God created both men and angels with possession of a Self-determining Self-determining Freedom of Preference so that they might either choose the good, and live eternally; or choose the evil, and incur merited punishment *.

:

(4.) A fourth passage, yet again of the same tendency, will be found in the first of his two Apologies.

Lest, from what has been said, some should imagine, that we assert events to occur according to a Fatal Necessity, because those events have been foreknown and predicted: we will also solve this difficulty.

Having learned from the prophets, that both punishments and rewards are assigned according to the deserts of each person's actions, we assert this to be true: for, if it were not so, but if all things happened according to Fate, our Freedom of action would forthwith be destroyed. Thus, if it were fated, that This man should be good, and that man bad; there would be no room either for approbation or for censure: and, again, unless the human race, by a Free Preference, had the power to reject the bad and to choose the

* Βουλόμενος γὰρ τούτους, ἐν ἐλευθέρᾳ προαιρέσει, καὶ αὐτεξουσίους γενομένους, τοὺς τε ἀγγέλους καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὁ Θεὸς πράττειν, ὅσα ἕκαστον ἐνεδυνάμωσε δύνασθαι ποιεῖν, ἐποίησεν. εἰ μὲν τὰ εὐάρεστα αὐτῷ αἱροῖντο, καὶ ἀφθάρτους καὶ ἀτιμωρήτους αὐτοὺς τηρῆσαι· ἐὰν δὲ πονηρεύσωνται, ὡς αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ἕκαστον κολάζειν. Justin. Dial. cum Tryph. Oper. p. 247.

good, it would not be the cause of whatever things were done. But, that, by Free Preference, man both does right and does wrong, we thus demonstrate.

The same individual we see passing from one set of actions to their contraries. Now, if it were fated, that he should be, irrecoverably and constrainedly, either bad or good: he would plainly be incapable of these frequent transitions. Consequently, we must either say, that Fate, as the cause of bad, acts contrary to itself: or we must adopt the opinion, that there are no such things as virtue and vice; an opinion, which, as the true word shews, is the height of impiety *.

As, in the former passages, Justin asserted Man's Freedom of Preference against the perverse sophistry of the Jews : so, in the present passage, he

* Οπως δὲ μὴ τινες, ἐκ τῶν προλελεγμένων ὑφ ̓ ἡμῶν, δοξάσωσι καθ ̓ εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκην φάσκειν ἡμᾶς τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ προειπεῖν προεγνωσμένα· καὶ τοῦτο διαλύομεν.

Τὰς τιμωρίας καὶ τὰς κολάσεις καὶ τὰς ἀγαθὰς ἀμοιβὰς, κατ ̓ ἀξίαν τῶν πραξέων ἑκάστου ἀποδίδοσθαι, διὰ τῶν προφητῶν μαθόντες, καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαινόμεθα· ἐπεὶ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καθ ̓ εἱμαρμένην πάντα γίνεται, οὔτε τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅλως. Εἰ γὰρ εἵμαρται, τὸν δὲ τινα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸν δὲ φαῦλον· οὔθ ̓ οὗτος ἀποδεκτὸς, οὔδε ἐκεῖνος μεμπτέος. Καὶ αὖ, εἰ μὴ, προαιρέσει ἐλευθέρᾳ, πρὸς τὸ φεύγειν τὰ αἰσχρὰ, καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι τὰ καλὰ, δύναμιν ἔχει τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος· ἀναίτιον ἐστι τῶν ὁπωσδήποτε πραττομένων. ̓Αλλ ̓, ὅτι ἐλευθέρᾳ προαιρέσει καὶ κατορθοῖ καὶ σφάλλεται, οὕτως ἀποδείκνυμεν.

Τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν μετέλευσιν ποιοῦμενον ὁρῶμεν. Εἰ δὲ εἵμαρτο ἢ φαῦλον ἢ σπουδαῖον εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἐναντίων

M

argues against the pagan stoical dogma of Fate or of Fixed Uncontroulable Necessity. Such an opinion, by converting men into mere irresistibly impelled machines, destroys all moral responsibility. Justin, therefore, in opposition to it, contends: that No man is invincibly forced to act AGAINST his will or his choice or his inclination.

(5.) A fifth passage we read in his second Apology and here again he is professedly arguing, not against the need of Divine Grace in order to willing holiness of life, but simply against the Absolute Uncontroulable Fatalism of the Stoics.

The Stoics maintain, that All things are according to a Fatal Necessity. But, because God, in the beginning, created both angels and men in possession of a Power of Self-determination if they do evil, they will justly, in eternal fire, suffer punishment for their misdeeds. Now, of every intelligent creature, it is the nature, to be capable both of vice and of virtue: for, unless there was a power of spontaneously turning to either, there would be no room for praise *.

