52

ordinarily a question for the jury, under the evidence, as to whether the injuries for which recovery is sought were proximately caused by the carrier's negligence or other wrong, or whether they were caused by some act of the person injured,53 or by the acts of some third person." 54 On the other hand, where the facts are undisputed, the question of proximate cause of an injury to a passenger is for the court;55 and where plaintiff fails to prove that the negligence of the carrier was the proximate cause of the injury, there is no case for the jury,5

56

N. C.-Morrow v. Atlanta, etc., Air | ark, etc., R. Co. v. Line R. Co., 134 N. C. 92, 46 SE 12; Davis v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 132 N. C. 291, 43 SE 840; Whitley v. Southern R. Co., 122 N. C. 987, 29 SE 783.

Okl.--Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McAlester, 39 Okl. 153, 134 P 661.

S. C.-Cooper V. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 78 S. C. 562, 59 SE 704. Tex.-Huchingson v. Texas Cent. R. Co., 55 Tex. Civ. A. 229, 118 SW 1123; International, etc., R. Co. v. Satterwhite, 15 Tex. Civ. A. 102, 38 SW 401.

[a] Evidence held insufficient to submit question to jury.-Saxton v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 98 Mo. A. 494, 72 SW 717.

52. U. S.-Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Tharp, 223 Fed. 615, 139 CCA 161; Lee v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 220 Fed. 863, 136 CCA 493.

Ala.-Birmingham R., etc., Co. v. Glenn, 179 Ala. 263, 60 S 111; Birmingham R., etc., Co. v. Lide, 177 Ala. 400, 58 S 990.

Cal.-Johnson V. Oakland, etc., Electric R. Co., 127 Cal. 608, 60 P 170 (excessive speed).

Del.-Freeman v. Wilmington, etc., Tract. Co., 25 Del. 107, 80 A 1001.

D. C.-Washington, etc., R. Co. v. Lukens, 32 App. 442.

Ga.-Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Rives, 137 Ga. 376, 73 SE 645, 38 LRANS 564; Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Norris, 135 Ga. 838, 70 SE 793; Valdosta St. R. Co. v. Fenn, 11 Ga. A. 586, 75 SE 984.

Ill.-Chicago Union Tract. Co. v. May, 221 II. 530, 77 NE 933 [aff 125 Ill. A. 144]; Murphy v. Chicago City R. Co., 191 Ill. A. 431; Hayward v. Metropolitan West Side El. R, Co., 174 11. A. 408; Goodhart v. Chicago City R. Co., 167 A 339; Chicago Union Tract. Co. v. Ertrachter, 130 Ill. A. 602 [aff 228 Ill. 114, 81 NE 816].

Ind. Chicago, etc., R. Co. V. Mitchell, 56 Ind. A. 354, 105 NE 396; Harris v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 32 Ind. A. 600. 70 NE 407. Compare Richmond St., etc., R. Co. v. Beverley, 43 Ind. A. 105, 84 NE 558, 85 NE 721.

Iowa. Burger v. Omaha, etc., St. R. Co., 139 Iowa 645, 117 NW 35, 130 AmSR 343.

Ky-Sacrey v. Louisville R. Co., 152 Ky. 473, 153 SW 760; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Grimes, 150 Ky. 219, 150 SW 346 (whether plaintiff developed pneumonia from exposure due to defendant carrier's negligence).

Minn.-Barnett V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 130 Minn. 300, 153 NW 600; Fairchild v. Fleming, 125 Minn. 431, 147 NW 434; Fox v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 121 Minn. 511, 141 NW 845. Miss.-Troutman V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 95 Miss. 183, 48 S 515.

Mo.-McDonald v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 219 Mo. 468, 118 SW 78, 16 AnnCas 810; Stokes v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 173 Mo. A. 676, 160 SW 46; Cartlich v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 129 Mo. A. 721, 108 SW 584; Moorman v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 105 Mo. A. 711, 78 SW 1089; Rawlings v. Wabash R. Co., 97 Mo. A. 511. 71 SW 535.

N. H.-Boothby v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 66 N. H. 342, 34 A 157.

N. J.-Jones v. Public Service R. Co., 86 N. J. L. 646, 92 A 397; New

Okl.-Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gilmore, 152 P 1096; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Melson, 40 Okl. 1, 134 P 388, AnnCas1915D 760.

S. C.-Cunningham v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 96 S. C. 456, 81 SE 150; Davis v. Atlanta, etc., Air Line R. Co., 83 S. C. 66, 64 SE 1015; Martin v. Southern R. Co., 77 S. C. 370, 58 SE 3, 122 AmSR 574.

Tex.-Mills v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 94 Tex. 242, 59 SW 874, 55 LRA 497 [rev (Civ. A.) 57 SW 291]; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Keller, (Civ. A.) 176 SW 62; Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Keith, (Civ. A.) 163 SW 142; Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. V. Wilkinson,

(Civ. A.) 152 SW 203; International, etc., R. Co. v. Satterwhite, 15 Tex. Civ. A. 102, 38 SW 401.

Va.-Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. V. Barger, 112 Va. 688, 72 SE 693; Thompson v. Norfolk, etc., Tract. Co., 109 Va. 733, 64 SE 953. Wash.-Frescoln Puget Sound Tract., etc., Co., 90 Wash. 59, 155 P 395; Austin v. Washington Water Power Co., 68 Wash. 508, 123 P 775, AnnCas1913E 936.

V.

Wis. Nelson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 130 Wis. 214, 109 NW 933.

[a] Excessive rate of speed and concurrent injury-Evidence that a street car company ran its car at an excessive rate of speed and of concurrent injury to a passenger, is sufficient to make it a jury question whether the excessive speed caused the injury. Austin v. Washington Water Power Co., 68 Wash. 508, 123 P 775, AnnCas1913E 936.

[b] Offensive language and mental distress.-Whether plaintiff, a female passenger, suffered mental distress in consequence of offensive language by defendant's conductor is to be determined by the jury from the nature of the language used and the circumstances of the case. Birmingham R., etc., Co. v. Glenn, 179 Ala. 263, 60 S 111.

