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Officers and agents.

6. Laws 1881, c. 488, § 1, provides that
any town, village, or city may, at its own ex-
pense, build a bridge over a canal within its
own limits, under the direction of the state
superintendent of public works. Section 2 pro-
vides that such superintendent shall have sole
power of appointing and removing the tenders
of hoist, lift, and swing bridges, but their
wages shall be paid by the town, village, or
city to the superintendent, to be paid by him
to them. Held, that the building of a bridge
by a city, under such law, is an acceptance of
its terms, whence arises a contract to pay the
wages of the bridge tenders, and they may sue
the city on its default in such payment.-Fail-
ing v. City of Syracuse, (Co. Ct.) 24 N. Y. S.
705, 4 Misc. Rep. 50.

7. The charter of the village of Whitestone
(Laws 1869, c. 199, tit. 2, § 1) provides that
there shall be seven trustees of the village.
Section 8 provides that, in case of a vacancy
in the board, a majority of the remaining trus-
tees may call a special election to fill it, at
such time and place and in such manner as
they may prescribe. Held, that the statute is
mandatory, and mandamus will lie to compel
such trustees to call a special election to fill a
vacancy in the board. - People v. Board of
Trustees of Whitestone, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 532.
8. Laws 1879, c. 145, § 2, provided that the
commissioners of excise in cities should hold
their office for three years, and until others
should be appointed in their place. Laws 1892,
c. 401, § 2, approved April 30, 1892, repealing
that act, provided that the term of office of
every commissioner of excise then in of-
fice should be the term for which he was
elected or appointed, and the term of every
commissioner appointed before the end of the
term of the mayor then in office should be
for the term then provided by law. Section
5 of this chapter provided that a commission-
er's term of office should expire with the term
of the mayor who appointed him. Section 45
provided that the repeal of a law by that act
should not affect rights already accrued under
the repealed act. Held, that persons appointed
by the mayor April 4, 1892, such appointment
to take effect May 1st, would hold office for
three years, irrespective of the fact that they
qualified under a subsequent appointment
made by the same mayor in July, and that
others were appointed to fill such office by
the succeeding mayor at the beginning of the
next year.-People v. Lahr, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S.
1020.

9. A notice by the aqueduct commissioners
to an inspector of masonry, that, owing to lack
of work, you are hereby suspended from No-
vember 16th, without pay, until such time as
your services may be required," shows an in-
tention to dismiss, and not merely to suspend,
notwithstanding three months later the commis-
sioners, evidently as a precautionary measure,
passed a resolution that the inspector's services
were no longer required, and that he was there-
fore dismissed. Barrett, J., dissenting. Greg-
ory v. Mayor, etc., 21 N. E. 119, 113 N. Y. 416;
Emmitt v. City of New York, 28 N. E. 19, 128
N. Y. 117, distinguished.-Kelly v. City of New
York, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 1.

Officers and agents-Authority to incur
expense in litigation.

10. City aldermen, who have been convicted
of contempt in disobeying an injunction, which
conviction stands unreversed, cannot, by reso-
lution, make the city liable for the expense of
defending the contempt proceedings.-West v.
City of Utica, (Sup.) 24 Ñ. Y. S. 1075.
Implied contracts.

11. Where water is supplied to a village
which has power to make contracts for water
for public use, but no contract was in fact
made, an agreement to pay will be implied.-
Port Jervis Water-Works Co. v. Village of
Port Jervis, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 497.
Defective streets.

12. The fact that a sewer system was con-
structed by water commissioners, free from any
control by the city, does not exempt the city
from liability for an accident happening 15
years thereafter, as a result of the cover of a
and out of repair from protracted use.-Cassidy
sewer basin in the street having become worn
v. City of Poughkeepsie, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 523.

