Galliers v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co traded for, and a third person destroys a part of that property, he may prove the worthlessness of the property exchanged therefor. If the seller is satisfied with the value of property which he received in exchange for his property, its value cannot be shown in reduction of the value of the property for which it was exchanged. This seems to us to be the sound rule, and in fact the only one that will keep the main issue in cases of this kind before the jury; otherwise it would be competent to try the value of every article which had entered into trades leading up to the one in controversy. There is no difference in principle between this rule and that where one is compelled to pay the debt of another, and does so in property which is accepted in full satisfaction thereof. In such case the debtor cannot reduce the recovery of his surety by offering evidence that the property was of less value. Garnsey v. Allen, 27 Me. 366. As applying the same principle, see Winch v. Baldwin, 68 Iowa, 764, 28 N. W. 62; Likes v. Baer, 8 Iowa, 368. The correctness of this rule is further illustrated in this case. It was shown that the dead horse, with others, was traded by a former owner to the party of whom the plaintiff purchased him, and the defendant then offered to show the value of all of these other horses, and in fact was permitted to show the value of some of them. Evidence of the value of this stallion when sold to Keefe, long before he was obtained by the plaintiff, even if a cash price had been paid for him, was incompetent, under the rule announced in Gere v. Insurance Co., 67 Iowa, 272, 23 N. W. 137, 25 N. W. 159. The defendant offered evidence as to the market value of the sire of this stallion and of his ability as a trotter, as a colt getter, and as to the quality of his colts, the amount of his patronage, and his reputation as a sire where owned. Some of this evidence was received; more than was material to the issue in this case, we think, but enough to show the quality of the sire and the character of his stock. His breeding was not in dispute, and this was all that was material on the question of the value of the plaintiff's stallion for stock purposes. At the close of the evidence the plaintiff filed an amendment to his petition, stating that the horse was undul exposed to the elements in the car in which shipped, and that by reason thereof he caught cold, and died from the effects thereof. This issue was submitted to the jury, which is assigned as error. It was not filed as a substitute for the original petition, and, we think, was properly given to the jury. There was evidence supporting the issue thus presented, and, as we understand the record, the amendment was not assailed, but an answer thereto was filed, putting in issue its averments. We discover no error, and the judgment is affirmed. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA v. KANSAS CITY (Supreme Court of Louisiana, March 31, 1902.) [31 So. Rep. 858.] Supreme Court-Jurisdiction-Suits by Railroad Commission. The provision of article 285 of the constitution, conferring upon this court jurisdiction of suits brought against the railroad commission to test the validity of whatever rule, regulation, etc., it may have adopted, cannot be made to apply to suits brought by the railroad commission to recover the amount of fines imposed by itself for violations of its ordinances. A suit of the latter kind is an ordinary suit, falling within the general rule as to jurisdiction. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from judicial district court, parish of De Soto; John Bachman Lee, Judge. Action by the railroad commission of Louisiana against the Kansas City Southern Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Dismissed. Walter Guion, Atty. Gen. (H. T. Liverman and Lewis Guion, of counsel), for appellant. Alexander & Wilkinson, for appellee. PROVOSTY, J. In this suit the railroad commission of Louisiana seeks to enforce payment of a fine of $1,000 imposed by itself upon the defendant railway company, and a motion is made to dismiss the appeal on the ground of want of jurisdiction ratione materiæ. As containing a grant of jurisdiction to this court in cases of this character, the attorney general refers to the following article of the constitution: "Art. 285. If any railroad, express, telephone, telegraph, steamboat and other water craft, or sleeping car company, or other party in interest, be dissatisfied with the decision or fixing of any rate, classification, rule, charge, order, act or regulation, adopted by the commission, such party may file a petition setting forth the cause of objections to such decision, act, rule, rate, charge, classification or order, or to either or to all of them, in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the domicile of the commission, against said commission as defendant, and either party to said action may appeal the case to the supreme court of the state, without regard to the amount involved, and all such cases, both in the trial and appellate courts, shall be tried summarily, and by preference over all other cases. Such cases may be tried in the court of the first instance either in chambers, or at term time: provided, all such appeals, shall be returned to the supreme court within ten days after the decision of the lower court; and where the commission appeals, no bond shall be required. No bond shall be required of said commission in any case, nor shall advance costs, or security for costs, be required of the commission." That article, in express terms, has refer Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Tribble ence exclusively to suits brought against the commission for the purpose of testing the validity of some action it may have taken; but the attorney general argues that the provision of this article on the subject of the appeal must be read into article 286, under which the present suit has been brought,the two articles being laws in pari materia, and having, therefore, to be construed together. The canon of construction here invoked is sound; but assuming, for argument's sake, that article 285 is in pari materia, the argument loses sight of the fact that there are other articles in the constitution which are also laws in pari materia, and in connection with which also article 286 must be construed. These are the articles inserted in the constitution for the special purpose of regulating the jurisdiction of this court, which impliedly prohibit this court from entertaining jurisdiction of cases involving a mere moneyed demand, where the amount is less than $2,000. We can readily understand why suit is brought to test the validity of any rule, regulation, etc., that the commission may have made, should go to the highest court, which alone is competent to give a decision that shall be authoritative in