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was without negligence on the part of its employees, or that the accident could not have been prevented by the exercise of the highest degree of care com

420; Williams v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 169 Mo. A. 468, 155 SW 64; Bowlin v. Union Pac. R. Co., 125 Mo. A. 419, 102 SW 631; Dimmitt v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 40 Mo. A. 654.

Mont.-Freeman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 154 P 912; Pierce v. Great Falls, etc., R. Co., 22 Mont. 445, 56 P 867.

Nebr.-Omaha St. R. Co. v. Boesen, 74 Nebr. 764, 105 NW 303, 4 LRANS 122; Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit Co., 36 Nebr. 890, 55 NW 270, 38 AmSR 753, 20 LRA 316.

Nev.-Sherman v. Southern Pac. Co., 33 Nev. 385, 111 P 416, 115 P 909, AnnCas1914A 287.

N. J. Bergen County Tract. Co. v. Demarest, 62 N. J. L. 755, 42 A 729,

72 AmSR 683.

N. Y.-Seybolt v. New York, etc., R. Co., 95 N. Y. 562, 47 AmR 75; Edgerton v. New York, etc., R. Co., 39 N. Y. 227, 6 Transcr. A. 248; Curtis v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534, 75 AmD 258; Braun v. Union R. Co., 115 App. Div. 566, 100 NYS 1012; Adams v. Union R. Co., 80 App. Div. 136, 80 NYS 264, 12 NYAnnCas 386; Holahan v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 73 App. Div. 164, 76 NYS 751; Webster v. Elmira, etc., R. Co., 85 Hun 167, 32 NYS 590; Murphy v. Coney Island, etc., R. Co., 36 Hun 199; Hegeman v. Western R. Corp., 16 Barb. 353 [aff 13 N. Y. 9, 64 AmD 517]; Brignoli v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 4 Daly 182. In an earlier case in this state it was held that the mere fact that a street car left the track was insufficient to raise a presumption of negligence on the part of the street car company. Hastings V. Central Crosstown R. Co., 7 App. Div. 312, 314, 40 NYS 93 (where the court said: "Counsel for the plaintiff insists that negligence is to be imputed to the defendant, from the mere fact that the car left the track, upon the authority of Edgerton v. New York, etc., R. Co., 39 N. Y. 227, 6 Transcr. A. 248, and subsequent cases to the same effect. But the rule applied in that case refers altogether to steam railways, and to cases where not only the vehicles but the tracks, are within the entire control of the defendant. It would be grossly unjust to extend that rule to street railway companies which have not exclusive control over the track or the roadway, but whose tracks are daily used by thousands of other vehicles, and are placed in public streets under the control of the city authorities, and in which work is constantly being done on or under the roadways and tracks").

Oh.-Lake Shore Electric R. v. Hobart, 32 Oh. Cir. Ct. 154; Cincinnati St. R. Co. v. Kelsey, 9 Oh. Cir. Ct. 170, 6 Oh. Cir. Dec. 209; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 6 Oh. Cir. Ct. 225. 2 Oh. Cir. Dec. 494.

Okl.-Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Vandivere, 42 Okl. 427, 141 P 799; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Nichols, 39 Okl. 522, 136 P 159; Muskogee Electric Tract. Co. v. McIntire, 37 Okl. 684, 133 P 213, LRA1916C 351.

Pa.-Reading City Pass. R. Co. v. Eckert, 2 Pa. Cas. 31, 4 A 530.

Coast

S. C.-McLean V. Atlantic Line R. Co., 81 S. C. 100, 61 SE 900, 1071, 128 AmSR 892, 18 LRANS 763.

Tenn.-Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Porter, 117 Tenn. 13, 94 SW 666, 10 Ann Cas 789; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 107 Tenn. 106, 64 SW 202.

Tex-San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson, 73 Tex. 277, 11 SW 327; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323; Abilene, etc., R. Co. v. Burleson, (Civ. A.) 157 SW 1177: Freeman v. Davis, (Civ. A.) 117 SW 186; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Cheatham. 52 Tex. Civ. A. 1. 113 SW 777; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Black, (Civ. A.) 93 SW 1071; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Green, (Civ. A.) 91 SW 380; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Harkey. 39 Tex. Civ. A. 523, 88 SW 506; Bonner v. Grumbach, 2 Tex. Civ. A.

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482, 21 SW 1010. Vt.-Parker v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 84 Vt. 329, 79 A 865. Va.-Norfolk-Southern R. Co. V. Tomlinson, 116 Va. 153, 81 SE 89; Washington-Virginia R. Co. v. Bouknight, 113 Va. 696, 75 SE 1032, Ann Cas1913E 546 and note; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Rhodes, 109 Va. 176, 63 SE 445.

W. Va.-Carrico v. West Virginia Cent., etc., R. Co., 39 W. Va. 86, 19 SE 571, 24 LRA 50.

Wis.-Lockwood v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 55 Wis. 50, 12 NW 401.

Eng.-Carpue v. London, etc., R. Co., 5 Q. B. 747, 48 ECL 747, 114 Reprint 1431; Pym v. Great Northern R. Co., 2 F. & F. 619; Dawson v. Manchester, etc., R. Co., 7 H. & N. 1037; Flannery v. Waterford, etc., R. Co., Ir. R. 11 C. L. 30; Bird v. Great Northern R. Co., 28 L. J. Exch. 3; Great Western R. Co. v. Fawcett, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 31; Dawson v. Manchester, etc., R. Co., 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 682.

Ont. Ferguson V. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 11 OntWR 470.

Compare Shea v. Halifax, etc., R. Co., 47 N. S. 366 (holding that, while the happening of an accident caused by the wheels of a slowly moving train leaving the rails does not of itself afford sufficient grounds to entitle plaintiff under the circumstances to a judgment in his favor, it constitutes an element not to be overlooked in considering the whole case).

"Plaintiff makes out a case of negligence by showing the derailment and attendant circumstances and the burden then shifts to defendant to show that there was no negligence on its part." Patterson v. Springfield Tract. Co., 178 Mo. A. 250, 264, 163 SW 955.

[a] Пlustrations.—(1) Where the truck of the tender to an engine leaves the rails and the wheels run on the crossties causing a passenger coach to tilt over and a passenger is injured, the rule of res ipsa loquitur applies. Shaw v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 173 Ill. A. 107. (2) The testimony of a passenger that the car in which he was a passenger and three other cars left the track suddenly and turned over, whereby he was injured, shows a defect in the rails or wheels of the cars at the time of the accident, and requires the carrier to explain the accident in order to escape liability.

