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judicial authority which would otherwise be inevitable, [* 15] and which, besides being unseemly, * would be dangerous to the peace, harmony, and stability of the Union.

Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291, an important question was presented as to the proper course to be pursued by the Supreme Court of the United States, under somewhat embarrassing circumstances. That court had been called upon to put a construction upon a State statute of limitations, and had done so. Afterwards the same question had been before the Supreme Court of the State, and in repeated cases had been decided otherwise. The question now was whether the Supreme Court would follow its own decision, or reverse that, in order to put itself in harmony with the State decisions. The subject is considered at length by McLean, J., who justly concludes that" adherence by the federal to the exposition of the local law, as given by the courts of the State, will greatly tend to preserve harmony in the exercise of the judicial power in the State and federal tribunals. This rule is not only recommended by strong considerations of propriety, growing out of our system of jurisprudence, but it is sustained by principle and authority." The court accordingly reversed its rulings to make them conform to those of the State court. See also Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Blossburg, &c. R. R. Co. v. Tioga R. R. Co., 5 Blatch. 387; Smith v. Shriver, 3 Wall. Jr. 219. It is of course immaterial that the court may still be of opinion that the State court has erred, or that the decisions elsewhere are different. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 360. But where the Supreme Court had held that certain contracts for the price of slaves were not made void by the State constitution, and afterward the State court held otherwise, the Supreme Court, regarding this decision

wrong, declined to reverse their own ruling. Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134. Compare this with Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812, in which the court followed, without examination or question, the State decision, that a State general banking law was in violation of the constitution of the State. The United States Circuit Court had held otherwise previous to the State decision. Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 195.

This doctrine does not apply to questions not at all dependent upon local statutes or usages; as, for instance, to contracts and other instruments of a commercial and general nature, like bills of exchange: Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; and insurance contracts: Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins Co., 3 Sum. 220. And see Reimsdyke v. Kane, 1 Gall. 376; Austen v. Miller, 5 McLean, 153; Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. C. C. 322; Bragg v. Meyer, McAll. 408. And of course cases presenting questions of conflict with the Constitution of the United States cannot be within it. State Bank v. Knoup, 16 How. 369; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 436. And where a contract had been made under a settled construction of the State constitution by its highest court, the Supreme Court sustained it, notwithstanding the State court had since overruled its former decision. Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 176. See Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678. Of late it has seemed that new and doubtful grounds were being taken for disregarding State decisions, and in several cases nearly one-half the members of the federal Supreme Court have deemed it necessary to protest against an abandonment of the sound and safe doctrine of the earlier decisions.

Besides conferring specified powers upon the national government, the Constitution contains also certain restrictions upon the action of the States, a portion of them designed to prevent encroachments upon the national authority, and another portion to protect individual rights against possible abuse of State power. Of the first class are the following: No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque or reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit,1 or make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties upon imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign. power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. Of the second class are the following: No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,2 or make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, nor base discriminations in suffrage on race, color, or previous condition of servitude.*

Darrington v.

1 To constitute a bill of credit constitutional sense.
within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, it must be issued by a State,
involve the faith of the State, and be
designed to circulate as money on the
credit of the State in the ordinary
uses of business. Briscoe v. Bank of
Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Woodruff v.
Trapnall, 10 How. 209. The facts
that a State owns the entire capital
stock of a bank, elects the directors,
makes its bills receivable for the pub-
lic dues, and pledges its faith for their
redemption, do not make the bills of
such bankbills of credit" in the

State Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12.
See, further, Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet.
410; Byrne v. Missouri, 8 Pet. 40;
Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 317;
Moreau v. Detchamendy, 41 Mo. 431;
Bailey v. Milner, 35 Geo. 330; City
National Bank v. Mahan, 21 La. Ann.
751.

2 Const. of U. S. art. 1, § 10; Story on Const. c. 33, 34.

3 Const. of U. S. 14th Amendment; Story on Const. (4th ed.) c. 47.

4 Const. of U. S. 15th Amendment; Story on Const. (4th ed.) c. 48.

Other provisions have for their object to prevent discriminations by the several States against the citizens and public authority and proceedings of other States. Of this class are the provisions that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; that fugi

1 Const. of U. S. art. 4. "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to pass through or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the citizens of the other State,

may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective

6

franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of Confederation) the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States of the Union.'' Washington, J., in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380. The Supreme Court will not describe and define those privileges and immunities, in a general classification; preferring to decide each case as it may come up. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. Rep. 391. The question in this last case was whether the State of Virginia could prohibit citizens of other States from planting oysters in Ware River, a stream in that State where the tide ebbs and flows, and the right be granted by the State to its own citizens exclusively. Waite, Ch. J., in answering the question in the affirmative, said: "The right thus granted is not a privilege or immunity of general but of special citizenship. It does not belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, but only to the citizens of Virginia, on account of the peculiar circumstances in which they are placed; they, and they alone, owned the property to be sold or used, and they alone had the power to dispose of it as they saw fit.