[c] Insufficient station accommodations as causing illness.-(1) It is a question for the jury whether plaintiff's illness was caused by exposure resulting from the failure of the carrier

to furnish a sufficient waiting room (Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gilmore, (Okl.) 152 P 1096), (2) or to keep its station open (Boothby v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 66 N. H. 342, 34 A 157), (3) or to keep its depot waiting room warm after plaintiff became a passenger (Barnett V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 130 Minn. 300, 153 NW 600).

[d] Physical facts.-(1) Whether plaintiff's injury was a physically possible result of the negligence complained of is a question for the jury (Frescoln v. Puget Sound Tract., etc., Co., 90 Wash. 59, 155 P 395; Blau v.

Puget Sound Tract., etc., Co.. 88 Wash. 260, 152 P 1023), (2) since the frequency of unlooked-for results from the interaction of forces precludes arbitrary deductions from the general laws of physics by the court (Blau v. Puget Sound Tract., etc.. Co., supra). (3) However, where

[e] A failure to close the elevator door or to guard the open space with the arm of the elevator boy cannot, as a matter of law, be said not to be the proximate cause of the death of a passenger who fell into the opening while the car was ascending. Munsey v. Webb, 231 U. S. 150, 34 SCt 44, 58 L. ed. 162 [aff 37 App. (D. C.) 185].

53. See infra § 1520.

54. Valdosta St. R. Co. v. Fenn, 11 Ga. A. 586, 75 SE 984; Fairchild v. Fleming, 125 Minn. 431, 147 NW 434; Alexander v. Rochester City, etc., R. Co., 12 NYS 685; Seidlinger v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 28 Hun 503 [aff 97 N. Y. 642]; Martin v. Southern R. Co., 77 S. C. 370, 58 SE 3, 122 AmSR 574.

55. Henry v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 76 Mo. 288, 43 AmR 762.

56. Gebus v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 22 N. D. 29, 132 NW 227; Reardon v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 43 Pa. Super. 344.

57. Painter V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 93 Nebr. 419, 140 NW 787; Ginn v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 220 Pa. 552, 69 A 992.

58. U. S.-Clemmens v. Washington Park Steamboat Co., 162 Fed. 815.

D. C.-Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Howard, 14 App. 262 [aff 178 U. S. 153, 20 SCt 880, 44 L. ed. 1015].

Ill-Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Delong, 109 Ill. A. 241.

Me.-Berry v. Atlantic R. Co., 109 Me. 330, 84 A 740.

Pa.-People's Pass. R. Co. V. Lauderbach, 2 Pa. Cas. 187, 3 A 672. Tex.-Missouri, etc., R. Co. V. Ryon, (Civ. A.) 177 SW 525.

[a] Illustrations.—(1) Where plaintiff purchased a ticket which on its face indicated that defendant steamboat company controlled the transportation by steamboat and trolley to plaintiff's destination, and defendant, in an action for injuries to plaintiff on the trolley road, introduced certain testimony showing that the trolley was operated by another company, whether such was the fact was for the jury. Clemmens v. Washington Park Steamboat Co., 162 Fed. 815. (2) In an action by a passenger against a street car company for injuries received in a collision with the street car of another line, it appeared that at the point where the accident occurred the tracks of defendant company approach so closely those of another company that the projecting roofs of the cars touch each other in the passage of the cars, which run in opposite directions, and that plaintiff had his arm on the outside of the window, so that it was thrown out by the shock, and broken by the collision, it was for the jury to determine on which company the negligence lay. People's Pass. R. Co. v. Lauderbach, 1 Pa. Cas. 187, 3 A 672.

59. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Adeeb, 15 Ga. A. 842, 84 SE 316.

60. U. S.-Oregon Co. v. Roe, 176 Fed. 715, 100 CCA 269.

Cal.-Lauder v. Currier, 3 Cal. A. 28, 84 P 217.

Ga.-Byrd v. Atlanta Nat. Bank, 16 Ga. A. 7, 84 SE 219.

Il-Field v. French, 80 I11. A. 78; Hartford Deposit Co. v. Pederson, 67 Ill. A. 142 [aff 168 Ill. 224, 48 NE 30].

Iowa.-Monohan V. Equitable L. Ins. Co., 156 NW 994; Cubbage v. Youngerman, 155 Iowa 39, 134 NW

1074.

Mo.-Lee v. Knapp, 155 Mo. 610, 56 SW 458.

N. Y.-Rumetsch v. Wanamaker, 216 N. Y. 379, 110 NE 760, LRA 1916C 1245 [rev 154 App. Div. 800, 139 NYS 385].

Wis.-Ferguson v. Truax, 136 Wis. 637, 118 NW 251.

an

[a] Safety devices.-Whether elevator was furnished with the best safety devices known and in use at the time of an accident, and whether a defect in those appliances or devices was a latent one and such as had not been, and could not be, discovered on due inspection, nor by the application of the usual and recognized tests of science in that behalf, are questions of fact for the jury. Hartford Deposit Co. v. Pederson, 67 Ill. A. 142 [aff 168 111. 224, 48 NE 30].

61. U. S.-Munsey v. Webb, 231 U. S. 150, 34 SCt 44, 58 L. ed. 162 [aff 37 App. (D. C.) 185].

Cal.-Lauder v. Currier, 3 Cal. A. 28, 84 P 217.

Ga.-Grant v. Allen, 141 Ga. 106, 80 SE 279.

Il-Masonic Fraternity Temple Assoc. v. Collins, 210 Ill. 482, 71 NE 396 [aff 110 Ill. A. 504]; Chicago Exch. Bldg. Co. v. Nelson, 197 Ill. 334, 64 NE 369 [aff 98 Ill. A. 189]; Field v. French, 80 Ill. A. 78.

Iowa.-Cubbage V. Youngerman, 155 Iowa 39, 134 NW 1074.

Ky.-H. B. Phillips Co. v. Pruitt, 82 SW 628, 26 KyL 831, 83 SW 114, 26 KyL 1105.

Me-Jones v. Co-operative Assoc. of America, 109 Me. 448, 84 A 985. Mass.-Sullivan v. Marin, 175 Mass. 422, 56 NE 600; Stewart v. Harvard College, 12 Allen 58.

Mich.-Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich. 204. 96 NW 29: Roulo v. Minot, 132 Mich. 317, 93 NW 870.