Brown v. Yazoo, etc., Valley R. Co., 88 Miss. 687, 41 S 383. (3) The fact that the wheels of a passenger car left the rails and ran along the ties without any showing of defective wheels or trucks made a strong prima facie showing that the track or roadbed was defective. Williams v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 169 Mo. A. 468,.155 SW 64. (4) Where decedent was injured by being thrown against the stove by the sudden derailment of a street car, plaintiff could assume that the derailment was caused by negligence, and if the company did not show want of negligence, or that the accident was caused by an independent cause, it would conclusively be presumed that the accident was due to its negligence. McDonald v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 219 Mo. 468, 118 SW 78, 16 AnnCas 810.

[b] By obstruction on track.-(1) Where a wreck was caused by an obstruction on the track, the presumption is that the obstruction was due to negligence of the carrier, requiring it to show that it was the act of another. Broom v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 96 S. C. 368, 80 SE 616. (2) Where a street car passenger was injured by the derailment of a car caused by a brick on the track, plaintiff established a prima facie case by proof of her relation as a passenger, and that she was injured by the derailment of the car. O'Gara v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 724, 103

SW 54, 12 LRANS 840, 11 AnnCas 850. (3) In the absence of any other adequate explanation, negligence of a street car company may be inferred from the fact of the car going off the track, whereby a passenger was injured, there being evidence that it had gone off the track an hour before, and that immediately before it ran off the second time, causing plaintiff's injury, it was running at the rate of fifteen miles an hour, down a Harrigrade, and around a curve. man v. Reading, etc., St. R. Co., 173 Mass. 28, 53 NË 156.

[c] Alleging several causes of derailment.- Where a complaint clearly shows the relation of carrier and passenger, and it appears that plaintiff, the passenger, was injured by a derailment, the rule of res ipsa applies, loquitur notwithstanding several are alleged to have produce the derailment. Southern R. Co. v. Adams, 52 Ind. A. 322, 100 NE 773.

causes

43. Ala.-St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Savage, 163 Ala. 55, 50 S 113; Orr v. Boockholdt, 10 Ala. A. 331, 65 S 430. Ark. Sloan v. Little Rock R., etc., Co., 89 Ark. 574, 117 SW 551; Arkansas Midland R. Co. v. Griffith, 63

Ark. 491, 39 SW 550.
Cal.-Roberts v. State Sierra R.
Co., 14 Cal. A. 180, 111 P 519, 527.
Del.-Braunstein v. People's R. Co.,
25 Del. 55, 78 A 609.

Ga. Florida Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Rudulph, 113 Ga. 143, 38 SE 328.

Ill. McGrew v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 142 Ill. A. 210.

Ind.-Indiana Union Tract. Co. v. McKinney, 39 Ind. A. 86, 78 NE 203; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Bravard, 38 Ind. A. 422, 76 NE 899; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Grimm, 25 Ind. A. 494, 57 NE 640.

Iowa. Cronk v. Wabash R. Co., 123 Iowa 349, 98 NW 884.

Kan.-Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Brandon, 77 Kan. 612, 95 P 573: Meador v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 62 Kan. 865, 61 P 442; Atchison, etc.. R. Co. v. Elder, 57 Kan. 312, 46 P 310. Ky.-Louisville, R. etc., Co. Mitchell, 162 Ky. 253, 172 SW 527; Louisville St. R. Co. v. Brownfield, 96 SW 912, 29 KyL 1097.

V.

La.-Reems v. New Orleans Great Northern R. Co., 126 La. 511, 52 S 681.

Mass.-Feital v. Middlesex R. Co., 109 Mass. 398, 12 AmR 720. Mo.-Hurck V.

Missouri Pac. R. Co., 252 Mo. 39, 158 SW 581; Siegel v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 186 Mo. A. 645, 172 SW 420; Heyde v. St. Louis Transit Co., 102 Mo. A. 537. 77 SW 127.

Mont. Pierce v. Great Falls, etc., R. Co., 22 Mont. 445, 56 P 867.

Nev. Sherman V. Southern Pac. Co., 33 Nev. 385, 111 P 416, 115 P 909. AnnCas1914A 287.

N. J. Bergen County Tract. Co. v. Demarest, 62 N. J. L. 755, 42 A 729, 72 AmSR 685.

N. Y.-Retter v. Olean St. R. Co., 140 App. Div. 667, 125 NYS 674; Klinger v. United Tract. Co., 92 App. Div. 100, 87 NYS 864 [mod on other grounds 181 N. Y. 521 mem, 73 NE 1125 mem].

Okl.-Midland Valley R. Co. v. Hilliard, 148 P 1001; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Posten, 31 Okl. 821, 124 P 2. R. I.-Cheatham v. Union R. Co., 26 R. I. 279. 58 A 881.

Tenn. Illinois Cent. R. Co. V. Porter, 117 Tenn. 13, 94 SW 666, 10 AnnCas 789: Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 107 Tenn. 106, 64 SW 202.

Tex.- Southern Pac. Co. v. Blake, 61 Tex. Civ. A. 396, 128 SW 668; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Mosley, (Civ. A.) 124 SW 485; Norton v. Galveston, etc., R. Co.. (Civ. A.) 108 SW 1044; Davis v. Galveston, etc.. R. Co., 42 Tex. Civ. A. 55, 93 SW 222; Galveston, etc.. R. Co. v. Green, (Civ. A.) 91 SW 380; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Harkey, 39 Tex. Civ. A. 523, 88 SW 506; International, etc., R. Co.

44

45

not due to negligence on defendant's part,** even without showing what caused the derailment, or it may be rebutted by evidence showing that it was caused by the acts of some third person,16 or by vis major. But proof that the derailment occurred from some unaccountable cause has been held insuffi

47

48

cient to overcome the presumption.* While plaintiff need not show any negligence causing the derailment, if he alleges general negligence, he may show specific defects without destroying the presumption of negligence on the carrier's part.19

An allegation of willful injury to a passenger resulting from a derailment cannot be sustained by a prima facie presumption of the carrier's negligence resulting from an unexplained derailment.50

[§ 1432] (ee) Breaking of Machinery or Appliances or Defects. Where an accident causing injuries to a passenger occurs through the breaking, or the defective condition of some portion of the machinery or appliances by which the passenger is carried, a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the carrier is made out,51 as where the accident v. Thompson, 34 Tex. Civ. A. 67, 77 | what caused the accident. Davis v. 60, 34 NE 710; Cleveland, etc., R. SW 439; Houston, etc., R. Co. V. Galveston, etc., R. Co., 42 Tex. Civ. Co. v. Newell, 75 Ind. 542. Richards, 20 Tex. Civ. A. 203, 49 SW A. 55, 93 SW 222. 687.