13. In an action against a village for in-
juries from a fall on an icy sidewalk, it ap-
peared that, during a month prior to the in-
jury, snow accumulated on the walk while
the temperature was such that the same
might have been removed, and that two or
three days before the injury the walk was
covered with sleet, and so remained while the
ing point. Held, that plaintiff could not re-
temperature was constantly below the freez-
cover without showing that the injury resulted
from the previous accumulation of snow, as
defendant would not be liable for the existence
of the sleet on the walk while the tempera-
ture was such that it could not be removed.-
Y. S. 1014.
Durr v. Village of Green Island, (Sup.) 24 N.

injuries caused by a defect in a cross walk
14. In an action against a city for personal
left by a street-railway company in building
its track, it is no defense that 30 days previous
completing its work, where such city was not
to the injury such company was enjoined from
a party to the injunction suit, and in its answer
admits that at the time of the injury it was
its duty to keep the walk in repair.-Dale v.
City of Syracuse, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 968.
injuries caused by a defect in a cross walk,
15. In an action against a city for personal
the question as to whether the fall of plaintiff
was caused by the hole in the walk or by the
slippery condition of the walk, arising from a
fall of snow during the previous night, for
which condition defendant is not liable, was
properly submitted to the jury under appro-
priate instructions.-Dale v. City of Syracuse,
(Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 968.

Negligence of traveler.

16. In an action against a city for personal
injuries caused by a defect in a cross walk,
plaintiff testified that at the time of the ac-
cident his attention was attracted from the
walk, and that he did not notice the hole in
the walk, with which he was familiar. Held,
that the question as to whether or not plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence was

for the jury-Dale v. City of Syracuse, (Sup.)
24 N. Y. S. 968.

| county from submitting to the court an action
by the town against the county on an agreed
ratement of facts because such statement
Deposit of sewage in private pond.
does not contain all the facts material to the
17. Where the sewage of a village is col-county's defense, in the absence of fraud and
lected and emptied through its sewers and gut- collusion on the part of defendants, unless the
ters into plaintiff's pond, polluting the water, acts of the board of supervisors in the matter
and causing a large deposit of offensive mat-
ter, plaintiff is entitled to a perpetual injunc- York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Maine, (Sup.)
were beyond their authority, and void.-New
tion, and to at least nominal damages.-
24 N. Y. S. 962.
Schriver v. Village of Johnstown, (Sup.) 24
N. Y. S. 1083.

Actions against-Conditions precedent.
18. Laws 1884, c. 308, provides that the
officers of a village created by special charter
shall have the same "powers" as are prescribed
in any general act for the incorporation of
villages, except as such special charter may be
in conflict with the general acts. Held, that
Laws 1889, c. 440, providing that no action
shall be maintained against a village for in-
juries caused by its negligence, unless notice
of the time and place at which such injuries
were received shall have been given the village
within one year after the injury, applies to a
village created by special charter, though the
latter required no such notice.-Freligh v. Di-
rectors of Saugerties, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 182.
19. It is not a compliance with the statute
requiring such notice, where it is served on
defendant's officers the same day, though be
fore, the action for the injury is commenced,
since the purpose of the law is to give such
officers an opportunity to investigate the facts
and settle the claim, if just, without litigation.
-Freligh v. Directors of Saugerties, (Sup.) 24
N. Y. S. 182.

20. A notice which merely states that plain-
tiff has a claim against the village for the loss
of a wagon and for injuries to his person and
property by reason of his coming in contact
with a pole which stands in P. street, is in-
sufficient, in that it does not specify the time
nor the particular place where the injury oc-
curred, as provided by Laws 1889, c. 440.-
Freligh v. Directors of Saugerties, (Sup.) 24
N. Y. S. 182.

Complaint in action against.

21. A complaint in an action against a town,
for injuries caused by defendant's negligence
in failing to keep a bridge in repair, must aver
that the claim was served on the supervisors
of the town within 6 months after the cause

of action accrued, and that 15 days elapsed
after the claim was so presented before the ac-
tion was commenced, as required by Laws 1890,
c. 568, § 16. Olmstead v. Town of Pound
Ridge, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 615.

22. Objection to the complaint, for failure
to show that notice of claim as required by
statute was given, may be raised at any stage
of the action.-Olmstead v. Town of Pound
Ridge, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 615.

Action by taxpayer to restrain acts of
officers.

Illegal disbursements.

24. Under Code Civil Proc. § 1925, provid-
action "to obtain a judgment preventing waste
ing that a resident taxpayer may bring an
of or injury to the estate, funds or other prop-
erty" of the city, such person may obtain
city officers from illegally paying out city funds
an injunction to restrain aldermen and other
for the defense of some of their number in
contempt proceedings, in pursuance of a pre-
of counsel for the purpose.-West v. City of
vious resolution authorizing the employment
Utica, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 1075.

