66 An alderman has jurisdiction in a suit for damages for breach of a contract, and a record setting forth that the suit was brought for loss sustained by plaintiff from defendant's failure to fulfill his contract in the sale and delivery of a cow to plaintiff" shows jurisdiction: Brubaker vs. Sheibley, 19 Lanc. Law Rev., 241. August 26, 1913. Opinion by SWEARINGEN, J. The defendant was acquitted on an indictment charging "cruelty to mals," but was directed by the jury to Pay one-third of the costs. The indictment was under the Act of May 6, 1909, P. L. 443, which provides that "it shall be unlawful for any owner to offer for sale or sell any horse which, by reason of debility, disease or lameness, or for other cause, could not be worked in this commonwealth without violating the laws. Damages for the breach of a contract against cruelty to animals," and that to saw lumber are within the jurisdic-any owner violating any provision of tion of a magistrate: Rehmeyer vs. Sheffer, 7 Del. Co. Reps., 592. Even contracts not to commit torts are within the jurisdiction of a magistrate: Green vs. Patterson, 3 Pa. Superior Ct., 354. We, therefore, conclude on reason and authority that the judgment of the magistrate cannot be interfered with. The exceptions of the defendant are, therefore, dismissed, and the judgment of the magistrate affirmed. Quarter Sessions. Commonwealth vs. Lilash. Criminal law Cruelty to animals-Costs Under the Act of May 6, 1909, P. L. 443, the court of quarter sessions has no jurisdiction to try an indictment charging a defendant with cruelty to animals. Jurisdiction of such an offense is in an alderman, magistrate or justice of the peace in summary proceedings. Where a defendant is acquitted in the quarter sessions on an indictment charging cruelty to animals, but is directed by the jury to pay one-third of the costs, the court will set aside the portion of the verdict imposing one-third of the costs on the defendant. Motion in arrest of judgment. Q. S. of Fayette Co. June Sess., 1913, No. III. this act shall be deemed guilty of a mis- And now, August 26, 1913, the motion in arrest of judgment is sustained, W. A. Miller, assistant district attor- that part of the verdict of the jury imney, for commonwealth. George Patterson, for defendant. posing one-third of the costs on the defendant is set aside, and it is ordered that said costs be paid by the county. Tegal Miscellany. Marriage and Divorce in France. BY CHARLES G. LOEB, ESQ., COUNSELORAT-LAW, OF VALOIS & LEOB, PARIS, FRANCE. It is only since the French Revolution that marriage is considered in France as essentially a civil contract. This principle, first established by the constitution of 1791 in France, has been consecrated ever since by the laws of this Republic, and the Penal Code at this day forbids any minister of any cult to give a marriage benediction to persons who have not previously justified to him that their marriage has been celebrated, by the competent civil officers, that is to say by the Mayor of the Town. or District in which one of the parties has resided for at least one month. With the consent of their parents, a boy may marry after eighteen and a girl after fifteen years. Before the age of twenty-one, however, neither boy or girl can marry with out the consent of his father and mother. In case the parents disagree, the consent of the father suffices. Should the parents be deceased, the grandparents replace them. Children who have attained the age of twenty-one, but have not yet reached thirty, must justify of the consent of their parents. This means that, should the consent not be obtained, it may be dispensed with provided certain formalities prescribed by the Code, called "sommations respectueuses" have been fulfilled. The person in this condition must serve upon the parents refusing to consent a summons in due form of law calling upon them to agree to the wedding. Should the parents refuse, the marriage may take place nevertheless after thirty days from the service of this paper and will be perfectly valid in spite of the parents' dissention. After the age of thirty, no consent of the parents is necessary. The essence of the marriage contract in France is the consent of the parties. The marriage must be preceded since the law of 1907 by the publication of bans. These bans are put up on the walls of the City Hall of the domicile of the parties ten days previous to the marriage of the parties and the act of marriage is transcribed on the margin of the birth records of each one of the parties in order to avoid bigamy. valid all marriage in a foreign country The civil code in France renders between French citizens or between a French citizen and a foreigner, provided this marriage was celebrated in the legal forms in force where the marriage takes place, provided also that the cation of bans, and provided also that marriage has been preceded by publiall the conditions prescribed by the French Code as to age, consent of parents and publication of bans have been fulfilled. marrying in France the full benefit and The French law gives to foreigners force of their "national law," that is to say that the legal age for marriage, the consent of their parents and the question of publication of bans at their domicile is left to their national law. The marriage contract in France involves the following obligations: The parties owe to each other mutually, fidelity, help and assistance; the husband promises to protect his wife and the wife promises to obey her husband (Art. 213, Civil Code France). The wife must reside with her husband and must follow him wherever he decides to reside; the husband is obliged to receive his wife and to furnish her with all that is necessary according to his condition and to the best of his abilities. Divorce in France.-Divorce was established in France in 1792. The Civil Code of 1804 consecrated the principle of divorce, but by the law of May 8th, 1816, after the downfall of the Napoleonic empire in France, divorce was suppressed. It was only in 1884 that the laws of France re-established marriage dissolution by divorce. Under the Civil Code in force to-day in France, a divorce may be obtained upon either of the following causes: First, adultery of the wife or of the husband. Second, cruelty, physical injuries or grave insults. Third, condemnation of one of the parties for infamous crime or felony. The tendency of the French courts i at present towards the facilitating of the dissolution of the marriage contract. | The decisions are continually widening the scope of the causes designated, as cruelty or grave insults. Law decisions have held that letters containing insulting words from a husband to his wife, or reciprocally, constitute grave injuries and were sufficient as a basis for a divorce. To abandon the conjugal domicile, to refuse to consummate the marriage or to continue the marriage relations, to use any incorrect familiarities with third parties, to communicate dangerous sickness and many other causes have been held to constitute grave insults and to be sufficient causes for divorce. Procedure.-Divorces are pronounced by the Civil Court in France. These judgments may be appealed from. The procedure comprises: First, an attempt to conciliate the parties by the President of the Court. If this does not succeed, and the facts alleged are clearly proven, the divorce judgment is granted de plano. If the facts are contestable and contested, the Court orders an investigation and each one of the parties may call forth witnesses. The divorce may be either pronounced in favor of one of the parties or "à leurs torts réciproques," which means by the wrong doings of both. There are two months for appeal after the rendering of the judgment. No appeal being taken, the divorce then becomes absolute, but has no effect or force until it is actually transcribed on the books and registers of the City Hall in the margin of the marriage act. This last formality is essential. A man may marry immediately after a divorce, but a woman must wait 300 days after the granting of the decree. This law has been made to avoid any question as to the paternity of a child. born or conceived during the said period. The French Court, by the judgment of divorce, dissolves absolutely the marriage contract and gives to each of the parties their entire liberty. The courts may arrange in their judgment all property rights and questions between the parties and have power to grant alimony. The question of the guardianship of the children is also settled in the judgment. Divorces are becoming more and more frequent in France, specially in the largest cities. The courts are becoming more and more liberal in their interpretation of the laws of divorce and are extending, by interpretation, the scope of the causes prescribed by the code. The law and the courts seem to be tending gradually and surely towards the simplest solution for matrimonial dissention: The divorce by mutual consent. -From the l'a. Law. Reg. "Love letters have a financial value when it comes to damage suits." "Why shouldn't they? Aren't they promissory notes ?" -Baltimore American. O. C. ADJUDICATIONS. Thursday, October 23, 1913. Agnes E. Overfield, Elizabethtown. Emanuel H. Bomberger, Elizabeth. 66 mand"; and also that, in case of de 66 LANCASTER LAW REVIEW. fault, any attorney" might, on behalf VOL. XXXI.] FRIDAY, NOV. 14, 1913. of and at the request of said party of the first part, sign an agreement for en[No. 2 tering an amicable action of ejectment in any competent Court, and confess. judgment therein against the said party of the second part (without stay of execution) for the recovery of the possession of said premises, without any liability on the part of said attorney, for which this lease alone shall be a sufficient warrant." It also provided that Common Pleas--Law, Gantz v. Morrett. Lease-Transfer-Judgment. The agreement of prior parties to a lease that a judgment in ejectment or for rent may be entered, will bind a transferee so far as the obtaining of possession is concerned, but it cannot be entered as a judgment against such transferee who has not signed the warrant of attorney. A judgment by confession must be selfsustaining on the record. Rule to open judgment and let defendant into a defense. C. P. of Lancaster County. September Term, 1913, No. 33. B. F. Davis, for rule. 66 any attorney of any Court of record of Pennsylvania, or elsewhere," was empowered to appear for and confess. judgment against said party of the second part for any rent that" might "be due and in arrear," and there was a further agreement that "all the provisions of this lease shall be binding on all persons claiming under the parties hereto as fully as if they were in every instance named." On September 2, 1913, under the caption of W. H. Gantz v. George Morrett, the attorney for the plaintiff filed a paper, directing the prothonotary to W. M. Hollowbush and W. C. Rehm, enter judgment against the defendant contra. (Morrett) for the sum of $91.67, being the amount of rent in arrear, under the October 4, 