Va.-Washington-Virginia R. Co. v. Bouknight, 113 Va. 696, 75 SE 1032, AnnCas1913E 546; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Noell, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 394.

See also cases supra note 42. [a] Inspection of track-In an action against a carrier for injuries to a passenger by a wreck, a defense that the wreck was caused by malicious persons who tampered with the track casts on defendant the burden of proving not only that the track was so tampered with, but also that due care had been used in inspecting the track so as to discover the defects. Norton V. Galveston, etc., R. Co., (Tex. Civ. A.) 108 SW 1044.

44. Florida Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Rudulph, 113 Ga. 143, 38 S 328; Omaha St. R. Co. v. Boesen, 74 Nebr. 764, 105 NW 303, 4 LRANS 122; Parker v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 84 Vt. 329, 79 A 865. But see Weber v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (Iowa) 151 NW 852 (holding that proof equally balanced does not satisfy defendant carrier's burden of proof to show freedom from negligence cast on it by proof of derailment of its train).

[a] Rebuttal held sufficient. Where after the submission of evidence which authorized the jury to determine that plaintiff was injured by a derailment of defendant's train of cars plaintiff rested her case on the presumption of negligence raised by the law, and defendant introduced evidence showing that at the time of the derailment the train was being run at a reasonable rate of speed; that the track and roadbed were in first-class condition; that the cause of the derailment was a freshly broken flange on one of the wheels of a car; that the wheel was properly made, and before being used was thoroughly tested at the manufactory, again tested before being placed under the car, and was inspected during the trip on the day when the accident occurred, and was apparently in perfect condition, and such evidence was not only uncontradicted, but was the only evidence introduced as to the cause of the derailment, the presumption was rebutted, and in the absence of proof of negligence a verdict for plaintiff was not sustained by the evidence. Florida Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Rudulph, 113 Ga. 143, 38 SE 328.

Rebutting presumption generally see infra § 1434.

R.

45. Davis V. Galveston, etc., Co.. 42 Tex. Civ. A. 55, 93 SW 222; Norfolk-Southern R. Co. v. Tomlinson, 116 Va. 153, 81 SE 89.

a

[a] Illustration.-The jury is authorized to find that the inference of negligence from derailment of train is rebutted by evidence that the train had run two hundred miles without anything to indicate any defect or weakness in any part of its equinment, that the track at the place of the accident was in good condition, that the engine, the mail car, and the front trucks of the baggage car passed over the place in safety, and that the train was going at a rate of only six or eight miles an hour, although it is not shown

46. Swigelsky v. Interurban St. R. Co., 91 NYS 350; Cheetham v. Union R. Co., 26 R. I. 279, 58 A 881.

[a] Illustration.-Where there is evidence that at the time of the occurrence a strike was in progress among the carrier's employees, that obstructions had been placed on the track at various points and several witnesses testified that the derailment was accompanied by a jolt as if an obstruction had been run over and that a spike was picked up from the track near the place of the accident which had the appearance of having been run over, and it is also proved that the car running at its maximum speed could not have been derailed at that point by its speed, the evidence sufficiently rebuts the presumption of negligence arising from the happening of the accident. Cheetham v. Union R. Co., 26 R. I. 279, 58 A 881.

47. Pierce v. Great Falls, etc., R. Co., 22 Mont. 445, 56 P 867; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Crier, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 434, 100 SW 1177. See also supra § 1427.

48. Sloan v. Little Rock R., etc., Co., 89 Ark. 574, 117 SW 551; Shaw v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 173 Ill. A. 107; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Lindsey, 51 Tex. Civ. A. 67, 110 SW 995.

[a] Thus evidence of persons who examined the railroad track and car after the derailment that the track was all right, and that they could see nothing the matter with the car, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of the railroad company's negligence, arising from the derailment itself, especially where the persons making the examination are not shown to have been competent inspectors. Houston, etc., R. Co. V. Lindsey, 51 Tex. Civ. A. 67, 110 SW 995.

49. Patterson v. Springfield Tract. Co., 178 Mo. A. 250, 163 SW 955. See also supra § 1427.

50. Knight v. Tombigbee Valley R. Co., 190 Ala. 140, 67 S 238. 51.

U. S. Murphy v. Milford, etc., R. Co., 210 Fed. 137, 126 CCA 656. Ala.-Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Hoskins, (A.) 69 S 339.

Ark. Arkansas Midland R. Co. v. Griffith, 63 Ark. 491, 39 SW 550.

Colo.-Denver Tramway Co. V. Reid, 4 Colo. A. 53, 35 P 269.

Ga.- Southern R. Co. v. Cunningham, 123 Ga. 90, 50 SE 979.

Ill. Chicago Union Tract. Co. v. Newmiller. 215 Ill. 383, 74 NE 410 [aff 116 I11. A. 625]; Wayne v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 165 II. A. 353; Szczech v. Chicago City R. Co., 157 Ill. A. 150: Chicago City R. Co. v. Wyckoff, 136 II. A. 342 [aff 234 III. 613, 85 NE 237]; McDonnell v. Chicago City R. Co., 131 Ill. A. 227; Chicago Union Tract. Co. v. Mommsen, 107 Ill. A. 353; Chicago City R. Co. Carroll. 102 111. A. 202 [aff 206 T. 318, 68 NE 10871; Wabash Western R. Co. v. Friedman, 41 III. A. 270 [rev on other grounds 146 Ill. 583, 30 NE 353, 34 NE 1111].

Ind. Cleveland, etc.. R. Co. V. Hadley, 170 Ind. 204. 82 NE 1025, 84 NE 13, 16 LRANS 527, 16 AnnCas 1; Terre Haute, etc.. R. Co. v. Sheeks. 155 Ind. 74, 56 NE 434; Louisville, etc., Ferry Co. v. Nolan, 135 Ind.

Ky.-Davis v. Paducah R., etc., Co., 113 Ky. 267, 68 SW 140, 24 KyL 135. La.-Leverst v. Shreveport Belt R. Co., 110 La. 399, 34 S 579.

Md.-Western Maryland R. Co. v. State, 95 Md. 637, 53 A 969; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson, 72 Md. 519, 20 A 2, 20 AmSR 483 and note, 8 LRA 673: Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State, 63 Md. 135.

Mass.-Hebblethwaite v. Old Colony St. R. Co., 192 Mass. 295, 78 NE 477.

Mich.-Garlach V. Detroit United R. Co., 171 Mich. 474, 137 NW 256.

Minn.-Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207. 42 NW 873, 16 AmSR 700, 4 LRA 673; Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 26 Minn. 278, 3 NW 333, 37 AmR 410; McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277.

