85 tract to furnish cars,84 and also to show the amount of damages sustained from a breach,8 is on plaintiff. Whether or not a contract existed, by which defendant agreed to furnish cars to plaintiff, is a question of fact for the jury.8 86 87 [§ 294] (5) Damages Recoverable. The damages which the shipper is entitled to recover are those proximately and naturally resulting from the failure of the carrier to furnish the cars in accordance with the terms of the contract, but nothing beyond this.88 If increased freight charges result from the failure to furnish cars, the shipper is entitled to recover the excess freight.89 So the shipper is entitled to recover the difference in the market value of the goods, if the market declined during the delay,90 depreciation in the goods themselves rendering. them less valuable,91 and also to recover any expenses incurred in paying for pasturage, and for the employment of labor to look after the cattle for which the cars were to be furnished, and in supplying food for horses used for that purpose. Likewise special damages are recoverable if, at the time the contract is made, the 92 San nished as defendant promised. Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Timon, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 47, 99 SW 418. (2) Where, in an action for injuries to cattle by a carrier's delay in furnishing cars, plaintiff only claimed damages occurring before the cattle were put into the cars, all testimony referring to the treatment of the cattle along the road was inadmissible. San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Timon, supra. (3) Where, in an action for breach of a carrier's contract to furnish cars in which to ship certain cattle, plaintiff alleged that defendants' agents who acted for them in negotiating the contract, namely, W and S, were duly authorized to make such contract, proof that plaintiff negotiated the contract with S through letters and telegrams, and consummated verbal contract with M, did not constitute a fatal variance. Pecos River R. Co. v. Latham, 40 Tex. Civ. A. 78, 88 SW 392. a 84. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Ray, 37 Tex. Civ. A. 622, 84 SW 691. 85. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Weems, (Tex. Civ. A.) 165 SW 1194. [a] Evidence on question of damages. In an action against a carrier for damages for failure to furnish cars for shipments of peaches, thus necessitating the canning of the peaches to save them, although they had become soft, evidence of the difference of the yield of the overripe peaches for canning purposes and the yield of normal peaches the year before was admissible to show damages, not being remote or speculative. Fremont Canning Co. v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 180 Mich. 283, 146 NW 678. [b] Sufficiency of evidence.-In an action against a railroad company for breach of contract to furnish refrigerator cars in which to ship peaches, as a result of which they fell off the trees and decayed during the period of delay in furnishing cars, where, although there was evidence that the peaches were worth a certain price. less the cost of the crates and of picking, packing, and delivering at the cars, there was no evidence as to the cost of the crates, picking, etc.. there was no basis for the court's finding as to the amount of damages. Texas, etc.. R. Co. v. Weems. (Tex. Civ. A.) 165 SW 1194. 86. Pope v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 112 Minn. 112, 127 NW 436; Hastings v. New York, etc., R. Co., 6 NYS 836. 87. M. C., etc., R. Co. v. Pounders, 4 Tenn. Civ. A. 372. 88. Williams v. Armour Car Lines, 23 Del. 275, 79 A 919; Louisville, etc.. R. Co. v. Queen City Coal Co., 13 KyL 832; Outland v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 134 N. C. 350, 46 SE 735 carrier has notice of the circumstances requiring a prompt delivery of the cars.93 While it is the duty of the shipper, on failure of the carrier to comply with its contract to furnish cars, to exercise reasonable diligence to avoid or to lessen his damages, the principle does not require him in the exercise of ordinary care to make a new contract with the carrier which had just broken an identical one, and again agree to pay it for services which it is already under legal obligation to perform." [§ 295] e. Agreement for Compensation to Shipper in Case of Loss or Damage. The shipper and the carrier may make a reasonable agreement for compensation to the shipper in the event of loss or damage to the goods by the carrier.95 [§ 296] f. Terms, Time, Etc.96 Special contracts as to the rates to be charged, time of transportation, the facilities for loading and unloading,' and like matters which will vary the common-law obligation of the carrier, may be made between the parties. These are but illustrations of the matters to which a special contract may relate.97 (instruction held not erroneous on the facts); San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Broad-Davis Cattle Co., (Tex. Civ. A.) 140 SW 514; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Scott, (Tex. Civ. A.) 86 SW 1065. 89. Pecos River R. Co. v. Latham, 40 Tex. Civ. A. 78. 88 SW 392. V. 90. Newport News, etc., Co. Mercer, 96 Ky. 475, 29 SW 301, 16 KyL 555; N. C., etc., R. Co. v. Pounders, 4 Tenn. Civ. A. 372; San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Timon, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 47, 99 SW 418. [a] Damages for failure to furnish cattle cars are to be measured by the difference between the prices which would have been obtained at the point of destination, if the cars had been furnished as contracted, and the prices that were obtained at the time of the arrival of the delayed car. N. C., etc., R. Co. v. Pounders, 4 Tenn. Civ. A. 372. 91. Newport News, etc., R. Co. v. Mercer, 96 Ky. 475, 29 SW 301, 16 KyL 555 (shrinkage in weight of cattle); N. C., etc., R. Co. v. Pounders, 4 Tenn. Civ. A. 372 (shrinkage in weight of cattle); San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Timon, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 47, 99 SW 418 (shrinkage in weight of cattle). 92. Newport News, etc., R. Co. v. Mercer, 96 Ky. 475, 29 SW 301, 16 KyL 555; Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Samples, (Tex. Civ. A.) 109 SW 417 (where it was said that damages of this character are not special damages requiring notice, on the part of the carrier, of special circumstances, in order to authorize a recovery therefor). 