Mo.-Luckel v. Century Bldg. Co., 177 Mo. 608, 76 SW 1035; Lee v. Knapp, 137 Mo. 385, 38 SW 1107; Becker v. Lincoln Real Est., etc., Co., 118 Mo. A. 74, 93 SW 291; Hensler v. Stix, 113 Mo. A. 162, 88 SW 108. N. Y.-Meng v. Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank. 169 App. Div. 27. 154 NYS 509; Schiemann v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 167 App. Div. 320, 153 NYS 172; Harris v. Guggenheim, 154 App. Div. 289, 138 NYS 1037; Miller V. Brewster, 32 App. Div. 559, 53 NYS 1.

R. I.-Blackwell v. O'Gorman Co., 22 R. I. 638, 49 A 28.

Wash.-Perrault v. Emporium Department Store Co., 71 Wash. 523, 128 P 1049.

[a] Sudden drop of car.-The sudden drop of an elevator car, of from twelve to fifteen inches, may, in connection with surrounding circumstances, make a question for the jury as to the negligence of its owners. Harris v. Guggenheim, 154 App. Div. 289, 138 NYS 1037.

62. Gibson v. International Trust

64. See Trial [38 Cyc 1594]. 65.

see

See Negligence [29 Cyc 643]. 66. U. S.-Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 203 Fed. 968, 122 CCA 270; Indianapolis Tract., etc., Co. v. Lawson, 143 Fed. 834, 74 CCA 630, 5 LRANS 721, 6 AnnCas 666.

Ala.-Birmingham R., etc., Co. v. Washington, 192 Ala. 617, 69 S 65. Ill.-Chicago Cons. Tract, Co. v. Schritter, 222 Ill. 364, 78 NE 820 [aff 124 Ill. A. 578].

Ky.-Bowling Green R. Co. V. Lewis, 157 Ky. 575, 163 SW 759. Mass.-Ahern v. Boston El. R. Co., 210 Mass. 506, 97 NE 72.

Mich.-Fortin v. Bay City Tract., etc., Co., 154 Mich. 316, 117 NW 741. Mo.-Rearden v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 215 Mo. 105, 114 SW 961; Flaherty v. St. Louis Transit Co., 207 Mo. 318, 106 SW 15.

N. Y.-Webster v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 115 N. Y. 112, 21 NE 725; Clinton v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 91 App. Div. 374, 86 NYS 932; Brown v. Manhattan R. Co., 82 App. Div. 222, 81 NYS 755.

Tex.-Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 79 Tex. 78, 15 SW 264, 23 AmSR 308, 11 LRA 395; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. V. Stone-De Lane, (Civ. A.) 156 SW 906; San Antonio Tract. Co. v. Hauskins, (Civ. A.) 148 SW 1100; Dallas Cons. Electric St. R. Co. v. McGrew, (Civ. A.) 115 SW 344; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Walters, 49 Tex. Civ. A. 71, 107 SW 369; Houston Electric Co. v. Nelson, 34 Tex. Civ. A. 72, 77 SW 978; Williams v. International, etc., R. Co., 28 Tex. Civ. A. 503, 67 SW 1085.

Va.-Virginia R., etc., Co. v. McDemmick, 117 Va. 862, 86 SE 744. Wash.-Whitlock v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 59 Wash. 15, 109 P 188. 67. U. S.-Pittsburgh R. Co. v. Givens, 211 Fed. 885, 128 CCA 263; Irvine v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 184 Fed. 664, 106 CCA 600.

Ala.-Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Mallette, 92 Ala. 209, 9 S 363.

Fla.-Louisville, etc., R. Co. V. Croxton. 63 Fla. 223, 58 S 369.

Ga.-Seaboard Air-Line R. Co. v. Andrews, 140 Ga. 254, 78 SE 925, Ann Cas1914D 165; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Brown, 138 Ga. 107, 74 SE 839. R. I.-Bullock V. Butler Exch.

Co.. 24 R. I. 50, 52 A 122.

Tenn.-East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Lee, 90 Tenn. 570, 18 SW 268.

Tex.-Paris, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson, 104 Tex. 482, 140 SW 434 [rev (Civ. A.) 127 SW 294]; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper, 70 Tex. 67, 8 SW 68; Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor, (Civ. A.) 162 SW 967.

See also St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Marshall, 71 Kan. 866, 81 P 169 (interpreting the instruction in question as merely fixing the attention of the jury on the peculiar facts of the case). [a] Instructions held proper and sufficient: (1) Birmingham R., etc., Co. v. Barrett, 179 Ala. 274, 60 S 262; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 117 Ark. 329, 175 SW 411; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Coy, 113 Ark. 265, 168 SW 1106; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 105 Ark. 269. 150 SW 706 (as to length of time of stopping mixed train); St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Pollock, 93 Ark. 240. 123 SW 790; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson, 70 Ark. 136, 66 SW 661, 91

