credit of the United States and to coin money and regulate the value thereof, has been argued into a power to establish a currency system for the country. The further power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the other powers delegated, is a general provision under which the burden of proof is on the other side to show the invalidity of any measure that may be deemed by Congress to be within the grant of its powers. In support of a wide measure of construction of this clause, there are opinions dating from the earliest days of the Supreme Court that that body will not interfere with the work of the Congress in carrying out its legislative functions, unless it can be clearly shown that the measures taken are contrary to the terms of the Constitution or subversive of the intent of that document.

The earliest departure from the strict construction of the powers of Congress was under the general welfare clause in the adoption of the policy of a system of internal improvements. This policy of securing a ready intercourse between the seaboard and the then undeveloped interior was supplemented by an improvement of the harbors of the sea coasts, which resulted in the tremendous system of river and harbor improvements, which have continued until the present day. Subsequent extensions of the power of the Congress to legislate for the general good have followed upon real public needs, and their accompanying public demands, but no more striking example of the manner in which the powers of Congress are extended in accordance with a general demand exists than is presented by the legislation under the clause which empowers Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. In consequence of the grant contained in this power, the Congress has not only been able to inspect certain products produced within the States of the Union and to prescribe the conditions under which they shall be produced, but it has passed legislation intended to regulate mercantile competition, ostensibly in interstate commerce, but in reality within the States themselves, and has further effected legislation which practically

prescribes the price at which transportation carried on by companies which are wholly and solely the creations of the individual States, shall be sold. In view of the extent to which the letter of the Constitution has been extended, it is useless to describe as fixed and limited those things which the Congress can and cannot do. Certain matters are set down with definiteness, but beyond and above them it would seem that the only limit to the construction that will be given to the general clauses of the Constitution is the sufficiently ardent desire of a sufficient number of people of the United States to add to the Congressional prerogative.

Each Congress lasts for two years, beginning on the first Monday in December in the odd year, and concluding on the fourth of March in the following odd year. The first session of each Congress lasts until the completion of the business of the Congress, or rather until the hot weather makes Washington uncomfortable, and there is then no Congressional business which must absolutely be completed; that is to say, from the first of June to the first of July. This is known as the long session, and efforts are made during this session to complete the general legislation, for which the majority party has pledged itself at a previous election. The second session, ending at noon on the fourth of March, is mainly devoted to passing the necessary appropriation bills with as little general legislation as possible. In case matters of importance arise in the recess between the two sessions, or the business has not been completed, the Congress may be called together again by the President during the summer or early fall. This, however, is seldom done, and has been done in recent years only to effect tariff legislation, while tariff legislation and the exigencies of war have extended the regular sessions of Congress far beyond the limits in certain years.

SENATORS OF THE UNITED STATES.

The establishment of the position of Senator of the United States is an example of the common sense in govermental mat

ters which has distinguished the Anglo-Saxon above all the other nations of the world. Theoretically, the creation of an artistocratic body in connection with the democratic form of government proposed by the Constitutional Convention was almost an absurdity. As an adjunct to the strictly representative character of the lower House of the Congress, it represents so diametrically opposite a theory of government that it might well have been argued that the Senate was an anomaly and wholly foreign to the purpose and project of a representative government. While, however, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention talked and wrote at length in the style of the French philosophers of the period, they were none the less keenly alive to the practical side of the problem which lay before them and were more concerned in creating a form of government that would "march" than in making its details conform to the philosophic principles upon which it was alleged to be based. The idea upon which the Constitutional Convention provided the legislative power of the United States has been tested by time and found to be sound. Repeated experiments have been made with the single-chambered legislative body, and the results have shown that the fears of the conventionists were well founded, that is to say, that hasty and ill-considered legislation, stimulated by the expediency of the moment, is promoted by a single legislative body, and is checked by a dual legislative body. While the revolutionists in America ardently rejected the title and prerogative which was a part of the English House of Lords, they could not reject and ignore the substantial value of the weight of conservative opinion as a balance-wheel for the legislative machine. They were wholly familiar with the value of such checks in their own colonial affairs, since councils to the Governor and similar bodies had been constituted under the various charters to steady and dignify the popular branches of the law-framing bodies. It is fair to assume that the delegates to the convention foresaw what has since been seen to be the fact, that a numerous body of immediate representatives of the people would be likely to be swayed by currents of public opinion

and hurried on to the enactment of opportunist legislation, only to be driven in the other direction and to the necessity of repeal when it appeared that an ill-considered remedy had failed of the desired effect. It is evident, from the Constitutional provisionsthat Senators should be thirty years of age, that is, five years older than the minimum age of Representatives; and should be nine years a citizen of the country as against seven years, the minimum for Representatives,-that it was proposed for the Senate the selection of older, more conservative, and, from the method of their election, more carefully selected men than might be sent immediately from the people through the medium of direct popular representation. It is shown, of course, by the history of the Constitutional Convention, that the smaller and weaker States insisted upon equal representation in the upper branch as a defense against encroachment from the larger and more populous. This, however, it may be held, was not the main purpose of the establishment of the Senate, but rather that it was deliberately chosen as a check and conservator in the legislative enactments. The term of a Senator is six years, and his compensation is $7,500 per year. In order to further carry out the idea of a conservative body as the upper branch of the national legislature, it was provided by the Constitution that, upon the election of the first body of Senators, they should be divided as equally as might be into three classes; the first class to serve for two years, the second for four years, and the third for six years. By means of this provision one-third of the membership of the Senate passes out of office or comes up for re-election every two years. Senators are elected by the legislatures of their respective States, and must be, as has been stated, thirty years of age, nine years citizens of the United States, and residents of States from which they are elected.

The body which elects the United States Senator is similar in its constitution to the national legislature in having two separate and distinct chambers with a mutual check on legislative propositions It has, however, this important difference in most of the States, that both of the branches of the State legislative body are directly rep

resentative, the members of the upper branch being elected by the ballot of the whole number of electors in the State, although representing larger districts than the members of the lower house. This difference from the original pattern has lent some color of logic to the proposition that the Senators should be elected by the ballot of the whole people of the States they represent. Objection has been made that influences which may be used more effectively on a comparatively small body of men than on the whole body of electors, has made it possible for certain interests to secure representation in the upper house of the national legislature to the detriment of legislation for the interests of the whole people. It cannot, however, be successfully established as a general proposition that deliberations of the Senate and the consequent checks and delays of hasty action, with the changes that have been made in proposed legislation as it comes from the House of Representatives, have been materially and designedly injurious to the general welfare, in any case, while on the other hand it is apparent in every session of Congress that these checks and delays are of inestimable value in securing the consideration not only by the Congress itself, but by the people at large, of legislative propositions. At the same time there is nothing in the movement for the election of Senators by direct ballot of the people of the State which would interfere with the real purpose and efficiency of Senators. The crux of the theory is that of a select and more carefully chosen representation than in the lower house, and the means by which the special representative shall be chosen by the people do not seem to be material. Popular representation in the State Senate has not proved to be a failure, but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that State Senates have been made the subject of similar charges as to the representation of special interests as have been against the Senate of the United States.

In case of a vacancy in the senatorial delegation from a state during the recess of the Legislature the Governor makes a temporary appointment until the Legislature can choose a person to fill out the unexpired term. The Senate of the United States is one of the few legislative bodies in the world which does not choose its own presiding officer. During the incumbency of the Vice-President of