent expeditions. The germs of disease, which soon after landing. became widespread and alarming, were undoubtedly fostered on board the transports. The 2d Oregon were the worst sufferers. It was reported that within thirty days after debarkation, not more than one-half of the regiment was fit for camp duties. There was much complaint on shipboard of improper food supply and clothing, and shoes were not up to the standard. Hygienic conditions aboard ship were doubtless neglected. The change from civil to military life brings new and untried conditions, which usually put to the test the best physical conditions. Add to this climatic change, improper diet and bad sanitation, and many break down under the strain. As the transport and supply service became better organized, and the troops got under better discipline, these conditions gradually disappeared.

The most prevalent disease, especially in the second expedition, was measles. Gen. Greene, accounting for this, says that there was a great strife among the regiments at San Francisco to be the first in taking transports; that at the time

his expedition left San Francisco a number of the members of the different regiments were in hospitals, some afflicted with measles, and about a dozen of these men by stealth escaped from the hospital, and secreted themselves on shipboard, and were not found until far out at sea.

AGUINALDO ADDRESSES THE POWERS.

Gen. Wesley Merritt arrived at Manila on July 25th. He at once assumed command, and on August 1st issued the order, already quoted, organizing the brigades of his army. On the 6th day of August, Aguinaldo, as President of the Revolutionary government, addressed a note to the Powers, asking their recognition of his government. In this he did not consult any representative of the United States, nor had he the concurrence or consent of any such representative. It was a plain, unequivocal act, indicating a determination to no longer act in concert with the United States. He said in his note: "The revolution has about 9000 prisoners of war, and a regularly organized army of 30,000 men, and they are now besieging Manila, the capital.'

On the 12th of August, 1898, the protocol between Spain and the United States was made, and among other recitals it provided: "That the United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines." The issue was thus plainly drawn. Aguinaldo demanded the recognition of his government. The United States decided that the status of the Philippines should be settled between them and Spain by a treaty yet to be made.

GROWING ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND FILIPINOS.

Ante-dating these events, a gradual antagonism between the personnel of the two armies had grown up. An indistinct, undefined color-line had been drawn between the armies. At first the Filipino sought fraternity, but his overtures fell on barren ground, and he was taught that there could be no social affinity between him and the Americans When once the breach began, it was but a step to open insults. Before and during the engagement which ended in the capture of Manila, animosities between the Americans and Filipinos became very manifest. During the advance, Aguinaldo was.

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GUNS IN THE ARSENAL AT MANILA.

ordered out of his trenches, then to cease firing, and at a time during the advance, a part of the two commands stood opposed to each other at the "fire" command. At the surrender the Filipinos were not allowed to participate, and,

with the exception of their commanding officers, were excluded from the city while bearing arms.

Some time before this Aguinaldo's headquarters were at Bacoor, in close proximity to the American land and naval forces. It was to free himself from this supposed dangerous proximity that he removed his headquarters to a place three miles north of Manila. To this Gen. Otis demurred, and Aguinaldo, paying no heed, on the 13th of September he was ordered peremptorily by Gen. Otis to evacuate by the afternoon of the 15th. On the 14th Aguinaldo, in consequence, moved his force to Malolos, where he established his headquarters and that of the Provisional government, making Malolos its capital. At this time, as stated, his forces, in part, were distributed as follows: At Caloocan, 3000 men; his cannon were pointed towards Binondo; at Pasig, 400; south of Malate, 1200, and at Pasai, Pandacan, Paco and Santa Ana, about 500 each.

During this time, and up to the signing of the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States, the insurgents claim that they had so conducted their campaign that the Spanish soldiery had been practically driven out of the Philippines, with the exception of Manila and its suburbs, and there was no civil control outside of this limit for the Spanish government to transfer to the United States. On August 9th the following general order was issued by Gen. Merritt: GENERAL Orders, Į HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC No. 3. AND EIGHTH ARMY Corps.

MANILA BAY, P. I., August 9, 1898.

In view of the extraordinary conditions under which this army is operating, the commanding general desires to acquaint the officers and men composing it with the expectations which he entertains as to their conduct. You are assembled upon foreign soil, situated within the western confines of a vast ocean separating you from your native land. You have come, not as despoilers and oppressors, but simply as the instruments of a strong, free government, whose purposes are beneficent, and which has declared itself in this war the champion of those oppressed by Spanish rule.

It is, therefore, the intention of this order to appeal directly to your pride in your position as representatives of a high civilization in the hope and with the firm conviction that you will so conduct yourselves in your relations with the inhabitants of these islands as to convince them of the lofty nature of the mission which you have come to execute.

It is not believed that any acts of pillage, rapine or violence will be committed by soldiers or others in the employ of the United States, but should there be persons with this command who prove themselves unworthy of this confidence, their acts will be considered not only as crimes against the sufferers, but as direct insult to the United States flag, and they will be punished on the spot with the maximum penalties known to military law.

By command of Major-General Merritt.

J. B. BABCOCK, Adjutant-General.

WORK OF AMERICAN TROOPS BEFORE THE FALL OF MANILA.

It was a vigilant command during the six weeks intervening between the landing of the first expedition and the fall of Manila, and during this interim both the officers and rank and file, without murmur, endured the hardships and vicissitudes of campaign life in the trenches. The rainy season was at its height, and the downpour was almost incessant. Life in camp, aside from the exposures on duty, was almost intolerable. Resort was had to every device to provide some

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