Mo.-Redmon v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 185 Mo. 1, 84 SW 26, 105 Am SR 558; Hite v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 130 Mo. 132. 31 SW 262, 32 SW 33, 51 AmSR 555; Clark v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 127 Mo. 197, 29 SW 1013; Sharp v. Kansas City Cable R. Co., 114 Mo. 94, 20 SW 93; Holland v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 105 Mo. A. 117, 79 SW 508; Madden v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 50 Mo. A. 666; Yerkes v. Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co., 7 Mo. A. 265.

Nebr.-Copeland v. Omaha, etc., St. R. Co., 98 Nebr. 42, 151 NW 947.

N. J.-Kuttner v. New Jersey Cent. R. Co., 80 N. J. L. 11, 81 N. J. L. 731. 77 A 470 [aff 80 A 1135].

N. Y.-Miller v. Ocean SS. Co.. 118 N. Y. 199, 23 NE 462; Holbrook v. Utica, etc., R. Co., 12 N. Y. 236, 64 AmD 502; Spaeth v. Manhattan R. Co., 109 App. Div. 819, 96 NYS 861; Stern v. Westchester Electric R. Co., 99 App. Div. 491, 90 NYS 870; Gilmore v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 6 App. Div. 117, 39 NYS 417; Hitchcock v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 44 Hun 627, 8 NYSt 848; Goodrich v. Pennsylvania, etc., Canal, etc., Co., 29 Hun 50; Burke v. State, 64 Misc. 558, 119 NYS 1089; Winter v. Interurban St. R. Co., 49 Misc. 131, 96 NYS 1009; Wynn v. Central Park, etc., R. Co., 14 NYS 172 [rev on other grounds 133 N. Y. 575. 30 NE 721]: Miller v. Ocean Steamship Co.. 6 NYSt 664.

Oh.-Cincinnati Tract. Co. v. Holzenkamp. 74 Oh. St. 379, 78 NE 529. 113 AmSR 980 and note, 6 LRANS 800.

Pa. Fern v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 95 A 590; Dougherty v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 213 Pa. 346, 62 A 926; McCafferty v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 193 Pa. 339, 44 A 435, 74. AmSR 690: Keator v. Scranton Tract. Co., 191 Pa. 102, 43 A 86, 71 AmSR 758, 44 LRA 546; Clow v. Pittsburgh Tract. Co.. 158 Pa. 410, 27 A 1004; Fleming v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co.. 158 Pa. 130, 27 A 858, 38 AmSR 835, 22 LRA 351; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. 339, 98 AmD 229; Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479, 49 AmD 533.

R. I.-Murray v. Pawtuxet Valley St. R. Co., 25 R. I. 209, 55 A 491. Tex.-Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Young, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 430, 100 SW 993; Dallas Cons. Electric St. R. Co. v. Broadhurst, 28 Tex. Civ. A. 630, 68 SW 315.

Va.-Baltimore, etc., R. Co. V. Noell, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 394; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Wightman, 29

was caused by the breaking of a car wheel52 or axle,53 or by the passenger receiving a shock of electricity because of a defect in the insulation or other appliances. It is then incumbent on the carrier, in order to prevent a recovery, to show that the injury occurred without any negligence on its part, and

Gratt. (70 Va.) 431.

Wash.-Pate v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 52 Wash. 166, 100 P 324. Wis.-Feldschneider V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 122 Wis. 423, 99 NW 1034. Eng.-Gee v. Metropolitan R. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 161; Harrison v. London, etc., R. Co., Cab. & E. 540.

Que.-Germain v. Montreal, etc., R. Co., 6 L. C. 172.

"It has been often held that proof of injury to a passenger in consequence of the breaking or failure of a vehicle, roadway, or other appliances owned or controlled by the carrier or used by it in making the transit, or the manner of their operation, raised a presumption of negligence against the carrier." Southern R. Co. v. Cunningham, 123 Ga. 90, 93, 50 SE 979.

a

[a] Thus a presumption of negligence has been held to arise where was injured: passenger (1) By the fall of the trolley pole as he was boarding or alighting. Chicago City R. Co. v. Carroll, 206 Ill. 318, 68 NË 1087 [aff 102 II. A. 202] (without proof as to what caused the pole to fall); Cincinnati Tract. Co. v. Holzenkamp, 74 Oh. St. 379, 78 NE 529, 113 AmSR 980 and note, 6 LRANS 800 and note. (2) By the giving way of a handrail on a street car. McCarty v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 105 Mo. A. 596, 80 SW 7. (3) By a gate on the platform swinging open while the car was in motion, allowing plaintiff to fall through and thereby injuring her. Spurlock v. Shreveport Tract. Co., 118 La. 1, 42 S 575 (holding that, where a passenger fell from the platform of a street car and was killed in consequence of the gate not being securely fastened, the question being as to whether the gate had been insecurely latched or was unlatched by the passenger himself, the burden of proof is on the carrier); Aston v. St. Louis Transit Co., 105 Mo. A. 226, 79 SW 999. By the collapse of a trapdoor which formed a part of the floor of a street car, under the weight of a passenger who was simply walking thereon. Jorden v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 122 Mo. A. 330, 99 SW 492.

(4)

[b] Falling window.-(1) Where a passenger raised a window sash with due care until it was latched, and because of a defective condition of the catch it fell and injured her, the case is within the rule that a passenger injured without his fault by a defective appliance of the carrier's is prima facie entitled to re

cover.

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presumption of negligence does not arise where a passenger is injured in alighting from an open street railroad car by having her dress catch on a broken curtain hook. Kelly v. New York, etc., R. Co., 109 N. Y. 44, 15 NE 879.

[e] The breaking of a rail in a railroad track, when not shown to have been due to vis major or unavoidable accident, is indicative of negligence in the railroad as against a passenger, regardless of the condition of the track prior to the time of the break. Western Maryland R. Co. v. Shivers, 101 Md. 391, 61 A 618.

52. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 II. 80; Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 106.

[a] The presumption arising from a broken car wheel is rebutted by evidence that the wheel was manufactured and tested by the most skillful manufacturers, and that wheels of that kind were in common use. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 111. 80.

53. Ind.-Ohio, etc., R. Co. V. Voight, 122 Ind. 288, 23 NE 774. Md.-Western Maryland R. Co. v. State, 95 Md. 637, 53 A 969. Mo.-Lemon

340.

v. Chanslor, 68 Mo.

N. Y.-Alden v. New York Cent. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 102, 82 AmD 401; Hegeman v. Western R. Corp., 13 N. Y. 9, 64 AmD 517.

Pa.-Meier v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 64 Pa. 225, 3 AmR 581.

Wash. Pate v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 52 Wash. 166, 100 P 324.

Eng.-Christie v. Griggs, 2 Campb. 79; Israel v. Clark, 4 Esp. 259; Dawson v. Manchester, etc., R. Co., 7 H. & N. 1037.

Great Western

Ont. Thatcher v. R. Co., 4 U. C. C. P. 543. 54.

Ill. Eickhof v. Chicago, etc., St. R. Co., 77 Ill. A. 196.

Ky-South Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 86 SW 970, 27 KyL 811. Mass.-McDonough v. Boston El. R. Co., 208 Mass. 436, 94 NE 809. Mo.-McRae v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 125 Mo. A. 562, 102 SW 1032.

N. Y.-D'Arcy v. Westchester Electric R. Co., 82 App. Div. 263, 81 NYS 952.

Tex.-Dallas Cons. Electric St. R. Co. v. Broadhurst, 28 Tex. Civ. A. 630, 68 SW 315.

touch Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Hadley, 40 Ind. A. 731, 82 NE 1025 [aff

Mur

170 Ind. 204, 82 NE 1025, 84 NE 13, 16 LRANS 527, 16 AnnCas 1]. (2) But the presumption of negligence has been held not to arise from the fall of a car window from the ledge on which it rests while closed. ray_v. Metropolitan Dist. R. Co., 27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 762. (3) Where it appears that the window and its attachments were in good order, and that the fall must have been due to it not having been properly fastened, and there is no evidence that defendant's employees raised the window, plaintiff cannot recover. Faulkner v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 187 Mass. 254, 72 NE 976.

[c] The ordinary burning out of a fuse used to prevent an excessive amount of electricity from entering the motors of electric street cars is not prima facie evidence of negligence in an action for injuries to a passenger alleged to have been caused thereby. Cassady v. Old Colony St. R. Co.. 184 Mass. 156, 68 NE 10, 63 LRA 285.

[d] Defective curtain hook. The

[a] Illustrations.(1) Where the controller box on an electric car was charged with electricity to such an extent as to endanger the safety of passengers who might accidentally it, an inference of negliSouth Covington gence is warranted. etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 86 SW 970, 27 KyL 811. (2) Where a passenger on a street car was injured by stepping on an electrified metal plate in defendant's car, thus receiving an electric shock, the burden is defendant to show that the presence of the electricity could not have been detected and prevented by the exercise of the highest degree of care. McRae v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 125 Mo. A. 562, 102 SW 1032.

on

55. Ky. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Morgan, 129 Ky. 731, 112 SW 859; Morgan v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 127 Ky. 433, 105 SW 961. 32 KyL 330, 15 LRANS 790, 16 AnnCas 608.

Mo.-Holland v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 105 Mo. A. 117, 79 SW 508.

Pa.-Dougherty v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 213 Pa. 346, 62 A 926.

R. I.-Murray v. Pawtuxet Valley St. R. Co., 25 R. I. 209, 55 A 491.

Tex.-Galveston, etc., R. Co. V. Young, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 430, 100 SW 993.

Utah.-Christensen v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 35 Utah 137, 99 P 676,

20 LRANS 255, 18 AnnCas 1159.

See also cases supra notes 51-53. [a] Injury from cinder.-(1) Where a passenger on a railroad train is injured by a red hot cinder from the engine, the burden of proof is on the railroad company to show that the engine was properly equipped. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Parks, 40 Tex. Civ. A. 480, 90 SW 343; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Parks, (Tex. Civ. A.) 73 SW 439; Texas Midland R. Co. v. Jumper, 24 Tex. Civ. A. 671, 60 SW 797. (2) But it has been held that instructions were erroneous which placed on defendant the burden of proving that it had selected, or exercised the highest degree of care to select. the best spark arrester in use. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell, 34 Tex. Civ. A. 394, 79 SW 94. Well known and approved machinery and appliances generally see supra § 1374.

[b] Where the brakes of a street car fail to work because of a broken chain, and a passenger is injured, the presumption of negligence arises which is not overcome by evidence that the brakes held on a previous trip of the car. Dougherty v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 213 Pa. 346, 62 A 926. 56. Chicago Union Tract. Co. v. Newmiller, 215 Ill. 383, 74 NE 410 [aff 116 111. A. 625]; Brod v. St. Louis Transit Co., 115 Mo. A. 202, 91 SW 993; Lynch v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 90 NYS 378; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Roach, 52 Tex. Civ. A. 95, 114 SW 418.

"The mere fact that an explosion occurred on the car is prima-facie evidence that it had a negligent origin and proof of such fact imposed on defendant the burden of showing by evidence that the explosion was not caused by any breach of duty on its part but by unavoidable accident." Agnew v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 178 Mo. A. 119, 122, 165 SW 1110.

57. Robinson v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 9 Fed. 877, 20 Blatchf 338; Kelly v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 113 Mo. A. 468, 87 SW 583; Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282.

[a] The explosion of a boiler in a steamboat is prima facie evidence of negligence. Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282.

El. R.

58. Ill-Garner v. Chicago Cons, Tract. Co., 150 Ill. A. 149. Mass.-Beattie V. Boston Co., 201 Mass. 3, 86 NE 920. Mo.-Agnew v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 178 Mo. A. 119, 165 SW 1110.

N. Y.-Paine v. Geneva, etc., Tract. Co., 115 App. Div. 729, 101 NYS 204; German v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 107 App. Div. 354, 95 NYS 112.

Wash.-Firebaugh v. Seattle Electric Co., 40 Wash. 658, 82 P 995, 111 AmSR 990, 2 LRANS 836 and note. Wis.-Gay v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 138 Wis. 348, 120 NW 283.

[a] Thus (1) where plaintiff was injured by an explosion from the controller on defendant's street car. and the evidence of an expert was that the accident could not have occurred from any other cause than a defect in the condition of the electrical mechanism and equipment of the car, and there was no evidence to warrant a finding that such an accident could have happened from any other cause, a case for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is presented. Beattie v. Boston El. R. Co., 201 Mass. 3, 86 NE 920. Proof of injury to a passenger on a street car by reason of an explosion in the controller box of a passing car is proof, in the absence of explanation by the company, that the

(2)

vehicle,59 have been held to make out a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the carrier unless it is evident that the explosion was such that it could not have been prevented by that high degree of care required of carriers.60

[ 1434] dd. Rebutting Presumption. The presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier, arising from the circumstances of the injury to a passenger, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is a presumption of fact and not of law, and although of itself sufficient to support a verdict for the passenger,61 it may be rebutted by the carrier, in doing which the burden is on the carrier to show that the accident was inevitable, or could not have accident arose from its want of care, when it was shown that such an explosion indicated a cause not usual in the ordinary operation of street cars. German v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 107 App. Div. 354, 95 NYS 112. (3) The sudden blazing out of flame from the controller of a trolley car is of an unusual and unexpected character and such as to bring into application the doctrine res ipsa loquitur, in an action for injuries to a passenger occasioned by the rush of the passengers to get off the car immediately after the occurrence, but that doctrine merely raises a presumption which yields readily evidence. Garner v. Chicago Cons. Tract. Co., 150 Ill. A. 149.

to

[b] Gross negligence.The fact that an explosion occurs in the controller box of a street car which up to the time of the explosion was running smoothly is not, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, a showing of gross negligence on the part of the operatives of the car. Martin v. Boston, etc., St. R. Co., 205 Mass. 16, 91 NE 159.