other cases besides the one in which it is rendered; but after the validity of these rules, regulations, etc., has been established, either by decision or by failure to contest, we can think of no special reason why suits brought to collect fines imposed under these rules and regulations should come to this court, any more than should any other suits brought by the state, or by any of the state agencies, for the recovery of mere money, and involving no governmental regulation. We have no jurisdiction of the appeal, and have to sustain the motion to dismiss; but, in doing so, we will add that the case, being the first of this kind, is one in which we should entertain an application for a writ of review on the petition of either party, so that no permanent injury to either party can result from our present action. Appeal dismissed. TEXAS & P. Ry. Co. v. TRIBBLE. (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, April 4, 1902.) [67 S. W. Rep. 890.] Railroads-Transportation of Stock-Negligence*-Instruction. In an action against a railroad company for injuries to two car loads of horses shipped over its road, an instruction that it was defendant's duty in handling them to exercise "such care, prudence, and caution as an ordinarily careful, prudent, and cautious man would have exercised under like circumstances; and, if * * defendant failed to exercise such prudence and caution, such failure would constitute neg ligence," was not improper. * * * * As to duty of carrier during transit and liability for negligence, see 1 Rap. & Mack's Dig. 745-756. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Tribble Appeal from district court, Taylor county; N. R. Lindsey, Judge. Action by G. M. Tribble against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company for damages to two car loads of horses shipped over defendant's road. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. The charge on negligence referred to in the court's opinion was as follows: "You are further instructed that in the transportation of said horses from Cisco, Texas, to Waskom, Texas, it was the duty of the defendant, in order to avoid injury to said horses, to exercise, in the handling and managing of the train in which said horses were transported, such care, prudence, and caution as an ordinarily careful, prudent, and cautious man would have exercised under like circumstances; and, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant failed to exercise such prudence and caution in handling and managing of said train, such failure, if any, would constitute negligence." B. G. Bidwell, for appellant. Hardwicke & Hardwicke, for appellee. STEPHENS, J. This appeal is from a verdict and judgment for $750 recovered as damages to two cars of horses carried from Cisco to Waskom, Tex., in November, 1900. The evidence tended to prove, and warranted the jury in finding, that, through the negligence of appellant, there was a delay of about 23 hours in the carriage of these horses from Cisco to Waskom,-the time usually required being only about 24 or 25 hours,—and that this delay, together with the careless and rough manner in which the horses were handled, resulting in the loss and death of some of them, produced injuries commensurate to the damages recovered. The assignment that the verdict is excessive is therefore overruled. The testimony of appellee as to the market value of the horses in good condition at Waskom fully warranted the charge complained of in second assignment, on the measure of damages, and that assignment is consequently overruled. We approve the charge defining negligence, and therefore overrule the last assignment, complaining of it. A suggestion of delay would have entitled appellee to damages in this case, as in quite a number of other simple damage suits brought before us by this appellant and some others; but, as the party interested has not seen fit to make the suggestion, we have hitherto hesitated, and still hesitate, to affirm with damages, especially as the verdicts fixing the amount of damages in such cases are usually about all that the evidence most favorable to recovery will warrant. Judgment affirmed. HUNTER, J., not sitting. 3 RR R-3 TEXAS & N. O. R. Co. v. BIGHAM et al. (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, March 19, 1902.) [67 S. W. Rep. 522.] Carriers-Delay in Delivery-Pleading Damages. A complaint against a carrier for delay in delivering a shipment of rice, alleging the difference between its value as delivered and as it should have been delivered, and praying for such difference as damages, is sufficient, though such damages be special damages because of the rice being wet when delivered to the carrier. Appeal from Jefferson county court; Geo. C. O'Brien, Judge. Action by Bigham Bros. against the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals. Affirmed. Baker, Botts, Baker & Lovett, and Watts, Chester & Ellison, for appellant. NEILL, J. The appellees, plaintiffs below, alleged in their petition that on the 23d day of November, 1900, they delivered to the Gulf & Interstate Railway Company of Texas 198 sacks of rough rice, at Fennett, a station on said road, to be transported thence to the town of Beaumont, and there delivered to the Beaumont Rice Mills; that said railway company promptly carried the shipment of rice from Fennett to Beaumont, and there delivered the same to the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, appellant, a connecting carrier, which undertook and promised to carry the rice over its road, and promptly deliver it to the Beaumont Rice Mills; that, after receiving the shipment, appellant wrongfully and negligently carried and delivered it to the Atlantic Rice Mills Company, where it wrongfully and negligently withheld the entire shipment of rice from the Beaumont Rice Mills until the 22d day of December, 1900, on which date appellant carried and delivered the rice to the Beaumont Rice Mills, and there received as its consideration for such transportation charges the sum of $5; that the rice was sound and in good condition when it was received by appellant for transportation over its line, but when finally delivered to the Beaumont Rice Mills it was, by reason of its having become wet since its delivery to the Gulf & Interstate Railway Company at Fennett, and while in transit, greatly damaged, and its market value greatly depreciated; that when delivered by appellant to the Beaumont Rice Mills the rice was mildewed, sour, partly rotten, and unfit for sale. So that the aggregate net market value of the entire shipment, when delivered to the Beaumont Rice Mills, was only $439.01, which is $301.51 less than the rice would have been worth on the market at its destination had it been safely carried and promptly delivered. After excepting to the petition and filing a general denial, appellant answered specially that the rice was loaded by appellees at |