93. See cases infra this note. [a] Illustrations.—(1) Where defendant carrier, at the time when it contracted to furnish plaintiff cars for shipment of timber, had notice of the existence of a contract to purchase the timber from plaintiff, or knew that such contract was in contemplation, and before default in supplying the cars, had notice that it had been made, and that the timber was to be delivered, in performance of plaintiff's contract of sale, the measure of damages for failure to furnish the cars is the profit which, but for such failure, plaintiff would have made out of his contract. Baxley v. Tallassee, etc.. R. Co., 128 Ala. 183, 29 S 451. (2) A carrier contracted to furnish cars to the operator of a coal mine, opened at the instigation of the carrier, and bound the operator not to contract with another line for the shipment of its coal. The carrier knew that fixed charges had to be met at the mine, whether it was run or was idle. and knew that the only practical way to mine was to load the coal into railroad cars, and that it was not practical to store coal. The carrier failed to furnish cars, and it was held that the operator might recover, as damages, the net profits of operating the mine. Midland Valley R. Co. v. Hoffman Coal Co., 91 Ark. 180, 120 SW 380. Special damages see generally Damages [13 Cyc 1]. 94. Pecos River R. Co. v. Latham, 40 Tex. Civ. A. 78, 88 SW 392. Rule of avoidable consequences see generally Damages [13 Cyc 71]. 95. Trakas v. Southern R. Co., (S. C.) 86 SE 492. And see generally supra §§ 211-222. 96. And see also infra § 404 et seq. 97. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Roberts, 71 Ill. 540; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Hall, 46 Ind. A. 219, 90 NE 498, 501, 91 NE 743 (where the court said: "The parties may make any agreement they please as to the time, place, and manner of delivery"); Burtis v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 24 N. Y. 269; New York Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 20 Hun (N. Y.) 39 [aff 87 N. Y. 486]. [a] Construction of contracts as to time of delivery.-(1) When the carrier delivers live stock at market on the day agreed on, but at such an hour and in such a condition as to make it necessary to carry them over to the following day's market in order to get the best results, such delivery is not a compliance with its contract, and it is liable for any resulting damages. Texas Midland R. Co. v. Fogleman, (Tex. Civ. A.) 172 SW 558; Texas Midland R. Co. v. Becker, (Tex. Civ. A.) 171 SW 1024; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. White, (Tex. Civ. A.) 160 SW 1128; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Wells. (Tex. Civ. A.) 153 SW 659. (2) Where a carrier contracted to transport and to deliver cattle in time for a particular market, it was bound to make the delivery in time, so that the cattle might be fed and watered, according to custom, before being placed on the market; and hence, where there was no time for this before the market closed, after the delivery at destination on the day the cattle were to be sold, the carrier was liable for a loss due to a decline in the market on the succeeding day. St. Louis, etc.. R. Co. v. White, supra. [b] Statements as to time will not constitute an express contract unless made and acted on as such. International, etc., R. Co. v. Wentworth, 87 Tex. 311, 28 SW 277. [c] Rates.-(1) One sustaining loss by a carrier's refusal to transport freight at stipulated rates may recover the loss sustained on contracts made on the faith of such Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hig rates. X. AUTHORITY OF AGENTS ΤΟ [§ 297] A. In General. In determining whether a contract made for the carrier by an agent is binding, the principles of agency are applicable, and the general rule is well settled that, if the contract is within the general scope of authority of the agent, the carrier will be bound thereby, although the agent has acted beyond his instructions in the particular case.99 This is in accordance with the well settled principle that the powers of the agent are prima facie coextensive with the business intrusted to his care and will not be narrowed by limitations not communicated to the persons with whom he deals. Applying this principle it is very generally held that, where a railroad company places an agent in charge of its business at a station, and empowers him to contract for the shipment of freight, it holds him out to the public as having authority to contract with reference to all 1 MAKE CONTRACTS FOR CARRIER 98 the necessary and ordinary details of the business, and, within the range of such business, he becomes a general agent, and may bind the company by a contract within the scope of his apparent authority, although in making the contract he may have exceeded his authority. Strangers or other persons delivering goods for transportation are not bound to inquire whether the person found at the depot ready to receive goods is authorized to transact such business, and the carriers cannot evade their responsibility for failure to carry and deliver goods so received. These contracts will be binding on the carrier, although oral, or although they were made before the goods were actually delivered. Such is ordinarily the rule in respect of contracts made by freight agents of the carrier, or by subagents appointed or designated by a general agent (2)| steamship company's agents at the don, 149 Ky. 321, 148 SW 26. Where a rate was quoted, but before shipment was made, the shipper was notified that an error had been made and that the rate was repudiated, and he then accepted a bill of lading specifying the higher rate, he thereby waived any right under the original offer. Wabash R. Co. v. Wright, 75 Ill. A. 243. [d] Shipment by particular train. -Where defendant contracted to ship five dogs for plaintiff on a particular train, and by reason of their being shipped on an earlier train, and the consequent failure of plaintiff to be present to receive them, one of them died from the long confinement, defendant was liable for the loss. Harrison v. Weir, 34 Misc. 519, 69 NYS 957 [motion dism app den 68 App. Div. 25, 73 NYS 1119]. 98. Authority to receive goods for shipment see infra §§ 314-316. 99. Iowa. Wood v. Chicago. etc., R. Co., 68 Iowa 491, 27 NW 473, 56 AmR 861. Mass.