of false representations, and recited the various false representations
made, is sufficient where not attacked by demurrer. (Marshall v.
Hillsboro Garden Tracts, 89.)

Cancellation of Instruments-Actions-Evidence.

3. In a suit for rescission of a contract for the purchase of land on
the ground of misrepresentations, relief cannot be afforded on account
of misrepresentations not set up in the complaint. (Henrickson v.
Hillsboro Garden Tracts, 96.)

See Food, 1, 3.

CANDY.

CARRIERS,

Carriers Carriage of Goods-Action-Burden of Proof.

1. A carrier, seeking to reduce its liability for goods lost in transit,
must allege and prove facts entitling it to the reduction. (Grice v.
Oregon-Wash. R. & N. Co., 17.)

Carriers-Carriage of Goods-Liability-Stipulation.

2. A bill of lading provided that the amount of any loss or damage
for which the carrier was liable should be computed upon the basis
of the value of the property, being the bona fide invoice price, unless a
lower value had been represented in writing by the shipper, or agreed
upon, or is determined by the classification or tariff upon which the
rate was based. A carrier lost goods delivered under such a bill.
Neither the bill of lading nor the statement of facts on which the
cause was tried showed the valuation of the property. The state-
ment of facts failed to show that a value lower than the invoice price
had been represented by the shipper, or that a lower value had been
agreed upon, or the value as determined by the classification or tariff
upon which the rate was based. Held that, as none of these matters
were disclosed by the pleadings or statement of facts, the carrier was
liable for the actual value of the goods under the common-law rule.
(Grice v. Oregon-Wash, R. & N. Co., 17.)

Regulations of and Liabilities of Carriers.

See Commerce, 1.

Arrest of Passenger by Conductor.

See False Imprisonment, 1.

CASES IN THE OREGON REPORTS.

Applied, Approved, Cited, Distinguished, Followed and Overruled in

this Volume.

See Table in Front of this Volume.

CHARTER OF CITIES.

La Grande-Birney v. La Grande, 531.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

Chattel Mortgages-Foreclosure-Sales.

1.

Where personal property, subject to a mortgage to secure
rent, was sold by a receiver under foreclosure and bid in by the

lessor at the full amount of the mortgage, which exceeded the
amount of the rent due, the lessor is liable to a subsequent chattel
mortgagee for the overplus, and the sale will not, in an analogy to
sales of real property, be set aside on the ground that the purchase
price exceeded the value of the goods, for sales of personalty are
not ordinarily subject to redemption. (Northern Brewery Co. v. Prin-
cess Hotel, 453.)

Chattel Mortgages Rights of Mortgagee.

2. Where a note secured by chattel mortgage provided for at-
torney's fees in case of suit for collection, an attorney's fee allowed
the holder cannot be recovered from one liable because having ob-
tained property subject to the chattel mortgage. (Northern Brewery
Co. v. Princess Hotel, 453.)

Commerce-Interstate Commerce-Regulations-Liability of Carriers.
1. The interstate commerce law (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat.
379), which was designed to prevent preferences, does not prohibit a
carrier from assuming the common-law liability in carrying goods
from one state to another. (Grice v. Oregon-Wash. R. & N. Co., 17.)

COMMERCIAL PAPER.

See Bills and Notes.

COMPENSATION.

See Attorney and Client, 3, 4.

See Brokers, 1-3.

78 Or.-43

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Constitutional Law-Legislative Powers.

1. The legislature is invested with legislative power to the fullest
extent except so far as limited expressly or by necessary implication
in the state and federal Constitutions, and in considering the con-
stitutionality of an act the question is not as to the extent of the
power delegated by the people to the legislative assembly, but as
to the extent of the limitations the people have imposed upon that
body. (State v. School Dist. No. 3, 188.)

Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law-Priority of Liens.

2. A mortgagee, in a mortgage executed subsequent to the statute
giving laborers and materialmen a preference, is not deprived of his
property right without due process of law, because his lien is post-
poned to the liens of laborers and materialmen. (Haines Commercial
Co. v. Grabill, 375.)

Constitutional Law-Act Creating State Industrial Accident Commis-
sion is Constitutional.

3. The act creating the State Industrial Accident Commission
(Laws 1913, p. 188) is not in contravention of Article III, Section 1
of the state Constitution that provides as follows: "The powers of the
government shall be divided into three separate departments-the
legislative, the executive, including the administrative, and the judi-
cial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these
departments shall exercise any of the functions of another." In re
Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592, 610, 611 (144 Pac. 505), approved and fol-
lowed. (Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 503.)

Constitutional Law Judicial Powers Conferred by Constitutional Pro-
vision.

