Moses v. McDivitt. v. Pitkin, 2 Cain. 147; Hunt v. Knickerbocker, 5 Johns. 334; Borden v. Fitch, 15 d. 121. II. As to bonds being given by plaintiff's advice: La Farge v. Herter, 9 N. Y. 243; Freelove v. Cole, 41 Barb. 318; Wheaton v. Hibbard, 20 Johns. 290; Story Eq. 308-324; Starr v. Vanderheyden, 9 Johns. 253; Evans v. Ellis, 5 Den. 640; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 344; Howell v. Ransom, 11 Paige, 538; Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cow. 527; Van Horne v. Everson, 13 Barb. 526; Bergen v. Udall, 31 Id. 9; 7 Sim. 539; 27 Eng. L. & Eq. 100; Ford v. Harrington, 16 N. Y. 285; Sears v. Shafer, 6 Id. 268-272; Reigal v. Wood, 1 Johns. Ch. 402; Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 165. III. As to defense that plaintiff purchased bond in violation of statute: 2 R. S. 288, § 71; People v. Smith, 5 Cow. 258; Baldwin v. Latson, 2 Barb. Ch. 306; Austin's Juris. §§ 621-625. NEILSON, Ch. J.-We are of opinion that upon the evidence the jury were justified in finding that the two loans by Washington Ritter to the defendant were made under and in pursuance of the corrupt and usurious agreements alleged. But notwithstanding the fourth finding of the jury, we regard the judgment in satisfaction of which the bond in suit was given, as putting an end to any defense that might have been interposed by reason of the prior contracts. The judgment was obtained in the usual course, upon the summons and complaint duly served. The arrangement under which that suit was brought and the judgment obtained, was not in and of itself usurious or in contemplation of further violations of the statute, but, at most, was intended to silence complaints as to the past and place the rights of the parties upon a proper basis. The defendant might have contested the claim in that suit on the ground of usury, but made his election not to do so. Under the circumstances, we think he is concluded Moses v. McDivitt. by that election. No application was made by him in that action to be relieved in respect to that judgment. The other branch of the defense goes to the right of the plaintiff to prosecute the action. He was an attorney and counselor at law when he obtained the bond on which the action was brought. The jury have found that he purchased it "with intent and for the purpose of bringing a suit thereon," and consequently contrary to the statute. We think that the proof of that was quite sufficient. We are not inclined to extend the statutory prohibition beyond the spirit and terms of the act or of the construction given to it by the adjudications. An attorney is to be protected when he makes such a purchase for a legitimate purpose, as, for instance, to protect his interests in property on which the claim may be a prior lien, or to protect himself as a creditor. In the absence of the mischievous intent and purpose reprobated by the statute, the purchase is harmless. The question raised by the exception to directions given on the coming in of the jury for specific instruction is earnestly pressed on our attention by the plaintiff. The jury wished to learn whether, if the plaintiff's intention was to sue the bond in a certain contingency, that would be a violation of the statute. The learned judge answered that inquiry in the affirmative. The point is thus sharply presented, whether, to bring a case within the evil against which the legislature intended to guard, the purchase must be made by an attorney for the sole, simple or naked purpose, of bringing a suit thereon. Contingencies, anticipated or not, may well attend every purchase of the kind. The attorney may intend to bring his action unless payment within a reasonable time be made, or if the debtor persists in carrying out an avowed purpose of disposing of his property, or of removing from the State, or if he refuse to retire from an election in which both he and Moses v. McDivitt. the attorney are rival candidates. We apprehend that the existence of any such contingency qualifying the intent with which the attorney makes the purchase would not take the case out of the statute. He may buy the claim with the objectionable intent and purpose, and that intent and purpose may characterize the act, however many other possibilities may attach; the contingency is a mere incident. If the intent and purpose must be absolute and unqualified, it would be easy to evade the statute by conjuring up or attaching contingencies, and the attorney might purchase claims, bring suits, and inflict costs upon the debtor without restraint. In this instance, the jury have found that the bond was purchased with the intent charged. The instructions given to the jury must have helped them to a proper understanding of the questions submitted, and were, it seems to us, correct. The judgment and orders appealed from should be affirmed. At a later day the counsel attended, and were heard as to the question of costs, arising on the stipulation. NEILSON, Ch. J.