24

DEFECTS DEVELOPED.

[1781-7]

with their commodities had free admission into our ports, American ships and exports were loaded with heavy exactions, or prohibited from entry into British ports." When Congress attempted to treat with foreign powers upon principles of reciprocity, the latter asserted that Congress could not guarantee the faithful observance of any commercial relations. "In a word (said Washington) we are a nation to-day, and thirteen to-morrow. Who will treat with us on such terms?" (Story, I. § 259-61.) England complained bitterly of infractions, by states, of the treaty of peace, and demanded redress. Congress could merely recommend that the states repeal

1784 Apr.

laws infringing on the treaty. Congress, in order to secure reciprocal advantages for the U. S., requested of the states, power, for fifteen years, to prohibit the importation and exportation of goods in the ships of nations with which we have no commercial treaties; and also to prohibit the subjects of foreign nations, unless authorized by treaty, to import any goods into the U. S., not the produce or manufacture of the dominions of their sovereign." This was in vain, as was also a later resolution, requesting full authority to regulate external and internal commerce, and to impose such duties as might be necessary for the purpose.

There were other INFERIOR DEFECTS in the Confederation.

4. The method of apportionment of contributions, among the states, according to the value of lands, was unjust and inconvenient.

5. The state gov'ts lacked a mutual guaranty against domestic insurrections, and usurpations destructive of their liberty.

6. The lack of direct power to raise armies was inconsistent with vigor and promptitude of action, and with economy and a just distribution of the public burdens.

[1781-7]

CHIEF SOURCE OF WEAKNESS.

25

7. The small states had equal suffrage with the large. A majority of the states, constituting a third only of the people, could control the rights and interests of the other two-thirds.

8. The organization of all powers of gov't, executive, legislative, and judicial, in one assembly, made that body either an extremely feeble, or an irresponsible body.

9. Congress lacked the exclusive power to issue paper money, and thus to prevent the circulation of base currency.

IO.

The frequent rotation in the office of members of Congress rendered experience and knowledge in public affairs useless to the country.

II. There was needed a judiciary power coextensive with the powers of the general gov't.

12.

The Confederation did not rest upon the consent of the people.

Because of these defects, under the pressure of necessity, Congress was led into some usurpations of authority; and the states into many gross infractions of its legitimate sovereignty." (Story, I. § 269.)

The chief source of weakness in the gov't of the confederation was that it dealt with states and could not reach the individual. "The Federal Gov't (says De Tocqueville, I. 73) is (in the U. S.) . . . . the exception; the gov't of the states is the rule. . . . The great political principles which now govern American society undoubtedly took their origin and their growth in the state." Lincoln, in his message of July 4, 61, said: "The states have their status in the Union, and they have no other legal status... Not one of them ever had a state constitution independent of the Union." (Von H., I. 6, n. 1.) Although the states may never have been legally independent, their machinery of gov't existed long before the

26

NATURE OF CENTRALIZATION.

[1781] Union. At the Revolution the states adopted, with slight changes, the old colonial forms of gov't. The states could pass laws, and by their courts enforce them. The gov't of the confederation could pass laws, but had no courts with which to enforce them. The latter was "a Federal Gov't" in which the subjects are states, and not a "National Gov't" in which the subjects are individuals. [Our present gov't is a mixture of the two.] Neither was the gov't of the confederation a "centralized gov't." In these "the power which directs. . . . general interests is concentrated in one place or in the same persons". The state gov'ts, however, were of this kind; but were not "Centralized Administrations." In these the direction of local interests is concentrated in

one place or in the same persons. "A centralized gov't acquires immense power when united to centralized administration. . . . England has never centralized its administration. Indeed I cannot conceive that a nation can live and prosper without a powerful centralization of gov't. But . . . . a centralized administration is fit only to enervate the nations in which it exists by incessantly diminishing their local spirit." (De Tocqueville, I. 107-9.)

VII.

THE ORIGIN AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Parallel: Story, I. § 272-305; Von Holst, I. 43-63; Curtis, I. 340-488; Marshall, Life of Washington, V. 90-133; Hildreth, III. (First series.) 482-526: The Federalist, I. II.; Eliot's Deb's on Constitution, 5 vols.; Austin, Life of Gerry, II. 1-79; Frothingham, 587-99; Rives, Life of Madison, II. 91-657 (full); Life of Hamilton, III. 147-531.

"The confederation was apparently expiring from mere debility. . . . The vital necessity of some measure

[1786]

CONVENTION AT ANNAPOLIS.

27

1785

Mar.

which might prevent the separation of the integral parts, of which the American empire was composed, became apparent even to those who had been unwilling to perceive it." (Story, I. § 271.) "In this state of things (continues Story, I. § 272), commissioners were appointed by the legislatures of Va. and Md. . . . to form a compact relative to the navigation of the rivers Potomac and Pocomoke, and the Chesapeake Bay. The commissioners, having met at Alexandria in Va. in Mar., in that year, felt the want of more enlarged powers, and particularly of powers to provide for a local naval force, and a tariff of duties upon imports. Upon receiving their recommendation, the legislature of Va. passed a resolution for laying the subject of a tariff before all the states composing the Union." This and a second resolution, appointing commissioners, "were communicated to the states, and a convention of commissioners from six states only, viz, N. Y., N. J., Penn., Del., Md., and Va., met at Annapolis." After discussing the subject, considering the inadequacy of their powers and the few states represented, the convention merely recommended to the several states and to Congress the appointment of commissioners from all the states "to meet at Phila., on the second Monday of May, then next, to take into consideration the situation of the U. S.; to devise such further provisions, as shall appear to them necessary, to render the constitution of the federal gov't adequate to the exigencies of the union; and to report such an act for that purpose to the U. S. in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every state, will effectually provide for the same." (Ibid., § 273.) Thereupon the legislature of Va. appointed delegates to

1786

Sept.

28

1787 Feb.

CONVENTION AT PHILA.

[1787] this convention; but Congress took no action until, at the instance of the N. Y. delegation in Congress (instructed to that effect by their legislature). Congress passed a resolution recommending to the several states to appoint deputies to meet in convention at Phila., on the second Monday of May ensuing, "for the purpose of revising the articles of confederation, and reporting to Congress, and the several legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the states, render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of gov't and the preservation of the Union." (Story. I. § 274; Marshall, Life of Washington, V. 90-7; Tucker, I. 342-4.)

Delegates from all the states except R. I. (which refused to appoint any) began to assemble at the appointed time: but not until May 25 was a majority of the states represented. "If there was any exit from the labyrinth of conflicting interests and views (says V. H., I. 49) this meeting must certainly find it; for it was unquestionably made up of the best men of the Union, of the most experienced, patriotic and intelligent." The leading spirits were Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, Madison, Edmund Randolph, Wilson, C. C. Pinckney, Rufus King, Gouverneur Morris; others less active were J. Langdon, Elbridge Gerry, Roger Sherman, Dickinson, Rutledge. John Adams was in England, and Jefferson, in France.

Although the ostensible purpose of the convention was to revise the articles of confederation, and the delegates had no authority in their instructions to form a new gov't, the leaders, e. g. Hamilton and Madison, were convinced that a mere revision of the articles would not meet the exigencies of the time, and were