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unpaid at that date, in accordance with the official statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, the sum of $2,177,000,000.

Of this amount, $1,177,000,000 are represented in a funded debt, bearing interest in gold, while $400,000,000 remain unfunded in Treasury circulation.

Up to the close of the last session of Congress, the annual reduction of taxes, as measured by the rates of 1869, had been as follows:

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The reduction of the yearly interest on the public debt exceeds the sum of $23,200,000, of which $21,743,000 are saved by the purchase and cancellation of the six per cent. public securities.

A careful consideration of these results of a prudent and faithful administration of the national Treasury, induces the undersigned to express the confident belief, that the general welfare of the country, the interests of its commerce and trade, and the consequent stability of its public securities, would be best promoted by the re-election of Gen. Grant to the office of President of the United States.

New York, Oct. 4, 1872.

PHELPS, DODGE & CO.,
GEORGE OPDYKE & CO.,

A. A. LOW & BROTHERS,

JOHN A. STEWART,
VERMILYE & CO.,

JAY COOKE & CO.,

JOHN STEWARD,

HARPER & BROTHERS,

JOHN TAYLOR JOHNSTON,
FREDERICK S. WINSTON,
PEAKE, OPDYCKE & CO.,
MORRIS FRANKLIN,
SCHULTZ, SOUTHWICK & CO.,
J. S. ROCKWELL & CO.,
ROBERT H. MCCURDY,
WILLIAM M. VERMILYE,
R. W. HOWES,

WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT,
C. L. TIFFANY.

SPOFFORD BROS. & CO.,
JOHN C. GREEN,

H. B. CLAFLIN & CO.,
MOSES TAYLOR,

WM. H. ASPINWALL,
ROBERT LENOX KENNEDY,

S. B. CHITTENDEN & CO.,
JAMES G. KING'S SONS,
HENRY E. PIERREPONT,

EMIL SAUER,

BOOTH & EDGAR,

WILLIAM ORTON,
ISAAC H. BAILEY,
SHEPHERD KNAPP,

WILLIAMS & GUION,

EDWARDS PIERREPONT,

RUSSELL SAGE,

PETER COOPER,

ANTHONY, HALL & CO.,

GARNER & CO.,

J. S. T. STRANAHAN,
E. D. MORGAN & CO.,
DREXEL, MORGAN & CO.,
AUGUSTINE SMITH.
WM. H. VANDERBILT,
MORTON, BLISS & CO.,
JONATHAN STURGES,
J. & W. SELIGMAN & CO.,
J. & J. STUART & CO.,
JOHN A. PARKER,
BENJAMIN B. SHERMAN,
JOHN D. JONES,

J. D. VERMILYE,

SAMUEL T. SKIDMORE,

HENRY F. VAIL.

LLOYD ASPINWALL,

JACOB A. OTTO,

GEORGE W. T. LORD,

SAMUEL MCLEAN & CO.,

HENRY CLEWS & CO.,

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE TWEED RING, AND THE COMMITTEE OF SEVENTY.

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THE RING MAKES ITSELF USEFUL IN SPECULATIVE DEALS.— How TWEED AND HIS HEELERS" MANIPULATED THE MONEY MARKET-THE RING CONSPIRES TO ORGANIZE A PANIC FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES-THE PLOT TO GAIN A DEMOCRATIC VICTORY DEFEATED AND A PANIC AVERTED THROUGH PRESIDENT GRANT AND SECRETARY BOUTWELL, WHO WERE APPRISED OF THE DANGER BY WALL STREET MEN. HOW THE COMMITTEE OF "SEVENTY" ORIGINATED. THE TAXPAYERS TERRORIZED BY BOSS TWEED AND HIS MINIONS.-HOW "SLIPPERY DICK" GOT HIMSELF WHITEWASHED.--OFFERING THE OFFICE OF CITY CHAMBERLAIN AS A BRIBE TO COMPROMISE MATTERS. HOW THE HON. SAMUEL JONES TILDEN, AS COUNSEL TO THE COMMITTEE, OBTAINED HIS GREAT START IN LIFE. 'HE Tweed Ring had considerable experience in and out of Wall Street for several years during the municipal reign of the famous Boss. I have made some reference to their attempts to manipulate the market through tight money, in my biographical sketch of that Wall Street celebrity Henry N. Smith.

THE

The Ring was often highly subservient in assisting certain operators in speculative deals in stocks, one notable instance being in Hannibal & St. Jo. shares, which resulted in a terrible loss to Boss Tweed & Co. This stock became quite neglected for a long period afterwards, and so remained until the famous "corner" was engineered many years after by John R. Duff, of Boston, through his New York broker, Wm. J. Hutchinson, and by which poor Duff was almost, if not entirely, ruined. It is only justice to Mr. Duff, in this connection, to state that he was not to blame, as an exhaustive investigation by the Governing Committee of the Stock Exchange showed that his trouble chiefly arose through

flagrant dishonesty and betrayal of trust on the part of his agent, in whom he reposed too much confidence.