-Green v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 128 Mass. 221, 35 AmR 370. Mo.-Baker v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 91 Mo. 152, 3 SW 486; Harrison v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 74 Mo. 364, 41 AmR 318; Pruitt v. Hannibal, etc.. R. Co., 62 Mo. 527; Gelvin v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 21 Mo. A. 273. Nebr.-Lincoln Tent, etc., Co. V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 86 Nebr. 338, 125 NW 603. N. Y.-Lowenstein v. Lombard, 164 N. Y. 324, 58 NE 44. Pa. New York Cent., etc., R. Co. V. Deer Creek Lumber Co., 49 Pa. Super. 453, 461 [cit Cyc]. Tex.-Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343, 89 SW 968; Texas Pac. R. Co. v. Nicholson, 61 Tex. 491. [a] The methods of business of an agent which have been pursued for a number of years are presumed to be known to, and to have been acquiesced in by, the carrier. Springer v. Westcott, 166 N. Y. 117, 59 NE 693. [b] For what carrier agent acting. The general agent of the receivers of a railway company was acting as agent for such receivers, and not as the agent of a connecting steamship company, in agreeing to forward a through shipment by a steamer sailing on a specified day, where his only authority as agent of the steamship company was created by a contract between the railway and the steamship companies, under which the railway company was to appoint agents who should act for the steamship company to quote through rates and to issue through bills of lading, and the application for a rate for such shipment was made to him as agent for the receivers, and the rate was quoted by him as such agent, and as such he signed a letter confirming the rate. and so described himself when informing the 1. Baker v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 91 Mo. 152, 3 SW 486; Lowenstein v. Lombard, 164 N. Y. 324, 58 NE 44. See also Agency et seq. 198 2. Il-Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Rosenberg, 31 Ill. Á. 47. And see Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Roberts, 71 Ill. 540 (where, however, the agent did not exceed his authority). Iowa. Wood v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 68 Iowa 491, 27 NW 473, 56 AmR 861. Ky.-Newport News, etc.. R. Co. v. Mercer, 96 Ky. 475, 29 SW 301, 16 KyL 555. Mich.-Sturges v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 166 Mich. 231, 131 NW 706. Mo.-Harrison v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 74 Mo. 364, 41 AmR 318; Pruitt v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 62 Mo. 527; Gelvin v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 21 Mo. A. 273. Nebr.-Lincoln Tent, etc.. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 86 Nebr. 338, 125 NW 603. N. H.-Flint v. Boston, etc., R. Co.. 73 N. H. 141, 59 A 938; Deming v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 48 N. H. 455, 2 AmR 267. N. C.-Harrell v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 106 N. C. 258, 11 SE 286. Pa.-Baltimore, etc., Steamboat Co. v. Brown, 54 Pa. 77; New York Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Deer Creek Lumber Co., 49 Pa. Super. 453, 461 [eit Cyc]. Tenn.-Watson v. Memphis, etc., R. Co.. 9 Heisk. 255. Tex.-Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Zimmerman, 99 Tex. 349, 89 SW 971 [rev (Civ. A.) 86 SW 54]; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 99 Tex. 349, 89 SW 971; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343. 89 SW 968; Pacific Express Co. v. Needham, 37 Tex. Civ. A. 129, 83 SW 22; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Short, (Civ. A.) 51 SW 261. Utah.--Nichols V. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 24 Utah 83, 66 P 768, 91 AmSR 778. the [a] Reason for rule.-"All business of the great railroad companies, and of corporations generally. must of necessity be transacted by agents. The corporation, of itself, without the intervention of an agent can make or enter into no contract. Agents are placed at each shipping point for this very purpose. Contracts made by them within the reasonable scope of their employment and business are binding. They are located at the stations, or in the city offices in the larger cities, for the purpose of managing the transportation from the points where the stations and offices are located. No one else is supposed to be in control.” Lincoln Tent, etc., Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 86 Nebr. 338, 343, 125 NW 603. [b] Contract to furnish special train.-The agent may make a special contract for carriage of freight by special train, where it is doubtful whether the regular train will arrive in time. Auditorium Theatre Co. v. Oregon-Washington R., etc., Co., 77 Wash. 277, 137 P 489. 3. Potts v. Bowler, 1 Ky. Op. 133. 4. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 99 Tex. 349, 89 SW 971; Gulf, etc.. R. Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343, 89 SW 968: Gulf, etc.. R. Co. v. Hume, 87 Tex. 211, 27 SW 110; San Antonio, etc.. R. Co. v. Williams, (Tex. Civ. A.) 57 SW 883. 5. Deming v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 48 N. H. 455, 2 AmR 267; Watson v. Memphis. etc.. R. Co., 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 255. 6. U. S.-Northern Pac. R. Co. v. American Trading Co., 195 U. S. 439, 25 SCt 84. 49 L. ed. 269. Ky.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Duncan, 16 KyL 119. Minn.-Baker V. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 91 Minn. 118, 97 NW 650. Pa. New York Cent., etc., R. Co. V. Deer Creek Lumber Co., 49 Pa. Super. 453. Tex. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. De Bord, 21 Tex. Civ. A. 691, 53 SW 587. [a] A general freight agent has the power to make a contract of carriage along its lines. "A railroad company has the power, as we have seen, to make such a contract of carriage beyond its lines. A general agent would be presumed to have such power. If the company have the power some individual must exercise it. It would not be supposed that the board of directors would be consulted and authority given by it every time such a contract was to be made." Northern Pac. R. Co. V. American Trading Co., 195 U. S. 439, 462, 25 SCt 84, 49 L. ed. 269. [b] The traveling freight agent (1) of a railroad company may bind his company by an agreement with a shipper to place freight on a siding of another line at a particular rate. where the agent had for several years been quoting rates to the shipper and arranging for the latter's shipments, the agreement in question was the inducement which procured the shipment, and the agent's authority had never before been questioned by the company. New York Cent.. etc., R. Co. v. Deer Creek Lumber Co., 49 Pa. Super. 