inconceivable; but it is not a very practical possibility. The differences of opinion and of practice, of life and civilisation, among the various races which people the earth are so wide and fundamental, that it is hard to see how, even within a thousand years from now, the world could become one community in this sense. But, even so, a world-federation is not more difficult to conceive than a world-league of nations. Unified world-control of such matters as posts and transports, industrial raw material, even of import and export duties, is by no means impossible at the present time; in regard to posts, indeed, international control is to some extent a fact.* It is in such matters as this that the necessary economic foundations must be sought for the future Society of Nations. Not by alliances of ever increasing range of complexity, like those which divided the world into two vast armies in the recent war, will the foundations of the future order be laid. Such alliances tend to divide precisely those who most need to be combined-France and England from Germany, Italy from Austria, Bulgaria from Serbia and Roumania. Nor by occasional conferences of Great Powers, seeking to "localise" conflict, and dictating to lesser powers the terms on which they may continue to exist. It is rather in such an institution

*For a survey of existing international organisations, see Woolf, International Government, Part II.

as the Universal Postal Union,* a genuine organ of government, with authority to make its decisions binding on the nations, that Tennyson's idea begins to be realised. Examples may also be found, among the lesser powers, of permanent combinations formed without reference to war and on a durable basis of common problems and interests.† Such groupings would no doubt retain their utility within a wider federation. Scandinavia and South America, for instance, offer in this respect a hopeful contrast to the unending rivalries of the Great Powers; and the pretences of the Concert of Europe are to some extent balanced by the realities of the Universal Postal Union. These instances suffice to show that super-national government is no mere chimera.

It has been frequently said in recent times that the only alternative to war is law. The statement is true and cannot be too often repeated; but its full implications are not always realised. When this statement is made in reference to the international problem, it is usually followed by proposals for what practically amounts to compulsory arbitration between nations, based on a conception of the relation of nation to nation which necessarily excludes a common law. A law is a rule of action framed by a community for itself

For details, see Woolf, l.c.

† Particularly the Scandinavian and South American groups. See International Politics, by C. Delisle Burns, ch. II.

and enforced upon its members. A common law presupposes a common government. Our existing “international law" may be a useful and admirable structure, but it is not law: it is a form of agreement or treaty. An agreement ends or limits disagreement, and the disagreement of nations is in the end war. The institution of a common law and government does not, of course, remove the possibility of quarrelling and fighting, but it does at once remove the possibility of war, between the governed. The conflict gets a new name, rebellion or civil war, and is thought of as something portentous and disastrous, not as an unfortunate but glorious and heroic adventure. In the stage of treaties and agreements war is a permanent possibility, never forgotten; it is indeed the ultimate ruling consideration; but when once common government is established war is out of account; its disturbing influence is removed; and the real problems set by the actual complicated inter-actions of men can at last be faced and studied. While war is a recognised resource of national governments, military security will be the first consideration with the nations, fatally obstructing the solution of the urgent economic problems of the time. The no-man's-land between the nations will give capital its opportunity for extortion and exploitation, and enable it to escape the benevolent attentions of the home governments. Palliatives are possible, but the only

road to cure is the extension of government and the wider rule of law.

We know that government pays. We see that it commonly evokes from the governed a devotion which is inexplicable to many of its critics. We find that we suffer more from its limitation than from its defects. But treaties and alliances, courts of arbitration and conciliation, leave men cold. They seem to cause as much trouble as they save; and they have no touch with the familiar realities of life. An organisation which is to have life and acquire a reputation must be given some necessary work to do and must be made responsible for doing it. It must be, in short, an organ of government, responsible to the individuals whom it governs.

This is the second alternative line of solution of our problem. By the general judgment of the present time it is regarded as quite visionary and impossible. The reasons given for this view are not our concern here, except in one respect. It is alleged that national patriotism, while suspicious of any international organisation, is inflexibly opposed to an organisation which in any way replaces national government or infringes its sovereignty. Our last task, therefore, is to see how the sentiments of patriotism and nationality are likely to be affected by a development such as has just been suggested. Will they help or hinder either the attempt or its success?

§ 16. RELATION OF PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM TO THESE ALTERNATIVES.

It seems fairly plain that in the long run the idea of a federation of nations has less to fear from the patriot or the nationalist than the idea of a league of governments. The essential claim of the nationalist is that his group is a nation and should be given the political status of a nation. He is not committed irrevocably to any abstract theory as to what national status is. The same rights and privileges as other nations is what he demands. If it can be shown that some function of government requires for its exercise an authority embracing a number of nations, there is nothing in the nationalist creed which should lead him to hesitate to assent to the establishment of such an authority. National selfconceit would perhaps be reluctant to admit that there was anything which the nation was not competent to settle for itself; but this would be a challenge on the

And it is not easy

ground of fact which could be met. to see how nationalism should lead a man to fall out with this authority once established. No other nation would be interfering with the affairs of his nation; no external authority would be over-riding the decisions of his government. Certain matters would have been removed from the control of his national government, but from that of others equally, and placed in the hands