of the legislature to contract debts on behalf of the State in aid of internal improvements; but the decisions of the first-named State have since been doubted,2 and those in Illinois, it would seem, overruled.3 In Michigan it has been held that they were inapplicable to a constitution adopted with a clear purpose to preclude taxation for such enterprises.* 1 Dubuque County v. Railroad Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; Clapp v. Cedar County, 5 Iowa, 15; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195; Prettyman v. Supervisors, 19 Ill. 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21′ Ill. 451; Johnson v. Stark County, 24 Ill. 75; Perkins v. Lewis, 24 Ill. 208; Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 474; Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479. 2 State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa, 388. And see People v. Supervisor, &c., 16 Mich. 254. 8 In People v. Mayor, &c. of Chicago, 51 Ill. 34, it is held expressly that the provision of the State constitution prohibiting the State from creating a debt exceeding fifty thousand dollars without the consent of the people manifested at a general election, would preclude the State from creating a like debt against a municipal corporation, except upon the like conditions. And it was pertinently said: "The protection of the whole implies necessarily the protection of all its organized parts, and the whole cannot be secure while all or any of its parts are exposed to danger. What is the real value of this provision of the constitution if the legislature, inhibited from incurring a debt beyond fifty thousand dollars on behalf of the State, may force a debt tenfold or one hundred-fold greater for there is no limit to the power- upon all the cities of the State? We can perceive none." We do not see how this can be reconciled with the earlier Illinois cases, and it is so manifestly right, it is hoped the learned court will never make the attempt. The following extract from the opinion in Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 504, is upon this point: "Our State had had a bitter experience of the evils of the government connecting itself with works of public improvement. In a time of inflation and imagined prosperity, the State had contracted a large debt for the construction of a system of railroads, and the people were oppressed with heavy taxation in consequence. Moreover, for a portion of this debt they had not received what they bargained for, and they did not recognize their legal or moral obligation to pay for it. The good name and fame of the State suffered in consequence. The result of it all was that a settled conviction fastened itself upon the minds of our people, that works of internal improvement should be private enterprises; that it was not in the proper province of government to connect itself with their construction or management, and that an imperative State policy demanded that no burdens should be imposed upon the people by State authority, for any such purpose. Under this conviction they incorporated in the constitution of 1850, under the significant title of Finance and Taxation,' several provisions expressly prohibiting the State from being a party to, or interested in, any work of internal improvement, or engaged in carrying on any such work, except in the expenditure of grants made to it; and also from subscribing to, or being inter Another class of legislation, which has recently demanded the attention of the courts, has been little less troublesome, from the ested in, the stock of any company, association, or corporation, or loaning its credit in aid of any person, association, or corporation. Art. XIV. §§ 9, 8, and 7. All these provisions were incorporated by the people on the constitution, as precautions against injudicious action by themselves, if in another time of inflation and excitement they should be tempted to incur the like burdensome taxation in order to accomplish public improvements in cases where they were not content to wait the result of private enterprise. The people meant to erect such effectual barriers that if the temptation should return, the means of inflicting the like injury upon the credit, reputation, and prosperity of the State, should not be within the reach of the authorities. They believed these clauses of the constitution accomplished this purpose perfectly, and none of its provisions had more influence in recommending that instrument to the hearty good-will of the people. "In process of time, however, a majority in the legislature were found willing, against the solemn warning of the executive, to resort again to the power of taxation in aid of internal improvement. It was discovered that though the State" was expressly inhibited from giving such aid in any form, except in the disposition of grants made to it, the subdivisions of which the State was composed were not under the like ban. Decisions in other States were found which were supposed to sanction the doctrine that, under such circumstances, the State might do indirectly through its subdivisions what directly it was forbidden to do. Thus a way was opened by which the whole purpose of the constitutional provisions quoted might be defeated. The State could not aid a private corporation with its credit, but it might require each of its townships, cities, and villages to do so. The State could not load down its people with taxes for the construction of a public improvement, but it might compel the municipal authorities, which were its mere creatures, and which held their whole authority and their life at its will, to enforce such taxes, one by one, until the whole people were beut to the burden. "Now, whatever might be the just and proper construction of similar provisions in the constitutions of States whose history has not been the same with our own, the majority of this court thought when the previous case was before us, and they still think, that these provisions in our constitution do preclude the State from loaning the public credit to private corporations, and from imposing taxation upon its citizens or any portion thereof in aid of the construction. of railroads. So the people supposed when the constitution was adopted. Constitutions do not change with the varying tides of public opinion and desire; the will of the people therein recorded is the same inflexible law until changed by their own deliberative action; and it cannot be permissible to the courts that in order to aid evasions and circumventions, they shall subject these instruments, which in the main only undertake to lay down broad general principles, to a literal and technical construction, as if they were great public enemies standing in the way of progress, and the duty of every good citizen was to get around their provisions whenever practicable, and give them a damaging thrust whenever convenient. They must construe them, as the new, varied, and peculiar questions involved, than that in relation to municipal subscriptions in aid of internal improvements. As the power to declare war and to conduct warlike operations rests in the national government, and that government is vested with unlimited control of all the resources of the country for those purposes, the duty of national defence, and, consequently, the duty to defend all the citizens as well as all the