resided in Holland, as had also two others the most influential in bringing it about, while a sixth was an intimate friend and companion of one of these. That a union of the colonies should have suggested itself to one and all of them is not strange, surrounded as they were by enemies on all sides and far removed from the protection of the mother country, or that its practicability should have seemed assured, familiar as were so many of their leaders, through personal experience, with the confederation of Holland. As far as the details of the development of the plan are known they include seven steps, beginning in 1637 with a conference between Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut in regard to the Pequot war and terminating six years later with the signing of the New England Confederation in 1643. The most important of all these steps was a month's discussion of the subject in Boston in 1639 on the part of Thomas Hooker and Governor Haynes.t The indebtedness of the New England Confederation to the Union of Utrecht is seen most clearly through the internal evidence. The preamble states the conditions under which the confederation was formed-all those uniting in it had come to America to advance the kingdom of Christ and to enjoy religious liberty; they were living in scattered settlements, surrounded by jealous and hostile neighbors, threatened by the Indians, and cut off by reason of the civil war in England from seeking the advice and protection of the mother country. Thus they were led to form a firm and perpetual league for defense and offense, for mutual advice and succor, safety, and welfare, and also for propagating the truth and liberty of the gospel. Thus the objects of the two unionsdefense and religious unity-are identical. The religious unity, however, secured by the New England Confederation was on a much narrower basis than that of the Union of Utrecht in that it attempted to secure the absolute identity of religious interests, while the Union of Utrecht deemed it sufficient to prevent active interference in religious affairs. Again, the New England Confederation was not formed with the thought of securing independence from England. Twenty years after * Winthrop, Hist. of New England, 1, 260; Bradford, Hist. of Plymouth Plantation, p. 351-355; Massachusetts Records, I, 192. + Winthrop, Hist. of New England, 1, 360; Hubbard, p. 466. S. Mis. 104- -10 wards the general court of Plymouth protested to the English commissioners, "the league between the four colonies was not with any intent (that we ever heard of) to cast off our dependence upon England, a thing which we abhor, entreating your honors to believe us, for we speak as in the presence of God."* In one respect the Union of Utrecht was more liberal than the New England Confederation, in that it provided for accession to its numbers, while the American union distinctly provided that no other jurisdiction should be taken into the confederation. The New England Confederation is, like the Union of Utrecht, crude in form and suggesting little the careful deliberation of six years. It is essentially aristocratic in character, carefully excluding those provinces that "ran a different course," especially that of Maine, "for they had lately made Acomenticus (a poor village) a corporation, and had made a tailor their mayor, and had entertained one Hull, an excommunicated person and very contentious, for their minister."† The New England Confederation is scarcely less negative in character than the Union of Utrecht. It provides like its forerunner for but one department, a legislative, with advisory powers. The local independence of each colony is forever guaranteed. It gives to the commissioners no authority over the individual members of the confederation, and it provides for the equality of the distinct jurisdictions. In every way the power of each province and of commissioners is hedged about that no one may have an advantage over any other. On its positive side it provides for the payment of all charges of war as regards men and supplies, according to the population of each jurisdiction, between sixteen and sixty years of age, and the distribution of booty on the same basis. For the determining of all these questions of war and peace the commissioners were to have full power, and a majority of six were to have power of decision. The commissioners were also, as they might have commission or opportunity, to endeavor to frame civil laws and agreements for preserving peace among themselves, preventing differences, securing the free and speedy passage of justice in every jurisdiction, mutual citizen ship, and a satisfactory Indian policy. Moreover, fugitives from service and from justice were to be delivered up. It was undoubtedly the influence of Holland that led to the refusal of the commissioners from Plymouth to approve the articles until they had been confirmed by the majority of the people of the colony. In both Plymouth and Connecticut, where there was Dutch influence, there was the greatest insistence on the responsibility of the deputies of the colonies. In 1638, when the articles were under consideration in Connecticut, that colony had insisted that if the commissioners were not unanimous in their opinions, the matter under discussion should be referred to the several colonies-a proceeding which, as Winthrop remarks, "beside that it would have been infinitely tedious and extreme chargeable, it would never have attained the end."* It is thus seen that the New England Confederation, like its prototype, was a confederation, not an organic union of colonies. Its commissioners also represented independent communities and the confederation had no power over individuals. It had the sovereign rights of declaring war, concluding peace, and levying taxes, while that of coinage still remained naturally with the mother country. Every colony had an equal voice with every other in the management of affairs, while the burdens of war were proportional to the population. In a similar manner to the Union of Utrecht, if the commissioners were unable to agree, the matter under discussion was to be referred back to the general courts of the four colonies. If these four general courts agreed upon the business, it was then to be prosecuted. Thus, at every point the unions in both countries could decree while it rested with the individual members of the union to carry out the decrees. It was inevitable in both countries that friction should result from this attempt to square the circle of nationality, and we find in the Netherlands John De Witt protesting that Holland gave far more to the Union than she received from it, while in New England the advantage derived from the confederation was disproportionate to what was contributed to it, a fact that led Massachusetts in the New England Confederation to play the part of Holland in the Union of Utrecht. * Winthrop, History of New England, 1; 342. It was inevitable that in details the unions should differ, but we think it must be seen that the underlying principles of the two are identical. If so, it must prove one more illustration of the fact that, in the words of Mr. George William Curtis, "Our political constitution was not an inspiration, it was an application." * *Address at the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of Vassar College, p. 28. |