[1854] THE U. S. COURTS. 155 The U. S. Circuit Court decided in favor of Scott on the question of law. i. e. that it was not law that a man of African descent cannot be a citizen. The defendant then fell back on the " merits of the case," i. c. on the claim that Scott, as his slave, could be restrained" by, him from any action whatever. This question turned on the point as to whether or not Scott had become free by his sojourn in free territory. The jury found Scott a slave at the time of bringing his suit, hence the verdict was in favor of the defendant. The case was carried to the Supreme Court of the U. S. on a writ of error. The Court, by 6 to 2 (Chief Justice Taney giving the decision) decided that "a free negro whose ancestors had been brought to this country and sold as slaves" was not a citizen in the meaning of the Constitution. (Greeley, I. 253-6.) He said that at the time of the Declaration of Independence and of the adoption of the Constitution, the black race was "never thought of or spoken of except as property," and that emancipated blacks were "regarded as a part of the slave population rather than the free." Taney said also that the negro "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." (Ibid. 254.) Regarding Scott's claim to freedom because of having been in free territory, Taney said that Art. IV. Sec. 3 (giving to Congress the power to legislate and make rules respecting the territories) applied only to the territories belonging to the U. S. then, i. e. at the adoption of the Constitution (hence not to La. or territories purchased from Mex. etc.). "The Gov't and the citizen both enter it under the authority of the Constitution." This is Calhoun's dogma of the self-extension of the Constitution to the territories. (Notes, 131.) Congress cannot pass laws prohibiting any citizen from holding his slaves in any place or from taking them to any place; hence 156 WISCONSIN · LINCOLN. [1861] the Mo. Compromise and similar measures are unconstitutional, and therefore null and void. [For the dissenting opinions of Justices McLean and Curtis, see Notes, 135.] The court attempted to settle by its decision a political doctrine of the country. But the decision itself, being disputed, only added to the agitation. McIntosh (U.S. Const. Hist., 149) says: "The Dred Scott decision added fuel to the anti-slavery agitation. The State of Wisconsin openly defied the Supreme Court in its attempt to enforce the punishment of Sherman M. Booth, who had been convicted of violating the fugitive slave law of 1850. The Supreme Court of Wis. on a writ of Habeas Corpus liberated Booth when imprisoned by a Federal court, and the legislature of that State passed resolutions denying that the U. S. Courts have the exclusive right to determine questions of Federal law. In his first Inaugural Address Pres. Lincoln 1861 said: "The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Gov't upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Gov't into the hands of that eminent tribunal." By this and other decisions the Supreme Court came into contempt in the North. In accordance with the progress of civilization a majority of the nation had decided that slavery should be eradicated, and that the Constitution should not be so construed as to defeat this purpose, and even the Supreme Court of the U. S. could not stem this tide of public sentiment. After Taney's death the National Gov't refused the offer, from the [1835] THE SUPREME COURT. 157 State of Md., of his statue to be set up in Washington. But now, on questions not relating to slavery, Taney is considered good authority. Justice Curtis (according to Tyler, Life of Taney, 363) "looks at it (the Dred Scott question). . . through the pinhole of a provincial creed, which excluded all the light of history by which alone the question could be properly understood." But Webster and the whole North looked through the same pinhole. Up to 1835, under such sound Justices as Marshall and Story, the Supreme Court had upheld a liberal construction of the Constitution, in accordance with Federal and Whig principles (i. e. the Court had supported centralization as opposed to State sovereignity). Marshall and Story gave due weight also to the implications in the Constitution; whereas a strict constructionist, like Taney and the most of his associates. gave only those powers that were expressly granted. By 1835 the Constitution had become quite stable. But the death of Marshall (1835) the appointment of Taney, and the death of Story (1842) gave the Constitution completely over to the strict constructionists, although Taney had been a Federalist. During ten years after Marshall's death, many of his decisions, especially in regard to slavery, were reversed much to the disgust of Story who thought seriously of resigning. (Life and Letters of Story, II. 126.) After the breaking out of the Civil War Taney's decisions did not have much effect. One of the main cases was when Taney tried to negative Pres. Lincoln's order commanding the suspension of a writ of Habeas Corpus in the Md. District. Lincoln had ordered the man to be arrested and imprisoned in Fort McHenry. The Commander of the fort would not comply with the 158 LINCOLN AND TANEY. [1861] order of Taney. The latter's argument, that only Congress could suspend a writ of Habeas Corpus was strictly logical: but this measure as well as the declaration of war by the Pres. were necessitated by the presence of war. The Pres. declared a blockade (not war) an internal matter. Here also the Supreme Court interfered and declared that all prizes taken on the seas, before the Act of Congress legalizing the action of the Pres. (three months later), should be given up. In this the Court prevailed; and the act of indemnity, passed after the war, legalized the action of the President. ERRATA. PAGE. LINE. 22 23 II 18 Instead of "Sept. 20." read "Dec. 20.” 33 40 21 57 4 Instead of fraction." read "one-half, or a frac tion over one-half." Insert after "majority," "The rule was enforced except in the following case:" (i. e. The chairman had two hours for debate, one when he introduced the bill, and one when the previous question was moved. 3 Instead of "Settled, 1842," read "Never settled.” Insert after "government." "of N. Y." 20 4 After reviewed,” insert "and contested.” Instead of "Philip." read "S. W." The 800,000 sq. miles included all the territory acquired from Mex.. including Texas. |