64

67

AmSR 74; Cary v. Los Angeles R. Co., 157 Cal. 599, 108 P 682, 27 LRA NS 764, 21 AnnCas 1329; Haight v. Turner, 21 Conn. 593; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Brown, 141 Ga. 553, 81 SE 857; Savannah Electric Co. v. McElvey, 126 Ga. 491, 55 SE 192; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Johnston, 106 Ga. 130, 32 SE 78; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Adeeb, 15 Ga. A. 842, 84 SE 316; Pease v. Chicago, etc., Tract. Co., 158 Ill. A. 446; Alton Light, etc., Co. v. Oller, 119 Ill. A. 181 [aff 217 Ill. 15, 75 NE 419, 4 LRANS 399]; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Bir, 56 Ind. A. 598, 105 NE 921; Keeley v. City Electric R. Co., 168 Mich. 79, 133 NW 1085; Chadwick v. St. Louis Transit Co., 195 Mo. 517, 93 SW 798; McHugh v. St. Louis Transit Co., 190 Mo. 85, 88 SW 853; Newcomb v. New York Cent., etc.. R. Co., 182 Mo. 687, 81 SW 1069; Feary v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 162 Mo. 75, 62 SW 452; Sweeney v. Kansas City Cable R. Co., 150 Mo. 385, 51 SW 682; Clark v. Dunham, (Mo. A.) 179 SW 795; Dye v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 135 Mo. A. 254, 115 SW 497; Barr v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 114 Mo. A. 425, 90 SW 107; Buck v. People's St. R., etc., Co., 46 Mo. A. 555; Walsh v. Yonkers R. Co., 114 App. Div. 797, 100 NYS 278 (not erroneous, although unnecessary); Fischel v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 113 App. Div. 116, 99 NYS 90; Doering v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 42 Misc. 192, 85 NYS 400; Ruffin v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 142 N. C. 120, 55 NE 86: Lease v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 247 Pa. 149, 93 A 286; Knox v. Robbins, (Tex. Civ. A.) 151 SW 1134; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Fife, (Tex. Civ. A.) 147 SW 1181; Drewery v. El Paso Electric R. Co., (Tex. Civ. A.) 120 SW 1061; Chicago, etc.. R. Co. v. Shannon, 50 Tex. Civ. A. 194, 111 SW 1060; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Wilkins, (Tex. Civ. A.) 98 SW 202; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Cannon, (Tex. Civ. A.) 81 SW 778; Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Mathews, (Tex. Civ. A.) 76 SW 288; International, etc., R. Co. v. Anchonda, 33 Tex. Civ. A. 24, 75 SW 557; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Adams, 32 Tex. Civ. A. 112, 72 SW 81; Crawleigh v. Galveston, etc., R. Co., 28 Tex. Civ. A. 260, 67 SW 140. (2) In an action for assault by an employee. Alabama City, etc., R. Co. v. Sampley, 169 Ala. 372, 53 S 142; Southern R. Co. v. Crone, 51 Ind. A. 300, 99 NE 762; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Gunterman, (Ky.) 122 SW 514; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Crawford, 112 Md. 508, 77 A 278; Rand v. Butte Electric R. Co., 40 Mont. 398, 107 P 87; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Batchler, 37 Tex. Civ. Á. 116, 83 SW 902; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Humphries, 20 Tex. Civ. A. 28, 48 SW 201. (3) In an action for injury to an alighting passenger by a sudden jerk, stop, or movement of the car. Birmingham R., etc., Co. v. King. 149 Ala. 504, 42 S 612; Florida R. Co. v. Dorsey, 59 Fla. 260, 52 S 963; Savannah Electric Co. v. Mulliken, 126 Ga. 722, 55 SE 945; West Chicago, St. R. Co. v. Lieserowitz, 197 III. 607, 64 NE 718 [aff 99 Ill. A. 591]; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Crunk, 119 Ind. 542, 21 NE 31, 12 AmSR 443; Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Brown, 32 Ind. A. 130, 69 NE 407; Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Dean, 160 Ky. 757, 170 SW 167; Pack V. Camden Interstate R. Co., 154 Ky. 535, 157 SW 906; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Deason, 96 SW 1115,

V.

29 KyL 1259; Henning v. Louisville R. Co., 74 SW 209, 24 KyL 2419; Hufford v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 130 Mo. A. 638, 109 SW 1062; Black v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 130 Mo. A. 548, 109 SW 86; Disher v. South Carolina, etc., R. Co., 55 S. C. 187, 33 SE 172; Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Viney, (Tex. Civ. A.) 30 SW 252. (4) In an action for injury to a passenger in boarding a moving car. Klinck v. Chicago City R. Co., 262 Ill. 280, 104 NE 669, 52 LRANS 70, AnnCas1915B 177 [aff 177 Ill. A. 165] (holding that, in an action for injuries to a passenger incurred while attempting to board a car after it had slowed up at an ordinary stop-injury ping place, an instruction that, if plaintiff did not show that the employees knew that he intended to board, and accepted him as a passenger, he did not become such, and defendant was bound to use only reasonable care to avoid injuring him, gave defendant no ground of complaint). (5) In an action for injuries resulting from the falling of a car window. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Lorton, 110 SW 857, 33 KyL 689. (6) In an action for setting down a passenger at an improper place. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Greer, (Tex. Civ. A.) 127 SW 270. (7) In an action for injuries caused by the disorderly conduct of fellow passengers. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Rudy, 118 Md. 42, 84 A 241. (8) In an action against a carrier for assault by a fellow passenger. Bedsole v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 151 N. C. 152, 65 SE 925. (9) In an action for injury by derailment. Harriman v. Reading, etc., St. R. Co., 173 Mass. 28, 53 NE 156; O'Gara v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 724, 103 SW 54, 12 LRANS 840, 11 Ann Cas 850; Overcash v. Charlotte Electric R., Light, etc., Co., 144 N. C. 572, 57 SE 377, 12 AnnCas 1040. (10) In an action for personal injuries, caused by an alleged defective roadbed. Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Waldo, (Tex. Civ. A.) 26 SW 1004. (11) In an action for injury to an elevator passenger. Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 111. 222, 50 NE 178, 64 AmSR 35 [aff 70 I11. A. 166]; Cooper v. Century Realty Co., 224 Mo. 709, 123 SW 848; Howard v. Scarritt Est. Co., 161 Mo. A. 552, 144 SW 185; Quimby v. Bee Bldg. Co., 87 Nebr. 193, 127 NW 118, 138 AmSR 477.

V.

[b] Instructions held erroneous: (1) Southern R. Co. v. Norwood, 186 Ala. 49, 64 S 604; Baril v. New York, etc., R. Co., 90 Conn. 74, 96 A 164; Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Moore, 99 Ga. 229, 25 SE 460 (as stating the law too strongly against defendant); Joliet St. R. Co. v. McCarthy, 42 Ill. A. 49; Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Beals, 50 Ind. A. 450, 98 NE 453; South Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Riegler, 82 SW 382, 26 KyL 666; Plummer v. Boston El. R. Co., 198 Mass. 499, 84 NE 849; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Trotter, 61 Miss. 417; Walker Quincy, etc., R. Co., (Mo.) 178 SW 108; Evans v. Interstate Rapid-Transit R. Co., 106 Mo. 594. 17 SW 489; Ridenhour v. Kansas City Cable R. Co., 102 Mo. 270, 13 SW 889. 14 SW 760; Johnson v. Wells, 6 Nev. 224, 3 AmR 245; Hughes v. Atlantic City, etc., R. Co., 89 N. J. L. 212, 89 A 769, LRA1916A 927 and note (unwarranted extension of res ipsa loquitur doctrine); Wise v. Columbia R., etc.. Co.. 94 S. C. 254. 77 SE 924 (as to duty to stop street car at all crossings); Steele v. Southern R. Co., 55 S. C. 389. 33 SE 509, 74 AmSR 756; McDonald v. Clark, 15 S. C. L. 223; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Huff, 98 Tex. 110. 81 SW 525 [rev (Civ. A.) 78 SW 2491; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Ball, 28 Tex. Civ. A. 287, 66 SW 879; Duck v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (Tex. Civ. A.) 63 SW 891; Conway v. Salt Lake, etc., R. Co., (Utah) 155 P 339. (2) In an action against a carrier for negligently carrying a passenger by his station. Nelson v. Chicago, etc..