4. By force of the amendment to Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution (Laws 1911, p. 7), the legislature was empowered and
authorized to confer judicial powers upon the State Industrial Acci-
dent Commission under the workmen's compensation law, for the rea-
son under this amendment either the legislature or the people have
the right to confer judicial powers upon any tribunal it or they may
select, provided, the executive, legislative and judicial departments of
the state government are not blended so as to contravene Article III,

Section 1 of the Constitution. (Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc.
Com., 503.)

Constitutional Law-Right to Trial by Jury-Due Process of Law.

5. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1913, p. 188), estab-
lishing a system of voluntary accident insurance and creating the
State Industrial Accident Commission to carry into effect its provi-
sions, does not violate either Article I, Section 10, of the state Con-
stitution, providing "No court shall be secret, but justice shall be ad
ministered openly * and without delay, and every man shall have
remedy by due process of law for injury done him in his person, prop-
erty or reputation," or Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, declaring 66 * * nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law,
for the reason that the act does not attempt to establish
a court to try causes without a jury, neither does it compel employers
and employees to adjust their grievances without their consent, for
the act allows the employer an election to either accept or reject its
provisions, and in case he rejects the act, he is left the right to pro-
tect himself from personal injury actions in the courts. (Evanhoff
v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 503.)

Constitutional Law-Construction as to Constitutionality of Statute.

6. The rule is well settled in this state that a statute will not be
held unconstitutional where a reasonable doubt exists as to its in-
validity. (Citing In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592 (144 Pac. 505), and
other Oregon cases.) (Evanhoff v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 503.)
Constitutional Law-Power to Delegate Adoption of Charter to Coun-
cil or Commissioners.

7. Under the Constitution of Oregon the legislature does not pos
sess power to authorize a city council or commissioners to either adopt
or amend city charters by ordinance, as that authority belongs to the
legal voters of every city and town within the state. (Section 2,
Article XI, Const.) (Birnie v. La Grande, 531.)

Constitutional Law-Legislative Power Cannot be Delegated.

8. Under Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution, the attempt
of the state highway commission to delegate the duties imposed by
statute upon the state engineer is void and of no effect whatever, for
the reason that legislative power cannot be delegated to a commission.
(Peterson v. Lewis, 641.)

See Appeal and Error, 13.

See Schools and School Districts, 1-5.

See Statutes, 4.

CONSTITUTION OF OREGON.

Cited and Construed.

See Table in Front of this Volume.

CONSTRUCTION.

See Constitutional Law, 6.

See Contracts, 4, 5.

See Covenants, 1.

See Mandamus, 6.
See Pleading, 5, 6.
See Statutes, 3, 7.
See Trial, 2.

CONTEMPT.

Contempt-Appeal-Bill of Exceptions.

1. Whether a sentence for contempt exceeds the limits fixed by
statute, being determinable from an examination of the judgment as
exemplified in the record, may be submitted on appeal without a bill
of exceptions, even though other questions discussed in the brief could
not be considered without the evidence and a bill of exceptions.
(State v. Rider, 318.)

Contempt Appeal-Record-Additional Abstract.

2.

Where respondent deems the abstract imperfect or unfair, he
should file an additional abstract, as prescribed by Supreme Court
rule 7 (56 Or. 616 [117 Pac. x]). (State v. Rider, 318.)

Contempt-Appeal-Assignments of Error-Sufficiency.

3. That assignments of error in the abstract on appeal fall short
of technical accuracy does not require a dismissal of the appeal, not
essential to a transfer of the cause. (State v. Rider, 318.)

Contempt-Appeal-Transcript-Authentication.

4.

Where defendant has attempted in good faith to comply with
Laws of 1913, page 656, declaring that when an appeal is perfected
the original pleadings and the original bill of exceptions shall be sent
up by the clerk of the trial court and made a part of the transcript,
he will be allowed to supply a certificate to meet the objection that
the pleadings and papers sent up were not properly authenticated.
(State v. Rider, 318.)

CONTRACTS.

Contracts Performance-Sufficiency-Building Contracts.

1. Where a contract required a monthly statement of account
"covering labor, materials," etc., used in a building, and that "all
receipted vouchers" be turned over by the contractor to the owner,
the contractor's failure to take vouchers for labor is failure to sub-
stantially perform the contract, and he cannot recover an alleged un-
paid balance, although canceled checks are offered in lieu of vouchers
to show the payments made for labor. (Camp & DuPuy v. Lauterman,
134.)

Contracts-Breach-Acquiescence-Injury.

2. Where plaintiff, a contractor, agreed to furnish to defendant
owner vouchers for all labor and material claims paid, and he never
secured such vouchers for labor, the fact that defendant was present
when laborers were paid, saw that no vouchers were taken, and did
not object, does not estop him from setting up the contract, since the
plaintiff did not, by reason of such acts of defendant. alter his posi-
tion to his injury. (Camp & DuPuy v. Lauterman, 134.)

Contracts-Irrigation Project-Abandonment.

3. The maker, after the plan of the work had been changed with-
out her consent, and she had refused a request to execute a new