Widmore v. Woodroffe.......... Ambl. 636, 640.... Woodruff v. The Levi Dearborne..4 Hall L. J. 97.

CASES DETERMINED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

FEBRUARY TERM, 1819.

TRUSTEES OF THE PHILADELPHIA BAPTIST ASSOCIATION et al. v. HART's

EXECUTORS.'

Charitable uses.

In the year 1790, S. H., a citizen of Virginia, made his last will, containing the following bequest: Item, what shall remain of my military certificates, at the time of my decease, both principal and interest, I give and bequeath to the Baptist Association that, for ordinary, meets at Philadelphia, annually, which I allow to be a perpetual fund for the education of youths of the Baptist denomination, who shall appear promising for the ministry, always giving a preference to the descendants of my father's family." In 1792, the legislature of Virginia, passed an act repeal ng all English statutes; in 1795, the testator died. The Baptist Association in question had existed as a regularly organized body, for many years before the date of his will; and in 1797, was incorporated by the legislature of Pennsylvania, by the name of “The Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association."

Held, that the Association, not being incorporated at the testator's decease, could not take this trust, as a society.

*2]

*That the bequest could not be taken by the individuals who composed the Association
at the death of the testator.

That there were no persons to whom this legacy, were it not a charity, could be decreed.
And that it could not be sustained, in this court, as a charity.

Charitable bequests, where no legal interest is vested, and which are too vague to be claimed by those for whom the beneficial interest was extended, cannot be established by a court of equity, either exercising its ordinary jurisdiction, or enforcing the prerogative of the king as parens patriæ, independent of the statute 43 Eliz.

If, in England, the prerogative of the king, as parens patriæ, would, independent of the statute of Elizabeth, extend to charitable bequests of this description: Quare? How far this principle would govern in the courts of the United States ?

Held, that it was unnecessary to enter into this inquiry, because it could only arise where the attorney-general is made a party.

In the year 1790, Silas Hart, a citizen and resident of Virginia, made his last will in writing, which contains the following bequest: "Item, what shall remain of my military certificates, at the time of my decease, both

1 This case was practically overruled in Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127; for though it is there stated to have been decided upon the 4 WHEAT.-1

local law of Virginia, where the English statute of 43 Eliz., ch. 4, was not in force, yet the court came to the conclusion, in the latter case, that 1

Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors.

principal and interest, I give and bequeath to the Baptist Association that, for ordinary, meets at Philadelphia, annually, which I allow to be a perpetual fund for the education of youths of the Baptist denomination, who shall appear promising for the ministry, always giving a preference to the descendants of my father's family."

In 1792, the legislature of Virginia passed an act, repealing all English statutes, including that of the 43 Eliz., c. 4. In the year 1795, the testator died. The Baptist Association which met annually at Philadelphia, had existed as a regularly organized body, for many years before the date of this will, and was composed of the clergy of several Baptist churches, of different states, and of an annual deputation of laymen from *the same churches. *3] It was not incorporated, until the year 1797, when it received a charter from the legislature of Pennsylvania, incorporating it by the name of “The Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association." The executors having refused to pay the legacy, this suit was instituted in the circuit court for the district of Virginia, by the corporation, and by those individuals who were members of the association at the death of the testator. On the trial of the cause, the judges of that court were divided in opinion, on the question, whether the plaintiffs were capable of taking under this will? Which point was, therefore, certified to this court.

The Attorney-General, for the plaintiffs, argued, that the peculiar law of charitable bequests did not originate in the statute of the 43 Eliz., which was repealed in Virginia, before the death of the testator. If lands had been conveyed in trust, previous to the statute, for such purposes as are expressed in this will, the devise would have been held good at law; and consequently, the court of chancery would have enforced the trust, in virtue of its general equity powers, independent of that statute. The statute does not profess to give any validity to devises or legacies of any description, not before valid; but only furnishes a new and more convenient mode for discovering and enforcing them; but the case before the court is such as requires the interposition only of the ordinary powers of a court of equity. Devises equally vague and indefinite, have been sustained in courts of common law, before the statute of Elizabeth, *and would, à fortiori, *4] have been supported in courts of equity. Porter's Case, 1 Co. 22 b; Plowd. 522. And the court of chancery, exercising the prerogative of the king as parens patriæ, has been constantly in the habit of establishing charitable bequests of this nature. “In like manner," says Lord Chancellor

66

the jurisdiction of the chancery over charitable uses was not derived from the statute, it appearing from the publication of the ancient English records, to have been exercised, in many cases, long before the statute was passed; and, of course, the argument derived from the repeal of all English statutes by the legislature of Virginia, fell to the ground. See Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 394. In Perin v. Carey, 24 Ibid, 501, the court admitted, that whatever doubts on that subject had been expressed in the Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors, they had been removed by later and more satisfactory

sources of information. So also in Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U. S. 367, Mr. Justice STRONG, says, that "trusts for charitable uses are not dependent for their support upon that statute; before its enactment, they had been sustained by the English chancellors, in virtue of their general equity powers, in numerous cases, and generally, in this country, it has been settled, that courts of equity have an original and inherent jurisdiction over charities, though the English statute is not in force, and independent of it." This, however, is not the law of Virginia. Ibid.