The statute is remedial in its nature, and should be construed to effectuate the purpose intended. 4. The stipulation of facts measured by this enactment discloses that the article in question was not only adulterated, but also misbranded, rendering the plaintiff amenable to the law and the activities of the commissioner as described in the pleadings. The decision of the Circuit Court was right, and is affirmed. MR. JUSTICE EAKIN did not sit. AFFIRMED. Argued September 23, affirmed October 13, rehearing denied December 21, 1915. RAMASWAMY v. HAMMOND LUMBER CO.* (152 Pac. 223.) Master and Servant-Pleading-Sufficiency of Reply. 1. In a servant's action for injury from dangerous and unguarded machinery, where the master pleaded contributory negligence and assumption of risk, a reply alleging that the control of the power was not visible from the place where plaintiff was injured, that he worked in a dangerous place only because ordered to work there, that he had no knowledge as to the manner of operating the machinery or of the dangers and risks of going underneath a sorting table in the sawmill, that he did not negligently place his hand or sleeve into the cogwheels, and denying that his injury was in any way due to his negligence, was a sufficient denial of the affirmative defenses. Master and Servant-Negligence Employers' Liability Act Contributory Negligence. 2. Under Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 16) contributory negligence is not a defense, but may be taken into account by the jury in fixing the damages. *An analogous discussion of Employers' Liability Acts will be found in notes in 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 38, and L. R. A. 1915C, 47, on constitutionality, application and effect of Federal Employers' Liability Act. As to acquiring jurisdiction over foreign corporation by service of process, see note in 70 L. R. A. 532. REPORTER. Master and Servant-Master's Liability—Assumption of Risk. 3. The defense of a servant's assumption of risk is not available in an action coming within the provisions of the Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 16). Pleading-Judgment on Pleadings-Denial of Immaterial Allegation— Reply. 4. Where the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk pleaded were not available, though the reply thereto was insufficient, there was no error in refusing judgment on the pleadings, since a denial of an immaterial allegation raises no issue. Venue-Transitory Action-Personal Injury. 5. An action for damages resulting from personal injuries is a transitory, and not a local, action. Corporations-Foreign Corporations Process-Statute. 6. Under Section 6726, L. O. L., requiring every foreign corporation before doing business in the state to execute a power of attorney and record it with the Secretary of State, empowering some resident, as its attorney in fact, to accept service of all process necessary to give complete juris liction to any court of the state, the appointment is made for the whole state; and in a servant's action for injury received in C. County, where the defendant's agent for process resided, service upon him there gave the Circuit Court of M. County jurisdiction, since jurisdiction of a foreign corporation may be obtained by the Circuit Court for any county by summons upon the resident agent, regardless of his residence or where the cause of action arose. [As to designation by foreign corporation of agent to accept service, see note in 85 Am. St. Rep. 926.] Corporations-Foreign Corporations-Process. 7. Where a state prescribes the conditions upon which foreign corporations may do business and a method whereby its courts may acquire jurisdiction by process upon its designated agents, a corporation subsequently doing business in the state is deemed to consent to such conditions, and to be bound by the prescribed process. Appeal and Error-Harmless Error-Pleading-Election. 8. In a servant's action for personal injury, where the complaint asserted the cause of action in four ways differing in respect to the machinery, whether it was in motion or was started after plaintiff commenced work, and as to the protection of the cogwheels, and the defendant before trial moved that plaintiff be required to elect, that the court required him to elect only after the close of plaintiff's evidence was not prejudicial to defendant. Master and Servant-Action for Injury-Evidence-Machinery. 9. In a servant's action for injury from dangerous and unprotected cogwheels in a sawmill, evidence for plaintiff of a mechanical engineer who had visited the sawmill and examined the sorting-table where plaintiff was injured and observed the manner in which it was operated was admissible, where the operation was approximately the same as when the machinery was run before, and where a diagram of the sorting table and the machinery showing the cogwheels was in evidence. Evidence-Master and Servant-Expert Evidence-Machinery. 10. In a servant's action for injury from the dangerous and unprotected cogwheels in a sawmill, where defendant did not claim that the place of work was not dangerous, but that plaintiff's disregard of his duties caused the injury, expert testimony of a mechanical engineer who had worked in several similar places that the place under the sorting-table where the cogwheels moved was dangerous was inadmissible. Appeal and Error-Harmless Error-Admission of Evidence. 