"We found a bruise over the back of the left hand. We found a bruise between the first and second knuckle, found a bruise in the center of the forearm, anterior surface of the left arm, found a bruise on her right arm, above the elbow, a corresponding one on the left elbow, found bruises, several bruises over the neck, scratches on the side of the neck and a large bruise Q. (Interrupting.) What did these bruises on the neck, what did they resemble, the appearance of them? A. The scratches resembled the appearance of nails. Q. Finger nails? A. Finger nails; found a large depression in the center of the forehead, the skin broken. You want me to tell what we found when we went in? Q. One minute; were those the same bruises you noticed, Doctor, when you first went to the house and looked at the body? A. Yes, also two large bruises over the knee, right and left legs." He said the marks upon the neck which looked like scratches from finger nails were "curved back," and would have to be done by some one standing behind and not in front of Mrs. Brandon. He testified that Mrs. Brandon's death was a result of the blow on the forehead, strangulation, and shock. [5, 6] Dr. Hopkins, who saw the body of Mrs. Brandon at her home before the autopsy, testified that she died from shock as a result of her injuries. Several witnesses corroborated the evidence of Dr. Joyce as to the injuries to Mrs. Brandon, and there is really no contradiction of this evidence, and no real question that she died as the result of her injuries. During the examination of Dr. Joyce, he was shown and identified certain photographs which he said represented the marks and bruises on the body of Mrs. Brandon at the time he first saw it and at the time of the autopsy. These marks and bruises were fully described in his evidence, and it was not denied that they existed. The defense objected to the offer and introduction of the photographs in evidence. Their objections were overruled, and these rulings constitute the third and fourth bills of exceptions. As these photographs were merely representations of injuries which had been fully described by the witness, and not denied to exist, their introduction in evidence could not be held to have injured the accused. But aside from this they were properly admitted. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Smith, 109 Md. 186, 72 Atl. 651. Later in the trial the defense moved that these photographs be stricken out or withdrawn. This motion was overruled, and this ruling constitutes the twelfth exception. It follows from what we have said in disposing of the third and fourth exceptions that there was no error in this ruling. [7] The testimony to which we have referred, and which was not denied by anybody, was strong proof to show that Mrs. Brandon was murdered as charged in the indictment. If the evidence satisfied the jury that she had That been murdered, it was incumbent upon the Briefly, but substantially, stated, Mary Perkins testified that on the day of Mrs. Brandon's death (Wednesday, August 8, 1917) she was sitting in her parlor at the parlor window, about 11 o'clock or a few minutes after 11 o'clock, writing a few letters. She had written one, and had started to write another, when her attention was attracted by a noise in Mrs. Brandon's house. She described it as a rushing sound towards the door, footsteps, and a knock against the door, and she saw a chair "knocked in front of the window." She said her sister, Edith Creditt, came into the room where she was sitting, and she told her about the noise she had heard; that in about 15 or 20 minutes she saw the front door open, and she saw Snowden, whom she positively identified, inside the Brandon home at the front door; that "he looked towards Murray's Hill first and then towards West street; that was before he brought his whole body out of the door, and in coming out the door, when he closed the door, he closed the door from behind with his right hand; he never turned his back, and he walked off the porch, and when he got near the second porch he then began to fool with something that he took out of his pocket; I took it to be a bottle or flask; I mean it was reddish and looked as though it either had whisky in it or it was a red flask, and he took it from his hip pocket and put it in front in some of his pockets, and he walked up the street, and in looking behind my sister saw his face before he got far"; that she saw him on Main street the following morning driving an ice wagon; that she had seen him before Mrs. Brandon's death, but did not know his name. Edith Creditt testified that her sister called her attention to the man; that he was then on the pavement, and she identified that man as Snowden, whom she had seen and knew before. She fixed the