SO

to

the

gence, unless the jury believe that plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence "that at the time and place in question he was a passenger on one of the cars of the defendant." Morris v. Chicago Union Tract. Co., 119 Ill. A. 527.

[e] Erroneous coupling of requirements. It was error to charge conjunctively that the passenger injured could not recover if the jury found that she was negligent with respect to an open door, and that permitting the door to be open was not negligence or the cause of the injury. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Gatlin, 142 Ga. 293, 82 SE 888.

[f] Exemplary damages.-(1) An instruction that plaintiff in an action against a carrier for personal Injuries was entitled to punitive damages if her injuries were the result of "gross negligence," and that punitive damages are allowed only in punishment, and not simply to make greater the recovery, is erroneous, because it fails to explain under what circumstances punitive damages are allowed. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Lee, 90 Tenn. 570, 18 held

SW 268. (2) Instructions
proper. Louisville R. Co. v. Frick,
158 Ky. 450, 165 SW 649; Louisville,
etc., R. Co. v. Ray, 101 Tenn. 1, 46
SW 554 (holding that, in an action
for damages by reason of plaintiff's
being pushed off a train by an em-
ployee of the carrier, a charge that
if the employee was acting within
the scope of his employment the
company would be liable, and if the
act was done in a grossly negligent
or oppressive manner the company
would be liable for punitive dam-
ages, is sufficient, without stating
what acts would be within the scope
of such employment).

[g] Words; legal equivalents.The words "not knowing" or "having no reasonable grounds to suspect," or "knew" or "know," or "had reasonable grounds to suspect," when used in an instruction in an action for injuries to a passeger while attempting to board a train, in consequence of the starting of the train, relating to the knowledge or want of estab-knowledge of the conductor in starting the train before the passenger had boarded it, are legal equivalents. Choctaw, etc., R. Co. v. Hickey, 81 Ark. 579, 99 SW 839.

[h] Construction of particular instructions.-(1) St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McMichael, 115 Ark. 101, 171 SW 115; Kirchner v. Detroit City R. Co., 91 Mich. 400, 51 NW 1059; Rearden v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 215 Mo. 105, 114 SW 961; Bente v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 90 App. Div. 213, 86 NYS 85 [aff 180 N. Y. 519 mem, 72 NE 1139 mem]; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Nance, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 394, 101 SW 294. (2) Where the court charged that negligence could not be presumed, but must be proved, and that, although plaintiff was injured in getting on or off defendant's car, such fact alone does not entitle plaintiff to recover, but she must prove that she was injured in direct consequence of the negligence of defendant's employees, the jury were not told that negligence could not be inferred from the circumstances. 01fermann v. Union Depot R. Co., 125 Mo. 408, 28 SW 742, 46 AmSR 483.

68. Ala.-Birmingham R. etc., Co. v. Landrum, 153 Ala. 192, 45 S 198, 127 AmSR 25 (too indefinite).

Ga.-Hillman v. Georgia R., etc., Co., 126 Ga. 814, 56 SE 68, 8 AnnCas 222.

Il-Galena, etc., R. Co. v. Fay, 16 Ill. 558, 63 AmD 323; East St. Louis R. Co. v. Gray, 135 Ill. A. 642. Iowa. Fitch v. Mason City, etc., Tract. Co., 124 Iowa 665, 100 NW 618. Mo.-Bolton v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 172 Mo. 92, 72 SW 530; Kinyour v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 153 M A. 477, 134 SW 15.

Tex.-Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. Taylor, (Civ. A.) 162 SW 967.

ferent terms or expressions used.69 An instruction which covers the case generally is ordinarily sufficient, in the absence of a request for more particular instructions.70 The instructions must cor

Wis.-Zimmer v. Fox River Valley Electric R. Co., 118 Wis. 614, 95 NW 957.

[a] As to degree of care required. -An instruction that carriers are liable only for want of such care or diligence as is characteristic of cautious persons is insufficient, being too indefinite in indicating the degree of care required. Galena, etc., R. Co. v. Fay, 16 Ill. 558, 63 AmD 323. 69. Ala.-Alabama City, etc., R. Co. v. Bates, 43 S 98.

Cal.-Rawles v. Los Angeles Gas, etc., Corp., 23 Cal. A. 455, 138 P 369. Mo.-Nolan v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 250 Mo. 602, 157 SW 637.

Pa.-Geiger v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 234 Pa. 545, 83 A 367.

Tenn.-Louisville, etc., R. Co. V. Ray, 101 Tenn. 1, 46 SW 554.

Tex.-Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 4 Tex. Civ. A. 435, 23 SW 618.

[a] "Passenger.”—(1) Instructions which failed to define "passenger" have been held erroneous. Nolan v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 250 Mo. 602, 157 SW 637; Geiger v. Pittsburg R. Co., 234 Pa. 545, 83 A 367. (2) An instruction defining a passenger as "one who is boarding a car, or who is attempting to board a car, or at the station of a company operating a car, for the purpose of being carried on the cars from one point to another," is erroneous, as is also a statement therein that "he becomes a passenger when, with the intention of boarding a train, he attempts to board for the purpose of riding." Alabama City, etc.. R. Co. v. Bates, 149 Ala. 487, 491, 43 S 98.

[b] "Reasonable cause."-Where the jury are told that the company was liable if the misconduct of the conductor gave the passenger reasonable cause to jump from the train, it is error to charge that reasonable cause was a cause sufficient to have induced the act, having regard to the passenger's intelligence and experience in life, and his situation and surroundings at the time, as the company is liable only for the natural and probable consequences of the misconduct of the conductor who was not chargeable with knowledge of the passenger's "intelligence and experience in life;" and the error is not cured by an instruction requiring the cause to be such "as reasonably to have induced a man of ordinary prudence to believe his life was in danger, or that he was in danger of great bodily harm," nor by an instruction that the company was not liable unless the misconduct of the conductor and the others "was such as to convince a reasonable man that such threats would be carried into immediate execution." Spohn v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 101 Mo. 417, 455, 14 SW 880.

