back from the trench, along the Calle Real, owing to the focus of the Spanish range, there was a perfect maelstrom of firing. During the "battle" our forces fired 60,000 rounds, and it may be safely estimated that the Spanish during the same time fired nearly double that quantity, the heavy firing, including the cannonading, being centered in this locality. How it happened that so few were

killed or wounded is inexplicable.

The bullets were falling like a torrent, and the shells were bursting in a continuous roar, and this continued for about four hours. With all this the only casualty reported, caused by the shells, was the wounding of Lieut. Buttermore of the Pennsylvanians. He was knocked down by a piece of shell striking him over the eyes. He got up at once and went on with the fight. The Pennsylvanians in going into this position were undoubtedly in the thickest of the fight. Here the first soldier in the Philippines was killed in battle. He was Corp. N. E. Brown of Company D. Many were wounded here, and a little beyond this others were killed. In the trenches the men were standing two to the yard, and no more men could be worked there. The reserves were in position and chafing to

the first to fall, hit on the top of the head, on the right side, by a bullet. In the further advance, 1st Sergt. Maurice Justh of Company A, was instantly killed by a shot through the body. A number were wounded. Coming to the old trench, complying, as they supposed, with their order, they saw the flash of guns in their immediate front, which was our firing line in the new trench. Mistaking this for the reported advanced line of the Spaniards, they at once opened. fire by volleys, and discharged three volleys straight into the backs of the Pennsylvanians and Regulars. Col. Smith of the 1st Californias, had caught up with the Regulars of Battery H, and was with Capt. O'Hara in the trench, and at once sent one of his officers back to warn Maj. Boxton of his mistake. The officer ran with the message, but before it could be delivered the three volleys had been fired. The result of these volleys is not known. The surgeons, however, believe that no man was killed by a shot from the rear.

When the California Battalion finally got into position, it was sent to the relief of the Pennsylvanians. The cruiser Boston was at anchor in position to rake the whole Spanish trench, but Admiral Dewey did not wish to bring on an

engagement unless from necessity, and it was arranged that the Boston should not be signaled to open fire, unless as a last resort. Gen. Greene says he became convinced, after watching the Spanish fire, although reports were continually coming in of the Spanish advance, that they were still in their trenches, and hence did not signal the Boston.

GOOD CONDUCT OF THE VOLUNTEERS.

There were many heroic acts done during this engagement, but there is no space here for incidents. It was amply shown, however, that the old-time American valor was not wanting in the command. While Gen. Greene truthfully says, that when compared with the battles of the Civil War, this was an unimportant skirmish, and that during that war there were many affairs much larger in fatalities than this, of which no record was made, still he says the conditions were such as usually create consternation among green soldiers, and the Veterans of the Civil War could not have done more thoroughly what was required that night than did these young men from Pennsylvania, California, Colorado and Utah, and from the various States whose men were found in the 3d Regular Artillery.

On the night of August 1st, the Colorado Regiment held the trenches, but under strict orders not to return the enemy's fire unless they quit their trenches. With few exceptions this order was observed, but in the darkness the men would find an excuse for firing, alleging as a pretense that the Spaniards were advancing. In consequence of this unnecessary exposure one was killed and three wounded. Up to August 4th, the time when the Monterey arrived, our total loss while in these defensive tactics, was twelve killed and fifty-four wounded. At this time, Gen. MacArthur and his command had arrived, but not landed, being prevented by a rough sea. On the night of August 5th, occurred other conflicts between the lines, the usual excuse being that "the Spaniards were advancing." The trenches were held by one battalion each of the 14th and 23d Regulars and 1st Nebraskas. Firing began at half-past seven o'clock, and lasted till ten. About 20,000 rounds were fired by our men. The loss was three killed and seven wounded. Gen. Merritt and Admiral Dewey now hit upon a plan to end this skirmish firing, and the Governor-General at Manila was notified that within forty-eight hours, if these attacks on our lines did not cease, an attack by the land and naval forces on the city would take place, and that this notice was given so that

CHURCH AT MALATE.

non-combatants and women and children might be removed. This had the desired effect, and from thenceforth until the final attack on the city, on August 13th, there was no further molestation of our outposts, and the Spaniards were to be seen on their parapets with impunity.

The third expedition arrived on July 31st, but did not go into camp until the 9th of August. The Astor Battery was among the first to land. One of their cascos was capsized, her ammunition ruined, and most of the rations lost. Another boat was upset, but no one was drowned.

THE AMERICANS READY TO ATTACK MANILA.