time as 5 or 10 minutes of 12 o'clock. It was shown by the evidence of Le Roy Cisco, a colored boy, that he passed the Brandon home between 11 and 12 o'clock on the 8th of August, 1917; that he heard “a little noise" in the house, and saw “a lady's arm start to come out the door, and somebody pulled her back and shut the door." A determined effort was made by the defense tine Brandon, in his examination in chief, testified that, before leaving home on the morning of August 8th, he left a dollar bill with his wife, and that he never saw that dollar bill again. After he had concluded his testimony, he was recalled by leave of the court, and asked this question: "Q. Didn't you tell Mr. Munford at Annapolis, after the discovery of your wife's body. that you had found your dollar bill in question?" The court sustained the state's objection to the question. The question was too general and indefinite, and was properly excluded under the rule stated in Poe on Pleading & Practice, vol. 2, § 280, and in Conrades V. Heller, 119 Md. 448, 87 Atl. 28. to break down the testimony of Mary Perkins [ under the following circumstances: Valenand Edith Creditt; but the jury, who saw all the witnesses and heard all their testimony, evidently believed they told the truth. [8] The fourteenth and fifteenth exceptions were taken during the examination of Dr. William B. Carr, a physician and surgeon who made a second autopsy upon the body of Mrs. Brandon at the Emergency Hospital in Washington on the 14th of August, 1917. The record shows that Snowden was arrested on August 13, 1917, and was taken to the sheriff's office in Annapolis. It was there discovered that he had some scratches on his face which appeared to be fresh scratches. He was asked to account for them, and he said that Edna Wallace, a woman with whom he was living, had inflicted those scratches more than a week before. The state was permitted to show by Dr. Carr that the autopsy performed by him disclosed particles of skin of a colored person under the finger nails of Mrs. Brandon. This tes-ed the body of Mrs. Brandon for burial. timony was important, and we think under the circumstances clearly admissible. Dr. Hopkins assisted in the autopsy made in Washington, and the sixteenth exception was taken to the question asking him the results of the autopsy. The doctor answered the question as follows: "After the clothes were removed, an examination of the exterior of the body was made, and the various wounds that I mentioned that I found in the autopsy in Annapolis were still present. There was one wound made under the arm pit, I think it was the right arm, where the undertaker had injected his embalming fluid. After noting these wounds, an examination was made of the hands." [9-12] This answer was not harmful to the appellant. The twenty-first exception [14] There is no merit in the thirty-third exception. It was taken during the examination of John M. Taylor, a funeral director and embalmer of Annapolis, who had prepar re There appears to have been some confusion in or misunderstanding of his testimony as to the position of the hands of Mrs. Brandon after he had completed his work, and upon the application of the defense he was called to clear up any doubt on that point. It was within the discretion of the court to recall the witness, and his explanation of his prior answer as to the position of Mrs. Brandon's hands in the casket was a matter he was asked about, and the answer was proper. [15, 16] During the examination of Rachel E. Stewart, a nurse, called for the defense, she was asked this question: "Have you had any experience with eclamptic patients?" An objection by the state to this question was sustained, and this ruling constitutes the thirty-fourth bill of exception. There was no offer to prove that Mrs. Brandon had died of eclampsia. There is absolutely nothing in the case to support such a suggestion, and the ruling was correct. In the thirty-seventh bill of exception it appears that the state was permitted to show, over the objection of the traverser, what church Mary Perkins attended. That was not a material inquiry, and the court might have sustained the obJection, but we do not see how the answer could have resulted in any injury to the appellant. was taken to the action of the court in over- [13] The thirty-first exception was taken The forty-sixth, forty-seventh, and fortyninth exceptions were taken to the rulings of the court refusing to permit the followin questions to be answered. They were propounded to Mary J. Williams, a witness call night before Mrs. Brandon's body was found, (1) "Q. During the night of August 7th, the did you hear any noise in that house?" (2) "Q. Where were you between 11 and 12 o'clock on the night before Mrs. Brandon's body was