"When a court of equity has jurisdiction for one purpose, it may retain jurisdiction to settle all disputes relating to the same subject-matter between the parties to the suit." "

The case of Webster & Co. v. Hotel Co., 151 Wis. 1 (138 N. W. 102), was a proceeding under a mechanic's lien law. The court had before it the parties to the original contract, subcontractors, materialmen, and surety companies who had signed bonds for the various contractors. The surety companies demurred for various reasons, one of which was that the proceeding was in equity for the foreclosure of mechanics' liens; while the cause of action alleged against them was an action at law. In the opinion disposing of the case there is a discussion which we think is germane to the case before us. We quote:

"It is strenuously asserted in behalf of all the demurrers that several alleged causes of action have been improperly united and that the complaint and cross-complaints do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The joinder of different causes of action for relief in favor of a party to a lien suit, or in favor of different persons who are proper parties to the action, is justified and proper, as we have heretofore seen, if the relief sought involves, or in some manner affects, 'the contract, transaction or property which is the subject-matter of the action.' The grounds upon which the subcontractors, the hotel company, the principal contractors, and their bondsmen are found to be proper parties to this action for foreclosure of liens on the hotel property show that the relief they seek to enforce involves rights related and germane to the matter of enforcing the liens against the hotel property and securing payment of the amounts due under the construction contracts, and involves the determination of the ultimate liabilities of the parties between themselves, on each side of the controversy, pertaining to the transaction of the construction of the hotel. Jurisdiction of the parties in the suit for these purposes carries with it the right to unite in the complaint or cross-complaints the different grounds or causes of action for relief, to enable

the court to 'determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side, as between themselves, either on cross-complaint or equivalent pleadings or otherwise, and may grant to the defendant any affirmative relief to which he may be entitled.' Section 2883, Stats. 1898. The scope of this power is declaratory of the broad, equitable powers courts may employ in joining parties and subjects in one suit, to determine their ultimate rights within its jurisdiction. This power is of peculiar applicability to lien foreclosure suits under the statutory provisions heretofore referred to and considered. The appellants claim and insist, however, that the causes of action alleged by the lienors against the principal contractors and their bondsmen for relief on the bonds, and by the hotel company against the Kirkman Construction Company and its surety for relief under the construction contract and the bond, are actions at law which cannot be litigated in this equity suit. A portion of the relief demanded by the hotel company is that, if the principal contractor default in paying what is due subcontractors for material and labor, then that the surety be required to pay such claims to save the hotel company harmless from liens against its property. This the surety contracted to do, and under this obligation the hotel company may enforce this primary liability of the surety to pay the debts of its principal. This right is within the equitable principle governing this duty between the surety and the hotel company, which, in turn, is liable to these lienors as a surety of the surety company, that the surety company bear the obligation which is about to be cast on the hotel company, which principle was applied in the case of Dobie v. Fidelity & C. Co., 95 Wis. 540 (70 N. W. 482), and approved in Monsen v. Noyes, 105 Wis. 565 (81 N. W. 860), [60 Am. St. Rep. 135]. The trial court held that the hotel company's claim for breach of contract by the Kirkman Construction Company was not related to the primary right sought to be enforced in this lien action. Failure of the construction company to furnish the material and do the work required of it has, it is alleged, resulted in damages to the hotel company and in liens against its property. The rights and liabilities arising from the construction and surety contracts, the hotel property,

