Mass., 284. The reasonableness of time is a question of law for the court.

Section VII. Work and Service. If a workman vary from his work without orders, acquiescence on the part of the employer cannot be presumed from the mere fact that he has taken possession of the property on which the work was done. Munro vs. Butt, 8 Ellis & Blackburn, 737. If the facts show that a partial performance is accepted, an implied contract arises to pay for the reasonable value of the work. Cutter vs. Powell, 2 Smith's Leading Cases. When the work is of such a kind that the employer may reject it, acceptance is evidence of waiver. The mere fact that services are rendered is not enough, there must be facts from which a promise may be implied. A man could. not recover from his mother-in-law for board while she was on a visit to his family. Sawyer vs. Hebard, 58 Vt., 375; Moyer's Appeal, 112 Pa. St., 290.

Section IX. Mutual Promises do not necessarily make a contract. Thus two persons may mutually promise to attend a lecture or a theatre. If one of them should subsequently refuse to do so, no action would lie. The promises must concern in some way their benefit or detriment. There must be some element of a pecuniary nature or its equivalent to constitute

a contract.

The distinction between non-mutuality and an offer to make a contract is discussed in Wyson vs. Dunn, L. D., 34 Ch. Div., 577- Illustration. If a person

should make a contract to sell that which he did not own-non-mutuality. But if the purchaser knew that the vendor did not own and then offered to buy, the vendor might buy and hold the purchaser, though the latter could withdraw on notice before the land was obtained by the vendor. Is

this correct? Does not non-mutuality consist in the want of meeting of the minds? And might not the minds meet though property was not owned unless ownership was made a term in the contract?

If a person makes a proposition to contract and the other party does not accept there is no consideration for the proposition; on the other hand, as soon as an order is given the proposition ceases to be unilateral and becomes bilateral. Great Northern Ry. Co. vs. Withan, L. R., 9 C. P., 16. In this case the railway company advertised for offers for supply of stores for a period of twelve months. The defendant sent in a tender at specified prices as the railway might want from time to time. The company accepted the tender and gave a particular order which the defendant refused to honor. Held that defendant was liable. The defendant might have perhaps revoked before the order was given. This case is not opposed to Burton vs. Great Northern Ry. Co., 9 Ex., 507, for there the action was against the railway company before granting the order. See Miller vs. McKenzie, 95 N. Y., 580, where many cases are collected.

Section X. Cases of subscription are of two general classes, one is where the subscriber receives or contracts to receive as a subscription to the stock of a projected railway company. The advantage which he is to derive from the stock is a sufficient consideration for his promise, 3 DeGex & Jones, 27. The second class of cases is where the subscriber receives no pecuniary advantage, as to repair losses by fire, charitable contributions, &c. In this class of cases the element of detriment or inconvenience to the other party is necessary. Mutual contribution between the subscrib

ers does not possess this element and mere promise to pay a sum of money to a college is without consideration and void. Special facts may make the consideration sufficient; as when the college agrees to put itself to trouble, as to employ agents to raise subscription; there will then be mutual promises of a binding character; Barnes vs. Perine, 12 N. Y., 18. So if a subscriber should know that money was to be expended by the charitable society on the faith of his subscription and it is so expended the transaction is valid, 74 N. Y., 72; 121 Mass., 528. This case disregards earlier dicta to contrary.

Section XI. The distinction between the consideration and the promise. The words consideration and promise are closely related; that which is in one respect consideration may in another be promise. Thus, if A and B mutually promise to marry, each promise is the consideration of the other. So in the sale of goods the price is the consideration of the goods, and the goods for the payment of the price. The application of the terms will thus depend upon the position in which a case stands before a court. Thus, if the buyer is suing, the price is the consideration and the engagement of the seller is the promise. If the seller is plaintiff, the goods are the consideration and the obligation to pay the price is the promise.

Section XII. There is a confusion in the text between illegality in the consideration and illegality in the promise. If there be any illegality in the former there can be no recovery, there being a rule that no one can be heard who alleges his own turpitude. On the other hand, if the consideration be wholly legal and the promise be partly legal and partly illegal and they are separate, a recovery can be had for the legal part of the promise. In the latter

case the plaintiff is not urging a bare act on his part, and the court may distinguish between the performance of two distinct acts on the part of defendant.

The performance of the consideration may be legal when the contract is made but may be subsequently prohibited by statute. In this case, if the plaintiff has performed in part before the illegality arose, he may recover for such part. Heine vs. Mayer, 61 N. Y., 171.

