BOOK II. CHAP. I. TESTIMONY:- -THE NATURE AND FOUNDATIONS OF TESTIMONY. MORAL ORDER. ON N this fubject a queftion of fome importance prefents itself for our examination-How am I to be convinced that the great legiflator of nature has spoken? Is it not reasonable, it may be faid, previously to enquire wherefore the legiflator has not Spoken to ME? The answer is plain-Every individual might claim an equal right to that favour; and to fatisfy the defires of every one, extraordinary evidences must have been varied and multiplied in a relative proportion to thefe defires. But, by this exceffive multiplication, extraordinary evidences, would have loft the nature of miracles; and that that which, in the order of divine WISDOM, ought to have been extraordinary, would appear no more than the common course of nature. I must also acknowledge that I am fo conftituted, that my fenfes and reflection are to be my guides. An inward revelation, which conftantly effected in me the strongest perfuafion of a future ftate, would not be confistent with my nature, and the general state of my earthly existence. I could not exift in all times and all places; I could not poffibly fee, touch, hear, and examine every thing with my own fenfes. It concerns me however to know the truth, or at least the probabilities of things, which happened long before my existence, or very diftant places. in The intention therefore of the author of my existence, with refpect to these things, is, that I should rely on the evidence of those who have been witneffes, and have tranfinitted either oral or written teftimonies. In this refpect, my conduct refts on a confideration, which to me appears very rational; namely, that I muft fuppofe others to enjoy the fame effential faculties which I perceive in myself; this fuppofition is, I confefs, merely analogical. But I can easily be convinced, that analogy in this cafe is of equal force as in every other cafe resting on common and constant experience. Is it neceffary to fearch fo deeply into the nature of my fellow-creatures, to be certain that they have the fame fenfes and the fame faculties which I myself enjoy ? From these arguments, therefore, I draw this plain inference, that those things, which I should have seen, heard, examined, and touched, had I existed in certain times and in certain places, may have been seen, heard, examined, and touched by those who did exist in those times and in thofe places. If moreover it be admitted that these things were capable of interefting very ftrongly the minds of the fpectators, it must also be admitted, that they have been strictly investigated; for it must be allowed that the con duct duct of thefe perfons, on certain important occafions, was determined by the fame motives by which I should myself have been determined: it seems to me that I should act contrary to the moft pofitive rules of analogy (a), if I judged otherwise. I speak only of those things which require eyes, ears, and a found judgment. But as teftimony is founded on analogy, it can only admit of a moral certainty. There can be no neceffary chain between the manner in which I should have been affected or should have acted, in such and such circumstances, and that manner in which the beings, which I believe fimilar to myself, have been affected or have acted in the fame circumftances;-the circumftances themfelves can never be perfectly the fame; the fubjects are too complicated; befides, the judgment which I form on the relation of the resemblance which these beings bear to myself is still analogical. But, if I believed those things only of which I have (a) Vide Part i. Chap. iii. Note ift. been been a witness, my incredulity would neceffarily expofe me to a most painful state of existence, and I fhould be utterly unacquainted with a multitude of things immediately connected with my present happiness; befides, experience and reflection furnish me with rules whereby I form a found judgment concerning the validity of testimony: I am taught by both, that in numberless cases I may adhere to teftimony, without incurring the risk of being deceived. The fame reafons therefore which have induced me to admit a certain order in the phyfical world (b), induce me to admit a certain order in the moral world. This moral order effentially refults from the nature of the human faculties, and the relations they bear to the things that determine the exercise of these faculties. The opinions I form concerning moral order cannot admit a perfect certainty, because, in every particular determination of the will, the contrary is always poffible, (b) Vide Part i. Chap. iii. |