rule is emphasized. From the "widowhood" provision it is not easy to find an intent to meet a relationship impossible in the lifetime of the testator, but uncertainty, if there be any, is dispelled by the testator's specification of "the widow contemplated as the mother of Benjamin S. Trout's children: In case either of the said children of the said Benjamin S. Trout should die during minority without leaving legal issue, during the lifetime of their said mother". While the testator's words seem to clearly indicate that if "their said mother" should survive Benjamin S. Trout, the trust shall continue for her during her life, and if she died before him it shall end with his life, they lend scanty assistance in the search for a scheme of distribution of the corpus of the trust. Because of the spirit of the will one is readily led by the feeling that upon the termination of the trust it was the testator's intention that the corpus be divided between the children of the cestui que trust, but it will require a strained construction and the interpolation of words presumably inadvertently omitted to sustain the presumption that having made a will the testator did not intend to die intestate as to any part of his estate. After creating the trust the testator says: "In case the widow of the said Benjamin S. Trout shall again marry, then and in that case the said trust shall cease and the principal sum be equally divided between the children of my said son Benjamin S. Trout". As we have seen their mother never was a widow, and as we have found she was the one contemplated by the testator as "the widow". While the conclusion as to "the widow seems well founded, nevertheless it might be shaken and Mary Baer Trout, the second wife and widow of the cestui que trust, become a beneficiary, because of the preponderancy of the presumption against any intestacy, if such a revision would harmonize the parts of the will so as to express a complete testacy; but unfortunately even such a doubtful step would not meet the difficulty, for even Mary Baer Trout would be obliged to sacrifice the bounty on the nuptial altar to give birth to remainder interests in the children of the cestui que trust. By this clause of the will there are gifts to them only in the event "the widow of the said Benjamin S. Trout shall again marry". It would be no hazard to say that the testator intended the children of Benjamin S. Trout to enjoy the remainder not only upon the re-marriage of the widow", but also upon her death, and it is altogether probable that a more competent scrivener would have clearly expressed such an intention, but if it can not be thus found the testator died intestate as to this remainder. The clause of the will as quoted providing for conditions after the re-marriage of " the widow" begins " In case ". It is followed immediately by another clause providing for conditions which may follow from some other contingency beginning with the same words, as follows: "In case either of the said children of the said Benjamin S. Trout should die during minority without leaving legal issue, during the lifetime of their said mother, then and in that case the same shall be equally divided between the survivors or survivor of them". This evidently implies the vesting of an interest in the children which is to be in some other way affected by their mother than by her re-marriage. The widow" and "their said mother' are synonymous expressions. If "the widow" "shall again marry the children shall take. If a child should die " during the lifetime of their said mother' the surviving children shall take. When? Certainly not "during the lifetime of their said mother ", therefore, after her death. The death of a child is not a prerequisite condition to the taking, but a possible happening which is anticipated and provided for. The significant feature is the provision relative to the lifetime of the mother. It signals a warning against excluding the children because "the widow " never had a second husband. A qualification as to a lifetime is an anticipation of a death. The first "In case has to do with matters relating exclusively to a re-marriage. The second "In case" has nothing to do with a re-marriage, but is in harmony with a disposition of the re mainder after the death of "the widow". I toxicating liquors into so-called "dry From this may be gathered the testator's states, thus stripping these commodities intention to give to his grandchildren not of the last vestige of their character as only if their mother should survive their legitimate articles of interstate commerce, father and again marry, but as well if so far as shipment into such states is she died. concerned. They can no longer cross the state border into so-called "dry territory under the protection of the interstate commerce provision of the Constitution; the right of the consignee to receive the original package from across the state line without interference from the state authorities is at an end if the Webb act passes the gauntlet of the various courts up to and