found?" (3) "Q. Was there or not any unusual noises or sounds coming from the Brandon home on | 2. COUNTIES ~~2—CHANGE of BoundarIES— that night, August 7th, between the hours of CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 11:30 and 12:30 o'clock?" Acts 1918, c. 122, creating the suburban sanitary district within the counties of Montgomery and Prince George's but not changing any lines of the counties or interfering with their general jurisdiction, is not in contravention of Const. art. 13, § 1, relating to new counties. [17] In view of the uncontradicted evidence of five witnesses, viz., Valentine Brandon, Ida Burch, Grace Myers, and Mr. and Mrs. King, that Mrs. Brandon was alive on the morning of August 8, 1917, and was seen by two of these witnesses at her house on that morning as late as 10:30 o'clock, and there being no evidence to connect any one, except Snowden, with the crime, or to justify a suspicion that any particular person, other than he, had committed it, the proposed offer of testimony was clearly inadmissible and prop-ner of raising funds for local improvements and erly refused. [18] The fifty-fourth and fifty-sixth exceptions were taken to testimony in rebuttal by the state in contradiction of the evidence of Snowden wherein he testified to certain acts of maltreatment inflicted upon him by the police of Baltimore city at the time he made certain statements, which had been put in evidence by the state. The witnesses offered in rebuttal were Samuel House, deputy marshal of Baltimore city, and Robert G. Carter, marshal of police of Baltimore city. They each gave testimony in denial of Snowden's evidence of abuse and maltreatment by the officers. In 2 Poe on Pleading & Practice, § 287, it is said: "It is not always easy to draw the line between what is rebutting evidence and what is evidence properly adducible in chief. The subject is one which is addressed to the sound discretion of the court; and the appellate court will not reverse for an error on this point, unless the ruling of the court below was both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious. Indeed, as a general rule, in such cases no appeal will lie." See, also, Bannon v. Warfield, 42 Md. 39, and Jones v. State, 132 Md. 142, 103 Atl. 459. There was no error in these rulings. We have given the case our most careful and earnest consideration, and we have found no reversible error committed by the trial court in any of its rulings, and the judgment will therefore be affirmed. Motion to dismiss the appeal denied, and judgment affirmed, with costs. (133 Md. 644) DAHLER v. WASHINGTON SUBURBAN 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 3-ESTABLISHMENT OF SANITARY DISTRICTS-LEGISLATIVE POWERS. The Legislature has the power to establish a sanitary district whether situated in one or in more than one county, and to prescribe the man to designate whether the cost thereof shall be Acts 1918, c. 122, § 8, creating a suburban sanitary district and providing for classification by the commission of all property within the district into four classes for the purpose of assessing benefits of construction of water supply and sewage systems to change classification as the properties change in use and for an appeal to the Public Service Commission as to both classification and assessment, held not in violation of the state or federal Constitutions. 5. TAXATION 40(1)—SANITARY DISTRICTS 6. STATUTES 120(2)-TITLE-SANITARY DIS TRICT. Acts 1918, c. 122, establishing the sanitary district within the counties of Montgomery and Prince George's is not invalid for conflict with Const. art. 3, § 29, providing that every law shall embrace but one subject to be described in its title. Appeal from Circuit Court, Prince George's County; Fillmore Beall, Judge. "To be officially reported." Bill in equity by Augustus H. Dahler against the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Decree affirmed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRIS (Court of Appeals of Maryland. Jan. 16, 1919.) COE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URN 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 42-PERSONS ENTITLED TO RAISE QUESTION-TAXPAYER. ER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ. S. Marvin Peach, of Upper Marlboro (T. Clagett, of Upper Marlboro, on the tion for general purposes under an act establish- brief), for appellant. A taxpayer liable for assessment and taxa-Van ing a sanitary district is entitled to maintain a T. Howard Duckett and Charles W. Clagsuit to test the validity of the statute. ett, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee. BRISCOE, J. The appeal in this case is [erage carried to some common point for from a decree of the circuit court for Prince treatment or discharge. George's county dismissing a bill in equity, The sanitary district will cover an area filed by the appellant, for an injunction to of about 90 square miles of territory and restrain the appellee corporation, from car-will practically include all of the territory rying out the provisions of chapter 122 of the contiguous to the District of Columbia, in Acts of 1918, creating a suburban sanitary the state of Maryland. The present popudistrict, within the counties of Montgomery lation of this district, including the incorand Prince George's, in the state of Mary-porated towns, is about 40,000, and the asland and contiguous to the District of Co- sessed valuation of its property about $25,lumbia. 