453. (2) Where a traveling freight agent of a common carrier, with authority to solicit freight business, and with special authority to contract for shipments of freight on special conditions as to movements of trains, contracts for the shipment of freight, without disclosing the conditions limiting his authority, the principal is bound by his act, and is liable for resulting damages. Baker having power to contract for the carrier, or by a clerk apparently in charge of a freight office. In all cases where the contract is within the apparent scope of the agent's authority, the carrier cannot escape liability thereon, unless the shipper had actual knowledge that in making the contract the agent exceeded his authority. So long as the agent has apparent authority to contract, the shipper is under no obligation to make inquiries as to his authority and is not chargeable with notice of a limitation of the agent's right to contract,10 and the burden is on the carrier to show that the parties, when the contract was made, had knowledge of the fact that the agent was acting beyond his authority, if it seeks to escape liability on the ground that the contract is unauthorized.11 Contracts not within scope of apparent authority. On the other hand, an agent cannot bind the carrier beyond what may fairly be presumed, from the v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 91 Minn. 118, 97 NW 650. (3) A general traveling freight agent may bind a railroad company with reference to privileges at a particular station. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. De Bord, 21 Tex. Civ. A. 691, 53 SW 587. a [c] An agent authorized only to solicit freight, (1) and not generally exercising the power of making special contracts was held not to have apparent authority in a particular case to deviate from the terms of shipment publicly set out in circulars of the company. Lienkauf v. Lombard, 12 App. Div. 302. 42 NYS 391. (2) But where it was shown that a soliciting freight agent with authority had negotiated settlement arising out of a previous contract with the same shipper, and that the company had recognized the settlement and paid the amount stipulated which was part consideration of the new contract, and for a month carried out the new contract, the shipper was justified in regarding him as a general agent for that branch of the business. Graves v. Miami SS. Co., 29 Misc. 645, 61 NYS 115. 7. Tennessee River Transp. Co. v. Kavanaugh, 101 Ala. 1, 13 S 283; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Kidd, 29 Ala. 221; Taylor v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 74 Ill. 86; Harrell v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co.. 106 N. C. 258, 11 SE 286. 8. Bauer v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 175 Ill. A. 346. 9. Ill.-Erie, etc., Despatch V. Cecil, 112 Ill. 180. N. Y.-Lowenstein v. Lombard, 164 N. Y. 324, 58 NE 44; Schroeder v. Hudson River R. Co., 12 N. Y. Super. 55. Pa. -New York Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Deer Creek Lumber Co., 49 Pa. Super. 453, 461 [cit Cyc]. Tex.-International, etc.. R. Co. v. True, 23 Tex. Civ. A. 523, 57 SW 977; San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, (Civ. A.) 57 SW 883; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hume, 6 Tex. Civ. A. 653, 24 SW 915; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. House, 4 Tex. Civ. A. 263, 23 SW 332. Wis. -Hansen v. Flint, etc., R. Co., 73 Wis. 346, 41 NW 529, 9 AmSR 791. [a] Where the local agent of a railway company purported to act for an association of companies in making a special contract, it was held that the articles of agreement between the companies were not admissible to show want of power in the local agent to make such contract. as they were not binding on the agent nor on the public. Erie, etc.. Despatch v. Cecil, 112 111. 180. 10. Lowenstein v. Lombard, 164 N. Y. 324, 58 NE 44; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Irvine, (Tex. Civ. A.) 73 SW 540; San Antonio, etc,, R. Co. v. Williams. (Tex. Civ. A.) 57 SW 883; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Bryan, (Tex. Civ. A.) 37 SW 234 (holding that it is no defense to an action for damage arising from delay in the transportation of cattle that the cattle character of his employment, to be his authority;12 and if the shipper seeks to enforce such contract, the burden is on him to show actual authority on the part of the agent to make it.13 Thus for obvious reasons the local station agent's authority presumptively extends only to the control of the carrier's business at his own station, and he cannot act for the carrier in the matter of shipping from stations other than that at which he is employed, unless expressly or impliedly authorized so to do.14 A contract made by an unauthorized agent may be ratified by an authorized agent, notwithstanding the want of authority of the former," and the carrier may ratify a contract made by its agent in violation of its rules.16 If to the knowledge of the shipper the particular contract is not within the scope of the agent's authority, it is of course not binding on the carrier.17 were shipped in the name of one not the owner thereof, in order to get the benefit of certain rates to which such person was entitled, there being no evidence of want of authority in defendant's local agent who knew the facts to consent to such mode of shipment). "Patrons are not expected, nor does the law require them, to ascertain by inquiry and investigation whether the person found in charge of the business of the station is there wrongfully or without authority." Lincoln Tent, etc.. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 86 Nebr. 338, 343, 125 NW 603. "When shippers enter the offices of common carriers, they have the right to assume that the persons therein dealing with them have the right and authority to bind the carrier, and, if they have not, the carrier should prove the want of authority." Pecos, etc., R. Co. v. Cox, (Tex. Civ. A.) 150 SW 265, 267. 11. Harrison v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 74 Mo. 364, 41 AmR 318; Pecos, etc., R. Co. v. Cox, (Tex. Civ. A.) 150 SW 265. 