through the Supreme Court of the United States. It may be said that this conclusion is held by a thread spun too fine, but if all parts of the will have been harmonized, intestacy averted and the testator's intention found a cable is unnecessary. Loose sentences in a will which are not in harmony with its spirit and which if strictly construed would defeat a palpable intention, may be re-arranged, even supplied with omitted words, if thereby the intention is made to appear more clear. It is so evident that the tes-ity?" queries Mr. Woolwine. "Has Contator intended to give to the children of Benjamin S. Trout not only in case "the widow again married, but also if she died, that none of those who otherwise would be interested is making a claim. Distribution of the corpus is accordingly decreed to the children of Benjamin S. Trout. It is ordered and decreed that The Peoples Trust Company, trustee as aforesaid, do pay the amounts, as herein directed, to those respectively entitled to the same. This report is confirmed nisi. Legal Miscellany. Constitutionality of Webb Act. In March of the present year, states Thomas Lee Woolwine, of the Los Angeles Bar, in the December Case and Comment, the Congress of the United States passed, over the veto of President Taft, a law designed and intended as an aid to prohibition states in the enforcement of the laws of such states against the sale of intoxicating liquors, by divesting such liquors, in case of transportation into such states, of all the immunities and privileges heretofore given to such commodities as legitimate articles of interstate commerce. The measure referred to is known as the Webb act. This bill prohibits the shipment of in "Has Congress exceeded its author gress the power to hand over to the government of the respective states the right to declare how and when and under what conditions the interstate commerce in intoxicating liquors shall be allowed, and thus to outlaw and abandon a commodity heretofore repeatedly held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be a legitimate article of interstate commerce, and therefore under the exclusive control, jurisdiction, and protection of the federal government?" The author points out that "the President, in his message, bases his refusal to sign the bill upon the principal ground that beer and other intoxicating liquors are a recognized and legitimate subject of interstate commerce,' and refers to the fact that the opinion of the AttorneyGeneral, accompanying the message of the President, while admitting that Congress, under the decisions of the Supreme Court, might prohibit the carriage in interstate commerce of intoxicating liquors in the exercise of its power to regulate such commerce,' contended that the bill under discussion does not declare intoxicating liquors to be an outlaw of commerce; and that it does not, as a uniform rule, prohibit its carriage in interstate commerce; and that it simply proposed to turn over the whole subject to the conflicting laws of the different states, and that it is not the exercise by the national government of its power in the manner that it has been exercised respecting the transportation of adulterated food, diseased cattle, obscene literature, contains the germ from which, perhaps, lottery tickets, or women for immoral purposes." Since the Webb act became a law, several of the states have enacted legislation designed to carry into effect the terms thereof. So far as I have been able to learn, says Mr. Woolwine, the constitutionality of the measure has not as yet been considered by any federal court, but it seems that such act has been passed upon indirectly by the highest courts of three of the states, respectively, upon local legislation. The writer has not the text of these decisions, but the information is conveyed by a telegram of date October 12, 1913, from the Honorable E. Y. Webb, the author of the bill, as follows: "Delaware supreme court last week upheld unanimously Webb act. Have not seen text decision. Supreme Court, Kentucky, practically sustained act in Com. Adams Exp. Co. Superior Court, Iowa, recently held it unconstitutional. Act undoubtedly constitutional if state act claimed to be violated is valid under state constitution." The text of these decisions of the state courts cannot be obtained at this time, but any discussion of them would not be of the greatest value even if the act in question had come squarely before each of such courts for decision. This act must, of course, ultimately reach the Supreme Court of the United States in a way to determine, without question, its constitutionality, and any consideration of the decisions of the state courts upon this important measure, while extremely interesting, would not furnish any conclusive answer to the question. Babylonian Laws. The Museum of the University of Pennsylvania announces an archæological discovery of special interest to lawyers. It is a shattered tablet, upon particles of which, pieced together, are inscribed many of the missing laws from the code of King