Notes specific applications of the duty, and only a few cases which state the obligation in general terms are here cited. Michigan. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537, 31 Am. Rep. 321. Minnesota.-Bishop v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 48 Minn. 26, 50 N. W. 927. New York.--Curtis v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534, 75 Am. Dec. 258; Hegeman v. Western R. Corp., 13 N. Y. 9, 64 Am. Dec. 517, affirming 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 353. Pennsylvania.-Meier v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 64 Pa. St. 225, 3 Am. Rep. 581. Texas.-Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Hamilton, 66 Tex. 92, 17 S. W. 406, 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 182; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323, 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 475. Washington.-Washington v. Spokane, etc., R. Co., 13 Wash. 9, 42 Pac. 628. B. Cars, Engines, Couplings, Bell-Ropes, etc. In the case of a railroad train, the whole train must be regarded as the vehicle, and care must be exercised that the engine and all the cars are free from defects and roadworthy, that the couplings are adequate, and that the appliances necessary to the safe management of the train are supplied. It may be a question for the jury as to whether it is negligence to use a baggage car for the transportation of passengers. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Swann, 81 Md. 400, 32 Atl. 175, 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 187, 31 L. R. A. 313. The fact that passengers are carried on a hand car cannot, of course, relieve the railroad of the obligation to exercise care properly to equip the car for the purpose. International, etc., R. Co. v. Prince, 77 Tex. 560, 14 S. W. 171, 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 294, 19 Am. St. Rep. 795; International, etc., R. Co. v. Cock (Tex.), 14 S. W. 242. If, during the course of a trip, a street car is discovered to be out of repair, it should ordinarily be withdrawn from the service. Washington v. Spokane, etc., R. Co., 13 Wash. 9, 42 Pac. 628. A car is, of course constructed with a view to its proper management, and it cannot be said that the mode of construction is defective, or not reasonably safe, when the unsafety is dependent upon conditions which are the result of negligent conduct either of passengers or company. Werbowlsky v. Ft. Wayne, etc., R. Co., 86 Mich. 236, 48 N. W. 1097, 24 Am. St. Rep. 120. The engine should be of the proper kind and in good condition. Peyton v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 861, 6 So. 690, 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 550, 17 Am. St. Rep. 430; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Buckalew (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), 34 S. W. 165. It may, in some cases, be necessary to equip the engines with spark arresters to protect passengers from injury by escaping sparks. Higgins v. Cherokee R. Co., 73 Ga. 149, 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 218. A railroad company has been held liable to a passenger rightly standing on a station platform who was injured by sparks flying from a passing engine, the evidence tending to show that the emission of sparks was due to a defectively constructed ash pan. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Young, 62 U. S. App. 428, 33 C. C. A. 251, 90 Fed. 709. See Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Jumper (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 60 S. W. 797. Care should be exercised that the couplings are of the proper kind and in repair. Cotchett v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 84 Ga. 687, 11 S. E. 553; Palmer v. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 120 N. Y. 170, 24 N. E. 302, 30 N. Y. S. R. 817, 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 298, 17 Am. St. Rep. 629, affirming 46 Hun (N. Y.) 486, 11 N. Y. S. R. 872. A cattleman while descending a ladder of one of the cars in the train on which he was riding in charge of cattle, was injured in consequence of being caught between that and the adjoining car and crushed. It was alleged in the declaration that the two cars were defective owing to the bumpers being out of repair, so that, when the train was backed or pushed forwards, the two cars came within six inches of each other. A judgment for plaintiff was sustained. New York, Notes etc., R. Co. v. Blumenthal, 160 I11. 40, 43 N. E. 809, 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 174. In a few states it is provided by statute that passenger trains shall be equipped with bell-ropes. Tenn. Code 1884, sec. 1306; Vt. Stat. 1894, sec. 3909. And see Hay v. Great Western R. Co., 37 U. C. Q. B. 456. But while it might be negligence to fail to equip a train with bell-ropes when that is necessary for the protection of passengers and it is practicable to do so, there is no rule of the common law which requires that to be done in all cases and on every kind of train. In an action by a passenger on a "mixed" train operated as a "way freight" and "passenger accommodation" combined, it appearing in evidence that it was impracticable and not usual to have bell-ropes on such trains, and it not being shown that the use of a bell-rope would have tended to prevent the accident complained of, it was held that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury "that on the evidence they could not find the