[c] Jumping from car. The fact that the passenger jumped from the car, with a view of saving himself, and was injured does not deprive him of the right to insist that proof of the accident, the blowing out of a controller, presumptively shows actionable negligence on the company's Firebaugh v. Seattle Electric part. Co., 40 Wash. 658, 82 P 995, 111 Am SR 990, 2 LRANS 836. 59.

Hughes v. Atlantic City, etc., R. Co., 85 N. J. L. 212, 89 A 769, LRA 1916A 927; Wilkie v. Bolster, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 327.

60. Bigwood v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 209 Mass. 345, 95 NE 751, 35 LRANS 113.

61. Cal.-Bush v. Barnett, 96 Cal. 202, 31 P 2.

Mass.-Feital v. Middlesex R. Co., 109 Mass. 398, 12 AmR 720.

N. Y.-Breen v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 109 N. Y. 297, 16 NE 60, 4 AmSR 450.

Tex. Bonner v. Grumbach, 2 Tex. Civ. A. 482, 21 SW 1010.

Ont. Thatcher v. Great Western R. Co., 4 U. C. C. P. 543.

See also supra §§ 1426-1433.

62. U. S.-New Jersey R.. etc., Co. v. Pollard, 22 Wall. 341, 22 L. ed. 877; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181, 10 L. ed. 115; McKinney v. Neil, 16 F. Cas. No. 8,865, 1 McLean 540. Ala.- -Western R. Co. v. McGraw, 183 Ala. 220, 62 S 772; Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Mallette, 92 Ala. 209, 9 S 363.

Cal.-Bush v. Barnett, 96 Cal. 202, 31 P 2; Fairchild v. California Stage Co., 13 Cal. 599; Walker v. Beaumont Land, etc., Co., 15 Cal. A. 726, 115 P 766.

Fla. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Thompson, 57 Fla. 155, 48 S 750.

Ga. Douthitt v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 136 Ga. 351, 71 SE 470 (construing Civ. Code [1910] §§ 2780, 2714); Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Gilleland, 133 Ga. 621, 66 SE 944; McEwen v. Atlanta R., etc., Co.. 120 Ga. 1003, 48 SE 391; Yonge v. Kinney, 28 Ga. 111.

62

64

been prevented by the exercise of the required degree of skill and care on its part, or that it would not have occurred but for the passenger's own negligence. 63 Although it has been held that the carrier must explain the cause of the accident in order to rebut the presumption of negligence, as a general rule the burden is not on it to furnish a satisfactory explanation of the cause of the accident, but merely to rebut the inference that it has failed to use due care, and it is generally sufficient if the carrier produces sufficient evidence to balance the presumption without overcoming it by the preponderance of the evidence.66 But it has been held that the burden

65

Ill-Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 Ill. 80; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson, 56 Ill. 138; Galena, etc., R. Co. v. Yarwood, 17 Ill. 509, 65 AmD 682.

Ind.-Louisville, etc., R. Co. V. Miller, 141 Ind. 533, 37 NE 343: Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Faylor, 126 Ind. 126, 25 NE 869; Louisville, etc.. R. Co. v. Pedigo, 108 Ind. 481, 8 NE 627; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 NE 836; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 74 Ind. 462. Kan. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Elder, 57 Kan. 312, 46 P 310.

Ky.-Central Pass. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578, 6 SW 441, 9 KyL 725, 9 AmSR 309; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ritter, 85 Ky. 368, 3 SW 591, 9 KyL 22.

La.-Julien v. The Wade Hampton, 27 La. Ann. 377.

Md. Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill 406, 45 AmD 138.

Mass.-Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick. 106. Mich.-Congdon v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 179 Mich. 175, 146 NW 118.

Minn. McLean V. Burbank, Minn. 277.

11

Miss.-Yazoo, etc., R. Co. v. Messina, 109 Miss. 143, 67 S 963; Easley v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 96 Miss. 396, 50 S 491.

Mo.-Sharp v. Kansas City Cable R. Co., 114 Mo. 94, 20 SW 93; Sawyer v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 37 Mo. 240, 90 AmD 382; Agnew v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 178 Mo. A. 119. 165 SW 1110; Kirkpatrick v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 161 Mo. A. 515, 143 SW 865; Rice v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 153 Mo. A. 35, 131 SW 374.

Nebr.-Lincoln Tract. Co. v. Webb,

73 Nebr. 136, 102 NW 258, 119 AmSR 879; Spellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit Co., 36 Nebr. 890, 55 NW 270, 38 AmSR 753, 20 LRA 316.

N. Y.-Curtis v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534, 75 AmD 258; Bowen v. New York Cent. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 408, 72 AmD 529; Paine v. Geneva, etc., Tract. Co., 115 App. Div. 729, 101 NYS 204; Brehm v. Great Western R. Co., 34 Barb. 256; Holbrook v. Utica, etc., R. Co., 16 Barb. 113 [aff 12 N. Y. 236, 64 AmD 502]; Wilkie v. Bolster, 3 E. D. Smith 327; Brumberger v. Joline, 125 NYS 519; Bial v. Interurban St. R. Co., 90 NYS 434. Or.-Goss v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 48 Or. 439, 87 P 149.

[ocr errors]

Pa. Fern v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 250 Pa. 487, 95 A 590; O'Connor v. Scranton Tract. Co., 180 Pa. 444, 36 A 866; Pittsburg. etc., R. Co. V. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510, 18 AmR 424; Meier v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 64 Pa. 225, 3 AmR 581; Sullivan v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 30 Pa. 234, 72 AmD 698; Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479, 49 AmD 533; Reading City Pass. R. Co. v. Eckert, 2 Pa. Cas. 31, 4 A 530. S. C.-Shelton v. Southern R. Co., 86 S. C. 98, 67 SE 899. Tex-Mexican Cent. R. Co. Lauricella, 87 Tex. 277, 28 SW 277, 47 AmSR 103.

V.