Boss Tweed and his special retainers sometimes made Wall Street instrumental in engineering national and State political movements. About the time of an election, if their opponents happened to be in power, the Ring would produce a stringency in the money market, by calling in simultaneously all the city money, which was usually on temporary loans in the Street.

This the Ring managers would accomplish through some of the banks which were the depositories of the city funds, and were under their control.

By this means they worked up a feeling of antagonism against the Republicans who were in office, by throwing the blame on them, and thus rendering them odious in the eyes of those who had lost money in speculation. The blame was not unnaturally fastened on the party in power, and most men, when they lose money, are credulous enough to believe anything that seems to account for the manner in which the loss has been sustained. It seems to have a soothing effect upon their minds, and furnishes them with a tangible object upon which they may wreak their vengeance and feel satisfied. There is nothing so irritating to the disappointed speculator as the harassing doubt of where to fix the blame.

The Tweed Ring supplied this long-felt want, and filled the aching void in the heart of the man who happened to get on the wrong side of the market. When speculators frequently had their margins "wiped out," and were almost beggared of everything except their votes, they found that consolation which Wall Street refused them, in the sympathetic hearts of Tweed's "heelers," who pointed to the poor office-holders of the Republican party, representing them as the sole possessors of Pandora's box, which contained all evils that flesh is heir to.

So these financial disasters were brought about by the Tweed party for the purpose of getting their friends into office,

TWEED'S GANG ORGANIZE A PANIC.

329

which always paid tribute to the Boss when he was instrumental in elevating a person to a fat position. He, himself, did not want any better office than receiver general of this tribute.

In those days a Presidential election was largely influ enced by the way Pennsylvania went, so that it had grown into a political maxim, "As goes the Keystone State so goes the Union."

In the Spring of 1872, the year in which General Grant was the Republican candidate for the second term, when it was decided that Horace Greeley should be the Democratic candidate, great efforts were made to produce a panic in Wall Street. It was arranged by the Tweed party that the panic should take place simultaneously with the State election in Pennsylvania, so as to illustrate the evil results of Republican rule, and turn the influence in favor of Mr. Greeley's election.

I received intimation of this politico-speculative conspiracy, and communicated my information to Senator Conkling, who was stopping at the Fifth Avenue Hotel at the time. I told him that the Democrats were working up a panic to help to defeat General Grant. He said it was the first he had heard of it, but it was so like a move that Tweed and his party would make, that he felt there was just cause for alarm about it, and he requested me to go and see Governor Morgan, and also George Opdyke, on the subject. I found that the Governor was at a church meeting, and I left my card telling him to call upon me at the rooms of the Republican National Committee, as I wanted to see him upon important business. I left word for Mr. Opdyke to call also.

The Governor soon presented himself at the Committee rooms, and I divulged to him my information and suspicions. He did not exhibit so much interest as I imagined the importance of the case demanded, and he appeared to doubt the correctness of the report of the political inten

tions of the Tweed Ring, or rather he seemed to imagine that the Ring was hardly capable of a move that involved such subtlety and depth of design. Therein he greatly underestimated the power, resources and statecraft of Peter "Brains" Sweeney. The Governor was of a phlegmatic temperament, and it was difficult to convince him of anything that was not very clearly demonstrable. I told him that my information was of such a positive and reliable nature that I knew I was right, and that if there should be a panic in Wall Street I had serious apprehensions that it would prove disastrous to the Republicans in the national campaign.

Governor Morgan appointed a meeting for the next day to discuss the matter more fully and obtain further light upon the subject. I took with me to see the Governor, whom I had now convinced of the reality of the political plot, Mr. George Opdyke and Mr. H. B. Claflin.

In the meantime the Governor had seen Travers, who, being an inveterate bear on the situation, had an inkling of what was in progress to break the market. The Governor had satisfied himself that my representations were correct, and that trouble was really brewing. He then entered with earnestness into the question of the best policy to be adopted to obstruct the schemes, and frustrate the purposes of the Democratic party.

I then suggested, that as the matter did not admit of delay, it was highly essential that some one, or more, of us should go to Washington to see General Grant. The Governor said he could not go. I could not go, and neither could Mr. Claflin. So Mr. Opdyke, who was very ready in such matters, consented to bear the important message in person, provided we all agreed to back him up by writing a strong letter to the President, setting forth the facts in relation to the emergency. This we did, and Mr. Opdyke left at once for Washington. This was on Friday evening, and he transacted his business with more than ordinary despatch, and

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