Section XIII. An important distinction must be taken between impossibility in the consideration and impossibility in the promise. If the consideration be impossible the contract is nudum pactum and void. If, on the other hand, the consideration is valid and the promise be impossible, it will not necessarily follow that the contract is void. It will be observed that the promisor has in this case received the advantage of the consideration, and justice would dictate that he should be liable unless in extreme cases.

(1) To exempt him from liability the promise should be logically impossible. His promise must be equivalent to an absurd engagement. Such as to go from the United States to Europe in a day. If the thing to be done be possible in its own nature and yet not possible for him, he will still be liable in damages. He should have foreseen the difficulty and should have provided against it. Thus, if A should agree that B should sign a deed, though he cannot compel B to sign, he is responsible for damages. See the early case of Paradine vs. Jane, Aleyn's Report; Harmony vs. Bingham, 12 N. Y., 99; Tompkins vs. Dudley, 25 N. Y., 272; Williams vs. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y., 217; Trenton vs. Bennett, 3 Dutcher, 514.

(2) There may be an implied condition in the contract which will make impossi

bility a defense. Thus, where there is an agreement to make repairs upon a building there may be an implied condition that the building shall exist for the purpose of making repairs to it. Accordingly, if it is destroyed without the fault of the repairer, he may be relieved. Niblo vs. Binsse, 3 Abbot's Appeals Decisions, 375; see also Dexter vs. Norton, 47 N. Y., 62.

(3) In contracts of service there is regularly an implied condition that the capacity to render service shall continue. Accordingly, if the servant falls sick or dies, his duty to serve may be at an end. Boast vs. Firth, L. R., 4 C. P., 1; Robinson vs. Davison, L. R., 6 Ex., 269; Wolf vs. House, 20 N. Y. This same rule may apply where the master dies. In case a servant is disabled or dies there may be a recovery for a proportional part of the contract price.

Section XV. Stranger to the consideration. The meaning of this expression is, a person bringing the action who does not advance the consideration. He is, as it were, the nominee of the person who advanced the consideration. At one time in England such a person was allowed to sue. Dutton vs. Poole, Ventris, 318-322. This principle has been abandoned in England of late years, and the nominee is not allowed to sue.

Tweddle vs. Atckin

son, 1 B. and S., 393. In this country the old doctrine is adopted in a number of the States, including New York. The leading case is Lawrence vs. Fox, 20 N. Y., 268. The principle is known as the rule in Lawrence vs. Fox. Campbell vs. Smith, 71 N. Y., 26; Hand vs. Kennedy, 83 N. Y., 149; Pardie vs. Treat, E2 N. Y., 385. The court is not inclined to extend the doctrine beyond the cases already decided. An important instance is where a purchaser of mortgaged lands agrees with the mort

gageor as a debtor to assume the payment of the mortgage. In this case the mortgagee may have an action against the purchaser. Dutton vs. Poole is fully adopted in Todd vs. Webber, 95 N. Y., 186, 193, 194. In some States the contract is enforceable in equity rather than in law. Zell's Appeal, 111 Penn St., 532.

CHAPTER II. ASSENT.

Section I. In making a contract a party ought to be bound by what he expresses, even though he did not intend to use that expression; as if he gave an order to build two ships where he meant only one. The other party must judge not by the hidden intent, but by the outward sign or symbol. Crank vs. Sloan, 21 Fed. Rep., 561. It would seem that one would be estopped from showing that his words did not mean what the other side might fairly construe them to mean; so if a man should say to a woman, "I take you to be my wife," and she acted upon it, he could not show that, by the use of the word "wife," he did not mean what the word naturally imports. The term "assent," as applied to a contract, means all the facts requisite to show the concurrence of the minds of the parties. They must intend the same thing. If one refers to one thing and the other to a different thing, there is no assent. Cutts vs. Guild, 57 N. Y., 229. So the assent must not be merely jocose and so understood as a mock marriage. Again, there must not be mere discourse by one of the parties or a general course of remarks, which might be seized upon by another, contrary to the person's true intention. If one person proposes certain terms to another, there is no assent, unless there is an unconditional acceptance. A qualified acceptance is substantially a refusal to contract, and relieves the offerer, unless he chooses to

accept the qualification, which is a new proposal or offer.

SPECIAL CASES.

A. Auction sales. Such a sale is merely an offer on the part of the auctioneer to be accepted by the bidder. The crying of a higher bid by the auctioneer is legally a rejection of a lower one. If, then, the higher bidder withdraws, the auctioneer cannot accept the lower one without the bidder's consent. The contract is complete when, the bid being still pending, the hammer falls, except that when the contract is required by statute to be in writing it must also be written.