Va.-Roanoke R., etc., Co. v. Sterrett, 111 Va. 293, 68 SE 998; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Wightman, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 431; Farish v. Reigle, 11 Gratt. (52 Va.) 697, 62 AmD 666 and note.

Eng. Carpue v. London, etc., R. Co., 5 Q. B. 747, 48 ECL 747, 114 Reprint 1431; Skinner v. London, etc.. R. Co., 5 Exch. 787, 155 Reprint 345; Great Western R. Co. v. Fawcett, 9 Jur. N. S. 339.

Que.-Germain v. Montreal, etc., R. Co., 6 L. C. 172.

Particular applications of burden on carrier see supra §§ 1428-1432.

63. City, etc., R. Co. v. Svedborg, 20 App. (D. C.) 543 [aff 194 U. S. 201. 24 SCt 656, 48 L. ed. 935]; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ritter, 85 Ky. 368, 3 SW 591, 9 KyL 22; Lincoln Tract. Co. v. Webb, 73 Nebr. 136, 102 NW 258, 119 AmSR 879.

Contributory negligence generally see infra §§ 1481-1528.

64. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell, 57 Ark. 418, 21 SW 883; Burke v. State, 64 Misc. 558, 119 Fla. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Thompson, 57 Fla. 155, 48 S 750.

NYS 1089. 65.

Ill.-Garner v. Chicago Cons. Tract. Co., 150 Ill. A. 149.

Co. V. Com

Ind.-Louisville, etc., R. Jones, 108 Ind. 551, 9 NE 476. pare Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Hadley, 40 Ind. A. 73, 82 NE 1025 [aff 170 Ind. 204, 82 NE 1025, 84 NE 13, 16 LRANS 527, 16 AnnCas 1] (holding that, where, in an action against a carrier for injury to a passenger caused by a car window sash falling, plaintiff made out a prima facie case, the carrier had the burden of the showing all collateral facts of necessary to explain the cause the accident and of showing proper diligence in maintaining the car and appliances in a safe condition).

fowa. Tuttle v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 48 Iowa 236. Minn.-Eldridge

V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 32 Minn. 253, 20 NW 151. Eng.-Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. N. S. 588, 103 ECL 588, 142 Reprint 926.

66. Cal.-Patterson v. San Francisco, etc., Electric R. Co., 147 Cal. 178. 81 P 531.

Ill. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Rothschild, 134 Ill. A. 504; Elgin, etc., Tract. Co. v. Hench, 132 III. A. 535; Chicago, etc., Tract. Co. v. Leonard, 126 III. A. 189.

Mich. -Sewell v. Detroit United R. Co., 158 Mich. 407, 123 NW 2.

Nebr.-Lincoln Tract. Co. v. Shepherd, 74 Nebr. 369, 104 NW 882, 107 NW 764.

R. I.-Murray v. Pawtuxet Valley St. R. Co., 25 R. I. 209, 55 A 491. Tex.-Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. Day, 50 Tex. Civ. A. 407, 111 SW 663.

V.

Utah.-Christensen V. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 35 Utah 137, 99 P 676, 20 LRANS 255, 18 1159.

AnnCas

Wis. Gay v. Milwaukee Electric R., etc., Co., 138 Wis. 348, 120 NW 283.

[a] Explosion of controller.Proof that the controller of a street car may explode without any negligence of the company meets the prima facie case of negligence established by the proof of the explosion of the controller and resulting injury to a passenger. Gay v. Mil

is on the carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence to the satisfaction of the jury,67 and that proof that the accident happened from some inexplicable cause, or that the probabilities are equal

68

that the accident did or did not result from the carrier's negligence,69 does not satisfy the burden of proof to show freedom from negligence.

71

the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is made out, and it is then incumbent on defendant, in order to prevent a recovery, to show that the accident was not due to negligence on its part," or that the passenger's contributory negligence caused the injury.72 The fact of the falling of an elevator while being operated as a carrier of passengers is presumptive evidence of either negligence in its operation or that it was out of repair or faultily constructed, and throws on the owner the burden of showing freedom from negligence,73 but he has not the burden of explaining how it fell. It has been held that where an elevator suddenly drops about four feet causing a person who is entering to fall against Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207, 209, 42 NW 873, 16 AmSR 700, 4 LRA 673.

[§ 1435] (c) Elevator Cases. A passenger injured on an elevator has the burden of proving negligence on the part of the carrier or the operator of the elevator causing his injury;70 but where he proves the fact of his injury from an accident which in the usual course of events would not have happened if due care had been used, a prima facie case, under

waukee Electric R., etc., Co., 138 Wis. 348, 120 NW 283.

Weight and sufficiency of evidence generally see infra §§ 1450-1452.

67. Atkinson v. Brantley, 15 Ga. A. 129, 82 SE 773; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Vandivere, 42 Okl. 427, 141 P 799. 68. Muskogee Electric Tract. Co. v. Eaton, (Okl.) 152 P 1109.

69. Weber v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (Iowa) 151 NW 852; Easley v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 96 Miss. 396, 50 S 491.

70. Monahan v. Equitable L. Ins. Co., (Iowa) 156 NW 994; Cooper v. Century Realty Co., 224 Mo. 709, 123 SW 848; Griffen v. Manice, 36 Misc. 364, 73 NYS 559 [aff 74 App. Div. 371, 77 NYS 626 (aff 174 N. Y. 505, 66 NE 1109)].

71. Cal-Worden v. Central Fireproof Bldg. Co., 172 Cal. 94, 155 P 839; Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 P 266, 13 AmSR 175, 5 LRA 498.

Ga.-Helmly V. Savannah Office Bldg. Co., 13 Ga. A. 498, 79 SE 364.

Ill-Pontius V. Commercial Nat. Safe Deposit Co., 187 Ill. A. 20; Anderson Art Co. v. Greenburg, 118 Ill. A. 220.

Iowa.-Monahan V. Equitable L. Ins. Co., 156 NW 994.

Mass.-Shattuck v. Rand, 142 Mass. 83. 7 NE 43.

Minn.-Goodsell V. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207, 42 NW 873, 16 AmSR 700, 4 LRA 673.

Mo.-Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 214 Mo. 35, 112 SW 532; Anderson v. American Sash, etc., Co., (A.) 182 SW 819; Chambers v. Kupper-Benson Hotel Co., 154 Mo. A. 249, 134 SW 45. Nebr.-Wagner V. Farmers', etc., Ins. Co., 90 Nebr. 463, 133 NW 650.

N. Y. Harvey v. Proctor, 158 App. Div. 139, 142 NYS 768; Hubener v. Heide, 73 App. Div. 200, 76 NYS 758; Gage v. Waldorf Astoria Hotel Co., 90 Misc. 331, 152 NYS 1019.

