I should neceffarily bring myself to doubt of all physical truths, of those of natural history, and of historical facts. Would univerfal a Pyrrhonism be conformable to reafon? I should have faid, even to common fense?

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fo

I shall fay nothing as to the illufion of the fenfes because I have fupposed the miraculous facts were palpable, numerous, and diverfified; fuch, in fine, as not to admit of a doubt concerning their certainty. It would, befides, be very unreasonable to argue concerning the illufion of the fenfes, whilft we treat of facts, which may have been examined, and which I fuppofe to have been examined, by several senses.

CHAP. VII.

EXPERIENCE SET IN OPPOSITION TO ITSELF. NEW OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONIAL PROOF.-ANSWER.

A

FTER all, a question presents itself,

Have I not granted too much in favour of teftimony? Is not my reasoning erroneous? Have I fufficiently doubted? I am convinced of the veracity of men, merely by the knowledge I have acquired of men: that knowledge is fupported by experience; yet it is experience itself which contradicts the phyfical poffibility of miracles.-Thus I have experience in oppofition to experience. -How then am I to decide between two experiences fo greatly in oppofition to each

other?

In this cafe I discover diftinctions, which arife from the nature of the fubject, and which I fhall attempt to develope. As I could not exist in all times, and in all pla

ces,

ces, my perfonal experience becomes neceffarily very confined, and that of my fellowcreatures falls under the fame predicament; teftimony, therefore, is the only road by which I can arrive at the knowledge of every experience which I have not made myself.

When I advance that the experience of all times and of all places evinces that the dead do not rife, I only fay, that the teftimony of all times and all places attests that the dead do not rife. If, therefore, weighty testimonies appear, attefting that dead men did rife, there will be an oppofition between these two teftimonies.

I fay, however, that these testimonies will not, properly speaking, be contradictory; because the teftimonies which bear witnefs that the dead do not rife, do not attest that it is impoffible for the dead to rise. The testimonies, therefore, which appear opposed to each other, do in reality no more than diffent from each other. Now, if the testimonies which atteft that the dead did rife, have all the requifite qualities to command my affent, I cannot reasonably refuse it; because,

5

First,

First,

The contrary testimonies cannot prove the impoffibility of this refurrection. Secondly. Because I have no proof that phyfical order may not contain some secret difpenfations, of which this refurrection might be the result.

Thirdly. Because, at the fame time that the witneffes attest this resurrection, I evidently discover the moral intention of the miracle.

There is not, therefore, properly speaking, any contradiction between the experiences, but there is diverfity between the tef

timonies.

It is true, that experience makes known to me physical order; it is alfo by experience that I come to the knowledge of moral order. But these two modes of

experience are not precisely of the fame kind, neither can they be placed in competition with each other.

From experience of the first kind I may legitimately deduce, that, according to the ordinary courfe of nature, the dead do not rise; but I cannot with propriety conclude,

that

that it is phyfically impoffible for the dead to rife.

1

I may deduce from experience of the fecond kind, that men endued with the fame faculties as myself, may have seen and felt things, which I should have feen and felt, had I exifted in the fame time and in the fame place.

And if I have competent moral proofs of the validity of their teftimony, I may also deduce from this kind of experience, that those men have seen and felt those things.

The Indian, when he afferts that it is phyfically impoffible for water to become a folid body, is no logician; his conclufion reaches beyond the premises from which it is drawn. When he has faid that he has never feen, and that no one has ever seen, water become, in his country, a folid body; fo far he is juftified in his affertions: but he should proceed no further. Indeed, having never feen ice, and also being very certain that no one of his countrymen had ever feen any, he has a right to be very incredulous concerning the teftimonies which are offered to him, concerning fuch a fact,

If,