B. Proposals or offers allowing time for their acceptance. When such an offer is made it is not binding on the offerer if he desires to withdraw it. Accordingly, if he communicates with the offeree notice of withdrawal before acceptance, the offerer is not bound. If no such notice is given, the offeree may accept before the time fixed expires. If no time be fixed the law implies a reasonable time. No formal notice of withdrawal is necessary. It is enough if the offeree knows from any authoritative source that the offer is withdrawn. Dickerson vs. Dodds, L. R., 2 Chan. Div., 463. A person may for a valuable consideration bind himself not to withdraw an offer. Still vs. Huidekoper, 17 Wallace, 384. Under this general head may be placed offers of rewards for doing a particular act, or advertisements for proposals, &c., when they are sufficiently definite to be offers to contract. 32 Beavan, 490; Williams vs. Byrns, i

Moore, P. C. N. S., 154. A policeman may claim such a reward if the act to be done is not in the regular line of his duty. England vs. Davison, 11 A. and E., 856; see also Turner vs. Walker, L. R., 2 Q. B., 301. The analysis of these cases is that the offer is made to all, and that one accepts who complies with the terms of the advertisement.

C. Offers made by letters, telegrams, messengers, or by deposit in some specified place. The peculiarity of these cases is that the proposal is not made necessarily on time, as in the last case, but through some special medium selected by the offerer, who posts the letter or dispatches the telegram or sends the messenger. The real point in the case seems to be that if the offerer selects the same medium, as he may, the acceptance is complete when he has done the act of entrusting his reply to the same medium. It is immaterial, therefore, whether the offerer receives the reply. If the letter of acceptance miscarries or the offeree's messenger fails to deliver, the contract is still complete. Mr. Parson's explanation of this subject is not adequate. The earlier cases were letters sent by mail. The same rule applies to telegrams. 36 N. Y., 307. Burns vs. Van Tienhoven, L. R., 5 C. P. Div., 344; Household Fire and Carriage Insurance Co. vs. Grant, L. R., 4 Ex. Div., 216. A similar principle governs the case where the proposer makes use of a box or receptacle in which he places the proposition. A reply made in the same manner constitutes the acceptance, though it is never received. Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362.

EASILY REPAIRED.

A widow, whose husband had lost his life in a railway accident, received from the company 10,000 francs, by way of compensation. Shortly afterward she heard that a traveller who had lost a leg on the same occasion had been paid 20,000 francs. The widow at once put on her bonnet and shawl, and trotted off to the offices of the company.

"Gentlemen, how is this?" she said. “Here you give 20,000 francs for a leg, and you have only allowed me 10,000 for the loss of my husband!”

"Madam," replied one of the clerks, "the reason is quite plain; 20,000 francs won't provide the poor man with a new leg, but a young lady with charms such as you possess can any day, for 10,000 francs, get another husband, perhaps a better one."-Balt. Underwriter.

SUMMER BOOM.

A few days since a famous lawyer sat in his shirt sleeves in his inner office, with his feet on a window-sill and a cigar in the corner of his mouth, at half-past ten in the morning. People came to see him. at short intervals, and they were all told. that he was engaged at an important conference uptown, but that he would be at the office between twelve and one. At twelve o'clock the lawyer had finished his cigars, got through with the papers, and narrowly escaped falling asleep half a dozen times.

At the stroke of twelve a remarkable change came over him. He pulled on an alpaca coat, brushed his hair back from the bulging forehead, buttoned the coat up severely to the neck, and sat down in his

consulting room, surrounded by ponderous tomes and legal documents. All the people who had been to see him that day crowded into the office at twelve o'clock,

and patiently waited for a chance to speak to the great man. All were impressed by the tremendous rush of business on hand. The outer room was crowded to suffocation. At one o'clock the last of the callers had been disposed of, and the statement went forth that the lawyer could see no one else until twelve o'clock the next day. -Hall's New York Letter.

UP GOES THE UPPER BERTH.-The Supreme Court of Minnesota deserves the benedictions of all travellers. It has sustained the State Railroad Commissioners in ordering that the upper berths in sleeping-cars, when not occupied, shall not be kept open against the wishes of the occupants of lower berths. Every railroad traveller has angrily rebelled, dozens of times, against the stupid meanness of the rule that keeps unused upper berths drawn down, to prevent the unhappy man below from enjoying sufficient air. That rule has been the cause of more bumped heads and more semi-excusable profanity than any other feature of our travelling system.Minneapolis Tribune.

TWO POINTS IN VIEW.-Stranger: "If a man falls down an open coal-hole, can he sue the owner of the premises for damages ?"

Lawyer: "Certainly, sir, damages, and get them too. particulars."

certainly, big Give me the

"Well, as my brother was passing your house this morning, he fell through a coalhole and broke his leg."