What officers to defend actions.

25. Laws 1866, c. 220, provides for the in-
corporation of the village of Saratoga Springs.
vesting in the board of trustees power of suing
and defending "in all courts and places what-
soever." Laws 1890, c. 470, provides for the
appointment of a board of street commissioners
to exercise all the powers in relation to the pub-
lic streets of said village theretofore vested in
the trustees. By Laws 1884, c. 308, the trus-
tees of villages created by special charter are
given the same powers as are prescribed in
any general act for the incorporation of vil-
lages; and by Laws 1870. c. 291, tit. 3, § 3,
subd. 5, boards of trustees are authorized "to
employ an attorney or attorneys for the trans-
action of any matter requiring legal skill.”
Held that, in proceedings for the appointment
of commissioners to appraise the damages to
property in said village by a change in the
grade of a street, under Laws 1883, c. 113, as
amended by Laws 1884, c. 281, providing that
notice thereof shall be served on the person
or persons having complete authority to make
such change, the board of trustees alone is au-
thorized to defend therein, and the attorneys
employed by it may act without the presence or
consent of the board of street commissioners.—
Collins v. Village of Saratoga Springs, (Sup.)
24 N. Y. S. 234.

Mutual Benefit Insurance.
See "Insurance," 14, 15.

NAVIGABLE WATERS.
Control of lands under navigable wa-

ters.
The state holds title to the land under
navigable waters as trustee for the public, and
23. Under Code Civil Proc. § 1925, as sup- has no power to grant to a railroad company a
plemented by Acts 1881, 1887, authorizing an strip of land adjoining the shore of a river, so
action by a taxpayer to prevent injury to the as to cut off a riparian owner's right of access
property of a municipality, a taxpayer cannot to the waters thereof. 23 N. Y. S. 927, af-
maintain an action to enjoin a supervisor | firmed.-Saunders v. New York Cent. & H. R.
of a town and the board of supervisors of a R. Co., (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 659.

NEGLIGENCE.

INDEX.

See, also, "Damages."
Contributory, of passenger, see "Carriers," 7.
of servant, see "Master and Servant," 17-

19.

of traveler on defective street, see "Munici-
al Corporations," 16.

Defective streets, see "Municipal Corporations,"
12-16.

Indemnity against action, see "Indemnity," 1-3.
Liability of railroad company, see "Railroad
Companies."

Of carrier of passengers, see "Carriers," 1–7.
Of keeper of boarding house, see "Boarding-
House Keepers.

Of master, see "Master and Servant," 3.
What constitutes.

the driver was talking with a passenger, and
he did not know that he had run over any one
until the conductor pointed to the body lying
on the track. There was no obstruction of the
view of the track at the time of the accident.
Held, that the evidence of negligence on the
part of the driver was sufficient to justify the
submission of that question to the jury.-Mason
v. Atlantic Ave. R. Co., (City Ct. Brook.) 24
N. Y. S. 139, 4 Misc. Rep. 291.
Liability for acts of independent con-

tractor.

to

8. Where the owner of premises, whose
duty it is to keep the same in repair, contracts
with a third person to make necessary repairs,
the owner
and he fails
make them,
is liable for injuries resulting from the de-
fective condition of the premises, though such
third person was an independent contractor.-
Brennan v. Ellis, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 426.
Defective sidewalks-Liability of abut-
ting owners.

1. In an action for damages caused by a
dam washing away, where there was no waste
weir to the dam, or flagging over the dirt fill-
ing between the walls of the dam, and an
expert testified that it was not safe to build
9. In an action against a railroad com-
a dam without a waste weir, and a witness
called by defendant testified that he would not pany for injuries to plaintiff from slipping on
build such a dam without a waste weir, the ice which had accumulated on the sidewalk
question of defendant's negligence in its con- from water dripping from the spout of defend-
struction was properly for the jury.-Cottrell ant's water tank, defendant could not defeat
v. Marshall Infirmary, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 381.
a recovery on the ground that, the obstruction
2. The owner of a dam is not liable for being on the sidewalk, the city only was liable.
damages caused by its washing away by a-Thuringer v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.,
phenomenal flood, that no one could expect. (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 1087.
Cottrell v. Marshall Infirmary, (Sup.) 24 N. Y.
S. 381.

