was partly due to a consciousness of the weakness of Prussia's eastern frontiers, and of the danger arising from the superior numbers and inferior civilisation of the Russians. No one who knew Germany could doubt that the fear of Russia was genuine and widespread, and many Germans were quite aware that their own ruling class was prepared to exploit this fear in order to produce war-feeling when required. Further, it is easy in a country like England to create prejudice against any proposal to erect a super-national authority by appealing to an Englishman's sense of the superiority of his own nation. Since England is clearly superior to France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and the rest, it is argued that an assembly comprising all the countries of Europe will be on a lower level than one which is purely British. It is from the blind prejudice of nationality, it will be said, that such arguments derive their force.

All this is true. It is true, further, that the history of the nineteenth century shows nationalism as the tool of chauvinists and imperialists rather than as a cause of peace and co-operation. But it does not follow that Mazzini's principles are unsound, or his ideals selfcontradictory. It was not a friend, but an enemy of nationalism, who said of it that it "forbids to terminate war by conquest," and empire is based on conquest. But the problem must be reserved for later treatment.

§ 10. CRITICISMS OF NATIONALISM.

The older critics of nationalism were alarmed chiefly at the threat to the existing order of things which they detected in the new principle. Nationality was to them a subversive principle, which threatened great Empires with destruction; and their fear was proportioned to their belief in such units of government as a civilising force. Lord Acton* was perhaps mainly moved by the danger to Catholic Austria. Lecky† hints plainly at a danger to the British Empire. After noting, as a limitation of the principle, that "scarcely anyone would apply it to the dealings of civilised nations with savages," he further asserts that :

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Every great Empire is obliged, in the interest of its imperial unity, and in the interest of the public order of the world, to impose an inflexible veto on popular movements in the direction of disintegration, however much it may endeavour to meet local wishes by varying laws and institutions and compromises."

He urges, with questionable justice, that if the Americans of the North had been true Nationalists they would not have been able to fight the Southern States on the question of secession. He also sees danger

* See the essay of Nationality (1862), reprinted in the posthumous volume, History of Freedom.

+ Democracy and Liberty (1896), ch. V.

for Belgium and Switzerland, and in general to that "belief in the sovereign authority of the State and in the indissoluble character of national [sic] bonds" which gives stability to political arrangements. He himself compares the question with that of marriage and divorce. As the marriage tie loses stability if divorce is known to be easily obtained, so political groupings lose authority if they are believed to be subject to rearrangement on demand. Lord Acton's argument is more subtle, but similar in its main tendency. Nationalism is the rejection of law and authority. "There is," he says, no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this."

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These critics were brought up in that curious combination of belief in the State and distrust of State action which was characteristic of nineteenth century liberalism. John Stuart Mill belonged to the same tradition. He, however, writing within a year of Lord Acton, accepted in general the nationalist claim.* The sentiment of nationality constitutes a "prima facie case " for a separate government. "This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective

* Representative Government (1861), ch. XVI.

bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves." And he observes that the case is only strengthened by free institutions. Nevertheless, he also recognises that the dislike and distrust of foreigners is a savage and uncivilised trait, and that "whatever really tends to the admixture of nationalities, and the blending of their attributes and peculiarities in a common union, is a benefit to the human race." This shows that he was aware of the dangers arising from national particularism, on which Acton dwells so strongly. At bottom the difference between Mill and Acton seems to be this, that Mill believed in democracy, while Acton did not. Both, of course, had in mind mainly the Italian renaissance; and, though modern developments of the nationalist spirit were hidden from them, Acton must be given credit for foreseeing the danger that nationalism triumphant might assert itself in tyranny and oppression against alien minorities within its territories.

At the present day it is not disintegration, or even oppression, which is chiefly feared from nationalism. It is not the weakening of the bond of State, but its excessive strengthening which is apprehended. Jingoism, militarism, aggressive imperialism-these are now said to be the fruits of the awakened national spirit. Professor Zimmern,* speaking in the second year of the recent war, could even go so far as to say that the * Nationality and Government, esp. ch. II.-IV.

principle of nationality was " one of the most formidable and sinister forces on the side of our enemies, and one of the chief obstacles to human progress at the present time." He argues that nationality is only a sound and safe principle if wholly divorced from the State and restricted to the social and educational sphere. Government, in his view, should be based on nothing narrower than common humanity: but education requires a more definite foundation than this. The necessary background can only be supplied, outside the home, in the customs and traditions of the race. In education, therefore, nationalism is both necessary and harmless. He writes as a Jew, with the problem of the Jews, scattered over the world throughout all countries, in his mind, and with an eye to the American problem how to fuse into a single solid whole the heterogeneous overflow of Europe. The Jews, he thinks, are a nation, though for many centuries they have not formed a State; and similarly the immigrants into the United States may avoid the demoralisation which awaits the déraciné, if each group is trained in its own home-traditions. It is not necessary that a brand-new American nationality should be forced upon them, with the waving of flags and the singing of patriotic songs. They will be better citizens if they are encouraged to bring with them to their new home the familiar treasures of the old.

It will be observed that the two lines of criticism