11. In a servant's action for injury, where it appeared that he was 21 years of age, and where the complaint alleged that he was capable of earning $2 per day by manual labor, $50 per month as a stenographer, that he was a graduate of a university, and upon completion of his electrical course might earn from $3,000 to $10,000 a year, temporary admission of evidence tending to show the salary of a mechanical engineer to be $3,000 per year and over was not prejudicial to defendant, in view of an instruction not to consider what plaintiff might earn after education for a profession. Master and Servant-Dangerous Place to Work-Evidence. 12. In view of Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 16), Section 2, providing that the manager or foreman in charge of construction or operation should be the agent of the employer in all suits for damages for injury to an employee, evidence in a servant's action for injury, where there was a dispute as to whether he was directed to work where he was injured, to the effect that the defendant's foreman had told him that if he did not like the job he could leave, was admissible as tending to show where plaintiff was required to work. Witnesses-Cross-examination-Scope. 13. In a servant's action for injury from unguarded machinery in a sawmill, defendant introduced a certificate of the state labor commissioner, dated about one year before the injury, that the mill was properly equipped and the machinery protected as required by law, which certificate, under Section 5046, L. O. L., was only prima facie evidence of the condition of the sawmill at its date, and where the deputy commissioner testified that he had inspected the mill about a year later, about four days before the accident, it was proper cross-examination to show by the witness that he would not have then passed the mill for renewal; the defendant upon redirect being entitled to show that the defective condition referred to related to other machinery than that in question. Master and Servant—Instructions—Contributory Negligence. 14. In view of the Employers' Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 16), declaring contributory negligence to be no defense, defendant's requested charge that its negligence could not be presumed from the accident, but that plaintiff must show it was caused by defendant's sole negligence without plaintiff's own negligence, was properly modified by adding that, if it was solely the plaintiff's fault, and not his contributory fault, he could not recover. From Multnomah: HENRY E. MCGINN, Judge. Department 2. Statement by MR. JUSTICE BEAN. The plaintiff, Krishna Ramaswamy, instituted this action in the Circuit Court for Multnomah County against the defendant, the Hammond Lumber Company, a corporation, to recover damages for a personal injury inflicted upon him while he was in the employ of the defendant. Verdict and judgment went for the plaintiff in the sum of $6,500. Defendant appeals. The defendant is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New Jersey. At the time of the institution of this action its principal office and place of business was at Tongue Point, Clatsop County, Oregon, where it operated a sawmill with certain machinery therein. In his complaint plaintiff describes the accident resulting in the injury in four separate causes of action differing somewhat in the narration of the occurrence. Upon the trial he elected to rely upon the second cause of action, the substance of which as to the allegations of negligence is as follows: That defendant's machinery was dangerous to operate or to work near, and should have been securely covered and protected to the fullest extent that its operation would permit, but that defendant willfully and negligently failed to cover and protect it; that in the course of the operation thereof it was necessary for the safety of persons working near the dangerous machinery that there be provided a system of communications by means of signals for prompt and efficient communication between them and the employees, which system defendant negligently failed to provide; that part of the machinery consisted of cogwheels which were uncovered and unprotected; that about October 15, 1912, plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a laborer in and about the sawmill; that defendant, with willful negligence and disregard for the safety of plaintiff, by its foreman, Thomas Penny, ordered him to clean up a quantity of sawdust which had accumulated under and around a place in the sawmill in the vicinity of the dangerous machinery and cogwheels, which were not then in motion; and that in pursuance thereof plaintiff began to do the work as directed, when the defendant willfully and negligently suddenly started or caused to be started, without warning or signal to plaintiff, the dangerous machinery and cogwheels in the vicinity of which plaintiff was working, whereupon the unprotected cogwheels caught the sleeve of the right arm of plaintiff's coat, pulling his right arm between said cogwheels and mangling the same, necessitating the amputation thereof. Robert S. Shaw, the statutory agent of defendant, resided at Tongue Point, Clatsop County, Oregon, where the cause of action arose, which place was specified in the power of attorney appointing him and filed in the office of the Secretary of State. Service of summons and complaint was had upon defendant by serving the same upon its statutory agent in the above-named county. The defendant made a special appearance before the Circuit Court by a motion to quash the summons and the return thereof. This motion was based upon the ground, as shown by affidavit, that the action was commenced and prosecuted in the wrong county, and therefore the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the cause of action or of the defendant. The court overruled this motion, and held that by the service of the summons jurisdiction was acquired over the defendant. The defendant then filed its answer, in which it |