*

tives from justice shall be delivered up,' and that full [16]

They owned it, not by virtue of citizenship merely, but of citizenship and domicile united; that is to say, by virtue of a citizenship confined to that particular locality." See also Paul v. Hazelton, 37 N. J. 106. For other discussions upon this subject, see Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 393; Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270, and 20 N. Y. 562; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & M'H. 554; Amy v. Smith, 1 Lit. 326; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 340; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101; Commonwealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Grat. 767; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 544; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 68; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill. 172; Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 441; Same v. Wright, 3 E. D. Smith, 453; Same v. Holfenstein, 16 Wis. 136; Sears v. Commissioners of Warren Co., 36 Ind. 267; Jeffersonville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 71; Cincinnati Health Association v. Rosenthal, 55 Ill. 85; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann. 434; Live Stock, &c. Association v. Crescent City, &c. Co., 16 Wall. 36; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; Barbemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; United States v. Cruikshanks, 92 U. S. Rep. 512. The constitutional provision does not apply to corporations. Warren Manuf. Co. v. Etna Ins. Co., 2 Paine, 501; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. A discrimination between local freight on railroads and that which is extra-territorial is not personal, and therefore not forbidden by this clause of the Constitution. Shipper v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 338. A State cannot impose, for the

privilege of doing business within its limits, a heavier license tax upon non-residents than is required of residents. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418:

1 Extradition as between the States. The return by one State of fugitives from justice which have fled to it from another State is only made a matter of rightful demand by the provisions of the federal Constitution. In the absence of such provisions, it might be provided for by State law; but the Constitution makes that obligatory which otherwise would rest in the imperfect and uncertain requirements of inter-state comity. The subject has received much attention from the courts when having occasion to consider the nature and extent of the constitutional obligation. It has also been the subject of many executive papers; and several controversions between the executives of New York and those of more southern States are referred to in the recent life of William H. Seward, by his son. The following are among the judicial decisions: The offence for which extradition may be ordered need not have been an offence either at the common law or at the time the Constitution was adopted; it is sufficient that it was so at the time the act was committed, and when demand is made. Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 221; Johnston v. Riley, 13 Geo. 97; Matter of Fetter, 23 N. J. 311; Matter of Voorhies, 32 N. J. 141; Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind. 123; Matter of Hughes, Phill. (N. C.) 57; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66. The offence must have been actually committed within the State making the demand, and the accused must have fled therefrom. Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean, 133. The accused may be arrested to await

[* 17] faith and credit shall be given in* each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. Many cases have been decided under these several nison, 14 Pet. 540; Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631; People v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321.

demand: State v. Buzine, 4 Harr. 572; Ex parte Culreth, 49 Cal. 436; but he cannot be surrendered before formal demand is made, and parties who seize and deliver him up without demand will be liable for doing so: Botts v. Williams, 17 B. Monr. 677. Still, if he is returned to the State from whence he fled without proper papers, this will be no sufficient ground for his discharge from custody. Dow's Case, 18 Penn. St. 39. The demand is to be made by the executive of the State, by which is meant the governor: Commonwealth v. Hall, 9 Gray, 262; and it is the duty of the executive of the State to which the offender has fled to comply: Johnston v. Riley, 13 Geo. 97; but if he refuses to do so, the courts have no power to compel him: Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; Matter of Manchester, 5 Cal. 237. There must be a showing of sufficient cause for the arrest before the requisition can issue; but, after it is issued and complied with, it is competent for the courts of either State on habeas corpus to look into the papers, and, if they show no sufficient legal cause, to order the prisoner's discharge. Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean, 121; Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 219; Matter of Manchester, 5 Cal. 237; Matter of Heyward, 1 Sandf. 701; Ex parte White, 49 Cal. 431; State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa, 391; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182; Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223. The federal courts have no power to compel the State authorities to fulfil their duties under this clause of the Constitution. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.

Extradition to foreign countries is purely a national power, to be exercised under treaties. Holmes v. Jen

1 Const. of U. S. art. 4. This clause of the Constitution has been the subject of a good deal of discussion in the courts. It is well settled that if the record of a judgment shows that it was rendered without service of process or appearance of the defendant, or if that fact can be shown without contradicting the recitals of the record, it will be treated as void in any other State, notwithstanding this constitutional provision. Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby, 126; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Middlebrooks v. Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 307; Wood r. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500; Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 409; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Woodworth v. Tremere, 6 Pick. 354; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Commonwealth v. Blood, 97 Mass. 538; Edson v. Edson, 108 Mass. 590; s. c. 11 Am. Rep. 393; Kilbourne v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37; Robinson v. Ward's Executors, 8 Johns. 86; Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. 194 ; Pawling v. Bird's Executors, 13 Johns. 192; Holbrook v. Murray, 5 Wend. 161; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 299; Thurber v. Blackbourne, 1 N. H. 242; Whittier v. Wendell, 7 N. H. 257; Rangely v. Webster, 11 N. H. 306; Adams v. Adams, 51 N. H. 388; s. c. 12 Am. Rep. 134; Wilson v. Jackson, 10 Mo. 334. See McLaurine v. Monroe, 30 Mo. 462; Bimeler v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536; Warren v. McCarthy, 25 Ill. 95; Curtiss v. Gibbs, 1 Penn. 406; Rogers v. Coleman, Hard. 416; Armstrong v. Harshaw, 3 Dev.

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