property of all the municipal organizations in the several States, rests upon the national authorities. This much is conceded, though in a qualified degree, also, and, subordinate to the national government, a like duty rests doubtless upon the State governments, which may employ the means and services of their citizens for the purpose. But it is no part of the duty of a township, city, or county, as such, to raise men or money for warlike operations, nor have they any authority, without express legislative sanction, to impose upon their people any burden by way of taxation for any such purpose. Nevertheless, when a war arises which taxes all the energies of the nation, which makes it necessary to put into the field a large proportion of all the able-bodied men of the country and which renders imperative a resort to all available means for filling the ranks of the army, recruiting the navy, and [* 220] replenishing the national treasury, the question* become a momentous one, whether the local organizations those which are managed most immediately by the people them selves may not be made important auxiliaries to the nationa and State governments in accomplishing the great object i which all alike are interested so vitally; and if they are capabl of rendering important assistance, whether there is any constitu tional principle which would be violated by making use of thes organizations in a case where failure on the part of the centra authority would precipitate general dismay and ruin. Indeed as the general government, with a view to convenience, economy people did in their adoption, if the means of arriving at that construction are within their power. In these cases we thought we could arrive at it from the public history of the times." 1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H. 545; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn. 47; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Con 131. See also Claflin v. Hopkinton 4 Gray, 502; Cover v. Baytown, 1 Minn. 124; Fiske v. Hazzard, 7 R. 438; Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me. 44 People v. Supervisors of Columbi 43 N. Y. 130; Walschlager v. Li erty, 23 Wis. 362; Burril v. Bosto 2 Cliff. 590. and promptness of action, will be very likely to adopt, for any purposes of conscription, the existing municipal divisions of the States, and its demand for men to recruit its armies will assume a form seeming to impose on the people whose municipal organization embraces the territory covered by the demand, the duty of meeting it, the question we have stated may appear to be one rather of form than of substance, inasmuch as it would be difficult to assign reasons why a duty resting upon the citizens of a municipality may not be considered as resting upon the corporation itself of which they are the constituents, and if so, why it may not be assumed by the municipality itself, and then be discharged in like manner as any other municipal burden, if the legislature shall grant permission for that purpose. One difficulty that suggests itself in adopting any such doctrine is, that, by the existing law of the land, able-bodied men between certain specified ages are alone liable to be summoned to the performance of military duty; and if the obligation is assumed by the municipal organizations of the State, and discharged by the payment of money or the procurement of substitutes, the taxation required for this purpose can be claimed, with some show of reason, to be taxation of the whole community for the particular benefit of that class upon whom by the statutes the obligation rests. When the public funds are used for the purpose, it will be insisted that they are appropriated to discharge the liabilities of private individuals. Those who are already past the legal age of service, and who have stood their chance of being called into the field, or perhaps have actually rendered the required service, will be able to urge with considerable force that the State can no longer honorably and justly require them to contribute to the public defence, but ought to insist that those within the legal ages should perform their legal duty; and if any upon whom that duty rests shall actually have enrolled themselves in the army with a view to discharge it, such persons may claim, with even greater reason, that every consideration of equality and justice demands that the property they [* 221] leave behind them shall not be taxed to relieve others from a duty equally imperative. Much may be said on both sides of this subject, but the judicial decisions are clear, that the people of any municipal corporation or political division of a State have such a general interest in relieving that portion of their fellow-citizens who are liable to the performance of military duty, as will support taxation or render valid indebtedness contracted for the purpose of supplying their places, or of filling any call of the national authorities for men, with volunteers who shall be willing to enter the ranks for such pecuniary inducements as may be offered them. The duty of national defence, it is held, rests upon every person under the protection of the government who is able to contribute to it, and not solely upon those who are within the legal ages. The statute which has prescribed those ages has for its basis the presumption that those between the limits fixed are best able to discharge the burden of military service to the public benefit, but others are not absolved from being summoned to the duty, if at any time the public exigency should seem to demand it. Exemption from military duty is a privilege rather than a right, and, like other statutory privileges, may be recalled at any time when reasons of public policy or necessity seem to demand the recall. Moreover, there is no valid reason, in the nature of things, why those who are incapable of performing military service, by reason of age, physical infirmity, or other cause, should not contribute, in proportion to their ability, to the public defence by such means as are within their power; and it may well happen that taxation, for the purpose of recruiting the armies of the nation, will distribute the burden more equally and justly among all the citizens than any other mode which could be devised. Whether it will be just and proper to allow it in any instance must rest with the legislature to determine; but it is unquestionably competent, with legislative permission, for towns, cities, and counties to raise money by loans or by taxation to pay bounty moneys to those who shall volunteer to fill any call made upon such towns, cities, or counties to supply men for the national armies.2 1 See post, p. *383, and cases cited in note. 2 The power to create a public debt, and liquidate it by taxation, is too clear for dispute. The question is, therefore, narrowed to a single point: Is the purpose in this instance a public one? Does it concern the common welfare and interest of the municipality? Let us see? Civil war was raging, and congress provided in the second section of the act of 24th February, 1864, that the quota of the troops of each ward of a city, town, township, precinct, &c., should be as nearly as possible in proportion to the number of men resident therein liable to render military service. Section three provided that all volunteers who may enlist after a draft shall be or |