000,000. The validity of the act is assailed upon five stated grounds, alleged in the bill, but only two of these were urged in the argu-| ment and appear only, to be relied upon by the appellant in his brief. The defendant answered the bill, and the case was heard upon bill, answer, and exhibits, and from a decree of the court, holding the act to be valid and constitutional, refusing the relief by injunction and dismissing the bill, the plaintiff has appealed. The legislation adopted, and the plan for the creation of the sanitary district and the method, ways, and means, for the construction and operation of the system proposed, were recommended to the Legislature of 1918, in a detailed report, by a commission, which had been appointed by chapter 313 of the Acts of 1916, for the purpose of considering the subject. The objections raised to the constitutionality of the act, as stated in the bill, are: (1) The appellant is a citizen of the state of That it violates and is in conflict with secMaryland, a resident of the town of Bladens- tion 1, art. 13, in that it creates an adminburg, in Prince George's county and a tax-istrative and taxing district of parts of two payer in the suburban sanitary district creat- counties, without the consent of the residents ed by the act. [1] As such taxpayer he is liable for the assessments and taxation for the general purposes of the act, and it is no longer an open question in this state that, if the statute is invalid and injurious to him, he has a clear right, as a taxpayer, to maintain this suit. Baltimore v. Keyser, 72 Md. 106, 19 Atl. 706; Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 87 Atl. 413. [2] The title of the act is: of those parts of the county, included in the and "An act to create a sanitary district within Montgomery and Prince George's counties contiguous to the district of Columbia; to incorporate the same and to provide for the government thereof; to provide for the construction, The first objection, that the act is in conmaintenance, operation, purchase or condemna-travention of section 1, art. 13, of the Contion of water supply, sewerage and refuse disposal systems; to provide for the issuance of stitution, is clearly not tenable. bonds for the purpose of such construction; and the levy of taxes, assessments and benefits, water charges and rates for the payment of said bonds; and the operation, maintenance, regulation and control of said systems, and for other purposes." The act contains eighteen sections and covers over seventeen pages of the printed Laws of Maryland of 1918, and incorporates certain sections or parts of the two counties within the bounds and area specifically named there in, as "the Washington Suburban Sanitary District," for the purposes named in the statute. It is ob vious that the act has no relation whatever to section 1, art. 13, of the Constitution, which has to do with new counties. It does not in any way change the lines of any county nor interfere with the general jurisdiction of either of the counties mentioned in the act, but creates a sanitary district or a special taxing district within the lines of two counties, for local improvements, which are essential to the health and prosperity of the community within its border. [3] The exercise of this power by the Legislature has been sustained by the courts of this state, and by the Supreme Court of the The object and purpose of the act is to United States, in a number of decisions. bring within the jurisdiction of a commis- Balto. v. State, 15 Md. 376, 74 Am. Dec. 572; sion, acting for these counties, within the Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460, 16 Atl. 287, 1 territory incorporated, an elaborate and com- L. R. A. 757; Revell v. Annapolis, 81 Md. 1, plete system of water supply, sewerage, and 31 Atl. 695; Thrift v. Laird, 125 Md. 55, drainage in this district, by which the sec- 93 Atl. 449; Welch v. Coglan, 126 Md. 15, tions and communities would be served with 94 Atl. 384. water from some adopted source and the sew In Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. [6] This