12. Dak.-Mulligan V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 4 Dak. 315, 29 NW 659. Ind.-Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Katzenbach, 118 Ind. 174, 20 NE 709. Kan. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Carpenter, 44 Kan. 257, 24 P 462. 15 [a] Rule applied.-A carrier's agent at a station to which goods were not consigned had no authority to contract to stop them at his station; nor had an agent at another station authority to contract to reship them from destination to his station. Anderson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (Tex. Civ. A.) 156 SW 358. [b] Presumption rebuttable.-Although a carrier's agent is presumed to be without authority to act for it in contracting for shipments from stations other than his own and beyond the carrier's line, the contrary is susceptible of proof. McManus v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 156 Iowa 359, 136 NW 769. [c] Evidence held insufficient to establish authority.-Evidence that the agent at a railroad station informed a shipper of the rates made by the general freight agent between two other stations, and told him his understanding of the time and the connection of trains between those stations, is not sufficient to establish the authority of the agent to contract for the shipment of freight between those stations. Burgher v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 105 Iowa 335, 75 NW 192. 15. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 99 Tex. 349, 89 SW 971; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343, 89 SW 968. 16. Nashville, etc., R. Co. V. Ky. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Bennett, 76 SW 408, 25 KyL 834; New-Smith, 132 Ala. 434, 31 S 481; Kirby port News, etc., R. Co. v. Reed, 10 KyL 1020. Minn.-Weikle v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 64 Minn. 296, 66 NW 963. Miss.-Illinois Cent. R. Co. V. Ewanson, 92 Miss. 485, 46 S 83.§ N. H.-Elkins v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 23 N. H. 275. Tex.-Gathright v. Pacific Express Co., 105 Tex. 157, 145 SW 1185 [aff 61 Tex. Civ. A. 587. 130 SW 1035]. Eng. Horne v. Midland R. Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 131, 5 ERC 506; Great Western R. Co. v. Willis, 18 Č. B. N. S. 748, 114 ECL 748, 144 Reprint 639. 13. Ky.-Newport News, etc., R. Co. v. Reed, 10 KyL 1020. Minn.-Weikle v. Minneapolis, etc., Miss.-Illinois Cent. R. Co. V. Eng. Giles v. Taff Vale R. Co., 2 E. & B. 822, 75 ECL 822, 118 Reprint 975. 14. Burgher v. Chicago, etc.. R. Co., 105 Iowa 335, 75 NW 192; Voorhees v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 71 Iowa 735, 30 NW 29, 60 AmR 823; Hunter v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 167 Mo. A. 624, 150 SW 733; Gathright v. Pacific Express Co., 105 Tex. 157, 160, 145 SW 1185 (where it was said: "If such agent make contracts for the transaction of business at other stations. confusion would soon prevail"): Anderson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (Tex. Civ. A.) 156 SW 358. See also infra § 298. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 242 Ill. 418, 90 NE 252 [rev on other grounds 225 U. S. 155, 32 SCt 648, 56 L. ed. 1033, AnnCas1914A 501]; Porter v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co., 132 N. C. 71, 43 SE 547 (holding that, where a railroad company ratified and undertook to perform a contract for the transportation of goods made by a local agent in violation of its rule, which required advance payment of freight, and accepted in lieu thereof a deposit of the amount at the point of destination, it was bound to perform such contract); St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Boshear, 102 Tex. 76, 113 SW G [aff (Civ. A.) 108 SW 1032]. See also Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mink, 126 Ky. 337, 103 SW 294, 31 KyL 833 (holding that, although the agent of a carrier at a certain station resigned and his resignation was accepted, yet, no one else having been appointed for a year, and the company having in the interim left the station keys with him, and he having personally seen to billing freight, although he did not sign the bills of lading, and no notice of his discharge having been given the public, but he having been permitted to act substantially as he had done before, the carrier was estopped by its acquiescence to question his authority as agent as between it and the shippers who dealt with him). Ratification generally see Agency §§ 77-146. 17. Ala. Gulf City Constr. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 121 Ala. 621, [§ 298] B. Contracts for Furnishing Cars.18 An oral contract by a duly authorized agent of a carrier to furnish cars to a shipper constitutes a contract which is valid and binding on both parties.19 The general manager of a railroad has authority to make contracts to furnish cars to shippers.20 General freight agent. The general freight agent. of a division of a railroad has authority to make contracts to furnish trains for moving freight," and he has authority to bind the carrier by a contract to furnish a certain number of cars on a specified day for the transportation of freight.22 Conductor of train. The carrier is bound by the promise of a freight train conductor to furnish cars for a shipper, where he has been intrusted generally with such power and authorized to exercise it.2 23 Station agent. The station agent, having charge of a railroad company's business at a particular 25 S 579. Ga.-Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Felton, 110 Ga. 597, 36 SE 93 (knowledge by shipper that agent is acting in direct violation of positive instructions previously given by carrier). Iowa. Angle v. Mississippi, etc., R. Co., 18 Iowa 555 (holding that the agent cannot bind the carrier by a contract in violation of a rule known to the shipper). Me.-Barnard v. Wheeler, 24 Me. 412 (holding that, if the shipper has reason to know that the authority of the agent is limited in a particular instance, he is bound by such limitation). Eng.-Walker v. York, etc., R. Co., 2 E. & B. 750, 75 ECL 750, 118 Reprint 948. [a] Where the agent of a railway company attempts to make with himself as consignor an unauthorized contract for transportation of goods he is bound by any knowledge which he may have as to the limitations of his own authority. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Felton, 110 Ga. 597, 36 SE 93. 