[c] Provisions of ordinance.Where in an action against a street railroad company for an injury to a passenger caused by her stepping into an excavation the court charged that the violation of provisions of an ordinance established for the protection of the public was negligence, if it was the proximate cause, he should have further explained what provisions were for the benefit of the public. Rawles v. Los Angeles Gas, etc., Corp., 23 Cal. A. 455, 138 P 369. 70. Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Shepherd, 30 Ind. A. 193, 65 NE 765; Fillingham v. St. Louis Transit Co., 102 Mo. A. 573, 77 SW 314; Texas, etc.. R. Co. v. Brown, 78 Tex. 397, 14 SW 1034; Denham v. Washington Water Power Co., 38 Wash. 354, 80 P 546. See also cases supra note 67.

[a] An instruction which is too general is erroneous. (1) Moore v. Saginaw, etc., R. Co., 115 Mich. 103, 72 NW 1112; Stauffer V. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 243 Mo. 305, 147 SW 1032; Jackson v. Grand Ave. R. Co., 118 Mo. 199, 24 SW 192; Frahm

v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 131 App. Div. 747, 116 NYS 90; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Bibb, (Tex. Civ. A.) 172 SW 178; ΕΙ Paso Electric R. Co. V. Harry, 37 Tex. Civ. A. 90, 83 SW 735 (holding that, in an action against a street railroad company for injuries to a passenger, a charge requiring a verdict for defendant, unless its employees did or failed to do something which would not have been done or left undone by a very cautious and careful person under the circumstances, was too general, where the pleadings and evidence | raised certain distinct issues as a cause of action and as a defense thereto). See also Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Davidson, 76 Fed. 517, 22 CCA 306 [certiorari den 166 U. S. 719 mem, 17 SCt 994 mem, 41 L. ed. 1186 mem] (where an instruction as to the condition of the premises was held too broad but not necessarily a reversible error). (2) But an instruction that "the measure of care against accident which one must take to avoid responsibility is that which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use if his interests were to be affected and the whole risk were his own," was not objectionable as too general, where it was further charged that negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily do under the circumstances, and a failure to observe the degree of care which the circumstances justly demand. Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Shepherd, 30 Ind. A. 193, 65 NE 765. 767.

71. Cal.-Stadler v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 23 Cal. A. 571, 138 P 943; Morgan v. Los Angeles Pac. Co., 13 Cal. A. 12, 108 P 735.

Ga.-Macon Cons. St. R. Co. V. Barnes, 113 Ga. 212. 38 SE 756.

Il-North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Palkey, 203 111. 225, 67 NE 793; Elgin, etc., Tract. Co. v. Hench, 132 Ill. A. 535.

Ind. Southern R. Co. v. Ellis, 53 Ind. A. 34, 101 NE 105; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 51 Ind. A. 245, 99 NE 503.

71

(holding that a charge that negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have done under the circumstances or the situation, or doing that which a prudent person under existing circumstances would not have done, was not erroneous when applied to a carrier of passengers); Birmingham R., etc., Co. v. King, 149 Ala. 504, 42 S 612; Southern R. Co. v. Burgess, 143 Ala. 364, 42 S 35; Birmingham R., etc., Co. v. Cockrell, 10 Ala. A. 578, 65 S 704; Weirling v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 115 Ark. 505, 171 SW 901, AnnCas1916E 253; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Grimsley, 90 Ark. 64, 117 SW 1064; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Richardson, 87 Ark. 602, 113 SW 794; Kelly v. Santa Barbara Cons. R. Co., 171 Cal. 415, 153 P 903; Valente v. Sierra R. Co., 151 Cal. 534, 91 P 481 (collision); Stadler V. Pacific Electric R. Co., 23 Cal. A. 571, 138 P 943; McBride v. Georgia R., etc., Co., 125 Ga. 515, 54 SE 674; Macon Cons. St. R. Co. v. Barnes, 113 Ga. 212, 38 SE 756 (holding that it is not erroneous to instruct as to passengers that it is the duty of a carrier to use "extreme care and caution," when, in connection with the words quoted, the court adds, "which very prudent persons exercise in securing and preserving their own property"); Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Cole, 1 Ga. A. 33, 57 SE 1026; Chicago City R. Co. v. Smith, 226 Ill. 178, 80 NE 716 [aff 124 Ill. A. 627]; Frank Parmelee Co. v. Wheelock, 224 Ill. 194, 79 NE 652 [aff 127 Ill. A. 500]; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Johnson, 180 Ill. 285, 54 NE 334 [aff 77 I. A. 142]; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis, 145 Ill. 67, 33 NE 960; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Baddeley, 54 Ill. 19, 5 AmR 71 (holding that an instruction that defendant should have exercised extraordinary care is sufficient without any explanation of the phrase); Mayzels v. Chicago City R. Co., 177 Ill. A. 534; Chicago City R. Co. v. Foster, 128 Ill. A. 571 [aff 226 Ill. 288, 80 NE 7621; Chicago Union Tract. Co. v. Kallberg, 107 Ill. A. 90; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Huskins, 183 Ind. 614, 109 NE 764; Wabash River Tract. Co. v. Baker, 167 Ind. 262, 78 NE 196; Cronk v. Wabash R. Co., 123 Iowa 349, 98 NW 884; Larkin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 118 Iowa 652, 92 NW 891; Donahoe v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 214 Mass. 70, 100 NE 1033; Gal

N. Y.-Ball v. Interurban St. R. Co., 49 Misc. 129, 96 NYS 739; Dinkelspiel v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co.. 113 NYS 187.

