central point of view. For that among other reasons it seemed best that the present handbook should attempt an outline of the various portions of the system. The Chicago handbooks edited by Dr. Morris will be found of great service in pursuing further study of Hegel's detail. But no magic can make Hegel an easy author; and no helps, however efficient, ought to be used as substitutes for personal knowledge of the master mind.1 1 In the literature at the head of several chapters, it will be observed that (A) stands for translations; (B) for untranslated and relevant portions of Hegel's writings; (C) for helpful works in English on the subjects under discussion, or works influenced strongly by Hegel. XI. HEGELIANISM AND PSYCHOLOGY. Note A. On the Phenomenology of Spirit HEGEL AND HEGELIANISM CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY PHILOSOPHY is often described as a doctrine of the Absolute. It is not indeed specially characteristic of Hegel to use such a definition. He prefers to speak of the Idea. For Hegel is upon his own showing an idealist, and an absolute idealist. When we have dealt with his system in detail, particularly with what he calls Logic, we shall find ourselves, or ought to find ourselves, better able to appreciate the motives of his terminology. Still, the difference in words does not imply a difference in subject or topic. Like other philosophies, Hegel's might also be called a doctrine of the Absolute. He ends his expositions in the region of "absolute knowledge" or "the absolute idea." This sounds somewhat abstract and aloof from everyday life. It may be said at the outset that Hegel's philosophy less than any other stands aloof from reality or aspires to a construction in vacuo. We may very possibly blame him for being unduly entangled in the realities of ordinary experience; we cannot fairly charge him with disparaging them. And if we are allowed to translate the word Absolute by a less pretentious equivalent, we may be helped to repel the unfair suspicions spoken of. The doctrine of the Absolute is a doctrine. of reality. Whatever is real-in or below the halfdeceptive appearances of things-through or behind the 'phenomena" of ordinary experience or of the physical universe—that is the object of the philosopher's quest. He is not the only teacher of mankind who seeks reality. Every teacher who deserves respect has the same high ambition somehow ruling in him. Yet in certain respects the philosopher stands alone. He is pledged to thoroughness, and tries to push inquiry further than it is carried by others, e.g. by the physical sciences. Properly, of course, the word "science" simply means knowledge; it is by a conventional use of language that we restrict the word, as we ordinarily do, to specialised knowledge in a single department. When Hegel uses the German word for science-Wissenschaft there is no corresponding restriction. And is not Hegel justified? If partial knowledge ought to be studied, is there not room for one who shall cultivate knowledge as a whole? Knowledge as a whole, or reality as a whole-we may use either form of words without change of meaning; or are we prepared to fall back upon the despised groping of the Platonic dialogues, and suppose that one kind of knowledge deals not with reality but with the unreal? It is more fashionable nowadays to suppose that a reality exists with which knowledge cannot enter into any relation. Whether this is wiser than the other onesidedness may be questioned. Hegel will vigorously deny its wisdom. |