Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, J.

linquent person should be set forth in the complaint by proper allegation so that the defendant may be informed what charge he will be called upon to meet when placed upon trial.

Said section of the statute defines a "delinquent child" as one under the age of eighteen years who violates any law of this state or any city or village ordinance; or who is incorrigible or who knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons; or who is growing up in idleness or crime, or who knowingly visits or enters a house of ill-fame, etc., and specifies a number of other acts which if done by such child brings the child within the meaning of the words, "delinquent child."

In support of counsel's contention, they cite subd. 3 of sec. 7696, Rev. Codes, and also People v. Pierro, 17 Cal. App. 741, 121 Pac. 689. Sec. 7679 requires that the indictment or complaint be direct and certain as it regards the party charged, the offense charged and the particular circumstances of the offense charged when they are necessary to constitute a complete offense. In the case of People v. Pierro, supra, the court had under consideration a statute of California almost identical in language with said sec. 159 of the act under consideration, and the court held that the complaint was insufficient in that it did not specify for what act or acts the child had been adjudged a juvenile delinquent person.

Said sec. 7679 requires the complaint to be direct and certain as it regards the party charged, the offense charged and the particular circumstances of the offense charged when they are necessary to constitute a complete offense. We are satisfied that the complaint in this case sufficiently complies with the provisions of said section, and that from the language used therein the defendant fully understood the exact crime with which he was charged and the circumstances under which he was charged to have committed the offense. The California supreme court in People v. Pierro, supra, held that it was not essential to a prosecution under the 26th section of the California juvenile delinquency act that the child who was encouraged to do some unlawful act be a dependent child or that some one of the acts, omissions or conditions constituting the

Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, J.

child a dependent be alleged in the information or complaint. The ruling in that case is to the effect that if the child were not a juvenile dependent at the time the acts complained of in the information were committed by the adult, the adult committed no offense under sec. 26 of said act. Sec. 159, under which this action was prosecuted, will not bear the construction that the California court has placed upon said sec. 26 of the California act. The language of said sec. 159 makes it a misdemeanor for any person by any act to encourage, cause or contribute to the delinquency of a child and is intended as a preventive measure. That statute is designed to guard against children becoming delinquent, as well as to punish those who contribute to their delinquency after the fact of delinquency has been determined. Sec. 152 of said act declares what acts a child under eighteen years of age must commit in order to become a delinquent, and it is not necessary under sec. 159 that such child be declared a delinquent by the proper court in order to convict a person of "encouraging, causing or contributing" to the delinquency of such child. When any person by any act encourages, causes or contributes to the delinquency of such child, he is guilty of a misdemeanor whether such child has been declared a delinquent or not. It is clear that said act was intended as a preventive measure.

In State v. Dunn, 53 Or. 304, 99 Pac. 278, 100 Pac. 258, which involved some provisions of the delinquent child law of Oregon, the court said:

"It is not charged that the alleged mistreated child has become delinquent, within the meaning of the statute, but averred merely that the acts complained of manifestly tend toward such delinquency. It is not essential to a conviction either to charge or to prove that the minor has become delinquent. The general purpose of the law on the subject, as applied to improper acts of adults, is intended more particularly to cover instances of misconduct by adults, not otherwise pro- . vided for by statute. To assume that it was intended that the state should await the result of the wrong perpetrated before punishing the offender, would, therefore, be unreasonable, as well as strongly tend to defeat the very purpose of the law in

Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, J.

its effect to protect children. It needs no discussion to show that, if the accusations against the defendant are true, the effect of the alleged wrongful acts would manifestly tend to cause a girl of immature years to become a delinquent, as defined by the juvenile acts."