brings us to the last and fifth objection to the act, and that relates to its title. It is contended that the law is invalid because in conflict with section 29, art. 3, of the Constitution, which provides that every law shall embrace but one subject and that shall be described in its title. S. 705, 4 Sup. Ct. 663, 28 L. Ed. 569, the Su- rates of assessment and taxation will be preme Court said the fact that the lands equal and uniform as to all the property may be situate in more than one county can- within the taxing district, and, this being so, not affect the power of the state to delegate it cannot be said that its provisions are in the authority. Such authority may be lodg-conflict with any constitutional requirement. ed in any board or tribunal which the Leg- Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460, 16 Atl. 287, 1 islature may designate. The expense of L. R. A. 757; Leser v. Wagner, 120 Md. 680, such works may be charged against parties 87 Atl. 1040. specially benefited, and be made a lien upon their property. This is a matter purely of legislative discretion. Whenever a local improvement is authorized, it is for the Leg islature to prescribe the way in which the means to meet its costs shall be raised, whether by general taxation or by laying the burden upon the district specially benefited by the expenditure. Orr v. Allen et al., 248 U. S. 35, 39 Sup. Ct. 23, decided December 9, 1918; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. Ed. 238; Orr v. Allen et al. (D. C.) The rule is well settled by a long line of 245 Fed. 486. cases in this court that, while the title must [4] The second, third, and fourth objec- indicate the purpose of the act, it need not tions to the act, relate to questions of tax-give an abstract of the contents of the act, ation and assessment, and the classification or the details thereof, nor need it mention of the property, under section 8 of the act. the means and methods by which the generThis section, it will be seen, provides for the al purpose is to be accomplished. classification by the commission of all prop- Frederick County, 105 Md. 545, 66 Atl. 487; erty within the sanitary district into four County Com'rs v. Meekins, 50 Md. 28; Steclasses, for the purpose of assessing bene-vens v. State, 89 Md. 669, 43 Atl. 929; Queen fits for the construction of the water supply Anne's County v. Talbot County, 99 Md. 13, and sewerage system, namely, agricultural, 57 Atl. 1; Crouse v. State, 130 Md. 370, 100 small acreage, industrial or business, and subdivision property, and to be assessed in Atl. 361; Ruehl v. State, 130 Md. 189, 100 accordance with its classification. The commission may change the classification of properties from time to time, as the proper ties change in the uses to which they are put. The act also provides for written notice and a hearing before the commission as to both classification and assessments of benefits, and the Public Service Commission is given jurisdiction to determine upon appeal the reasonableness of all assessments, tax levies, or service charges, as in the case of public service corporations. We find nothing in the provisions of this section that in any way contravenes or is in conflict with the state or federal Constitutions. [5] The contention that the provisions of the act impose an unjust discrimination in favor of agricultural lands when in use for farming and trucking purposes and when not in such use is based upon an improper construction of the act, and cannot be sustained. Nor do we find any valid objection to the classification of the property for assessment and taxation as prescribed by the act. The The title of this act is very broad and comprehensive and contains a very clear and deflnite description of the subject-matter of the act. Atl. 75. Fout v. The title, upon examination, will be seen, that is, the sanitary system for the protec fully describes the subject-matter of the act; tion of the public health, within the district designated. There is nothing in the act itself that is foreign or not germane and does not relate to what the title indicates. The purchase and cancellation of bonds, issued by authority of chapter 313 of the Acts of 1916, out of the funds derived from any issue of bonds under the act, is a part of the subject-matter covered in the title for the construction of the sanitary system and the issuance of bonds for the development of the same water and sewer systems provided for by the act. As we find no reason for declaring the act of 1918, c. 122, invalid or in conflict with any provision of the state or federal Constitutions, the decree of the court below denying the relief sought by injunction and dismissing the plaintiff's bill must be affirmed. Decree affirmed, with costs. |