With the arrival of Gen. MacArthur and the Monterey, the complement of men and equip.nent was at hand, and work was pressed for an attack on Manila. On the 10th, Gen. Anderson came over from Cavite and assumed command of the division, and their work went hurriedly on. Every point of weakness was considered and strengthened; the troops were looked carefully after, and every vantage ground and stragetic maneuver determined. The brigade commanders

urged the necessity of occupying the strong insurgent trenches by a part of Gen. MacArthur's Brigade prior to the advance, but Gen. Merritt persisted in his policy of not using force, strictly forbidding anything being either said or done that would give offense to the insurgent command, and further ordered that the trenches should not be extended. There were but two important objective points against which the forces should move-MacArthur's Brigade against the stronghold which included block-houses Nos. 13 and 14, in the first attack, and Greene's Brigade against the rest of the Spanish line west, resting on Fort Malate. For this purpose the forces were massed as follows: Against Fort Malate's front, and in Gen. Greene's Brigade, were seven battalions in the trenches and eight in reserve, the reserve being at Pasai cross-road, before described, under Gen. Anderson's immediate command. Seven guns of the Utah Battery were placed in the trenches at intervals, and in addition three guns of the navy, manned by a volunteer detachment of the 3d Art. These were on the extreme right of the column. MacArthur occupied a position, as seen, with a narrow front, owing to the fact that no further trenches were allowed and no interference with the insurgents, so that his force was massed in support of this narrow line back along the Pasai

Road. His front lay between impassable swamps, and back of this, to the Pasai Road, the brigade occupied invulnerable positions. The Astor Battery was on the right, one Utah gun in an insurgent emplacement on the Cingalon Road, the 13th Minnesota on the right, and the 23d Regulars on the left.

THE FLEET TAKES POSITION.

Having thus located the land forces at the time of the attack, we must now take up the matters pertaining to the fleet, which was to join in a joint attack on the Spanish positions at Manila on the 13th. In the preparations for this attack, Admiral Dewey and Gen. Merritt acted in concert. At this time there was a large fleet of foreign war-ships in Manila Bay, composed of four English, five German, two Frenchman, and a Japanese. Admiral Dewey wanted the place occupied by them in which to maneuver, and they moved out of the way. Every precaution was taken by the fleet for bombardment as though it actually might

occur.

EFFORTS TO INDUCE SURRENDER.

For some time before this, negotiations had been going on to effect a surrender without the loss of property or life. In this the Spanish held to their tradition of requiring defeat before surrender. They had, too, been watching and hoping for Camara's fleet and the Pelayo, and the 3000 men which the fleet was said to be convoying from Spain; but when Camara turned back, the last hope of holding the Philippines by force vanished; consequently, they were inclined to consider terms of surrender. The Belgian consul, M. Andre, had been for some time occupying a Belgian craft in the bay, and put forth his good offices as an intermediary between Admiral Dewey and Gen. Merritt and Captain-General Augustin, looking to a pacific capitulation. The Spanish authorities, however, held out for honor, and it required no little strategy to perfect the plan of mimic battle without it verging into the real. The American commander would not permit this if the play should go so far as to imperil the life of a single man. Still, if Spanish pride could be assuaged and no evil follow, it would be far better than to incur the loss of life and property which was sure to follow should a general engagement be precipitated. Augustin became so convinced of the folly of resistance that he was prepared to surrender without further show, and even, as is stated, hoisted the white flag. It was pulled down, however, and subsequently he was called to Madrid, and Fermin Jaudenes made Captain-General, which position he held when the "ultimatum" was made to him,

as before stated, on August 7th. When the final demand was made for surrender, the Captain-General got twentyfour hours' time, but after a conference, refused to surrender without an attack. In the meantime the Belgian consul was busy, and his trips were frequent between

fleet and the Captain-General's office. SIGNAL CORPS GOING TO THE FRONT. During this time the fleet had cleared for action and was ready at a moment to commence the attack. Gen. Merritt, at the time it was arranged the attack

should be made, came on board the Olympia and stated that the American forces were not in position sufficiently eastward to protect the city from the incoming insurgents at the time of surrender, so a little time was taken to accomplish this.

ALLEGED ARRANGEMENT FOR A SHAM BATTLE.

By the 12th of August, the full details of the coming "battle" were arranged between Admiral Dewey, Gen. Merritt and Captain-General Jaudenes. In this, on the part of the American forces, such display was to be made as would satisfy an observer that further resistance on the part of the Spaniards would not only be futile, but ground for censure by all non-combatants; when this point was reached the white flag of surrender was to be hung out from the Spanish fort, when further assault should cease. So definite were the details as to this, that the maneuver of the fleet was specified, the time when the attack should begin, where it should be made, its continuance and character; that the Spaniards should fire no shots in return, the exact time when the flag of surrender should be raised, the proceedings pertaining to this and the place and disposition of the American and Spanish forces after this, until the American occupation was made complete, so as to prevent looting and destruction, and ward off the insurgents from the city. All the principal officers in both commands were fully apprised, and specific instructions given so that no mistakes be made or loss of life occur. Pursuing this plan, the American fleet was put as fully in readiness as when it first went into the engagement in Manila Bay.

THE FLEET BEGINS THE ATTACK.

At nine o'clock on the morning of the 13th, the fleet commenced to maneuver into position for the attack, and within one-half hour the Olympia was in position for shelling Fort Malate, followed by the Raleigh and Petrel, the Callao and the little Barcelo closer in shore; and back of these was Gen. Merritt and staff on a

have amply justified the Spanish surrender without a shot, but the play went on, with the head of the army and escort in the rear, waiting for the white flag and the peals of victory, which should call him from his seclusion to receive the capitulation of the city as per arrangement.