Tex.-Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Keeling, 102 Tex. 521, 120 SW 847 [cert 51 Tex. Civ. A. 386, 112 SW 808]; Baker v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (Civ. A.) 158 SW 263; Texas Cent. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 52 Tex. Civ. A. 603, 116 SW 83; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Keeling, 51 Tex. Civ. A. 386, 112 SW 808; Malone v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 49 Tex. Civ. A. 398, 109 SW 430; Norton v. Galveston, etc., R. Co., (Civ. A.) 108 SW 1044; Sproule v. St. Louis, etc.. R. Co., (Civ. A.) 91 SW 657; Williams v. International, etc.. R. Co., 28 Tex. Civ. A. 503, 67 SW 1085; Fordyce v. Chancey, 2 Tex. Civ. A. 24, 21 SW 181.

men

Mass. 211, 65 NE 48; Marshall v. Wabash R. Co., 184 Mich. 593, 151 NW 696; Decker v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 102 Minn. 99. 112 NW 901; Stauffer v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 243 Mo. 305, 147 SW 1032; Grace v. St. Louis R. Co., 156 Mo. 295, 56 SW 1121 (holding that it is not error to instruct that defendant's employees were chargeable with a high degree of care, such as practical and skillful railroad men would have exercised under similar circumstances, although there is no evidence showing what practical and skillful railroad would do under such circumstances); Posch v. Southern Electric R. Co., 76 Mo. A. 601 (holding that an instruction imposing on street railroad employees such a degree of care as "would have been exercised by very careful and skillful railroad employees, under like or similar circumstances" is not objectionable, as imposing on them the care required of steam railroad employees, as the phrase "like or similar circumstances" expressly limits the instructo street railroad employees); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Sue, 25 Nebr. 772, 41 NW 801; Shay v. Camden, etc., R. Co., 66 N. J. L. 334, 49 A 547; Regensburg v. Nassau Electric R. Co., 58 App. Div. 566. 69 NYS 147; Leonard v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 57 App. Div. 125, 67 NYS 985: Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Keeling, 102 Tex.

V.

V.

521, 120 SW 847 [cert 51 Tex. Civ. A. 386, 112 SW 808]; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 79 Tex. 78, 15 SW 264, 23 AmSR 308, 11 LRA 395; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Moore, (Tex. Civ. A.) 161 SW 378; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Aycock, (Tex. Civ. A.) 135 SW 198; Pecos, etc., R. Co. v. Trower, 61 Tex. Civ. A. 53, 130 SW 588; Paris, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson, (Tex. Civ. Á.) 127 SW 294; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Fink, 44 Tex. Civ. A. 544, 99 SW 204; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Parks, 40 Tex. Civ. A. 480, 90 SW 343; Boyles v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (Tex. Civ. A.) 86 SW 936: Denison, etc., R. Co. v. Freeman, 38 Tex. Civ. A. 152, 85 SW 55; Missouri, etc., R. Co. of Texas v. Flood, 35 Tex. Civ. A. 197, 79 SW 1106; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harrison, (Tex. Civ. A.) 77 SW 1036 [rev on other grounds 97 Tex. 611, 80 SW 1139] (as to condition of car); St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Byers. (Tex. Civ. A.) 70 SW 558; Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Rogers, 24 Tex. Civ. A. 382, 60 SW 61; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Greer, 22 Tex. Civ. A. 5, 53 SW 58; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Scarborough, (Tex. Civ. A.) 51 SW 356; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Snead, 4 Tex. Civ. A. 31, 23 SW 277; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Frier, (Tex. Civ. A.) 22 SW 6; Fordyce Chancey, 2 Tex. Civ. A. 24, 21 SW 181; Fordyce v. Withers, 1 Tex. Civ. A. 540, 20 SW 766; Connell v. Seattle, etc., R. Co., 47 Wash. 510, 92 P 377; Foster Electric Co., 35 Seattle Wash. 177, 76 P 995 (holding that a charge, without further qualification, that the duty of the conductor and motorman toward the passengers on the car is to exercise the highest degree of care consistent with the proper discharge of all their other duties, while incorrect, was not reversible error, where there was evidence to the effect that the injury to plaintiff was caused by the fact that the conductor or motorman was engaged in the performance of another duty, and therefore could not look out for plaintiff); Clukey v. Seattle Electric Co., 27 Wash. 70, 67 P 379; Cogswell v. West St.. etc.. Electric R. Co., 5 Wash. 46, 31 P 411. (2) As to an alighting passenger. Florida R. Co. v. Dorsey, 59 Fla. 260, 52 S 963 (holding that there is no error in a charge that, after reasonable alighting time for passengers has elapsed, the conductor of a train should avoid all injury to a passenger that he "possibly can when he knows or sees that she is about to suffer some damage"); Indiana Union Tract. Co. v. Smalley, 44 Ind. A. 172, 88 NE 867; Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Shepherd, 30 Ind. A. 193, 65 NE 765; Champagne v. Boston El. R. Co., 217 Mass. 315. 104 NE 724; Galveston Electric Co. V. Dickey, (Tex. Civ. A.) 138 SW 1093: Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. White, 22 Tex. Civ. A. 424, 55 SW 593; Missouri, etc.. R. Co. v. McElree, 16 Tex. Civ. A. 182. 41 SW 843; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Russell, 8 Tex. Civ. A. 578, 28 SW 1042. (3) As to the duty to warn passengers of danger from obstructions near the track. Moers v. Michigan United R. Co., 158 Mich. 659, NW 602. (4) As to defendant's duty in stopping trains to discharge passengers. Lake Erie, etc.. R. Co. v. Beals, 50 Ind. A. 450, 98 NE 453.

no

123

degree of care required toward passengers, instead of "utmost," and the former should be used, although there may be but slight difference in their meaning. Quinn v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 218 Mo. 545, 118 SW 46.

[d] Applying care required.—An instruction merely defining the care required without applying it to the operation of the car in question is not erroneous as going beyond the specific charge of negligence and authorizing a recovery for any negligence of defendant. Norris v. Met137 SW 77.

41 SW 580. 19 KyL 687 (holding that carriers of passengers for hire are required to exercise the greatest degree of care and foresight, "as compared with and limited by the care and diligence of a prudent man engaged in that business," and that it is error, in charging the jury as to the care required for the safety of a passenger leaving the train. to omit that limitation); Raymond v. Portland R. Co., 100 Me. 529, 62 A 602, 3 LRANS 94 (holding that an instruction stating that it was the duty of the conductor to exercise great care, without in any way lim-ropolitan St. R. Co., 156 Mo. A. 201, iting or defining that expression, was erroneous); Kelly v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 89 App. Div. 159. 85 NYS 842; Medler v. Atlantic Ave. R. Co., 12 NYS 930 [aff 126 N. Y. 669 mem, 27 NE 854 mem]; Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Spear, (Tex. Civ. A.) 107 SW 613; Moore v. Northern Texas Tract. Co.. 41 Tex. Civ. A. 583, 95 SW 652; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Martin, (Tex. Civ. A.) 87 SW 387; International, etc., R. Co. Hubbs, 37 Tex. Civ. A. 77, 82 SW 1062; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Greer, 22 Tex. Civ. A. 5, 53 SW 58; Rapid Transit R. Co. v. Strong, (Tex. Cr.) 108 SW 394; Payne v. Spokane St. R. Co., 15 Wash. 522, 46 P 1054; Conroy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 96 Wis. 243, 70 NW 486, 38 LRA 419. (2) As requiring too high a degree of care. Indiana Union Tract. Co. v. Bales, 58 Ind. A. 92, 107 NE 682 (imposing absolute duty instead of highest degree of care); Parker v.