3. Where a railroad company delivers a car
load of lumber to the owner, it owes no duty
to an employe of his contractor to provide
against the danger of accident by the falling
of the lumber while such employe is engaged,
by direction of his employer, in unloading it
from the car.-Hulse v. New York, O. & W. R.
Co., (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 512.

4. A railroad company is not guilty of neg-
ligence because a car load of lumber is not so
piled on the car in loading that it will not fall
over at the sides while being unloaded, on re-
moval of the stakes and cross-ties which held
it securely while being transported.-Hulse v.
New York, O. & W. R. Co., (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S.
512.

Contributory negligence.

10. Where persons engaged in unloading a
car of lumber remove the stakes and cross-
ties which support the piles of lumber on the
car, so that it falls, and kills one of them, de-
ceased is guilty of contributory negligence.
Hulse v. New York, O. & W. R. Co., (Sup.) 24
N. Y. S. 512.

11. In an action for personal injuries, where
the evidence on the question of contributory
negligence is such that reasonable men might
reach adverse conclusions, the question is one
for a jury.-Erickson v. Twenty-Third St. Ry.
Co., (Sun.) 24 N. Y. S. 603.

12. Whether a woman injured by falling
on ice negligently allowed to accumulate on
the sidewalk by an adjacent owner was neg-
5. In an action for personal injuries result-ligent in not discovering the ice is a question
ing from plaintiff's team becoming frightened for the jury.-Thuringer v. New York Cent. &
at refuse timber left by defendant railroad H. R. R. Co., (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 1087.
company on its right of way, by the side of
the highway, the question whether the timber
thus situated was calculated to frighten horses
of ordinary gentleness is for the jury.-Tinker
v. New York, O. & W. R. Co., (Sup.) 24 N. Y.
S. 977.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Legality of consideration.

1. A note given to a woman with whom the
6. In an action against a railroad com-
maker had sustained illicit relations, and by
pany for injuries to plaintiff from slipping on
ice which had accumulated on the sidewalk whom he had had a son, not given for the pur-
from water dripping from the spout of defend-pose of continuing the relations, is not bad, as
ant's water tank, it was for the jury to say given for an immoral purpose.-People v. Hayes,
whether defendant was negligent, and whether (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 194.
its negligence caused or contributed to plain-
tiff's injury.-Thuringer v. New York Cent. Accommodation paper.
& H. R. R. Co., (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 1087.

7. In an action against a street railroad
company for causing the death of a boy six
years old, it appeared that at the time the boy
was struck by the car which caused his death

2. Defendants, in an action on a note, al-
leged that they indorsed the note for the ac-
commodation of plaintiff. The maker's clerk
testified that he was sent to procure defend-
ants' indorsement either by the maker or by

-

Weems v. Shaughnessy,

plaintiff's president, both of whom were in the | signee can recover.
maker's office at the time; that defendants (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 271.
refused to indorse the note without the writ- Sureties.
ten request of plaintiff's president; and that
witness wrote a letter to defendants stating
that plaintiff requested the indorsement. Held
sufficient to require the submission to the jury
of the question whether the indorsement was
for plaintiff's accommodation.-Bucyrus Steam
Shovel & Dredge Co. v. Meyer, (Sup.) 24 N. Y.
S. 246.

Bona fide purchasers.

3. A person is not liable under Laws 1890,
c. 564, § 57, on a note executed by the corpora-
tion while he was a stockholder, but not dis-
counted until after he disposed of his stock,
and the fact that the note was dated as of
the time of its execution, and the person seek-
ing to enforce such liability is a bona fide pur-
chaser for value, is_immaterial. Hatch, J.,
dissenting. Close v. Brady, (Super. Buff.) 24
N. Y. S. 567.

4. In an action on a note for $2,500, it ap-
peared that defendants made the note, and de-
livered it to one L. to have it discounted for
defendants, instead of which L. delivered the
note before maturity to plaintiffs, to whom he
owed about $4,000, and was credited on his ac-
count with the amount. After the note fell
due L. paid plaintiffs $500, and received a re-
lease in full of all plaintiffs' claims. Held, that
plaintiffs did not part with anything of value
before maturity of the note, and therefore could
not recover on it.-Vietor v. Bauer, (Sup.) 24
N. Y. S. 428.

5. An indorsee of a note, who surrenders
an old note, and pays the difference in cash,
is a bona fide holder.-Weems v. Shaughnessy,
(Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 271.

6. In an action by the indorsee of a check
against the drawer, who stopped payment, it
appeared that plaintiff, the payee's sister-in-
law, nad been living with the latter's family
some months before the check was drawn, on
a farm which belonged to one H.; that, as be-
tween the payee and H., the money for which
the check was given belonged to the latter; and
that plaintiff knew the check was given for
butter produced on the farm, at a time when
the payee was sick, and the family greatly in
need of money. H. testified that before the
butter was sold he told plaintiff's sister, in her
presence, that the check for the price must be
made payable to him, and that the day after it
was drawn he demanded it of such sister.
Plaintiff testified that she purchased the check
three or four days after it was given; that she
heard H. ask for it, but could not tell the date,
nor remember what was said; and that her
memory was good, and she did not remember
that H. told her sister that the check must
be made payable to him, but would not say
it did not occur. Held, that a finding by
the jury that plaintiff did not have knowledge
of circumstances that ought to have put her on
inquiry as to the rightful ownership of the
check by the payee was against the weight of
the evidence.-Fealy v. Bull, (Sup.) 24 N. Y.
S. 988.

8. A note signed by deceased and P. was
made to P.'s aunt, for money to pay off a note
ceased was surety.
to another person, signed by P., on which de-
The payee knew that P.
had the benefit of the money. P. personally
made payments on the note. All of the indorse
ments were in his writing, except one by the
payee, and all the interest payments were made
by P. At one time, deceased asked permission
to take his name off the note, which the payee
refused, and deceased then said that he should
understood that deceased was a surety only-
see that the note was paid. Held, that it was
In re Sanders' Estate, (Surr.) 24 N. Y. S. 317,
4 Misc. Rep. 343; In re Farrington, Id.
Demand and protest.

9. In New York, mere proof of the insol-
vency of the maker of a note is not a sufficient
excuse for failing to present the note for pay-
ment, and to notify the indorser of the dis-
honor.-Manning v. Lyon, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S.

265.

10. Evidence that there were several notes
of the same makers besides the note in suit,
payable at the same bank; that no funds were
provided for their payment; and that they
were not paid,-does not show that the makers
and prior indorsers were insolvent before the
maturity of such note, and therefore does not
excuse failure to demand payment.-Manning
v. Lyon, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 265.
Actions on.

C. to the order of defendant G., and indorsed
11. In an action on notes made by defendant
by him, the consideration of which was an old
note made by C. to O., there being, on the
one hand, evidence that the old note belonged
to plaintiff, and that it was surrendered to C.
at the time the notes sued on were given, and,
on the other hand, evidence that O. owned the
note at that time, and was to deliver it to C.
when the indorsed notes were delivered, and
that this was not done, it was error to direct
a verdict for plaintiff.-Murphy v. Carey, (Sup.)
24 N. Y. S. 585.

12. In an action on a note signed "T..
Agt.," the complaint averred that T. "was the
lawful agent of the defendant J., and, as such
agent, had the control, direction, and manage
ment of all her business transactions;" that
he, "as such agent aforesaid, heretofore made"
the note sued on; and that he made it "as such
agent for the said defendant J., under and by
the direction and authority of the said J., and
in the due management and control of her
said business, and for the benefit of said
business." Held, that the complaint was not
sufficient to charge J. as maker, since there
was no allegation that the note was made by
J.. or that she authorized or directed T. to
make it, or afterwards ratified it, or any alle
gation from which such inference could be le-
gally drawn. - First Nat. Bank v. Turner.
(Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 793.

Newly-Discovered Evidence.

7. If the assignor of a note, after maturity
and without consideration, was a bona fide
holder, and entitled to recover thereon, the as- See "New Trial," 2.

NEW TRIAL.

See, also, "Appeal."

Excessive damages, see "Damages," 5-7.

changed, the first decision must be regarded as
stare decisis.-Silliman v. Paine, (Sup.) 24 N.
Y. S. 344.

Notes.

Grounds-Disqualification or miscon- See "Negotiable Instruments."

duct of juror.

