Lyons v. Rutland R. Co volume-is avoided, and all the beneficial results of trustworthy regularity are realized. In addition to this, and as shown by the evidence in this cause, the history of the field in question has proven the desirability of the system, for it appears that from the opening of the field until now, notwithstanding the great number of coal operations, and the millions of business done, there has been but a single complaint, and that is the complaint made at bar. It is manifest, therefore, that this railway company's system of car distribution is not only reasonable, and fair to all, but evidently embodies the best lessons learned from other coal fields; and the court is of the opinion that the system should be approved on account of its reasonableness, and the peremptory writ denied on account of the impartiality of its application. LYONS v. RUTLAND R. Co. (Supreme Court of Vermont, Bennington, Nov. 29, 1901.) Carriers-Public Officers-Appeal from Justice-Grounds. A railroad company, in the operation of its road as a common carrier, is not a public officer, and in an action against such company before a justice, in which it pleads that it is a public officer, it has no right of appeal from the judgment, as permitted by V. S. § 1298, subd. 3, where the amount in controversy does not exceed $20, but defendant in good faith pleads in excuse and justification that it was acting as a public officer. From a Exceptions from Bennington county court; Stafford, Judge. Action by Homer A. Lyons against the Rutland Railroad Company, returnable before a justice of the peace. judgment dismissing an appeal by defendant from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant brings exceptions. Affirmed. At the justice trial, the defendant in good faith filed a plea in excuse and justification, alleging that it was acting as a public officer in the performance of the acts from which the cause of action arose, and claimed an appeal under the third paragraph of V. S. § 1298. An appeal was thereupon allowed the defendant, which was duly entered in the county court. After having entered a general appearance, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. Argued before TAFT, C. J., and ROWELL, TYLER, MUNSON, START, and WATSON, JJ. Charles A. Maurer and Charles H. Mason, for plaintiff. WATSON, J. The case was not appealable, unless it was made so by the fact that the defendant, in good faith, by its written plea before the justice, pleaded in excuse and justifi Galliers v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co cation that in the operation of its railroad it was a public officer, and that the plaintiff's right of action, if any he had, accrued by the acts of the defendant when acting as a common carrier in the operation of its said railroad, and therein. as a public officer. It is urged that the county court should have heard evidence on the question whether the defendant was a public officer, as set forth in its plea, and that to dismiss the action without such evidence being heard was error. The plea, which was before the court as a part of the record, set forth that the defendant was acting in its capacity of a common carrier, and therein as a public officer. If it cannot be a public officer when thus acting, it was not necessary to hear evidence thereon. Wyman v. Hayes, 73 Vt. 24, 50 Atl. 556. It is safe to say that, to constitute a public officer, it is indispensable that the officer be invested with some of the sovereign functions of one of the branches of government, legislative, executive, or judicial, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual holding the office is not a public officer. State v. Jennings, 57 Ohio St. 415, 49 N. E. 404, 63 Am. St. Rep. 723; Attorney General v. Drohan, 169 Mass. 534, 48 N. E. 279, 61 Am. St. Rep. 301; State v. Stanley, 66 N. C. 59, 8 Am. Rep. 488; Attorney General v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 23 L. R. A. 699, 41 Am. St. Rep. 606; Patton v. Board, 127 Cal. 388, 59 Pac. 702, 78 Am. St. Rep. 66; Eliason v. Coleman, 86 N. C. 235. It cannot be said that the defendant, in the operation of its road as a common carrier, holds any office which is a parcel of the administration of government, and it must follow that it is not delegated with any functions pertaining thereto, without which it cannot be a public officer. The motion to dismiss was properly granted, and judgment is affirmed. GALLIERS v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. Co. (Supreme Court of Iowa, April 11, 1902.) [89 N. W. Rep. 1109.] Carriers of Live Stock-Loss of Horse-Striking Out Allegations as to Value.* Where the petition in an action against a carrier for the loss of a stallion through defendant's negligence in shipping averred that the horse was purchased for breeding purposes, was young, highly bred, and well-gaited, and the answer denied these allegations, it was proper to strike from the answer an affirmative allegation that plaintiff traded for him an old horse, which he knew was without value, and without seeing the stallion, since such allegation was only material on the question of the value of the stallion, which could be shown under the denials, and the value of the horse traded was not in issue. Same-Same-Evidence. In an action against a carrier for the loss of a stallion through defend*See generally, 1 Rap. & Mack's Dig. 807 et seq. Galliers v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co ant's negligence in shipping the same in a car in which fresh lime had recently been carried, evidence that a horse traded by the plaintiff for the stallion was worthless, and that an action was pending against plaintiff for breach of warranty, together with the petition in such action, was properly rejected, since the value of an article traded for another cannot be shown in reduction of the value of the latter. Same-Same-Same. In such case, evidence of the value of the stallion when sold to another, long before he was obtained by plaintiff, was incompetent. Same-Negligence-Pleading Amendments. Where the petition alleged that plaintiff's horse received injuries resulting in death, through the negligence of the defendant in shipping him in a car in which fresh lime had recently been carried, and an amendment was filed at the close of plaintiff's evidence, not as a substitute for the original petition, stating that the horse was unduly exposed to the elements while in the car, by reason of which he caught cold and died, the issue thus raised was properly submitted to the jury. Appeal from district court, Monroe county; T. M. Fee, Judge. Action to recover the value of a horse alleged to have died on account of the negligence of the defendant. Trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appeals. Affirmed. T. B. Perry and N. E. Kendall, for appellant. SHERWIN, J. The petition alleges the loss of a standardbred trotting stallion through the negligence of the defendant in shipping the horse from Des Moines to Albia in a car in which fresh lime