draw or accept bills, but did however once accept a bill which was paid at maturity, without the defendant's knowledge, and when defendant heard of it, he reprimanded B., and distinctly told him he had no authority to accept bills. Subsequently B. accepted the bill sued on in the name of B. & Co., and the plaintiff was an indorsee for value. The defendant pleaded he had not accepted. The Court however held, that B. was defendant's agent for managing the defendant's business at L., and that as drawing and accepting bills was incidental to carrying on the business, it would be very dangerous to hold, that a person who allows an agent to act as principal in carrying on a business, and invests him with an apparent authority to enter into contracts incidental to it, could limit the authority by a secret reservation. A partner has no implied authority to bind his co-partners by his acceptance of a bill of exchange, except by an acceptance in the true style of the partnership. Where a signature is common to a firm, and an individual of which the individual is a member, a bona fide holder of a bill of exchange bearing such signature, has not an option to sue either the individual or the firm; there is a presumption that the bill was given for the firm, and is binding upon it, at least where the individual carries on no business separate from the firm of which he is a member; this presumption, may however be rebutted, by proof that the bill was signed, not in the name of the partnership, but of the individual for his private purposes, and it is immaterial that the bona fide holder took it as the bill of the proprietors of the business, carried on by the firm, whoever they might be, and not merely as the bill of the individual.3 2 Every one of the partners in a mercantile firm, whether his name appear on the face of the instrument or not, and whether he be a sleeping and secret partner, is liable upon a bill, drawn by a partner in the recognised trading name of the firm for a transaction incident to the business of the firm, unless it be shown that the holder of the bill knew at the time he received 1 Edmunds v. Bushell, L. R. 1 Q. B. 97; S. C. 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 20; see ill. (a), s. 251 Contract Act, (App.); Maclae v. Sutherland, 3 E. & B. 1;, Buckley ex parte, 14 M. & W. 469; S. C. 15 L. J. (Bkg. Cy.) 3. 2 Kirk v. Blurton, 9 M. & W. 284; S. C. 12 L. J. (Ex.) 117. 3 Yorkshire Bkg. Co. v. Beatson, 5 C. P. D. 109; Miles in re, L. R. 9 Ch. at p. 643; Furze v. Sharwood, 2 Q. B. 388; S. C. II L. J., Q. B. 121; 2 G, & D. 116. it that the transaction was the private affair of a single partner.' Where one partner of a not strictly trading firm, had authority to draw bills limited in amount on the firm, but drew bills greatly in excess, in favor of a person, who knew of the limited authority, but who also knew that the limit, had been previously slightly exceeded and ratified by the firm, such person it was held could not hold the firm liable on the bills so greatly in excess of the limit.2 Where a partner in a firm included in a bill of exchange accepted by him, in the name of the firm a private debt due by him. self to the drawer, it was held the bill was a good one for the amount due by the firm.3 A member of a firm of attorneys, has no implied authority to bind his co-partners by a post dated cheque, which is a bill of exchange, drawn in the name of the firm.* The reason why in the case of a partnership, a person is bound by an acceptance, which is not his own, but that of his partner, is founded on the law of estoppel in pais; it is because, he has consented to his partner having authority to accept bills in the name of the firm, that he is therefore bound by the exercise of the authority (even though fraudulently exercised), as against all persons who have taken the bill for value without fraud. In such a case he is estopped from what? why, from denying his acceptance." The third clause is founded on a dictum of Tindal, C. J. where he says, 66 It may be admitted that an authority to draw does not "import in itself an authority to indorse bills; but still the "evidence of such authority to draw is not to be withheld from "the jury, where they are to determine on the whole of the evi"dence, whether an authority to indorse, existed or not." 1 Bunarsee Dass v. Gholam Hossein, 13 Moo. Ind. App. 358; S. C. 13 Suth. W. R. (P. C.) 29; see also Contract Act, Secs. 249— 251, (App). 2 Premabhai Hemabhai V. Brown, 10 Bom. H. C. R. 319; see Contract Act, Sec. 237, (App). 3 Ellston v. Deacon, L. R. 2 C. P. 20; see Baines v. Ewing, L. R. 1 Ex. 320; see also Garland v. Jacomb, L. R. 8 Ex. 216. The mode of revoking the authority of an agent is laid down,' and also when it may be done, and it may be stated generally that the authority is revoked by the business of the agency being completed, the principal dying, or becoming of unsound mind, or being adjudicated an insolvent; it takes effect so far as regards the agent when the revocation becomes known to him and as regards third persons when it becomes known to them. Chitty says, "A general authority to an agent is supposed to continue until notice of its determination is given; and therefore, if a clerk or agent who has been usually employed to draw, accept or indorse bills or notes be discharged, his employer will be bound by his signature, made after the determination of his authority, unless notice is given of the discharge. When, therefore the authority of the agent has been determined, and there is reason to apprehend that he will attempt to circulate bills in the name of his former employer, it is advisable for the latter to give notice of the determination of the authority in the "Gazette," and also to all his correspondents individually, notice in the "Gazette" not being in itself, sufficient per se, to affect a former customer."3 Sub-Agents. As a general rule agents cannot delegate their authority, except by the custom of trade, or express authority from the principal.