defendant ought to have a bell-rope on the train." Oviatt v. Dakota, etc., R. Co., 43 Minn. 300, 45 N. W. 436. C. Brakes. Care must be exercised to equip a train or street car with proper and sufficient brakes, and to maintain them in sound working condition. Lyon v. Union, etc., R. Co., 35 Fed. 111; Wormsdorf v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 75 Mich. 472, 42 N. W. 1000, 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 271, 13 Am. St. Rep. 453; Wynn v. Central Park, etc., R. Co., 133 N. Y. 575, 30 N. E. 721, reversing 14 N. Y. Supp. 172; People's etc., R. Co. v. Weiller (Pa. 1886), 2 Atl. 510; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Hamilton, 66 Tex. 92, 17 S. W. 406, 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 182; Cogswell v. West Street, etc., R. Co., 5 Wash. 46, 31 Pac. 411, 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 500. This duty has been made the subject of legislative enactment in several states, and it has been provided that passenger trains shall be equipped with automatic air brakes. Ky. Gen. Stat. 1894, sec. 778; 1 How. Ann. Mich. Stat., sec. 3363; N. Y. Laws 1884, c. 439, sec. 6; R. I. Pub. Stat. 1882, c. 158, sec. 12; Vt. Stat. 1894, sec. 3910. When a train is equipped with the usual air-brakes required by law, which are in good condition when the train is started, but the brakes refuse to work in consequence of the unexplained turning of an air-cock, the failure of the brakes to work is not, it has been held, of itself evidence of negligence. Porter v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 80 Mich. 156, 44 N. W. 1054, 20 Am. St. Rep. 511. A judgment for plaintiff in an action by a passenger who was injured by the sudden flying back of an iron brake lever, the declaration alleging and the evidence tending to prove that the brakes and grip and appurtenances were in bad order and condition, has been sustained. West Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 180 Ill. 285, 54 N. E. 334, affirming 77 Ill. App. 142. D. Interior of Railroad Coaches. The duty of a railroad company to exercise care to provide safe vehicles necessarily extends to the interior fixtures of its coaches. Thus railroad companies have been held liable to passengers for injuries inflicted by the falling of a lampshade (White v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 144 Mass. 404, 11 N. E. 552, 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 615), by the falling of a seat (International, etc., R. Co. v. Anthony [Tex. Civ. App. 1900], 57 S. W. 897), by the falling of a berth (Northern, etc., R. Co. v. Hess, 2 Wash. 383, 26 Pac. 866, 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 91. See, post, this note, II, S., and IV) and by a bell cord which a brakeman, in making a connection, pulled through a car in a violent manner. Thompson v. Yazoo, etc., R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1107, 17 So. 503. A railroad company will be liable for injuries to passengers resulting from the use of doors of unusual construction and which are more than ordinarily dangerous. Sturdivant . Ft. Forth, etc., R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), 27 S. W. 170. But in an action to recover damages for mortification sustained by a woman passenger on account of being imprisoned in a water closet owing to a defective Notes lock, it appearing that the iock was of the best manufacture, and it not being shown that defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to keep the lock in good repair, a judgment for plaintiff was reversed. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 338, 30 S. W. 361. E. Heating Railroad Coaches. It is the duty of a railroad company to provide for the comfort and welfare of passengers to the extent of properly and comfortably warming its coaches. Hastings v. Northern, etc., R. Co., 53 Fed. 224; Taylor v. Wabash R. Co. (Mo. 1896), 38 S. W. 304, 42 L. R. A. 110; Duck v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 63 S. W. 891; International, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 340, 43 S. W. 540; Dillingham v. Hodges (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), 26 S. W. 86. And, therefore, in an action to recover for the death of a passenger caused by the alleged negligence of defendant in failing, though requested, to warm its coaches in cold weather, it is not necessary for plaintiff to allege and prove a universal custom on the part of railway companies to warm their coaches. Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Hyatt, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 435, 34 S. W. 677, 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 397. For the cases dealing with the duty of railroad companies to heat the waiting rooms at their stations, see II, D. 3 of the note to Muhlhause v. Monongahela St. R. Co., 2 R. R. R. 131, 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 131. F. Window Guards. No obligation rests upon a railroad to provide the car windows with guards so as to protect passengers from injury by exposing their arms at the windows, or to protect them against missiles thrown from the outside by persons over whom the company has no control. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Rutherford, 29 Ind. 82, 92 Am. Dec. 336; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. McClung, 56 Pa. St. 294, overruling New Jersey R. Co. v. Kennard, 21 Pa. St. 203; Missimer v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 17 Phila. (Pa.) 172. And so in the case of street railways, undoubtedly there is no invariable rule of law requiring them to provide the windows of their cars with guards to prevent injury to passengers who expose their hands and arms at the windows. Still under some circumstances, as where the cars run unusually close to structures alongside the track, it may be a question for the jury whether due diligence does not require that barricades or guards be provided for the car windows. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Schneider, 13 U. S. App. 655, 8 C. C. A. 571, 60 Fed. 210. G. Platform Guards. It has sometimes been provided by statute that the platforms of passenger coaches shall be guarded with flexible or movable bridges or aprons (Conn. Gen. Stat. 1888, sec. 3540; Ohio Rev. Stat. 1890, sec. 3347), and that the front platform of street cars shall be equipped with gates. See Muehlhausen v. St. Louis R. Co., 91 Mo. 332, 2 S. W. 315, 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 157. But in the absence of statutes to this effect it cannot be said as a matter of law that it is negligence on the part of railroad or street railway companies not to equip their cars with gates or similar guards; the question of the carrier's negligence must be determined in each case in view of all the facts. Thus it has been held that there is no absolute duty resting on a street railway company operating cars on parallel tracks to equip the car platforms with gates to prevent passengers from getting off the cars on the side next to the parallel track; whether it is negligence to fail to equip cars with gates is a question for the jury to be determined upon the facts of each particular case. Augusta R. Co. 7. Glover, 92 Ga. 132, 18 S. E. 406, 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 269. And it has been held that it is a question of fact which ought to be submitted to a jury to determine whether or not the position of riding upon the front platform of a street car is so dangerous that the company, in discharging its duty to the public, should construct some kind of a guard to prevent them from being thrown from the car. Archer v. Ft. Wayne, etc., R. Co., 87 Mich. 101, 49 N. W. 488, 48 Notes Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 50; West Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Gallagher, 108 Pa. St. 524, 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 201. But in an action against a street railway operating its cars upon a single track, it was held that the use of cars which had no gates upon the platforms was not negligence. Byron v. Lynn, etc., R. Co., 177 Mass. 303, 58 N. E. 1015. The question of whether a company which has equipped its cars with gates is chargeable with negligence in failing to have them closed must, it has been said, be determined by the jury in each case. Augusta R. Co. v. Glover, 92 Ga. 132, 18 S. E. 406, 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 369. In an action to recover for the death of a passenger from injuries received in consequence of falling off the rear platform of a street car, the evidence tended to prove the following facts: The rear platform extended the whole width of the car body, about 6 feet, and was about three and one-half feet wide. It had a dasher across the end, and a shifting gate on the side next the other track, for the purpose of keeping passengers from going out on that side. The other side of the platform was left open for the ingress and egress of passengers. The dasher had a rail along the top, and on the rear end of the car body was a hand rail on each side of the door. The rail on the dasher was about two and one-half feet high, and the gate on the side was "a little bit lower." The dashers and gates on the cars on some of defendant's other lines were from 6 to 8 inches higher. The track on that line was quite rough, had "high and low joints,' so that a car "would go uneven when it passes over them." The cars would rock a good deal. It was the practice and custom of the defendant to carry passengers on the platforms, and at certain hours they would be crowded. On appeal, the reviewing court, in holding that the question of defendant's negligence was one for the jury, said: "Permitting and inviting, as it did, passengers to ride on the platform, it was its duty to use all reasonable precautions to insure their safety. Under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence it was to be anticipated that passengers might, by reason of the jolting or rocking of the cars, or of some other cause, lose their balance, especially when the platform was crowded; and it was a fair question for the jury to say whether, in the exercise of that high degree of care required of carriers of passengers, the defendant ought not to have guarded the platform with rails or gates of sufficient height to have prevented just such accidents as occurred in this instance." Matz v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 52 Minn. 159, 53 N. W. 1071. H. Ice, Snow, etc., on Platforms and Steps of Cars. In a Unquestionably, railroad and street railway companies must exercise care to keep the platforms and steps of their cars free from snow, ice, and other substances which threaten the safety of passengers in getting on and off, and will be liable for negligence in the discharge of the duty. Louisville R. Co. v. Park, 96 Ky. 580, 29 S. W. 455; Herbert v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (Minn. 1902), 88 N. W. 996. case in which there was