had recently been carried. It was also averred that the horse was purchased by the plaintiff for breeding purposes, and that he was young, highly bred, and well-gaited. The defendant, in its answer, denied these allegations, and stated that the plaintiff traded for him an old horse, which he knew was of no value, and without seeing the stallion in question until his arrival at Albia. The affirmative allegation above noted was stricken out on motion. There was no error in this, for two reasons. In the first place, it could only be material on the question of the value of the horse traded for, which was provable under the denials in the answer; and, secondly, because the value of the horse traded was not in issue, and could not be put in issue, in this action, as we shall show hereinafter. The defendant sought to show on the cross-examination of the plaintiff that the horse he traded for the stallion was worthless; and, further, that he then had an action pending for a breach of warranty in the sale of the horse to him. This testimony, and the offer of the petition in the other action, were rejected, and rightly so. We have held that the price at which an article sold may be shown as tending to fix its market value. Buford v. McGetchie, 60 Iowa, 298, 14 N. W. 790. But we have been cited to no case in this state or elsewhere which holds that, where personal property has been Galliers v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co traded for, and a third person destroys a part of that property, he may prove the worthlessness of the property exchanged therefor. If the seller is satisfied with the value of property which he received in exchange for his property, its value cannot be shown in reduction of the value of the property for which it was exchanged. This seems to us to be the sound rule, and in fact the only one that will keep the main issue in cases of this kind before the jury; otherwise it would be competent to try the value of every article which had entered into trades leading up to the one in controversy. There is no difference in principle between this rule and that where one is compelled to pay the debt of another, and does so in property which is accepted in full satisfaction thereof. In such case the debtor cannot reduce the recovery of his surety by offering evidence that the property was of less value. Garnsey v. Allen, 27 Me. 366. As applying the same principle, see Winch v. Baldwin, 68 Iowa, 764, 28 N. W. 62; Likes v. Baer, 8 Iowa, 368. The correctness of this rule is further illustrated in this case. It was shown that the dead horse, with others, was traded by a former owner to the party of whom the plaintiff purchased him, and the defendant then offered to show the value of all of these other horses, and in fact was permitted to show the value of some of them. Evidence of the value of this stallion when sold to Keefe, long before he was obtained by the plaintiff, even if a cash price had been paid for him, was incompetent, under the rule announced in Gere v. Insurance Co., 67 Iowa, 272, 23 N. W. 137, 25 N. W. 159. The defendant offered evidence as to the market value of the sire of this stallion and of his ability as a trotter, as a colt getter, and as to the quality of his colts, the amount of his patronage, and his reputation as a sire where owned. Some of this evidence was received; more than was material to the issue in this case, we think, but enough to show the quality of the sire and the character of his stock. His breeding was not in dispute, and this was all that was material on the question of the value of the plaintiff's stallion for stock purposes. At the close of the evidence the plaintiff filed an amendment to his petition, stating that the horse was undul exposed to the elements in the car in which shipped, and that by reason thereof he caught cold, and died from the effects thereof. This issue was submitted to the jury, which is assigned as error. It was not filed as a substitute for the original petition, and, we think, was properly given to the jury. There was evidence supporting the issue thus presented, and, as we understand the record, the amendment was not assailed, but an answer thereto was filed, putting in issue its averments. We discover no error, and the judgment is affirmed. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA v. KANSAS CITY (Supreme Court of Louisiana, March 31, 1902.) [31 So. Rep. 858.] Supreme Court—Jurisdiction—Suits by Railroad Commission. The provision of article 285 of the constitution, conferring upon this court jurisdiction of suits brought against the railroad commission to test the validity of whatever rule, regulation, etc., it may have adopted, cannot be made to apply to suits brought by the railroad commission to recover the amount of fines imposed by itself for violations of its ordinances. A suit of the latter kind is an ordinary suit, falling within the general rule as to jurisdiction. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from judicial district court, parish of De Soto; John Bachman Lee, Judge. Action by the railroad commission of Louisiana against the Kansas City Southern Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Dismissed. Walter Guion, Atty. Gen. (H. T. Liverman and Lewis Guion, of counsel), for appellant. Alexander & Wilkinson, for appellee. PROVOSTY, J. In this suit the railroad commission of Louisiana seeks to enforce payment of a fine of $1,000 imposed by itself upon the defendant railway company, and a motion is made to dismiss the appeal on the ground of want of jurisdiction ratione materiæ. As containing a grant of jurisdiction to this court in cases of this character, the attorney general refers to the following article of the constitution: "Art. 285. If any railroad, express, telephone, telegraph, steamboat and other water craft, or sleeping car company, or other party in interest, be dissatisfied with the decision or fixing of any rate, classification, rule, charge, order, act or regulation, adopted by the commission, such party may file a petition setting forth the cause of objections to such decision, act, rule, rate, charge, classification or order, or to either or to all of them, in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the domicile of the commission, against said commission as defendant, and either party to said action may appeal the case to the supreme court of the state, without regard to the amount involved, and all such cases, both in the trial and appellate courts, shall be tried summarily, and by preference over all other cases. Such cases may be tried in the court of the first instance either in chambers, or at term time: provided, all such appeals, shall be returned to the supreme court within ten days after the decision of the lower court; and where the commission appeals, no bond shall be required. No bond shall be required of said commission in any case, nor shall advance costs, or security for costs, be required of the commission." That article, in express terms, has refer |