* 28. An agent who signs his name to a promis- Liability of sory note, bill of exchange or cheque without indi- agent signing. cating thereon that he signs as agent, or that he does not intend thereby to incur personal responsibility, is liable personally on the instrument, except to those who induced him to sign upon the belief that the principal only would be held liable. The contract Act Chap. X, contains the rules relating to the effect of agency on contracts in general, and by Sec. 230 it is provided, that a person acting as an agent is not personally bound except in certain cases. This section is consequently an ' Contract Act, Secs. 201-210. 2 Chitty on Bills, 11th ed., by Russell, p. 32; see also Byles on Bills, 13th ed., p. 36; Newsome v. 3 Contract Act, Sec. 206. exception to the general rule, and the obvious necessity of it arises from the negotiability of the instrument. Lord Ellenborough says, "Is it not a universal rule, that a man who puts his name to a bill of exchange, thereby makes himself personally liable, unless he states upon the face of the bill that he subscribes for another, or by procuration of another, which are words of exclusion; unless he says plainly, 'I am the mere scribe,' he is liable1” “As an illustration of what is a sufficient disclosure of agency, the following is a good example. Where the note contained the words ' For M. T. and W. Railway Company' and was signed Alexander Sizer, Secretary, it was held that the agency was disclosed it being said, "the signature is distinctly not personal, but as 'Secretary."2 In the converse case of a person signing as agent for a disclosed principal, who has in fact no existence at the time of the contract, the person signing is personally liable." Under the provisions of Sec. 1, exceptions will be allowed in the case of hundis, and the following is an instance. A custom whereby the gomastahs of the acceptor of a hundi, were held not liable as drawers, though the agency did not appear on the face of the hundi, was held to be good." The acceptance or indorsement, of a bill of exchange expressed to be 'per proc.' is a notice to the indorsee, that the party so accepting or indorsing, professes to act on an authority from some principal, and imposes upon the indorsee the duty of ascertaining, that the party so accepting or indorsing is acting within the scope of his authority. As to the same duty lying on the drawee of a cheque. If a contract made by a person who is an agent, is worded, so as, when taken as a whole, to 6 1 Leadbitter v. Farrow, 5 M. & S. 345, 349; Mare v. Charles, 5 E. & B. 978; S. C. 25 L. J., (Q. B.) 119. 2 Alexander v. Sizer, L. R. 4 Ex. 102; S. C. 37 L. J. (Ex.) 59; see also Lindus v. Melrose, 3 H. & N. 177; S. C. 27 L. J. (Ex.) 326; Salig Ram v. Juggun Nath, 1 Agra Rep. A. C. 137; Pigou v. Ram Kishen, 2 Suth. W. R. 301; Sheo Churn Sahoo v. Curtis, 3 Suth, W. R. 139. 3 Kelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174; S. C. 36 L. J. (C. P.) 94; • Hari Mohan Bysack v. Krishna Bysack, 9 Beng. L. R. (App). 1; S. C. 17 Suth. W. R. 442. Attwood v. Munnings, 7 B. & C. 278; S. C. 1 Moo. & R. 78 Alexander v. Mackenzie, 6 C. B. 766; S. C. 18 L. J. (C. P.) 94; Stagg v. Elliott, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 373' Charles v. Blackwell, 2 C. P. S. C. 31 L. J. (C. P.) 260. D. 151; see notes on Sec. 85. convey to the other contracting party the notion that the agent is contracting in that character, he cannot sue or be sued on such contract.' 29. A legal representative of a deceased person who signs his name to a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque is liable personally thereon unless he expressly limits his liability to the extent of the assets received by him as such. 2 The section by the expression legal representative, includes those representatives who are so by action of law as heirs, and those who become so voluntarily as executors and administrators. It also includes any capacity in which such representative may sign it, either as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser. If a person desires to limit his liability to payment out of assets, it must be so stated. The power of a legal representative to make or negotiate negotiable instruments is thus limited, similarly to that of an agent, and where he desires to contract in only a representative character, he must expressly state it." (See Sec. 57). 30. The drawer of a bill of exchange or cheque is Liability of le- gal representa Liability of drawer. bound, in case of dishonor by the drawee or accep- 2R 15 Burn 267 tor thereof, to compensate the holder, provided due notice of dishonor has been given to, or received by, the drawer as hereinafter provided. (Sec. 117). drawee of 31. The drawee of a cheque having sufficient Liability of funds of the drawer in his hands properly applicable cheque. to the payment of such cheque must pay the cheque when duly required so to do, and, in default of such payment, must compensate the drawer for any loss or damage caused by such default. The only drawee of a cheque is a Banker.* 1 Mackinnon v. Lang, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 584; Gadd v. Houghton, I Ex. D. 357. 2 See definition of these words, Act X of 1865, Sec. 3. 3 Childs v. Monins, 2 Brod. & |