the question of the hotel company's claim for unpaid lien debts, and its claims for damages for breach of the construction contract, which claims the company may retain and offset against any claim of the principal contractor or affirmatively enforce against the surety if the principal defaults in paying them, connect these inquiries sufficiently with the subject of the litigation to empower a court of equity to adjust and settle them between the parties to this action. The trial and determination of these issues in this action are incidental to the enforcement of the rights of the lien claimants against the hotel property, which the owners have a right to protect by asking that all the liabilities of the parties be adjusted, and that no more be allowed to lien claimants than they are upon investigation entitled to, and that the principal contractor and his surety be compelled to pay such debts and save the hotel property harmless. The bond is involved in the suit and the relief therein as to lienors, and as to the hotel company for default in construction, and this sufficiently connects the hotel company's claim for damages for breach of the construction contract with the subject of the action to authorize the court to retain it in order to have a complete and final determination of the rights and liabilities of all the parties in any manner interested in these contracts and the property. We are persuaded that this holding is within the principle of the decision in the following cases, which hold that a court may lay hold of a subject-matter, however large, made up of a single primary right, and all rights germane thereto, however numerous, or several such subject matters under certain circumstances, bring all parties directly interested before the court, with all parties necessary to be there for their due protection, and settle the entire controversy by a single decree': Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127 (99 N. W. 909); Gager v. Marsden, 101 Wis. 598 (77 N. W. 922); Carpenter v. Christianson, 120 Wis. 558 (98 N. W. 517); Herman v. Felthousen, 114 Wis. 423 (90 N. W. 432); Adkins v. Loucks, 107 Wis. 587 (83 N. W. 934); Level Land Co. v. Sivyer, 112 Wis. 442 (88 N. W. 317); Zinc Carbonate Co. v. Bank, 103 Wis. 125 (79 N. W. 229, 74 Am. St. Rep. 845); St. Croix Timber Co. v. Joseph, 142 Wis. 55 (124 N. W. 1049). The

claim that this course deprives the demurrants of the right to have these issues tried by a jury is not sustained."

The more recent case of Yawkey-Crowley Lumber Co. v. De Longe, 157 Wis. 390 (147 N. W. 334), is to the same effect. In the instant case we have before us the owner, the original contractor, the subcontractors, the materialmen, and the bonding company which gave a bond, not only to the owner, but "to all persons who may become entitled to liens under the contract." Is there any valid legal or equitable reason why the respective rights of the parties should not be settled in one proceeding? We think the

answer should be in the negative.

The decree of the lower court is reversed, the demurrer is overruled, and the defendant is given the usual time in which to answer, with costs to crosscomplainants.

BROOKE, C. J., and MCALVAY, KUHN, STONE, OSTRANDER, BIRD, and STEERE, JJ., concurred.

PASKVAN v. ALLOUEZ MINING CO.

CONTINUANCE - AMENDMENT-STIPULATIONS-PERSONAL

1. TRIAL
INJURY ACTION.

On the trial of an action for the unlawful killing of an infant, where plaintiff asked for leave to amend the declaration so as to show that the accident occurred at a point five hundred feet north, instead of five hundred feet south, of a designated point, and it was permitted by the court and the amendment ordered to take effect

as of the date that the same was proposed, and the case continued over the term upon the understanding that plaintiff should file an amended declaration and that it should be treated as amended from the date of the request, where the case was brought on by agreement for trial at a subsequent term, and defendant's attorney asked for further adjournment upon the ground that the amendment had been made immediately before the call of the case for trial, no error was committed in refusing to grant a further continuance for the reason set up, the defendant claiming to have been unable to prepare for trial upon the amended pleading.

2. MASTER AND SERVANT-MINES AND MINING-MINORS-LABOR LAW -EMPLOYMENT OF INFANT DANGEROUS OCCUPATION EVIDENCE. In an action for the death of an infant of 16 years of age, employed in defendant's mine, evidence considered and held, to present an issue of fact as to the negligence of the parents and beneficiaries under the statute in consenting to and approving of the kind of work in which the infant was engaged. (Act No. 289, Pub. Acts 1909; 2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 4009 et seq.). 3. SAME TRIAL-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-PARENT AND CHILDDEATH.

In an action under the death act, a request to charge, offered by the defendant, based upon the theory that the parents, who were beneficiaries under the statute, participated in the violation of the statute, and were therefore chargeable with negligence contributing to decedent's death, asking the court to instruct the jury that plaintiff could not recover for the benefit of the father and mother for any violation of the statute if they had consented to such employment, no limitation being included in the request in relation to the knowledge of the parents of the danger of the work in which he was engaged, was properly refused; the consent must be given understandingly, or it is no defense.

4. SAME-DEATH-CONTRIBUTION-PECUNIARY INTEREST. There was no error on the trial of such action in permitting the father to testify as to the amount of wages he was able to earn; that his eyesight was defective; that his wife was unable to work and the entire family in poor health; that he had several children, one of whom was blind; the testimony tended to present a