δεκτικὸς ἦν, καὶ πλειστάκις μετετίθετο· αλλ ̓ οὐδ ̓ οἱ μὲν ἦσαν σπουδαῖοι, οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι, ἐπει τὴν εἱμαρμένην αἰτίαν φαύλων καὶ ἐναντία ἑαυτῇ πράττουσαν ἀποφαινόμεθα· ἢ ἐκεῖνο τὸ προειρημένον δόξαι ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ οὐδὲ κακία, ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μόνον ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ νομίζεται" ἥπερ, ὡς δείκνυσιν ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος, μεγίστη ἀσέβεια καὶ ἀδικία ἐστὶν. Justin. Apol. i. Oper. p. 62, 63.

* Οἱ Στωϊκοί, καθ' εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκην, πάντα γίνεσθαι ἀπεφήναντο. ̓Αλλ ̓, ὅτι αὐτεξούσιον τὸ τε τῶν ἀγγέλων γένος καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν

3. Thus argues Justin against the dogma of Fatal Uncontroulable Necessity, whether sophistically employed by the Jews, or mischievously advocated by the Stoics. I have now to shew, that, in thus contending for Man's Freedom of Choice or Preference, he by no means contended on the pelagian principle that Divine influential Grace is unnecessary, but, on the contrary, that he upheld The need of Divine Grace in order to manʼs choosing or preferring a life of holiness rather than a life of unholiness.

The most satisfactory mode of conducting, my proof is simply to adduce Justin's own precise declarations.

It is not my business to pronounce sentence, by anticipation, upon any one of the race of you Jews. But, so far as this, I certainly must assert. If any one be saved, he must be of the number of those who can be saved through the Grace which is from the Lord of hosts *.

We must all hope in God, the Creator of all things and, from him alone, we must seek salvation and assistance. But we must not, like

ἀρχὴν ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς, δικαίως, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πλημμελήσωσι, τὴν τιμωρίαν ἐν αἰωνίῳ πύρι κομίσονται· γεννητοῦ δὲ παντὸς ἥδε ἡ φύσις, κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς δεκτικὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἦν ἐπαινετὸν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν, εἰ οὐκ ἦν ἐπ ̓ ἀμφότερα τρέπεσθαι, καὶ δύναμιν είχε. Justin. Apol. ii. Oper. p. 35.

* Οὐ φθάνω ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ὑμῶν, εἰ μὴ τις ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ χάριν τὴν ἀπὸ Κυρίου σαβαὼθ σωθῆναι δυνάJustin. Dial. cum Tryph. Oper. p. 224.

μενος.

other men who are ignorant of Christianity, fancy that we are saved, on account either of our descent or of our riches or of our strength or of our wisdom *.

Solely from the wonderful foreknowledge of God it has happened, that, through the vocation of the new and eternal covenant, we Christians are found to be more wise and more pious than you Jews who imagine yourselves to be both lovers of God and possessors of wisdom; but who, in truth, are neither the one nor the other †.

Wherefore to us it has been given, that we should both hear and understand and be saved through Christ‡.

II. If the character of Justin be not already cleared, we may bring to his assistance, both Ireneus who was instructed by Polycarp the disciple of St. John, and Augustine himself whose soundness on the doctrine of Divine Grace Mr. Milner would have been the last person to dispute.

* Επὶ Θεὸν τὸν πάντα ποιήσαντα ἐλπίζειν δεῖ πάντας, καὶ παρ ̓ ἐκείνου μόνου σωτηρίαν καὶ βοήθειαν ζητεῖν· ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὡς τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, διὰ γένος ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ σοφίαν, νομίζειν δύνασθαι oleoba. Justin. Dial. cum Tryph. Oper. p. 257.

+ Θαυμαστῇ προνοίᾳ Θεοῦ τοῦτο γέγονεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς, ὑμῶν τῶν νομιζομένων, οὐκ ὄντων δὲ, οὔτε φιλοθέων οὔτε συνετῶν, συνετώτεροι καὶ θεοσεβέστεροι εὑρεθῶμεν, διὰ τῆς κλήσεως τῆς καινῆς καὶ αἰωνίου διαθήκης, TOUTÉT, TOU Xprou. Justin. Dial. cum Tryph. Oper. p. 271. † Ἡμῖν οὖν ἐδόθη, καὶ ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ συνεῖναι, καὶ σωθῆναι, διὰ τούτου roi Xprov. Justin. Dial. cum Tryph. Oper. p. 274.