gression by which sin first gained entrance to the world and began its destructive sway. As from this mystical identification of the salvation of the believing world with Christ in his death and resurrection, we derive the idea of a real relation of those saving deeds to the believer's personal righteousness, so from a similar identification of the sinning of all men in and with Adam's sin, theology should deduce the principle of a real relation of individual sin to the previous sin of the race, through heredity—a principle to which modern science has added impressive emphasis.

Paul does not describe men as guilty for that inherited tendency to sin or vitiation of nature which they derive from their connection with a sinful race. The old theological theories which held that man was by nature sinful and guilty, that newly born children were blameworthy in the sight of God and objects of his wrath, found support for such a view in Paul only by unwarranted exegesis. The principal proof-text was Eph. ii. 3: "And (we Jews) were by nature children of wrath (тékva þúσeɩ оpyês), even as the rest" (the Gentiles). This passage was understood to affirm that all human beings are objects of God's wrath from the moment of birth in consequence of original sin and native depravity. Meyer has abundantly refuted this interpretation, and many other recent scholars have adopted substantially the view which he advocated.1 I have elsewhere 2 given my reasons for rejecting the interpretation that "Paulus nos cum peccato gigni testatur, quemadmodum serpentes venenum ex utero afferunt (Calvin); I can only briefly summarize them here. It is apparent from the context that the object of the passage as a whole is to describe the actual sinfulness of the Gentile world, and thus to show from what great depravity the readers have been redeemed. But not wishing to excuse the Jewish world, Paul throws in the statement that the Jews were quite as bad as the Gentiles. The

1/

Among them, Weiss, von Soden, and T. K. Abbott. See, especially, the latter's Commentary, in loco, in the International Series.

2 See The Pauline Theology, pp. 152-157.

passage is quite analogous to Rom. i. and ii. where, after depicting the depravity of the heathen, he turns to the Jews and charges them with doing the same things. In both cases he is speaking of actual sin. It is, moreover, utterly incredible that Paul should have described the Jewish people, the branches of the sacred olive tree of the theocracy (oi kaтà þúσi кλádoι, Rom. xi. 21), as by their very birth and nature, objects of God's wrath. If this interpretation is correct, it is no wonder that it is regarded as proof that Paul could never have written the Epistle to the Ephesians. It is, indeed, quite certain that he never wrote anything which stands in such glaring contradiction with his doctrine of the "holy nation" as does the old dogmatic interpretation of this passage. The words Téκva φύσει ὀργῆς do not necessarily mean objects by birth of God's wrath. Puois may mean "growth as well as "birth." It may refer to inheritance, as in Gal. ii. 15, or to the development of the voluntary life, as when the Gentiles are said to do φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου (Rom. ii. 14). Further, dúoe is not emphatic in our passage as the interpretation under review assumes. The passage, no doubt, presupposes a hereditary taint, but it does not assert that before and apart from any voluntary action, and on the basis of inheritance alone, human beings are objects of God's wrath. It teaches rather that Jews, as well as Gentiles, in their corrupt pre-Christian life, were objects of God's holy displeasure. "The word þúσa refers to their natural development (as in Rom. ii. 14), and purposely stands after Tékva, because to them belonged, through divine grace and calling, the sonship to God (Rom. ix. 4), in virtue of which they remained beloved of God (Rom. xi. 28) even when their conduct (Wandel) exposed them to the divine wrath."1

As a result of our review it appears that the elements of Paul's doctrine of sin are as follows: (1) Sin does not have its origin and ground in the sensuous nature, or in any metaphysical limitation of man, but in the will. (2) Sin is universal and guilty. It pervades and affects 1 Weiss, Die paul. Briefe, in loco.

all man's life and relations. Paul does not, however, teach the total depravity of all mankind. All men are not by nature "wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually." Even the heathen may "show the work of the law written on their hearts," and may, at least in some degree, "do by nature the things of the law" (Rom. ii. 14, 15), that is, partially conform to the divine will. (3) A bias towards sin is propagated by heredity. Men belong to a sinful race. They begin life with a predisposition to evil. Upon each life is entailed a moral inheritance from the past. The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. These principles are not shaken, but confirmed, by the results of science and by the subtlest speculations of ethical philosophy on the subject.

CHAPTER IV

THE LAW OF GOD

PAUL'S doctrine of the law is developed mainly from a Christological standpoint. He does not dwell upon the historic purpose and use of the law. He lays the greatest stress upon its office as preparatory to Christ. Of specific points under this general topic he discusses at greatest length the relation of the law to sin. This he does in order to show how the law served to quicken the consciousness and reveal the true nature of sin, and thus to prepare men to receive the gospel of redemption through Christ.

In setting forth this relation, Paul employs (1) a historical and exegetical argument founded upon the relation of the law to the promise given to Abraham (Gal. iii.; Rom. iv.), in which it is shown that the principle on which Abraham was justified was that of faith. The testimony of the Old Testament was that Abraham believed God, and his faith was reckoned to him for righteousness (Rom. iv. 3, 9). On the basis of this testimony Paul asserts that the promise to Abraham did not guarantee its blessing to him and to his seed on the ground of a legal obedience, but on the ground of a righteousness which is by faith (Rom. iv. 13). He therefore concludes that the way to acceptance with God is the way of faith, and that the validity of the promises made of old rests upon this principle (Rom. iv. 16; Gal. iii. 21, 22). He thus traces back his doctrine of the imputation of faith and of justification thereby (Rom. iv. 3, 5, 9, 22; ef. Gen. xv. 6) with historical continuity to the covenant made with Abraham. The effect of this argument is to show that the law had its main purpose in reference to the

Messianic age and work. Upon its use as a present power restraining from sin, Paul does not have occasion to dwell.

(2) He employs an argument based upon his doctrine of the cross. The postulate with which he starts is that the cross of Christ is the efficient means of redemption. But if righteousness were attainable by deeds of the law, there would not only be another way of salvation, but the way of the cross would be rendered unnecessary and useless (Gal. ii. 21; v. 4). But by the supposition this is impossible. The way by the law must therefore be shut, and the way by the cross remain the only path of life (Rom. ix. 30–33).

(3) A psychological argument is also employed to show how the law quickens the consciousness of sin, makes transgressions abound (Rom. iii. 20; v. 20; vii. 7–11), shuts men up in ward, and cuts off every other way but that of faith (Gal. iii. 23 sq.). The first of these three lines of proof is a general historical argument, the second a specifically Christological, and the third a psychological argument. This analysis gathers up the principal proofs by which the positive aspects of the law's preparatory office are set forth.

Its negative preparation for Christ is brought out in an argument showing the powerlessness of the law to secure righteousness. There are two main reasons for this inability of the law: (1) its external, preceptive character (2 Cor. iii. 6-18; Rom. ii. 27-29; vii. 6); (2) the carnal nature of man (Rom. viii. 3-7). Thus, negatively, the preparatory purpose of the law is shown by both its subjective and its objective inability.

Paul uses the word "law" to denote the Mosaic law, unless otherwise limited or defined.1 Nópos is sometimes used generically, but still denotes remotely the Mosaic legislation; óvópos denotes specifically the Mosaic law. A few passages may be taken as representative : Rom. ii. 14, where the Jews and Gentiles only are under consideration. The Gentiles" have not the law" (μn vóμov exovтa); the Jews have the law. Here the Mosaic law must be meant

1 As, e.g., in Gal. vi. 2, τὸν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ; Rom. ii. 14, ἑαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος.