is the position in which they are placed by their initial petition to the county commissioners, of what purpose is that part of section 26 which says: "If . . . it is advisable to go on with the work, they shall enter into the agreement.' Section 26 manifestly reserves to the supervisors the right of the final decision. It is only upon the condition that they find it advisable to go on with the work that the supervisors shall enter into an agreement containing the provisions found in the latter part of section 22.

In this case the supervisors have found it not advisable to go on with the work. Under these facts, we do not have the power to compel them to sign the agreement with the State Highway Department.

Rule is discharged, at the costs of the petitioners.

Tegal Miscellany.

The Martin Will Case.

The contested will of John C. Martin before Surrogate Fowler involved a searching inquiry into the legality of a will executed by a person who was admittedly insane at times, but who had lucid intervals, and in course of one of them made the will in question. Surrogate Fowler's opinion is the most exhaustive ever written on the subject, and his findings, as set forth in the syllabus,

are:

Where a testator is afflicted with 'manic depressive insanity,' which is a periodic malady, it is incumbent on a proponent of his will to prove sanity at the moment of testamentation.

"When lucid intervals have to be computed by days and hours, courts should be disinclined on that ground alone to disbelieve in the restoration of the patient to a state of disposing capacity.

"The legal tests differ from the medical tests as respects capacity to testa- | mentate. The burden is on the proponent, in a case such as this, to satisfy the conscience of the Surrogate that the

In the Martin case, Surrogate Fowler made this comment on the reliance to be placed on the testimony of expert witnesses as to the testator's mental condition:

"The Surrogate is not permitted in cases of this character to shelter himself from all responsibility by accepting the mere opinions of experts, without weighing them and subjecting them to the legal tests indicated. But this is a case so peculiar and subtle in character that the expert's testimony is very proper and helpful to the court. It is entitled to the greatest weight and consideration, for without it, it would be almost impossible for the Surrogate to arrive at correct conclusions, so delicate are the medical problems involved. And yet, here it must be subjected to the tests which the law, and the law alone, prescribes for our action. It has been said in substance that unfortunately the physiological conceptions of the phenomena of insanity furnish us with no definite rule for our guidance, but the accepted physiological view of insanity is generally adverse to the practice of allowing testamentary efficacy to wills made during periods of doubtful sanity. This conclusion accords with the law."

Young and Old Judges.

Ex-President Taft, who was a guest of the graduating class of the Harvard Law School at a dinner in Cambridge on Thursday night, agreed with one of the speakers who said that "we have too many young Judges who get their experience on the bench." Mr. Taft thereupon made this confession:

"I went on the bench at twenty-nine, and that was the first real legal training that I got. I regret to say that I learned

much of the law at the expense of the people."

Mr. Taft, however, has the judicial mind and temperament, and the appointment in his case had the color of expediency. But it was not defensible, any more than terminating a Judge's usefulness too soon is. On this latter point the opinion of Lord Chief Justice Alverstone, of England, is pertinent:

I should certainly not retire a Judge as long as he can do his work. I am quite satisfied that the best years of the Judges' lives in my lifetime have been the last ten years of their work. You want to learn to be a Judge. It is aston-, ishingly difficult. A man may be a great lawyer and yet not a great Judge, and a man may be a poor lawyer and yet be an excellent Judge."

Lord Alverstone, who was testifying before a Royal Commission, added that the great Judges he had known did their best work "between the ages of sixtyfive and eighty, or certainly between sixty-five and seventy-five." It is just as important to retain an experienced and wise old Judge whose mind is stored with case and precedent as it is to refrain from appointing or electing to the bench lawyers who are young. The testimony of Lord Alverstone, Lord St. Aldwyn and Mr. Justice Phillimore before the Royal Commission could be read with edification by President Wilson, who is inclined to think that at sixty a lawyer is too old to be appointed to the bench and that at seventy a Judge should retire. New York Sun.

Printing Supreme Court Decisions. All printed copies of United States Supreme Court decisions have been prepared in the same little printing shop for the last seventy-five years. In all that time, so far as anybody knows, there has not been one "leak." And yet the possession of an important decision at day or so in advance might enable one to make a fortune in stock speculation.

The original proprietor of the printing shop did the work himself, taking not chances on the secret getting out through

an employee. At his death, the foreman of the shop conducted the establishment for the estate, and continued to get the Supreme Court work. Another man— only the third manager in seventy-five years-is now running the plant. The printing is divided among several employees in such a way that no one has enough of the decision to make any sense out of it. And the final paragraph the part where the court puts in the 'cracker," saying whether the case is reversed or affirmed-is always set up by the manager of the shop himself.

66

Copies of the decision are turned over to the clerk of the Supreme Court, to be handed to the news associations as soon as the justice starts to read it from the bench.

But for some reason, much to the vexation of the newspaper men, there are never enough copies to go around. Sometimes there is only one copy given out, and the news association favored with that one copy has a brief lead over its rivals in getting the report on the wire.-Case and Comment.

O. C. ADJUDICATIONS.
By JUDGE SMITH:
Thursday, November 6, 1913.
Harry C. Young, Columbia.
Monday, November 17, 1913.
Bruce Clark, Martic.
Mary J. Cassel, Marietta Boro.
Dr. S. T. Davis, City.
Adam Sheaffer, Manheim Twp.
Jacob Gross, Brecknock.
Clarence D. Widmyer, City.
Leah B. Miller Stoner, Strasburg Boro.
Anna Stoll, Mt. Joy Twp.
Henry Wanner, Salisbury.

Thursday, November 20, 1913.
R. J. Barnes, East Drumore.
Elizabeth Bunting, Colerain.
Ida L. Weidler, Manheim Twp.
Catharine Sweeney, Columbia.
David Eicholtz, Penn.
Isaac Placo, Salisbury.

Term, 1911, No. 139; the said assignor

C.

Exceptions to report of auditor.
P. of Lancaster County. Trust Book
No. 22, page 209.

S. R. Zimmerman, for exceptions.
H. Edgar Sherts, contra.

The auditor, M. G. Schaeffer, reported, inter alia, as follows:

From the records and evidence submitted to the auditor, the following facts are found: On March 22, 1912, Frank J. Hagen, of Strasburg township, Lancaster county, Pennsylvania, being engaged in the occupation of a farmer in said township, made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors to John G. Homsher.

Frank J. Hagen, the assignor, on October 10, 1911, gave a judgment note to Frank L. Minnich, of East Lampeter Township, for $303, payable on demand. This note contained a confession of judgment and the same was entered in the Prothonotary's Office of Lancaster County on October 11, 1911, to August

Lefever for $550, dated May 12, 1910, and entered in the Prothonotary's Office of Lancaster County on March 20, 1912, to January Term, 1912, No. 293. On both of the aforesaid judgments executions were issued; that of Frank K. Lefever on the 20th day of March, 1912, fi. fa., April Term, 1912, No. 39; that of Frank L. Minnich on the 22nd day of March, 1912, at 4 o'clock p. m., fi. fa., April Term, 1912, No. 41. In these executions all the personal property of the said Frank J. Hagen was levied upon by the sheriff and practically the entire proceeds for distribution are the proceeds of personal property which had been levied upon by the sheriff and subsequently sold by the assignee. Both of the aforesaid writs of execution were stayed by the Court without prejudice to the rights of the execution creditors.

Joseph Miller is entitled to a preference on his claim for wages to the amount of $36.50, the amount due him as wages for manual labor performed. within six months previous to the assignment. The balance of this claim, $14.25, is allowed as a common claim.

The claim of Alfred Mowrer was for services as laborer rendered within six months previous to the assignment and is a preferred claim.