Hamurabi, who ruled Babylonia at a period estimated about 2100 to 2300 B. C. Most of the laws, as deciphered, refer to financial transactions, and one sprang all bankrupt laws of the last 4,000 years. No criminal statutes are expounded. The tablet, which is believed to be part of the oldest collection of laws and precepts extant, was found at Susa in the winter of 1901-'02 by M. de Morgan, a French archæologist, and brought here recently by an expedition of the university returning from Nippur, an ancient city in Babylonia, where the University of Pennsylvania has made extensive excavations. Dr. Arno Poebel, of the University of Breslau, a distinguished Oriental scholar, deciphered the much-worn Babylonish characters. The law relating to bankruptcy says: "If a man has borrowed grain or money from the merchant and has neither grain nor money to pay back, but he has movable goods, he shall give whatever he has to the merchant in the presence of witnesses, according as [words missing] the merchant shall not refuse; he must accept." Another law, dealing with interest. says: "If the merchant lends grain upon interest, he shall take one-fifth of a ker of grain for each ker as interest. If he lends money upon interest, he shall take a sixth and six grains of silver for each shekel as interest." The borrower who had been robbed and had nothing with which to repay, was compelled to go to the temple and take oath to his losses, after which he was permitted his freedom. Provision was made in the ancient law for the business man who met with failure, for it is set forth in the tablet that if an agent returning from a tour has made no profits, the merchant may not claim interest on goods or for any money advanced. Cross-examination. Policeman (to tenant of flat)—“And you say the rug was stolen from your hall. Can you give me any particulars?" Tenant (nervously) "Oh, yes. It was a fancy reversible rug-red on one side and green on the other." Policeman (impressively)—“Ah-and which was the green side?" business of selling pianos for the said LANCASTER LAW REVIEW. Kirk Johnson his entire and exclusive time, through which and upon which representations he obtained from said Kirk VOL. XXXI.] FRIDAY, FEB. 27, 1914. [No. 17 Johnson, between December 23, 1911, Quarter Sessions. Commonwealth v. Snyder. False pretense-Evidence. On the trial of an indictment for false pretense it is no defense that the money was obtained by means of a contract which the defendant's false pretense induced the prosecutor to make. It is not necessary that all the false repre sentation should be made at one time if all made before the money was paid, nor need the money have been paid at the time of the false pretense if paid by reason thereof. On the trial of an indictment for false pretense it was shown that while the defend ant was in the employ of Y. he entered into an agreement for employment with J., the prosecutor, to go into effect when he left the employ of Y., and subsequently telephoned that he had quit working for Y. and was ready to begin work for J. at once, to which J. assented, after which he sent daily reports of his work and expenses and was paid by J. the sums agreed upon, because of the representation that he was devoting his time exclusively to J.'s service, although he really continued in the employ of Y. Held, That these facts constituted false pretense, but it was error to direct the jury that the daily reports could be considered as evidence of false pretense. Indictment for false pretense. Rule for a new trial. Q. S. of Lancaster County. September Sessions, 1913, No. 32. M. G. Schaeffer and John E. Malone, for rule. W. C. Rehm, John M. Groff, Dist. Atty., and C. W. Eaby, Ass't Dist. Atty., contra. January 17, 1914. Opinion by HASSLER, J. The defendant was convicted of false pretense and now seeks a new trial. The indictment charges that on or about December 16, 1911, he did falsely pretend to Kirk Johnson "that he had quit the employment of Yohn Brothers of Harrisburg and was devoting to the and January 27, 1912, the sum of $263.81." The testimony showed that early in December, 1911, he called at Kirk Johnson's place of business, and it was agreed between them that he would work for Mr. Johnson, in the business of selling pianos, for $30 a week and expenses, and would give his entire time and attention to Mr. Johnson's business. At that time he was in the employ of Yohn Brothers of Harrisburg, a competitor of Mr. Johnson, and it was agreed that the agreement was not to be in effect until that employment was ended. A day or two afterwards the defendant telephoned to Mr. Johnson telling him that his resignation had been accepted by Yohn Brothers, and that he was ready to begin work for him at To this Mr. Johnson assented. Thereafter the defendant sent daily statements in writing of his expenses and the progress he was making in his work to Mr. Johnson, and each week with expenses, until he had been paid was paid the amount agreed on, together the sum of $263.81. Mr. Johnson testified that it was because of the representation