18. See also supra §§ 290-294. 19. Chattanooga Southern R. Co. v. Thompson, 133 Ga. 127, 65 SE 285; San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Timon, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 47, 99 SW 418. 20. Chattanooga Southern R. Co. v. Thompson, 133 Ga. 127, 65 SE 285. 21. Outland v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 134 N. C. 350, 353, 46 SE 735 (where it was said: "That designation carries with it, in law, the power to do all acts connected with the handling of freight and fixing special rates, the furnishing of trains for the movement of freight under special contract and all matters pertaining to the subject of freights, which the company itself could do"). [a] Evidence sufficient to show general agency.-(1) The testimony of the live stock agent of a railroad company that he had authority to contract for cars to ship cattle was sufficient to show him a general agent who could bind the carrier by a contract to furnish cars. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Kyser, 38 Tex. Civ. A. 355. 87 SW 389. (2) Evidence of contracts of a witness with the agent of the railway company, by which cars had been furnished at I, was admissible to show that such agent's contract with plaintiff to furnish cars at I was within the scope of his authority. Pecos River R. Co. v. Latham, 40 Tex. Civ. A. 78, 88 SW 392. 22. Baker v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co.. 91 Mo. 152, 3 SW 486. 23. Georgia Coast, etc., R. Co. v. Durrence, 6 Ga. A. 615, 65 SE 583. 24. Ill-Grimes v. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co., 142 111. A. 532; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Tison, 116 Ill. A. 48. Ind. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wolcott, 141 Ind. 267, 39 NE 451, 50 Am SR 320: Pittsburgh, etc.. R. Co. v. Racer, 10 Ind. A. 503, 37 NE 280. 24 station, has implied authority to contract to furnish cars at particular times for the shipment of goods, and the company will be bound by such contracts, even though in violation of the company's directions to the agent, if the limitation of his authority is not known to the shipper. A fortiori is this so where in the previous course of dealing between the same parties they recognize such contracts as valid,25 and the rule has been held to apply even though a reasonable time was not given to have the cars on hand.26 The station agent likewise has authority to bind the carrier to furnish a particular kind of cars,27 and it has further been held that a contract made by a station agent to furnish a shipper a certain variety of cars belonging to another company is within the apparent scope of his authority and binds his principal.28 It has even been held that such agent has implied authority to furnish cars for shipment to a destination beive; and it would be equally oppressive upon the shipper to require him to make such contracts as must be made with some general officer of the company. The time when the cars are to be ready is of the utmost importance in the shipment of many articles, especially livestock. Such business must of necessity be transacted by the company's agent, and in fact it is so done because it is a necessity. If the agent can contract to receive the freight, he can contract as to the time when he will receive it and as to every other undertaking necessary to that end." Easton v. Dudley, 78 Tex. 236, 239 14 SW 583. Iowa. Stewart v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 172 Iowa 313, 151 NW 485; Stoner v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 109 Iowa 551, 80 NW 569; Wood v. Chicago, etc.. R. Co., 68 Iowa 491, 27 NW 473, 56 AmR 861. Mo.-Harrison v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.. 74 Mo. 364, 41 AmR 318; Meriwether v. Quincy, etc., R. Co.,. 128 Mo. A. 647, 107 SW 434; Miller v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 62 Mo. A. 252. N. Y.-Clark v. Ulster etc., R. Co., 189 N. Y. 93, 81 NE 766, 121 AmSR 848, 13 LRANS 164, 12 AnnCas 883. Tex.-Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343, 89 SE 968; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hume, 87 Tex. 211, 27 SW 110; McCarty v. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 79 Tex. 33, 15 SW 164; Easton v. Dudley, 78 Tex. 236, 14 SW 583; Pecos, etc., R. Co. v. Stinson, (Civ. A.) 181 SW 526; Wells v. Hennessy, (Civ. A.) 156 SW 1158; Pecos, etc.. R. Co. v. Bishop, (Civ. A.) 154 SW 305; San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Timon, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 47, 99 SW 418; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Allen, 42 Tex. Civ. A. 331, 98 SW 450 [rev on other grounds 100 Tex. 525, 101 SW 792]; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Irvine, (Civ. A.) 73 SW 540; Texas Mexican R. Co. v. Gallagher, (Civ. A.) 70 SW 97; International, etc., R. Co. v. True, 23 Tex. Civ. A. 523, 57 SW 977; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson, (Civ. A.) 44 SW 8; Gulf. etc., R. Co. v. Hodge, 10 Tex. Civ. A. 543, 30 SW 829; Austin, etc., R. Co. v. Slator, 7 Tex. Civ. A. 344, 26 SW 233; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 1 Tex. Civ. A. 402, 21 SW 80: Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Graves, (Civ. A.) 16 SW 102. W. Va.-McNeer v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 86 SE 887. Compare Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Stults, 31 Kan. 752, 3 P 522. "The public, in dealing with the agent thus acting within the apparent scope of his authority, have the right to rely upon his apparent authority, notwithstanding some unknown limitations upon it." Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Racer, 10 Ind. A. 503, 37 NE 280. 381, 38 NE 186. [a] Reason for rule.-"There must be a contract as to the time when the freight will be received, otherwise a shipper would never know when to deliver such freight as could be received only on the cars. Such contracts are made daily, and must be made by some one. The question is, who is to make the contract for the company? Naturally the station agent. He is there to represent the company, and does represent it, otherwise the shipper would be compelled to find some general officer clothed with the necessary power, who in most cases would be many miles away from the station. It is the duty of the company to have some one on the ground to represent it in this respect. It can not be expected that the company should have a general officer at each station for this purpose-this would be oppress [b] Previous contracts with shipper negativing agent's authority.