The

"Where, from the relation of the parties and the manner of the accident, it appears that an instrumentality causing an injury was at the time controlled by the defendant, and that the casualty was such as in the usual course of events would not have occurred if those who managed the thing had used proper care, evidence of the injury and of the incidents accompanying and tending to produce the hurt inferentially shows that the accident arose from the want of requisite care. That is, by establishing a condition of surrounding and limiting circumstances whose existence forms an antecedent from which the principal fact of negligence may be deduced sufficient to create a prima facie case, requiring the defendant, who evidently had a better opportunity to know the cause of the harm, if he would avoid an adverse judgment based on such state of the case, to offer evidence tending to overcome the deduction which the reason of the jury makes from the facts and circumstances so established." Kelly v. Lewis Inv.

Co., 66 Or. 1, 4, 133 P 826, AnnCas 1915B 568.

[a] Presumption from injury.— An injury to a passenger on a passenger elevator raises a presumption of the negligent failure of the owner of the elevator to exercise the ordinary diligence required of him. Helmly v. Savannah Office Bldg. Co., 13 Ga. A. 498, 79 SE 364; Pontius v. Commercial Nat. Safe Deposit Co., 187 Ill. A. 20 (failure to make inspection); Burdette v. Chicago Auditorium Assoc., 166 Ill. A. 186; Monahan v. Equitable L. Ins. Co., (Iowa) 156 NW 994.

[b] The fact that an elevator shot upward after it had reached the main floor, and while plaintiff was attempting to alight from it, is of itself evidence of want of care and mismanagement in its operation. Franklin Printing, etc., Co. V. Behrens, 80 11. A. 313 [aff 181 Ill. 340, 54 NE 896]; Harvey v. Proctor, 158 App. Div. 139. 142 NYS 769 (holding that, where there is no evidence as to the acts of the operator of an elevator which, while in good working condition, suddenly moved upward while plaintiff was attempt

Or.-Kelly v. Lewis Inv. Co., 66 Or. 1, 133 P 826, AnnCas1915B 568. "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to a passenger elevator. plaintiff was only called upon to show that he was injured by the rapid descent and sudden stopping of the elevator, and that the elevator was under the control and management of the defendant. When he had made such proof he had made out a case presumptively showing negligence on the part of the defendant. The burden then devolved upon the defend-ing to enter it and then descended on ant to show that it was not guilty of negligence for which it could be charged." Worden v. Central FireProof Bldg. Co., 172 Cal. 94, 96, 155 P 839.

"The relation between the owner and manager of an elevator for passengers and those carried in it is similar to that between an ordinary common carrier of passengers and those carried by him. The same reason exists for requiring on the part of the owner the utmost human care and foresight, and for making him responsible for the slightest degree of negligence, and also, in case of injury by the breaking or giving way of an elevator, for putting on him the onus of proving that it was through no fault or neglect of his. The rule as to care applied by the court below was within this rule."

his foot, it will be presumed, in the absence of an explanation, that the operator was negligent).

to

[c] Where a passenger elevator refused to stop, but continued to the top of the shaft, where the hoisting cables parted, causing the car fall and thus injuring a passenger, a presumption of negligence arose establishing a prima facie case for the passenger. Diepenbrock v. Wove Realty Co.. 128 App. Div. 888, 112 NYS 539; Keller v. Wove Realty Co., 128 App. Div. 154, 112 NYS 538.

[d] Additional safeguards.—— Where plaintiff's intestate was injured in an elevator, plaintiff was under no burden to prove that a guard in common use, in addition to the guards used by defendant. was practicable. Monahan v. Equitable L. Ins. Co., (Iowa) 156 NW 994.

74

[e] Evidence in rebuttal held sufficient.-Where, in an action for injuries to an elevator passenger, defendant shows by a mechanician in charge of the elevator his daily inspection thereof and the machinery, and experts showed that they had made inspection at reasonable intervals, with a view to certifying to the sufficiency and structural soundness of the elevator, the evidence overcomes the inference of negligence of defendant in maintaining unsuitable or defective appliances. Cohen V. Farmers' L. & T. Co.. 70 Misc. 548, 127 NYS 561.

72. Cooper v. Century Realty Co., 224 Mo. 709, 123 SW 848.

Contributory negligence generally see infra §§ 1481-1528.

73. Cal. Treadwell V. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 P 266, 13 AmSR 175, 5 LRA 498.

Ill-Steiskal v. Field, 238 111. 92, 87 NE 117 [aff 142 Ill. A. 154]; Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 59 NË 953, 82 AmSR 464, 52 LRA 930 [aff 88 III. A. 529]; Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 111. 222, 50 NE 178, 64 AmSR 35 [aff 70 11. A. 166].

Ind.-National Biscuit Co. v. Wilson, (A.) 78 NE 251.

Minn.-Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207, 42 NW 873, 16 AmSR 700, 4 LRA 673.

Mo.-Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 214 Mo. 35, 112 SW 532.

N. Y.-Klein v. Fraser, 169 App. Div. 812, 155 NYS 848; Harris v. Guggenheim, 154 App. Div. 289, 138 NYS 1037; Gage v. Waldorf Astoria Hotel Co., 90 Misc. 331, 152 NYS 1019; Cohen v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 70 Misc. 548, 127 NYS 561.

Or.-Kelly v. Lewis Inv. Co., 66 Or. 1, 133 P 826, AnnCas1915B 568.

R. I.-Edwards v. Manufacturers' Bldg. Co., 27 R. I. 248, 61 A 646, 114 AmSR 37, 2 LRANS 744 and note, 8 AnnCas 974.

Wis.-Dibbert v. Metropolitan Inv. Co., 158 Wis. 69, 147 NW 3, 148 NW 1095, LRA1915D 305, 312, AnnCas 1916E 924.

[a] Thus a person injured through the fall of a hydraulic elevator in which he was being carried as a passenger need only prove that he sustained injury by the breaking of the machinery by which he was carried, and that such machinery was under the control and management of defendants, in order to make a case raising a presumption of negligence on the part of defendants; he is not bound to prove what constituted the fault or negligence of defendants; the burden is then thrown on defendants to show that they were not guilty of negligence by proof that the injury was caused by inevitable casualty, or proof of any fact relieving defendants from responsibility. Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 P 266, 13 AmSR 175, 5 LRA 498.

[b] Device failing to act.-That a safety device or catch to prevent an elevator from falling fails to act in an emergency tends to establish negligence on the part of the owner under the rule of res ipsa loquitur. National Biscuit Co. v. Wilson, (Ind. A.) 78 NE 251.

74. Klein v. Fraser, 169 App. Div. 812, 155 NYS 848; Gage v. Waldorf

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