the United States and of the State wherein they reside; and it forbids any State to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 2. It provides that when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President or Vice-President of the United States, representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or is in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of congressional representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 3. It disqualifies from holding Federal or State offices certain persons who shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. 4. It declares the inviolability of the public debt of the United States, and forbids the United States or any State assuming or paying any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave. The fifteenth amendment declares that the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.1

1 See, as to these amendments, Story on Const. (4th ed.) c. 46, 47, 48, and App. to Vol. II. The new amendments do not enlarge the privilege of suffrage so as to entitle women to vote. Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. They do not entitle persons as of right to sell intoxicating drinks against the prohibitions of State laws. Barbemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129. They are not violated by the grant by a State, under its police power, of an exclusive right for a term of years to have and maintain slaughter-houses, landings for cattle, and yards for in

closing cattle intended for slaughter, within certain specified parishes: Live Stock, &c. Association v. Crescent City, &c. Co., 16 Wall. 36; nor by denying the right of jury trial in State courts: Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. Rep. 90. Since these amendments, as before, sovereignty for the protection of life and personal liberty within the respective States rests alone with the States, and the United States cannot take cognizance of invasions of the privilege of suffrage when race, color, or previous condition of suffrage is not the ground thereof. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. Rep.

The executive power is vested in a president, who is made commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of the several States when called into the service of the United States; and who has power, by and with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate concur, and, with the same advice and consent, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.1

The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the national Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming

lands under grants of different States; and between a [*12] *State or citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. But a State is not subject to be sued in the courts of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.3

The Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, are declared to be the supreme law of the land; and the judges of every State are to be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.*

214; United States v. Cruikshanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 542. See, further, Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. Rep. 480; Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 446.

1 U. S. Const. art. 2.

2 U. S. Const. art. 3, § 2.

8 U. S. Const. 11th Amendment. 4 U. S. Const. art. 6; Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 318; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295;

Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331. When a treaty has been ratified by the proper formalities, it is, by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, and the courts have no power to inquire into the authority of the persons by whom it was entered into on behalf of the foreign nation: Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 657; or the powers or rights recognized by it in the nation with which it was made: Maiden v. Ingersoll, 6 Mich. 373. A State law in conflict with it must give

It is essential to the protection of the national jurisdiction, and to prevent collision between State and national authority, that the final decision upon all questions arising in regard thereto should rest with the courts of the Union; and as such questions must frequently arise first in the State courts, provision is made by the Judiciary Act for removing to the Supreme Court of the United States the final judgment or decree in any suit, rendered in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision could be had, in which is drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity; or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Constitution or any treaty or statute of or commission held or authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the * title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up [*13] or claimed by either party under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority.2

But to authorize the removal under that act, it must appear by the record, either expressly or by clear and necessary intendment, that some one of the enumerated questions did arise in the State court, and was there passed upon. It is not sufficient that it might have arisen or been applicable. And if the decision of

way to its superior authority. Ware . Hylton, 3 Dall. 99; Yeaker v. Yeaker, 4 Met. (Ky.) 33; People v. Gerke, 5 Cal. 381. See, further, United States v. Aredondo, 6 Pet. 691; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511; Ropes e. Clinch, 8 Blatch. 304; United States v. Tobacco Factory, 1 Dill. 261; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616. In this last case it is decided, as before it had been at the Circuit, that a law of Congress repugnant to a treaty, to that extent abrogates it.

1 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 334; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Bank of United States

v. Norton, 3 Marsh. 423; Braynard v. Marshall, 8 Pick. 196, per Parker, Ch. J.; Spangler's Case, 11 Mich. 298; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397.

2 Acts 1789 and 1867; R. S. 1875,

§ 709.

3 Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Inglee v. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363; Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311; Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117; Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 98; Harris v. Dennie, 3 Pet. 292; Fisher's Lessee v. Cockerell, 5 Pet. 256; New Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Pet. 223, 234; Keene v. Clarke, 10 Pet. 291; Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet.

the State court is in favor of the right, title, privilege, or exemption so claimed, the Judiciary Act does not authorize such removal.1 Neither does it where the validity of the State law is drawn in question, and the decision of the State court is against its validity.2

But the same reasons which require that the final decision upon all questions of national jurisdiction should be left to the national courts will also hold the national courts bound to respect the decisions of the State courts upon all questions arising under the State constitutions and laws, where no question of national authority is involved, and to accept those decisions as correct, and to follow them whenever the same questions arise in the national courts. With the power to revise the decisions of the

368; McKinny v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. 738; Williams v. Oliver, 12 How. 111; Calcote v. Stanton, 18 How. 243; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How. 511; Hoyt v. Shelden, 1 Black, 518; Farney v. Towle, 1 Black, 350; Day v. Gallup, 2 Wall. 97; Walker v. Villavaso, 6 Wall. 124; The Victory, 6 Wall. 382; Hamilton Co. v. Mass., 6 Wall. 632; Gibson v. Choteau, 8 Wall. 314; Worthy v. Commissioners, 9 Wall. 611; Messenger v. Mason, 10 Wall. 507; Insurance Co. v. Treasurer, 11 Wall. 204; McManus v. O'Sullivan, 91 U. S Rep. 578; Bolling v. Lersner, 91 U. S. Rep. 594. It is not sufficient that the presiding judge of the State court certifies that a right claimed under the national authority was brought in question. Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 36.

1 Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 3 Cranch, 268; McDonough v. Millaudon, 3 How. 693; Fulton v. McAffee, 16 Pet 149; Linton v. Stanton, 12 How. 423; Burke v. Gaines, 19 How. 388; Reddall v. Bryan, 24 How. 420; Roosevelt v. Meyer, 1 Wall. 512; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 Wall. 603.

2 Commonwealth Bank v. Griffith, 14 Pet. 56; Walker v. Taylor, 5 How.

64. We take no notice here of the statutes for the removal of causes from the State to the Federal courts for the purposes of original trial, as they are not important to any discussion we shall have occasion to enter upon in this work.

66

3 In Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 502, Mr. Justice Campbell says: The constitution of this court requires it to follow the laws of the several States as rules of decision wherever they apply. And the habit of the court has been to defer to the decisions of their judicial tribunals upon questions arising out of the common law of the State, especially when applied to the title of lands." In Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 524, it was contended that the exclusive power of State courts to construe legislative acts did not extend to the paramount law, so as to enable them to give efficacy to an act which was contrary to the State constitution; but Marshall, Ch. J., said: "We cannot admit this distinction. The judicial department of every government is the rightful expositor of its laws, and emphatically of its supreme law." Again, in Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 159, the same eminent judge says: "The judicial department of every government, where such depart

State * courts in the cases already pointed out, the due [*14] observance of this rule will prevent those collisions of