1913. Opinion by LANDIS, terms of the lease. On the same day, P. J. On March 12, 1912, W. H. Gantz leased to F. E. LeFevre a certain hotel property, known as the Farmers' Inn, located on Manheim Street, in the borough of Mount Joy. The term of the lease was three years from April 1, 1912, with privilege of renewal in LeFevre only, and the rent to be paid was $1,500, payable in monthly sums of $41.66% on the first day of every month. On August 24, 1912, LeFevre assigned the lease to George Morrett, and on August 26, 1912, Gantz ratified the transfer. under the same caption, judgment as in an amicable action in ejectment was entered in the prothonotary's office, signed by Wm. M. Hollowbush, attorney for plaintiff, and W. C. Rehm, attorney for defendant. It was set forth therein that the lease had been made between Gantz and LeFevre, and subsequently was transferred to Morrett, and that the rent was in arrear, and that George Morrett confessed judgment in ejectment with costs in favor of Gantz. Thereupon, a writ of habere facias to obtain possession was issued, and a fi. fa. for damThe lease provided that, "in case of ages and costs, and on September 4, default in the payment of said rent, or 1913, Morrett presented his petition and upon the breach of any other covenant obtained this rule. He alleges therein by the said party of the second part, the that he never signed any lease or judgestate demised should, "at the option ment; that he paid the rent up to July of the said party of the first part, cease 1, 1913, when a dispute arose between and determine, who may then re-enter him and Gantz concerning the water and take possession of said premises rent, and that Gantz then had a landwithout any previous notice or de-lord's warrant issued, and his goods and chattels were levied upon; that he issued a writ of replevin and gave bond, and that that case is not yet determined; that as to the August rent, he offered a certified check and subsequently to pay cash, but Gantz refused to accept the same. He does not pretend that he paid the September rent, nor that he ever made a legal tender of any rent; but, upon the grounds above stated, he asks that the judgment entered be set aside and stricken from the records. These facts are conceded by an answer duly filed by the plaintiff, and upon them we determine the legal points raised. to the terms of the lease between his lessor and the owner, and he could. have been ejected by proceedings on a judgment entered against Jackson. There was full authority for entering a judgment against Jackson, and its enforcement would have turned out of possession every one claiming under him; but we find no authority for entering a judgment against Lawson. He had not signed the warrant of attorney, and his coming in as a sub-tenant gave no one authority to confess judgment against him." In this case, a similar situation appears. Morrett did not sign the warrant of attorney, and therefore no one was authorized to enter a judgment by confession against him. Upon the presentation of the defendant's petition, we granted a rule to show cause why the judgment should not be opened. We think that, under the facts as they have been shown, the proper rule would have been one to strike off the judgment against Morrett. We, therefore, now grant such a rule and make it absolute, and as this serves the full purposes of the defendant in this proceeding, we discharge the rule to open the judgment. Rule to strike off judgment made absolute. "A covenant for an amicable ejectment and confession of judgment, for breach of conditions in a written lease, runs with the land, and binds the assignee of the original lessee, under the Statute of 32 Henry VIII, which is in force in Pennsylvania: "Benz v. Langan, 5 North., 139. But a judgment by confession must be self-sustaining, and the person against whom such a judgment is entered must have confessed it, or it cannot be entered against him. The agreement of the prior parties to the lease that a judgment in ejectment or for the rent may be entered will bind a transferree so far as the obtaining of possession is concerned, but it cannot be entered against such transferree as a judgment. Thus, in Stewart v. Lawson, 181 Pa., 549, a lease for two hotels contained a provision for entering an amicable action of ejectment with power of attorney to confess judgment in favor Judgment—Revival-Lien—Bankruptcy. of the lessor and against the lessee or any sub-tenant, in the event of the nonpayment of the rent as it fell due. The lease was signed by the lessee alone, but the judgment was entered against the lessee and persons in possession of the leased premises who were alleged to be sub-tenants. Mr. Justice Fell, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "We have, then, a judgment entered against three defendants on a warrant of attorney signed by one of them only. The only ground on which it is attempted to sustain the judgment against Lawson is that he was a sub-tenant and bound by the terms of the lease. It is true that, if he was a sub-tenant, he was subject Lehigh Valley Cornice Works v. Foltz. Where, after the entry of judgment as a valid lien on real estate, the defendant is discharged in bankruptcy, the lien of the judgment is not affected; but, on revival after five years from the entry of the judgment, the lien will be restricted to the real estate bound by it originally. Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. C. P. Lehigh Co. Ralph H. Schatz, for plaintiff. Plaintiff recoverd judgment before a |