that he was devoting his time and attention exclusively to his service that he paid him this money. It was shown that the defendant had not left the employment of Yohn Brothers, but continued in their employment during all the time he obtained money from Mr. once. Johnson. It is contended by defendant's counsel that no false representations, within the contemplation of the act of assembly were made, first, because what was said was not a representation of an existing fact but a promise to do something in the future; and, second, because even though the false representation had been of an existing fact, the money was not obtained by reason of that, but the defendant, thereby, only secured employment and the money was paid to him for his services and expenses in that employment. a contract which the defendant's false pretence induced the prosecutor to make. At this point it is to be observed that the cases are plain to the effect that it matters not whether the goods are obtained immediately by the false pretence, or mediately by a contract, to which the false pretence induced the prosecutor to consent, provided there be a causal relation between the contract and the false pretence.' In 12 Enc. of Law and Equity, 815, it is said, that a false pretence made to obtain money is indictable, though the money be obtained by means of a contract which the prosecutor was induced by the false pretence to make. We do not agree that the representa- | goods) were obtained mediately through tions made by the defendant were not of an existing fact. If the defendant had been paid the money upon the promise to resign from his position with Yohn Brothers, and had not done so, it would not be such a false representation as is contemplated in the act of assembly, as it would not have been the representation of an existing fact, but a promise to do something in the future. But that is not this case. The representation set forth in the indictment is the representation that he had quit the employment of Yohn Brothers, and was devoting to the business of selling pianos for Mr. Johnson his entire and exclusive time. The testimony fully sustains this. It showed that the agreement made in Mr. Johnson's office was not in effect until the defendant had resigned his position with Yohn Brothers, and that the next day, or the day afterwards, he telephoned to Mr. Johnson that he had resigned and was ready to go to work at once. The two conversations make the representation of an existing fact. It is not necessary that all of the representation should be made at one time, or in one conversation. If part of the representation is made on one day and part on another, and together they make such a false representation of an existing fact, sufficient to lead a prudent person to part with the possession of his property, it is all that the act of assembly requires; provided of course that the whole of the false representation was made before possession of the property was surrendered, which is the case here. The fact that the money was not paid at the time the pretence was made, but subsequently, at different times, does not change the effect if it was paid by reason thereof: 12 Enc. of Law and Equity 815. Nor can we agree with the second reason urged by the defendant. The defendant, it is true, did obtain his contract of employment through the false representations made by him, and through such employment he obtained the money paid by Mr. Johnson. In 2 Wharton's Criminal Law, Sec. 1444. 11th Edition, the rule is stated as follows: "It is no defence that they (the The prosecutor in this case testified that he was induced to make a contract with the defendant by the false representations which he made, and that he would not have made it except because of this. He also testified that he parted with his money because of them. There is a causal relation between the contract and the parting with possession of his money by the prosecutor, and it is the same in effect as though no contract was made and the defendant obtained the money directly through his false representations and not mediately through a contract to which the defendant induced the prosecutor to consent. Counsel for defendant on the argument of this rule referred us to a case in 2nd Wharton's Criminal Law, Sec. 1443, 11th Edition, and it does not agree with the views above expressed. The reference is as follows: "A, by falsely pretending that he was a naval officer, induced B to enter into a contract to lodge and board him at a guinea a week, and under this contract is supplied with food for a week. This is not obtaining food by false pretence, as the supplying of food in consequence of the contract is too remotely the result of false pretence to become the subject of an indictment". The case referred to is Reg. v. Gardner, Dears & B. C. C., page 40. We are unable to find this case in the library, but do find it referred to in other text books. In 12 Enc. of Law and Equity, 814, note, it is shown that in that case A obtained the lodging by means of the false repre |