V.

Des Moines City R. Co., 153 Iowa 254, 133 NW 373. AnnCas1913E 174; Central Kentucky Tract. Co. v. Chapman, 130 Ky. 342, 113 SW 438; Gardner v. Boston El. R. Co., 204 Mass. 213, 90 NE 534; Carroll v. Boston El. R. Co., 200 Mass. 527, 86 NE 793; Moore v. Saginaw, etc., R. Co., 115 Mich. 103, 72 NW 1112; Crolly v. Union R. Co., 46 Misc. 417, 92 NYS 313; Dinkelspiel V. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 113 NYS 187; Larson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 31 S. D. 512, 141 NW 353: Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Cobb, 60 Tex. Civ. A. 562, 128 SW 910; Bryant v. Northern Texas Tract. Co., 52 Tex. Civ. A. 600, 115 SW 880. (3) As not imposing as great a duty as the carrier was bound to bear. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Whitney, 198 Fed. 784, 117 CCA 392 (injury to postal clerk by a defect in the car); Cavin v. Southern Pac. Co., 136 Fed. 592. 69 CCA 366 [aff 144 Fed. 348, 75 CCA 350]; Kirkpatrick v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 211 Mo. 68, 109 SW 682 [rev 129 Mo. A. 524, 107 SW 1025]; Hartley v. Pecos Valley, etc., R. Co., (Tex. Civ. A.) 103 SW 1123; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell. 34 Tex. Civ. A. 394, 79 SW 94 (holding that charge a which uses the term "proper care" in defining care in a case where the highest degree of care is required is erroneous); St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Harrison, 32 Tex. Civ. A. 368, 73 SW 38. (4) As to the duty to protect persons lawfully on a station platform. Huddleston v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 90 Ark. 378. 119 SW 280. (5) As to the duty of furnishing a safe place for passengers to alight. Southern R. Co. v. Skinner, 133 Ga. 33, 65 SE 134. (6) Instructions in an action for injuries

to a passenger boarding a moving train as to the time allowed for going to a ticket office, using the terms "plenty of time" and "ample time." are inaccurate, "reasonable time" being all that is required. Southern R. Co. v. Nichols, 137 Ga. 670. 74 SE 268. (7) An instruction that one operating a passenger elevator in an apartment house is charged with the duty of keeping the elevator and the premises about it "safe" is erroneous, as making him an insurer. Tippecanoe L. & T. Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357, 101 NE 915, LRA1915E 721.

in

[e] Language of statute.—(1) An instruction substantially in the language of a statute defining the care required of a carrier and its consequent liability is not erroneous. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Croxton, 63 Fla. 223, 58 S 369; Ramsey v. McKay, 44 Okl. 774, 146 P 210. (2) But it is error to charge that carriers must treat their passengers respectfully and protect them so far as they reasonably can from injury and insult on the part of their employees, where the statute expressly makes it the duty of a carrier of passengers to use extraordinary dilion behalf of itself and its gence agents to protect the lives and persons of its passengers. Mason v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 135 Ga. 741, 70 SE 225, 33 LRANS 280. (3) In an action by a passenger injured by being compelled to remain in an unwarmed station, an instruction based on a statute requiring carriers to keep passenger stations warmed for at least one hour before and after the departure of trains, which does not contain the limitation of the statute, is erroneous. International, etc., R. Co. v. Doolan, 56 Tex. Civ. A. 503, 120 SW 1118.

[f] Willful act of stranger.Where the accident was the result of a willful criminal trespass of a stranger, for which the carrier was not responsible, it is not reversible error for the trial court to fail to emphasize and reiterate the rule that the company was bound to use the highest degree of care, skill, and prudence that was humanly possible. Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 157 Pa. St. 103, 27 A 689, 22 LRA 306.

[g] Gross negligence.-In an action for injury to a street car passenger, an instruction that gross negligence is that which evinces a reckless disregard of or indifference to the safety of others is favorable to the street railroad company, as "gross negligence" is the absence of slight care. Lexington R. Co. V. Johnson. 139 Ky. 323. 122 SW 830. to [h] Failure distinguish between duty and care in performance of duty-An instruction as to the duty of defendant's employees to know that plaintiff. a passenger, was alighting before they signaled the train to start was erroneous for not distinguishing between the duty to do a certain thing and the care necessary in the performance of such duty. Southern R. Co. v. Ellis, 53 Ind. A. 34, 101 NE 105.

72. See cases infra this note. [a] Instructions held not misleading: (1) In general. Bonneau v. North Shore R. Co.. 152 Cal. 406, 93 P 106, 125 AmSR 68; McClelland v. Burns, 5 Colo. 390; Southern R. Co. v. Wallis, 133 Ga. 553, 66 SE 370, 30 LRANS 401, 18 AnnCas 67; Western, etc., R. Co. v. Burnham, 123 Ga. 28, 50 SE 984; Jackson v. Georgia R., etc., Co., 7 Ga. A. 644, 67 SE 898; Chicago City R. Co. v. Smith, 226 II. 178, 80 NE 716 [aff 124 Ill. A. 627]; Chicago Union Tract. Co. v. Lowenrosen, 222 III. 506. 78 NE 813 [aff 125 III. A. 194]; Fisher v. Chicago City R. Co.. 189 Ill. A. 492; Ferrier v. Chicago R. Co., 185 Ill. A. 326; Indiana Union Tract. Co. v. Maher. 176 Ind. 289. 95 NE 1012, AnnCas1914A 994; Terre Haute Tract., etc., Co. v. Payne, 45