The act here under consideration, and especially those provisions contained in said sec. 159, was intended to prevent and restrain adults from encouraging, causing or contributing to the delinquency of a child, and those acts are made a misdemeanor, and the specific acts alleged to have been done by the defendant are clearly set forth in the complaint, and he is fully apprised of the criminal acts he is charged with having performed. It was not necessary to allege in said information the specific act performed by the child that would bring her within the meaning of "delinquent child," as used in said act. Under the provisions of said act, even though the child had not been a delinquent, it clearly appears that the acts performed by the defendant and alleged in the complaint are such acts as would encourage the delinquency of said child. therefore hold that said complaint is sufficient.

We

However, having held that under the law the defendant was entitled to a trial de novo in the district court, the judgment must be reversed, and it is so ordered, and the cause remanded with directions to the district court to proceed and try the appellant as provided by sec. 8325, Rev. Codes.

Ailshie, C. J., concurs.

INDEX-VOL. 25.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE.

Finding as to Balance Due.

See Insurance.

ACCOUNTS.

1. Where appellant cross-examined respondent at length upon
items of account in both the bill of particulars and account-books,
this court will not disturb the finding as to the balance due.
(Pomeroy v. Gordon, 279.)

Transfer of Bank Accounts-Account Stated.

2. Held, that there is not sufficient evidence adduced in the
record of this case with reference to monthly statements of respond-
ent's bank account, alleged to have been rendered to him by appel-
lant bank, to bind respondent on the theory of an account stated.
(Baker v. First National Bank, 651.)

1. Sec. 4807, Rev. Codes, as amended February 20, 1911, Laws
of 1911, chap. 111, par. 1, provides: "An appeal may be taken to
the supreme court from a district court: 1. From a final judgment
in an action or special proceeding commenced in the court in which
the same is rendered. . . . within sixty days after the entry of such
judgment." (Behrensmeyer v. Gwinn, 186.)

APPEAL AND ERROR (Continued).

Transcript of Record-Certificate.

2. Sec. 4818, Rev. Codes, as amended by Laws of 1911, chap. 117,
provides: "On an appeal from a final judgment the appellant must
furnish the court with a copy of the notice of appeal, of the judg-
ment-roll and of any bill of exceptions or reporter's transcript pre-
pared and settled as prescribed in sec. 4434, upon which the appellant
relies." (Behrensmeyer v. Gwinn, 186.)

3. Where the transcript on appeal does not contain the proper
certificate showing what papers the trial court or judge used on the
hearing of the matter presented to him, and a motion is made to
dismiss the appeal on that ground, and counsel for appellant asks
for permission to procure the proper certificate and he is given per-
mission to do so, and thereafter furnished the proper certificate, the
appeal will not be dismissed on that ground. (Smith v. Inter-Moun-
tain Auto Co., 212.)

4. Where a clerk's certificate to a transcript is insufficient and
does not properly certify the record, as required by the statute and
the rules of the court, the same may be amended on motion of the
appellant prior to the final submission of the case. (Steensland v.
Hess, 181.)

Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Verdict or Findings.

5. Evidence examined in this case, and held sufficient to sup-
port the findings and judgment. (Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Black, 98.)
6. Evidence examined in this case and held sufficient to support
findings. (Shawver v. Shawver, 70.)

7. Held, that although the evidence in this case was conflicting,
there was sufficient evidence before the jury to sustain a verdict
in favor of plaintiff, and in accordance with the established rule
of this court in such cases the judgment of the lower court will not
be disturbed. (Baker v. First National Bank, 651.)

8. Where the trial court made findings of fact, and it is con-
ceded, that the evidence upon which the court finds is in conflict,
this court will not reverse the findings where the evidence shows
preponderance in favor of the findings. (Commercial Trust Co. v.
Idaho Brick Co., 755.)

9. Where an instrument is in controversy as to whether it is a
mortgage or a bill of sale, and the record shows that the trial
court found, and the testimony sustains the findings, that said in-
strument was an absolute bill of sale and was intended as such
both by the trust company and the brick company, such finding
will not be reversed upon appeal. (Commercial Trust Co. v. Idaho
Brick Co., 755.)