-As we construe and understand that stipulation, costs of the appeal were to be allowed in an event which has not happened. But on the determination which we have made, judgment of affirmance was to be entered, but the stipulation is silent as to costs. We think that the attorneys by their special arrangement have determined the question, and that no costs of this appeal should be allowed to the prevailing party. McCUE, J., concurred. Grady v. Crook. GRADY v. CROOK. City Court of Brooklyn; General Term, April, 1876. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.-REWARD FOR LOST PROPERTY. One who offers a specified reward for the recovery of lost property is bound to pay it on the return of the property pursuant to the offer.* The fact that it is returned by an agent or lawyer, who refuses to disclose the name of the finder, his client, and who makes threats if the full reward be not paid, does not entitle the payer to recover back the reward. Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment dismissing complaint. On November 12, 1874, the plaintiff, John D. Grady, lost a package of diamonds valued at $6000. On the same day he advertised a reward of $1500 for their return. On November 19, the defendant addressed to the place named in the advertisement, a note, in reply to which plaintiff called on defendant upon several occasions. Defendant was an attorney and counselor at law, and told plaintiff he was retained to collect the reward by a client who had the property. Plaintiff sought by negotiation to obtain the property by payment of $1000, instead of the advertised amount of the reward. Defendant refused to receive it, and alleged want of authority to accept the smaller sum. * In addition to the cases cited in the text, see on the subject of the right to reward, Brague v. Lord, p. 1 of this volume; Jones . Phoenix Bank, 8 N. Y. 228; Prentiss v. Farnham, 22 Barb. 519; Gregg v. Pierce, 53 Id. 387; Brennan v. Haff, 1 Hilt. 151; Mead v. Boston, 3 Cush. 404; Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248; Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. (2 Otto) 73; Commonwealth v. Mason, 105 Mass. 163; S. C., 7 Am. R. 507; Janvrin v. Town of Exeter, 48 N. H. 83; S. C., 2 Am. R. 185. Grady v. Crook. Plaintiff testified he was told by defendant that defendant's client would destroy the identity of the goods if the reward were not fully paid, and that he (defendant) would have nothing more to do with the matter; that plaintiff thereupon paid the full reward, and defendant immediately sent for the diamonds by a messenger, who shortly returned and delivered them to plaintiff. This action was brought to recover back the reward on the ground that it was obtained by fraud and threats. The plaintiff was nonsuited and his complaint dismissed. James Troy (Sullivan & Dainty), for appellant, -cited: Armory v. Flyn, 10 Johns. 102; Baker v. Hoag, 7 Barb. 113. Chauncy Shaffer (Abel Crook, attorney), for respondent,-cited: City Bank v. Bangs, 2 Edw. Ch. 105; Howland v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604; Wentworth v. Day, 44 Mass. 352; Smith v. Moore, 50 Eng. C. L. (1 C. B.) 438; Williams v. Carwardine, 5 Car. & P. 566; S. C., 4 Barn. & Adol. 621, and 24 Eng. C. L. 711; Block v. U. S., 8 Ct. of Claims, 462. REYNOLDS, J.-The plaintiff on November 12, 1874, lost on Fulton street, Brooklyn, a valuable package of diamonds, and immediately advertised his loss in several papers, offering a reward of $1500, for the return of the diamonds to S. Casteel, 80 Fulton St., Brooklyn, or to a person named in New York city. This advertisement was kept in the papers till November 19, on which day the defendant sent a note to Casteel, enclosing a copy of the advertisement, and offering to assist the true owner in recovering the lost property. In pursuance of this note the plaintiff called upon the defendant and all further negotiations took place directly between them. After a satisfactory identification of the articles, the defendant offered to deliver them to |