St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Thurmond that she did not see the accident, and personally did not know where and how her husband was hurt. She only saw him after he was sent to the hospital, where he died. She testified that she was administratrix of the estate of her husband. Deceased was working as fire knocker at the time he was hurt; that is, that he was in what is called a "cinder pit," under an engine standing on the track running over the pit lengthwise, taking the cinders and ashes out of the ash pan of the standing engine, or was just entering the pit for the purpose of doing so, when his leg, which seems to have been on the rail of the track, was run over and crushed by the wheels of the engine, which had been put in motion by the approach and concussion of the engine No. 135 coming up at the time. The leg of the deceased was amputated, and from the effects of this hurt and the operation he died soon afterwards. A cinder pit, it appears, is an excavation in the ground, something like the width of the railroad track, or wider; and the one in this case was 75 feet long, with a decline at each end, so as to admit of the passage of engines. The pit was 18 or 22 inches deep in the ground, and the railway track above it is on posts or upright blocks resting on the bottom of the pit, and extending up about 12 or 18 inches above the surrounding ground, and the stringers and track are laid on these, so that the track is from 30 to 40 inches above the bottom of the pit, maybe less. The space above the track and between the wheels of an engine standing thereon, is the usual diameter of the wheels, substantially. The cinder-pit track was a continuation of a spur or side track of the railroad, which connected it with the main line of the road. At the time of the accident the engine No. 372 had been standing on the track until struck by engine No. 135 with such force as to move it its length; one witness for plaintiff testifying that 135 was moving at the rate of 15 miles an hour, while others make no estimate of or statement as to the speed. It is disputed whether the wheels of the standing engine were blocked or not, some witnesses testifying that they were blocked by two ordinary sticks of fire wood, one oak and the other pine, each "about the size of a man's leg," to use the language of plaintiff's witness. The defendant's witnesses saw no block of the kind in the vicinity. It appears to have been the duty of the fire knocker-the deceased in this case-to stop the engines on the track above the cinder pit, just as he wished them to be located, and to block the wheels as aforesaid. The pit in question was 75 feet long, but it is a matter of dispute whether the level part of the track was sufficientl" long to accommodate two engines, one standing and the other moving, as No. 135 was. It is also a matter of dispute whether or not the construction of the pit and track above, in connection with the position of the engines, afford sufficient room for escape in an emergency, and whether or not the place deceased was required to work St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Thurmond in was not too cramped to afford ready ingress and egress in case of danger, and therefore unsafe. It is a question also in this case whether the deceased entered the cinder pit by crawling over the track above, and between the wheels of the stationary engine No. 372, or had entered the pit otherwise. From the fact that he reached the pit from a place a little distance away, where he was engaged in other works for the company, and did so in great haste after he saw the approach of engine No. 135, it is inferred by the defendant in argument that he crawled over the tracks, between the wheels of the standing engine,—the most hazardous way he could have selected, and this is the principal ground upon which he is accused of contributory negligence, although his failure to block the wheels, it is contended, is another ground. There is no proof of the first; that is, of the manner in which deceased attempted to enter the pit. Nor is there positive proof that he failed to block the wheels of the engine, as required, or that he failed to use such means for that purpose as were at hand, and which it was the duty of the company to provide. It may be true, also, that the engine No. 372 was struck with such force as to have made the use of available blocks perfectly useless. All these questions were submitted to the jury on the charge of negligence against the defendant, as well as on the charge of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, and the jury have determined against the defendant. Finding no reversible error in the instructions, we cannot disturb the verdict on the facts by the jury. It is contended by defendant that the deceased, as fire knocker, and the engineer running 135, called a "hostler" were fellow servants, as they were engaged in the same employment, and were under the supervision of one person, John Morgan, the engine dispatcher, who had the discretion of the movement of engines about the yard and of others working therein. That is true; but our statute on the subject, in defining who are fellow servants, goes a step further, and says: "All persons engaged in the service of any railway company, foreign or domestic, doing business in this state, who are intrusted by such corporation with the authority of superintendence, control or command of other persons in the employ or service of such corporation, or with authority to direct any other employee in the performance of any duty, of such employee, are vice principals of such corporations, and are not fellow servants with such employee." Section 6248, Sand. & H. Dig. The following section makes it a requirement that they shall also be of the same grade. It is proof that the hostler of No. 135, that brought about the collision, had a man or men under him as assistants. The letter of the statute makes him not a fellow servant, because he supervises others, and because he is, on that account, not of the same grade as was the deceased, whose duty it was merely to clean out the ash boxes of engines after being in use and before Herbert v. St. Paul City Ry. Co being put in use again. It is doubtful what the legislature really meant, but such is the force of the language of the act, and as construed in Railway Co. v. Becker, 63 Ark. 477, 39 S. W. 358, and Id., 67 Ark. 1, 53 S. W. 406, 46 L. R. A. 814, 77 Am. St. Rep. 78. The verdict is extremely moderate as to amount of damages. Affirmed. WOOD and RIDDICK, JJ., not participating. HERBERT V. ST. PAUL CITY RY. CO. (Supreme Court of Minnesota, Jan. 31, 1902.) Street Railways-Care Required in Keeping Car Steps and Platforms A street car company is required to exercise the highest degree of care to keep its platforms and steps in safe condition for use in the season when operated, so far as it practically can do so, in consideration of the climate, temperature, and condition of the air with respect to snow, moisture, and frost. Sufficiency of Evidence. Evidence considered, and held to sufficiently support a verdict for plaintiff upon the claim that she was a passenger on a street car, and, when alighting therefrom, slipped and fell from the same by reason of ice and snow negligently permitted by the carrier to be and remain upon its steps and platforms. Excessive Verdict. Held that, under the evidence in this case, the verdict of the jury cannot be held to be excessive. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Olin B. Lewis, Judge. Action by Eva Herbert against the St. Paul City Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff for $1,000. From an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Munn & Thygeson, for appellant. LOVELY, J. Plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's street cars, and, in attempting to alight therefrom at her destination,-upon her claim,-slipped upon ice and snow negligently allowed by defendant to remain upon the rear steps of the car. She sustained injuries, for which a recovery was had. After denial of a motion for new trial, defendant appealed from such order. The material questions presented here for review are the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, and the amount of the damages. There was evidence for the plaintiff tending to show that *See notes at end of case. Herbert v. St. Paul City Ry. Co she and her daughter took passage on February 19, 1901, on a car of defendant's street railway in St. Paul; that the car was stopped for her to alight at her destination, at the corner of Rice and Rondo streets; that it was a cold, blustery morning; that two days before the accident 2.8 inches of snow had fallen; that the ground was at the time covered with snow; that, in attempting to leave the car, the conductor, who remained inside, opened the door for her, when she went to the platform, put out her hand to take hold of the hand rail to aid herself, and stepped out, when she suddenly slipped upon the ice and snow which had formed on the steps of the platform, and fell therefrom to the ground; that she was jarred, and injured to such an extent that she had to be taken to her home, where she was confined by reason of her injuries to her bed for the period of two weeks. Plaintiff's description of her injuries indicates that, while her health had been previously good, up to the time of the trial, May 17, 1901, she has suffered to a greater or 'ess extent and was still unable to work without pain, which condition might be permanent. Her physician testified that, while there was no substantial discoloration or bruises, yet she had received internal injuries, with a severe nervous shock, which would considerably impair her health. While there is no dispute as to the fact of plaintiff's fall at the place stated, there was a decided contradiction to her claim (supported by the testimony of several witnesses for defendant) that there was ice and snow on the car steps, and also testimony to show that her injuries, if any, were very slight. We find nothing in the evidence, however, that makes it physically impossible or highly improbable that the account of plaintiff and witnesses called by her might not have been truthful. The doubts arising rest solely upon the weight of the evidence, which was for the jury. In an exceedingly fair and impartial charge to the jury, applied to the facts, the learned trial court substantially stated the duty defendant owed to its passengers was the exercise of the highest degree of care to keep its platforms and steps in safe condition for their use, consistent with its undertaking to transport them in the season when such duties occurred, in this climate, as far as practicable, considering the climate, the temperature, and the condition of the air and ground with respect to snow, moisture, and frost. This obligation of duty, as stated by the trial court, was sufficiently favorable to the defendant, and stated the correct rule of law applicable to the case in that respect. The question of plaintiff's care was clearly for the jury, and needs no notice. The most that can be said upon the able argument of counsel for defendant is that the witnesses who contradicted the material statements of plaintiff exceeded in number those produced by her. The same argument on that question might have been presented to the jury, who were authorized to determine the weight of evidence. We are therefore bound to accept Notes the verdict as decisive, particularly in view of the fact that the learned trial court approved it. While the amount of damages awarded to the injured lady are questioned, yet, upon her own account of her sufferings, in connection with the opinion of her attending physician as to their character and durability, which were for the jury, we do not feel warranted in holding that their verdict was excessive or influenced by passion or prejudice. The order of the trial court is affirmed. NOTES. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS DUTIES AS TO VEHICLES. BY THEODOR MEGAARDEN. I. General Rule. II. Railroads and Street Railways. A. In General. B. Cars, Engines, Couplings, Bell-Ropes, etc. C. Brakes. D. Interior of Railroad Coaches. E. Heating Railroad Coaches. F. Window Guards. G. Platform Guards. H. Ice, Snow, etc., on Platforms and Steps of Cars. I. Projecting Bolts, etc., Catching Clothes of Passengers. K. Construction of Steps of Street Cars. L. Wheel Guards. M. Motive Power of Street and Cable Cars. N. Formation of Train. O. Attaching Improperly Loaded Car, or Car of Wrong Gauge, to Train. P. Precautions against Fires and Explosions. Q. Mixed Trains. R. Vestibule Trains. S. Palace or Sleeping Cars Forming Part of Train. III. Stage and Hackney Coaches. IV. Carriers by Water. V. Elevators. I. GENERAL RULE. While, as has been shown in a previous note (see note to Whippel v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 2 R. R. R. 774, 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 774), a distinction necessarily exists between different kinds of carriers with respect to the duty to exercise care that the road over which passengers are carried is safe and suitable for the purpose, all carriers are under practically the same obligation with respect to the vehicle in which passengers are transported; every public carrier of passengers, whether by railroad, stage coach, water craft, or otherwise, is bound to exercise care to see that the vehicle or vessel in which passengers are carried is safe and secure. II. RAILROADS AND STREET RAILWAYS. A. In General. Since a very large proportion of modern passenger transportation is in the hands of railroad and street railway companies, there are, very naturally, many recent cases in which the duty of these carriers with respect to their vehicles is stated. But most of these cases will be used later in this note in connection with a discussion of the |