1. On a motion for a new trial by plaintiff
in a case against a city, it appeared that plain-
tiff's attorney, when impaneling the jury, asked
if any of them had business relations with any
one connected with the city attorney's office,
and that no juror made any reply, whereupon
the attorney said he would take it for granted
that no such relation existed. It appeared that
one juror kept a livery stable, and regularly
furnished the law department with carriages,
under the direction of the corporation counsel,
and it appeared that the juror understood the
purpose of the question, and made no disclosure
merely because the attorney mentioned in terms
the city attorney, and not the corporation coun-
sel. Held, that a new trial should be granted.-
McGarry v. City of Buffalo, (Sup.) 24 N. Y.
S. 16.

Newly-discovered evidence.

Notice.

Fixing water rates, see "Municipal Corpora-
tions," 2.

Of appeal, see "Appeal," 1.
Of lien, see "Livery Stable Keepers."

NUISANCE.

Deposit of sewerage in private pond, see "Mu-
nicipal Corporations," 17.

Abatement of public nuisance.

A mill pond which, by the collection of
foul matter, becomes a nuisance endangering
the health of the public, may be discontinued.-
Board of Health of Yonkers v. Copcutt, (Sup.)
24 N. Y. S. 625.

Obligation of Contracts.

2. Newly-discovered evidence that defend-
ant's wagon had a broken shaft on the day
after plaintiff claimed he was run into by de- See "Constitutional Law," 2.
fendant, and that defendant admitted that he
ran into plaintiff, would be but cumulative to
plaintiff's direct testimony that defendant ran
into him.-Shute v. Jones, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S.
637.

Conditions of granting.

3. Where, on petition of a receiver of a
firm, disputed claims are referred, and are dis-
allowed by the referee after a regular trial,
and his report is confirmed, it is a proper con-
dition to the granting of a motion for a new
trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence,
made pending an appeal from the order of con-
firmation, that the receiver be reimbursed for
the amount he paid the referee for fees, and
that the partner, who was in no way liable
'for the claims, be allowed costs and attorneys'
fees. In re Wyatt, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S. 277; In
re Ryan, Id.

Statutory new trial as of right.

4. Where, in an action to recover posses-
sion of a suite of rooms in an apartment house,
the complaint alleges that defendant holds
forcible possession of the premises, of which
plaintiff had been in possession, and demands
treble damages, and it is doubtful whether
such complaint contains allegations necessary
to an action of ejectment, but it seems to have
been framed on the theory that it was an ac-
tion of forcible entry and detainer, it is error.
after final judgment against plaintiff, to grant
him a new trial under Code Civil Proc. § 1525,
which entitles the defeated party in ejectment
to a new trial, as of right, at any time within
three years, on conditions therein specified.—
Compton v. The Chelsea, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S.
241.

Decision on first trial as stare decisis.
5. Where a decision in ejectment has not
been reversed, on a second trial under the stat-
have been
ute,
unless the essential facts

OFFICE AND OFFICER.

See, also, "Receivers."

Action against officers, see "Venue in Civil
Cases," 1.

Officers and agents of corporation, see "Corpo-
rations," 3-5, 7-9.

of city, see "Municipal Corporations," 6-10.
State officers, see "States and State Officers.”
Preference of Union soldiers in making
appointment.

1. Laws 1887, c. 464, §§ 1, 2, provide that
in the public departments, and in noncom-
petitive examinations under the civil service
laws when they apply, "honorably discharged
soldiers and sailors shall be preferred for ap
pointment and employment," etc., and all per-
sons having appointing power are required to
faithfully comply with the terms of the stat-
ute in letter and spirit. Laws 1889, c. 382,
$30, repeats the authority given by the con-
stitution to the superintendent and warden as
to appointments, and provides that each shall
have the power to remove his appointees,
when, in his judgment, the public interests re-
quire it. Held, that a keeper of Sing Sing
prison, who is an honorably discharged soldier.
and has faithfully discharged his duty as such
officer for many years, has no absolute right
to such position; and the warden may remove
him when, in his honest judgment, the public
interests require it.-People v. Lathrop, (Sup.)
24 N. Y. S. 754.
Eligibility.

2. The supervisor of a city ward is not
ineligible to appointment as a commissioner of
excise.-People v. Lahr, (Sup.) 24 N. Y. S.
1020.

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