evidence that there was snow and ice on the step of a car before the train started, and that the step was in such a condition that passengers would slip upon it in getting on or off the car, it was held that the jury was warranted in finding that defendant was negligent. Gilman v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 168 Mass. 454, 47 N. E. 193, 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 478. But it is at times unwarrantable to expect or require a railroad or street railway company to keep the platforms and steps of its cars clear of snow, ice and sleet. Thus a railroad company can hardly be expected to keep an exposed car platform clear of snow while in transitu during a storm. The question of the carrier's negligence in this particular must depend upon whether it has had a reasonable opportunity to remove the nuisance (Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Aldridge [Ind. App. 1901], 61 N. E. 741), and is, in nearly every case, to be determined by the jury. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cockerel, 17 Ky, L. Rep. 1037, Notes 33 S. W. 407; Neslie v. Second, etc., R. Co., 113 Pa. St. 300, 6 Atl. 72, 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 180. In an action to recover for injuries received while alighting from defendant's train by slipping on snow and ice alleged to have been allowed to accumulate on the platform of the car through the negligence of the defendant, it appeared that the accident had happened about five o'clock in the morning at the end of a twelve hours' journey. It had stormed at various times during the night and morning, and the weather was cold and freezing. It was quite certain that the quantity of either ice or snow on the platform was inconsiderable, and perceptible only after some inspection. In reversing a judgment for plaintiff on the ground that the case presented no facts as to the negligence of defendant which the jury were justified in regarding as proof of negligence, the reviewing court, in discussing the duty of a railroad company to remove snow and ice on cars attached to a running train traveling at night during a continuous storm, said: "The immediate and continuous removal of all snow and ice from such trains, or the covering of them with sand or ashes in such manner that no slippery places shall be at any time exposed, would be quite impracticable and beyond the duty which a railroad company owes to its passengers. The presence of snow or ice upon exposed places on moving cars is an accident of the hour, and no ordinary diligence could, during the prevalence of a storm, wholly remove its effects from the places exposed to its action, so as to prevent accidents to heedless and inattentive travelers. A passenger on a railroad train has no right to assume that the effects of a continuous storm of snow, sleet, rain, or hail will be immediately and effectually removed from the exposed platform of the car while making its passage between stations or the termini of its route, and it would be an obligation beyond a reasonable expectation of performance to require a railroad corporation to do so. We are not referred to any case laying down the precise degree of care and diligence required of such corporations, under such circumstances; but we think it must be somewhat analogous to that imposed upon municipal corporations in respect to the removal of snow and ice from public streets. Those corporations are required to remove dangerous accumulations of snow or ice in a street or public place within a reasonable time after they have occurred, but they are not to be deemed negligent if they do not remove all traces of such obstructions when they do not constitute something more than the presence of a danger arising alone from their inherent quality of being slippery. Palmer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 111 N. Y. 488, 19 N. Y. S. R. 493, 18 N. E. 859, 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 150, 2 L. R. A. 252, reversing 42 Hun (N. Y.) 656, 4 N. Y. S. R. 888. A railroad company cannot be expected to keep up a continuous inspection or to know at each moment the condition of every part of a train. In an action by a passenger to recover for injuries received, while alighting from defendant's train, by slipping on filth which covered the car step, the evidence showed the following facts: The train had been inspected before the train started, the cars being found to be in good condition and free from the particular nuisance. The distance from the station where the inspection was made and where plaintiff boarded the train to the point where she alighted was two or three miles. The regular running time between the two points was eleven minutes. It was night, and there was no evidence to show that, in the brief interval which had elapsed since the inspection was made, either the conductor or any one of the brakemen had been so situated, in the discharge of his duties, that observation would have disclosed to him the condition of the step. The trial court refused to direct a verdict for defendant and plaintiff had judgment. On error, the judgment was reversed on the ground that the verdict for plaintiff was not supported by the evidence. Proud v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 64 N. J. L. 702, 46 Atl. 710, 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 633, 50 L. R. A. 468. 1. Projecting Bolts, etc., Catching Clothing of Passengers. Care should be exercised that bolts, hooks, etc., are not allowed to |