— Where a shipper made an oral contract with a station agent to furnish cattle cars on a specified date, the fact that the shipper knew that he would be required to sign a written contract before the cattle were shipped, and that similar written contracts previously signed contained a negation of the agent's power to contract to furnish cars to be loaded with live stock at any specified time was not sufficient to charge the shipper with notice that the agent had no power to make the oral contract. San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Timon, 45 Tex. Civ. A. 47, 51, 99 SW 418 (where it was said: "It can not be held as a matter of law that appellee's knowledge of what was in former contracts was notice to him of what would be in the next contract he would sign"). [c] Recital of agent's want of authority to contract for delivery at specified time.-A clause in a bill of lading reciting that agents of the carrier "were not authorized to agree to forward live stock to be delivered at a specified time, nor for any particular market," is not a limitation of the power of a station agent to agree to furnish cars and to receive freight for shipment on a particular date. Meriwether v. Quincy, etc., R. Co., 128 Mo. A. 647, 661, 107 SW 434 (where it was said that this is merely notice to the shipper that the agent had no power to bind the carrier absolutely to deliver a carload of stock on a particular date). 25. V. Meriwether v. Quincy, etc., R. Co., 128 Mo. A. 647, 107 SW 434. 26. Galveston, etc.. R. Co. Thompson, (Tex. Civ. A.) 44 SW 8. 27. Wells v. Hennessy, (Tex. Civ. A.) 156 SW 1158 (transportation of fowls). 28. Nichols v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 24 Utah 83, 86, 66 P 768. 91 AmSR 778 (where it was said: “Admitting that it could not furnish cars of another company with such company's consent, there is nothing to show that it could not enter or had not entered into some arrangement with other railroad companies to furnish their cars to shippers. On the contrary, the proof indicates that it On yond the carrier's line, and that, where the shipper has no notice to the contrary and relies on the appearance of authority, the contract made with the agent is binding on the company.29 A local station agent also has authority to arrange for loading and receiving cars for transportation.30 the other hand, a station agent is not to be presumed, in the absence of evidence, to have authority to contract to furnish cars to shippers at other stations than his own.31 And a local freight agent has no authority to bind the railroad by an agreement that cattle shall be shipped in a solid train, without mixing any other train with them, or that the train shall be drawn by a single engine.32 transportation over a connecting line is exceeding his ordinary authority as agent of the receiving carrier, and his principal is not bound by such contract, in the absence of express authority, or course of business from which such authority may be inferred.33 The authority of a station agent to bind a carrier by a contract of carriage to a point on a line of another carrier must be proved in order to hold the initial carrier for loss or damage occurring on the line of another company.3 Such authority cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the agent is authorized to receive goods for carriage, or from the mere fact that the freight for the entire distance was collected by such agent.3 But it is well settled that the authority of a station agent to bind a railroad company by a contract of carriage to a point beyond its terminus may be inferred from a previous course of dealing between the shipper and the carrier, as, for instance, where such contracts have been customarily made by the agent and assented to by the carrier.3 And where two or more railroad companies with connecting R. Co., 61 W. Va. 616, 57 SE 39, 31 LRANS 1 and note. 35 [299] C. Contracts for Transportation on Connecting Line. In the absence of statutes providing otherwise, the weight of authority in this country is that the carrier receiving goods for transportation to a destination beyond its own line impliedly contracts as carrier only for its own line, and in jurisdictions where this is the rule it is evident that an agent attempting to contract for was a usual thing for the appellant | Hodge, 19 Tex. Civ. A. 543, 30 SW to furnish such cars, and we know of no rule of law which prevents such an arrangement between common carriers. An arrangement whereby one or each one of several common carriers is permitted to ship freight over the lines of the other, and for that purpose to procure cars of such other, is entirely in consonance with public convenience and benefit, and hence is not in contravention of public policy"). 29. San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Timon, (Civ. A.) 110 SW 82, 83 [aff 102 Tex. 222, 114 SW 792] (where it was said: "It is contended as a question of law that the local station agent of a railroad company possesses no ostensible authority to make an oral contract for the transportation of cattle beyond the end of its line. This is prima facie so. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343, 89 SW 968. But appellant goes further and asserts that the same is the case in reference to a contract to furnish cars for the shipment of cattle when they are destined beyond its line. We do not regard the case just cited as declaring any such rule, but we understand it as declaring that such power ostensibly exists in the station agent. It is to be remembered that the action here is not on account of anything that happened to the cattle while being transported, but for something that happened to them at Skidmore before the transportation commenced. The contract sued on was the agreement to furnish cars, and the damages alleged to have been sustained occurred at Skidmore pending the arrival of the cars, a matter with which the written contracts, and also the obligations of the defendant with reference to the transportation of cattle after loading, had nothing to do, except in so far as the written contract undertook to discharge defendant from damages resulting from the failure to furnish the cars. matter of furnishing cars was a matter within the implied authority of the agent of the particular station, and plaintiff having no notice to the contrary, but relying on the appearance of authority the finding as to the binding force of the contract may be sustained"). the The 30. Stewart v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 172 Iowa 313, 151 NV 485. 