The claims of Frank K. Lefever and Frank L. Minnich are both presented as preferred claims. These claims are objected to as preferred claims and are also objected to, as well as the claim of S. H. Beiler, Joseph Kindig, Joseph Weaver and J. A. Umble & Bro., as not being entitled to participate in this distribution for the reason that these claims were not proven and filed with the assignee within six months from the date. of the printed notice to all creditors to prove their claims.

The auditor further finds that there is nothing in the evidence to show that there was any intention on the part of Frank J. Hagen to give an unfair advantage or preference to either Frank L. Minnich or Frank K. Lefever; nor is there anything in the record to show that Frank J. Hagen was in any way inter

ested in having the judgment entered nor that he had any knowledge that the executions on Frank L. Minnich and Frank K. Lefever judgments were about to be issued against him, nor any evidence to show that Frank K. Lefever knew of the insolvency of Frank J. Hagen or any contemplation of insol

vency.

Conclusions of law on the important matters to be decided in this distribution: I. Are the claims presented at the audit, but not proved and filed with the assignee within six months from the date of the printed notice to all creditors to prove their claims, entitled to participate in this distribution?

2. Are the amounts due Frank K. Lefever and Frank L. Minnich, judgments

on which executions were issued, en

titled to a preference out of the proceeds realized from the sale of personal property levied upon in the aforesaid executions?

The first part of Section 23 of the Act of 1901, page 416, provides as follows:

"No claim against the insolvent estate shall be allowed unless the claimant, or someone for him, if he can not do so, shall furnish to the assignee or receiver a statement of his claim, together with a copy of the book entries appertaining thereto or any note or other writing evidencing the same verified by affidavit." Which affidavit should be in the form prescribed in said section. The latter portion of this same section further pro

vides:

"If such claim and affidavit be in proper form and the balance claimed agrees with the amount stated by the insolvent, or, upon consultation with the creditor and the insolvent the amount is agreed upon, the claim shall be allowed if presented before the filing or audit of the account unless objected to in the manner hereinbefore set forth."

The exact meaning of Section 23 does not appear entirely clear and yet it is evident that by this section the Legislature intended to provide two methods in the proving of claims, the one to be presented and sworn to and filed with the assignees within six months from the date of the printed notice to all creditors

to prove their claims, and the other that the claims may be presented before the audit of the account, if the amounts claimed agree with the amounts stated to be due by the insolvent. It is evident that the purpose of the method of proving claims, as set forth in Section 22 and a portion of Section 23, was to enable the accountant, if there are no claims remaining unadjusted, to make distribution of the balance shown in his account among the creditors according to their respective claims, as filed and to within the period of six months, as aforesaid, as provided in Section 24 of said Act.

sworn

However, if there are claims remaining unadjusted, or, for that matter not presented and filed as required within the period of six months from the date of the printed notice to creditors, and make distribution, the various claimants an auditor is appointed by the Court to would certainly have a right to present their claims at the audit, if agreed to by the insolvent as being correct, as in this case. This same question under exactly the same facts was passed upon by C. H. Obreiter, Esq., in his report as auditor in the assigned estate of H. G. Troop & Bro., Trust Book No. 18, page 263, in which some of the claims presented at the audit were allowed although not proved and filed with the assignee within six months from the date of the notice to creditors and this report, on excepopinion filed by Judge Landis on March tions filed, was confirmed absolutely by 28, 1903.

It is not denied that Frank J. Hagen is a farmer, in fact, it is so admitted and, therefore, he belongs to the class of persons covered by the Insolvency Act of June 4, 1901. Citizens National Bank v. Gaas, 29 Superior Court, 125: Hoover v. Ober, 42 Superior Court, 308. Section 16 of the Act of 1901, provides as follows: Upon application of the assignee or receiver, the Court shall vacate and set aside all attachments, executions, sequestrations or other legal proceedings not wholly completed, and all money in Court or in the hands of the sheriff by virtue thereof shall be paid to such assignee or receiver. The assignee