To such objections as are here supposed the philosopher's reply would be simply this:-I do recognize truth in that worship; and I see some good reason for that reverence. Both were rooted in one idea-an idea of union with God. In connection with this idea there is expressed in all religions a consciousness of sin. Under one form or another, the truth is confessed, that the energies of man's soul and mind have fallen into disorder, and have lost their sense of union with their Creator. The tendencies that were organic have been made chaotic. Yet light shines through the chaos, and through all its warring elements there is felt— above all in the heart of man-the presence of an allpervading, attracting power, drawing the world of created minds back to their Creator. Hence, in the midst of all their disorder and perversity of will, we recognize the presence of one divine idea making itself more and more manifest amid all our various and defective forms of religion. Through all their diverse and sometimes contradictory traditions and tenets, there runs one clue, by which mankind will ultimately be led home to God. This view of heathen religions was opposed to the doctrine of some Christian apologists. Their way of defending their own faith was to treat as utterly erroneous every Pagan tradition. On the contrary, Schelling held that a tendency toward a true belief had more or less been present amid the errors of heathenism. Men, he said, believed and worshipped ignorantly; yet were led on toward the truth. There was more or less of a truc ethical tendency associated with their religious traditions and ritualistic institutions. Aërial spirits, by great Jove design'd They can reward with glory or with gold; A light -Cooke's Translation. which they could not comprehend shone through their darkness. This theory was held as not inconsistent with a belief that the religion of Israel served especially as a preparation for the coming of Christ, who was "the desire of all nations." For here, in Judaism, a consciousness of sin was especially awakened by the law, which was "holy." There, in the Gentile world, a poetic mythology was to a large extent corrupt in its ethical purport; the sense of man's sinfulness was mostly superficial; and the idea of union or reconciliation. with God was therefore shallow. For want of depth, there was a want of height. Ideas of mediation-mostly imaginative rather than religious-did, however, exist in heathenism; and indirectly foreshadowed the coming of Christ. They were signs, says Schelling, of his pre-existential and spiritual presence; and were not altogether neglected by the more religious men of the ancient world. These ideas were accepted by several Protestant theologians of the higher rank-for example by Tholuck-and served to enlarge their views of prophecy and its fulfilments. A new light was cast on the history of both heathenism and Judaism. Students of the prophetic scriptures now learned that not only a few texts, but the whole of the Old Testament, might be viewed as a prophecy of the Advent. Here we must leave the teaching of Schelling, and turn to a very difficult task-to give some account of the "Hegelian School." It has been the especial calamity of Germany in the present century, that the intellectual and analytical element in education has been made predominant to an extent wilful, tyrannical and destructive. The historical, the ethical, the religious, and (we would add) the intuitive and "sentimental "-all these forms, in which divine truth makes itself known, felt, and operative in the soul have been oppressed, trodden down, and in fact destroyed, in order that some form of logic or another may, for some few years, make itself absolute. And what has been the result?-Desolation, without the quietude that, one might suppose, should belong to a desert. Clearness of insight is the very last thing to be attained, even by the most reverent and faithful of students; and it will never be obtained by negation. It was especially a want of clearness that was the charge preferred against Schelling, when his teaching was made more positive; when he was led to treat more and more reverently the results of historical, ethical and religious inquiry. That inquiry led him to a profound belief in two facts:-the world, including especially the mind and will of mankind, has been set in opposition to divine love; and by a new manifestation of this love a mediatorial process has been instituted. Without these admissions-he said-history, religion, and philosophy were but dead subjects for dissection; and this dissection could have for him no interest-no hope of any good result. In order to place together our notices of Schelling's philosophy-the earlier and the later-the order of time has been neglected. During almost twenty years-but especially in 1818-31-his teaching was for the most part disregarded; and men especially complained of his "want of logic." This reminds one of a time remembered by the few old Oxonians still living. Soon after the passing of our Reform Bill, when the University of Oxford was a centre of controversy, political and ecclesiastical, it was said of a certain room there, that its atmosphere was "redolent of logic." With more justice might the same be said of the Berlin University, for some few years before that time. There a morbid tendency to excess in the culture (or cultus) of the mere intellect has long existed; but this was never so much the case as in the years 1820-35; or say more definitely in the five years 1827-31. There was then on all sides too much haste and impetuosity in grappling with the hardest problems of reason and faith. Schelling, living in comparative obscurity, predicted that the result would be negative; and Goethe who, in his old age, heard now and then something of discussion at Berlin, suggested that religion was a subject to be approached in another way (p. 316). It was Hegel's logic that was now making itself more and more predominant. For a time-say in 1820-26-the teaching of Schleiermacher held what might be called a rival position; but in 1827-31 the said logic made itself almost "absolute," in the University of Berlin. For a time it was viewed as a study leading to conclusions of a conservative character, as regards both religion and politics. But after 1831 its negative results were made apparent. How far did these "negative results" truly belong to Hegel, or fairly represent his meaning and intention? This is a question that here will still be left open; since we write for the most part historically, and have to show chiefly how that logic was so understood as to afford a basis for the hypotheses maintained by Strauss and others, who all supposed that they were writing more or less in accordance with the conclusions of that logic. It had shown, as they believed, how the chief ideas represented in nature, in history, and in the traditions and doctrines of religionespecially the Christian religion-were in truth ideas "immanent," or always abiding in the mind of man; just as life was supposed to be a force always immanent in nature, and ready to start forth as it were, and make itself manifest wherever the conditions favourable to its self-development were present and connected. A little consideration will suffice to show how this general idea could be so understood as to afford apparently some basis for either of the two distinct theories of Strauss and Baur, respecting the origin of the Christian faith and its chief tenets. It was granted on all sides that this faith, appearing in the first century, was largely "developed " near the close of the second. How? By the aid of "myths" said Strauss; while Baur had far more to say of "ideas developed by means of opposition." Both, however, had one common assumption as their ground. Each supposed that the ideas developed, whether by means of poetry or by controversy, were there already-"immanent" in the minds of men. The time 1-150 was eminently well adapted for their development-so said Baur in his writings on early Church history-and consequently no supernatural revelation was required. This may be viewed as the "speculative" or "philosophical" ground of the new controversy against historical Christian faith. The chief novelty of the attack-begun in 1835 and ended in 1873— consisted in the supposed fact that unbelief had now a basis in the "philosophy of religion," and might indeed be viewed as a "speculative-religious" argument against historical religion. In passing it may be added, that the supposed basis of 1835 was utterly rejected by Strauss in 1873; but this is not the point to be chiefly noticed here. The new controversial movement did in fact proceed out of the "Hegelian School" of 1827-35, of which, therefore, some account must be given. This, however, will be for the most part historical; and will chiefly have the aim of making clear the fact, that there have existed-so far as regards religion-three distinct interpretations of the doctrine taught in that school. The first, as held by Strauss, is clearly erroneous; and is in substance an abolition of all religion. The second interpretation has been so widely accepted by a large number of intelligent men—including, for example, Biedermann and Pfleiderer-that it must now be viewed as the established form of Hegelian religious doctrine. The third interpretation-a subordinate matter -will be noticed in another place. Here first must be given some general account of the school and its doctrines; and then must be more distinctly noticed the following fact, which we have chiefly to consider:-Whether it was brought to pass by a false or by a true interpretation of the said logic, we do not care to inquire; it remains true, however, that the main result of Hegelian logic was certainly one much like that which Schelling clearly predicted; especially when he said, "it will be negative." Throughout his later lectures and writings his chief aim was to keep logic in its own subservient place, and first of all to direct attention. toward ethical and historical studies, as affording the surest |