31. Voorhees v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 71 Iowa 735, 30 NW 29, 60 AmR 823; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Stults, 31 Kan. 752. 3 P 522; Missouri, etc.. R. Co. v. Belcher, 88 Tex. 549, 32 SW. 518; Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Cox, 47 Tex. Civ. A. 84, 103 SW 1122; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Ray. 37 Tex. Civ. A. 622, 84 SW 691; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Dinwiddie, 21 Tex. Civ. A. 344, 51 SW 353; Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. 829. See also supra § 297 text and note 14. 32. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343, 89 SW 968 [rev (Civ. A.) 86 SW 47]. [a] Reason for rule.-The validity of a contract of this character must be denied "for the same reasons which deny to the local agent the authority to contract to furnish cars at another station. The character of the trains which were to be run in the transportation of those cattle and the number of engines to be used were matters under the charge and control of entirely different departments from that in which Conway or the local agent of the railroad company was engaged. These The cases rest upon the well recognized rule of law that by conferring upon an agent express power to do certain acts, the authority is implied to do whatever may be necessary to execute the express power. authority to contract for the shipment implied the power to make the agreement to furnish cars at a given time; it was necessary to enable the agent to properly perform his duties." Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343, 347, 89 SW 968. 33. Ind.-Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Bryant, 36 Ind. A. 340, 75 NE 829. Iowa.-McManus v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 156 Iowa 359, 136 NW 769: McLagan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 116 Jowa 183, 89 NW 233. Ky.-Louisville, etc., R. Co. V. Owen, 12 KyLR 716. Md. Hoffman v. Cumberland Valley R. Co., 85 Md. 391, 37 A 214. Mass.-Burroughs v. Norwich, etc., R. Co. 100 Mass. 26, 1 AmR 78. Mo.-Baker v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 91 Mo. 152, 3 SW 486; Grover, etc., Sewing Mach. Co. v. Missouri Pa. R. Co., 70 Mo. 672, 35 AmR 444; Faulkner v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 99 Mo. A. 421, 73 SW 927; Minter v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 56 Mo. A. 282; Patterson v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co.. 47 Mo. A. 570; Crouch V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 42 Mo. A. 248; Turner v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 20 Mo. A. 632. N. Y.-Irwin v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 59 N. Y. 653; Wait v. Albany, etc., R. Co., 5 Lans. 475. S. D.-Sutton v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 14 S. D. 111, 84 NW 396; Coates v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 8 S. D. 173, 65 NW 1067. Tex.-Gulf, etc.. R. Co. v. Brown, 99 Tex. 349, 89 SW 971; Gulf. etc.. R. Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343, 89 SW 968; Blackburn v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 52 Tex. Civ. A. 443, 115 SW 874: St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Frazar, 43 Tex. Civ. A. 285, 97 SW 325; St. Louis, etc.. R. Co. v. Cates, 15 Tex. Civ. A. 135, 38 SW 648. W. Va.-Roy v. Chesapeake, etc., 37 36 [a] Where the agent gives a shipping receipt providing for the carriage of goods to the end of the company's line, a verbal agreement by him that the goods shall be sent further is not binding on his principal. Riley v. New York, etc., R. Co., 34 Hun (N. Y.) 97. [b] Traffic solicitor.-An agent employed to solicit traffic for a foreign railroad company having no line of road in this state has implied authority to bind his principal for the safe delivery of goods at a point beyond its own lines, and to contract over what road beyond that line the property shall be transported. Fremont, etc., R. Co. v. New York, etc.. R. Co., 66 Nebr. 159, 92 NW 131, 59 LRA 939. [c] An agent employed for the sole purpose of soliciting passengers has no power to bind the company by contract to receive freight from another road, and to transport it to the depot of, and to ship it on, the road for which he is agent. Taylor v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 74 Ill. 86. 34. McLagan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 116 Iowa 183, 89 NW 233; Faulkner v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 99 Mo. A. 421, 73 SW 927; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Cates, 15 Tex. Civ. A. 135, 38 SW 648. 35. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Bryant, 36 Ind. A. 340, 75 NE 829. Compare Ross v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 114 Me. 287, 96 A 223 (holding that express authority of a common carrier's agent to give a receipt for goods creating a through contract need not be proved, where he acted as such in the proper place for receiving goods and had the carrier's stamp used on such receipts, and where the carrier took possession of and shipped the goods). 36. Coates v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 8 S. D. 173, 65 NW 1067; Page v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 7 S. D. 297, 64 NW 137. 37. Faulkner v. Chicago, etc.. R. Co., 99 Mo. A. 421, 73 SW 927; White v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 19 Mo. A. 400; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Cole. 8 Tex. Civ. A. 635, 28 SW 391; Bigelow v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 104 Wis. 109, 80 NW 95. See also Hoffman V. Cumberland Valley R. Co., 85 Md. 391, 37 S 214; McGill v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 19 Ont. A. 245. [a] If the carrier has engaged in transporting freight beyond its own line, the power of its local agent to contract for a through shipment over connecting carriers may be implied from the course of business. since the local agent would be authorized to contract for those things usually done by his principal. Gulf, etc., R Co. v. Jackson, 99 Tex. 343, 89 S 968. |