ficient illegal votes cast for plaintiff to give defendant a majority of the legal votes after excluding all that were illegal.-HACKER V. CONRAD, Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 190.

42. EMINENT DOMAIN.-Where a condemnation suit is brought to acquire different pieces of property held in severalty by different defendants, one defendant has no right to complain of an order granting a new trial as to the property of another defendant, since, in effect, the proceeding against each piece of land is a separate suit.-GAGE V. CITY OF CHICAGO, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 163.

43. EMINENT DOMAIN Assessment of Damages. Code, § 2529, which specifies within what times different actions can be begun, does not apply to a proceed. ing to assess damages for land taken for railroad purposes, since such a proceeding is not an action, but a special proceeding, under Code, §§ 2505, 2506, which declares that a proceeding in which a plaintiff demands from a defendant "the enforcement or protection of a private right or the prevention or redress of a private wrong" is a civil action, and that "every other remedy in a civil case is a special proceeding."-HARTLEY V. KEOKUK & N. W. RY. Co., Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 352.

44. EQUITY-Limitation of Actions.-Courts of equity ordinarily act in obedience and in analogy to the statute of limitations, but they will not allow the bar of that statute to prevail where it would further manifest injustice; hence it is a well-settled rule in equity that, in cases of fraud, the time limited within which the action must be brought will not commence to run until the discovery of the fraud, or until the complainant was in a situation where, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he would have discovered the fraud.-LINCOLN V. JUDD, N. J., 24 Atl. Rep. 318.

45. ESTOPPEL IN PAIS-Replevin.-In replevin the evidence showed that defendant, as sheriff, had seized the goods under an attachment against a person who had fraudulently sold a stock of goods to the plaintiffs; that the goods seized had been bought by plaintiffs from another party after the fraudulent sale, and put with the stock of goods, and were seized as a part of said stock: Held that, if plaintiffs were present when the levy was made, and knew that defendant intended to levy on the stock fraudulently sold, and that the goods seized did not belong to said stock, and permitted defendant to seize them under the belief that they formed part of said stock, and did not tell him the facts, then they were estopped to claim that the goods seized were not part of said stock.-REISS V. HANCHETT, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 165.

46. EVIDENCE-Opinion Evidence.-It is error to allow a witness to answer a question as to how much a certain person's life estate in land would be worth at sheriff's sale, considering his age and physical condition, where it is not shown that the witness is acquainted with the average duration of human life, or that he has the skill constituting him an expert as to a man's physical condition, and its effect on his expectancy of life.-WILSON V. BENNETT, Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 184.

47. EVIDENCE-Res Gestæ - Declarations.-A brakeman on a flat car received an injury in a collision be tween such car and a detached portion of his train while making "a running switch." About two minutes after the injury, and while the brakeman was still on the car, the engineer left his engine and walked about a car length to where the brakeman was: Held, that declarations by the engineer as to the cause of the accident, where they did not refer to acts done or matters happening prior to the collision, were part of the res gesta.-OHIO & M. RY. CO. V. STEIN, Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 180.

48. EXECUTION-Intervention by Third Party.-Where the ownership of goods seized on execution is claimed by a non-resident son of the judgment debtor, who asserts that he merely invested the debtor with the exclusive management and control of the business, it is error to exclude evidence showing that the stock of

goods had been assessed during the four previous years in the judgment debtor's name, and upon her oath as to valuation, and that at various times she had advertised the business in her own name.-TURNER V. BRADLEY, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 364.

49. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Agreements.- A contract, which by its terms is not to be performed within a year, but which contains an option allowing either party to terminate it within a year, is not within the statute of frauds, and need not be in writing.-BLAKE V. VOIGHT, N. Y., 21 N. E. Rep. 256.

50. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Exempt Property.It is the settled law of this State that exempt property is not the subject of fraudulent sale, and that the vendee of such property takes the same free from the claims of the creditors of the vendor.-BLOEDORN V. JEWELL, Neb., 52 N. W. Rep. 367.

51. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Husband to Wife.A husband, who has taken land in his own name, conveyed to the wife. The husband and wife testified that the business of the husband had for a number of years been carried on with the wife's money, and that the purchase of this particular land had been made with money given her by her father only a few days before. The father was poor. The husband paid only a small part of the price, and arranged for deferred payments, and requested an extension when the payments became due. The conveyance was made when the husband learned that he was liable on certain notes given by him some years before: Held, that the conveyance was fraudulent as to creditors.- SMITH V. UTESCH, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 343.

52. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES- Insolvency.—Where the evidence is insufficient to show the grantor of a voluntary conveyance insolvent at the time of the grant, there is no presumption of fraud as to subsequent creditors.-CRAMPTON V. SCHAAP, Ark., 19 S. W. Rep. 669.

53. GARNISHMENT.-A garnishee is liable for money paid him by the judgment debtor for rent due "F M H," under an agreement that he should hold the same as trustee, and return it if the debtor should purchase the premises on foreclosure sale, although, after the purchase had been made, he paid the money over to "D H," who agreed to indemnify him, having first suggested to the debtor that he could still be sued for it if he paid it to "H," and having been told to "pay it over." as the debtor thereby intended that it should be paid to "F M H," and that the garnishee's liability should continue.-SCHUERMAN V. FOSTER, Wis., 52 N. W. Rep.

311.

54. GARNISHMENT-Attachment.-A garnishee in attachment may set up in defense that the court had no jurisdiction to render judgment against defendant.DENNISON V. TAYLOR, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 148.

55. HOMESTEAD Business Lot. Urban property, owned and used as a place of business, by a person also owning and residing at a homestead outside of the town limits, and not contiguous to the urban prop erty, is no part of the homestead, and is subject to execution.-WILLIAMS V. WILLIS, Texas, 19 S. W. Rep. 683.

56. HOMESTEAD - Extent.-Where a debtor owns a house and two town lots, each 25 feet front and 150 feet deep, and on the rear of two said lots is a building 20 feet wide and 50 feet long, used by other persons than the owner of said lots as a carpenter shop, and the owner occupies said house and lots with her family, the whole of said lots is a homestead, and no part of the same is subject to forced sale on a judgment rendered against the owner.-MILFORD SAV. BANK V. AYERS, Kan., 29 Pac. Rep. 1149.

57. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Adverse Possession.-Under Comp. Laws, § 2528, giving a married woman a right to acquire property the same as a feme sole, a wife living apart from her husband and supporting herself may acquire title by adverse possession to a portion of his lands awarded to her by a void decree of divorce.WARR V. HONECK, Utah, 29 Pac. Rep. 1117.

58. INSURANCE-Conditions of Policy.-Where a fire insurance policy insures the "estate of O," the words "estate of O" cover and sufficiently describe property left by O, which before his death he had conveyed to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors; and failure to mention the trust in the policy does not avoid it under a condition therein that it shall be void if the exact interest of the assured in the property, whether as owner, trustee, mortgagee or otherwise, be not truly stated therein.-WEED V. HAMBURG-BREMEN FIRE INS. Co., N. Y., 31 N. E. Rep. 231.

59. INTOXICATING LIQUORS Illegal Sale.- A nonresident landlord, who upon receiving notice of an action charging the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors upon his premises, with his permission, makes no effort, either in person or through an agent, to stop such sales, except by serving upon the tenant a notice to quit, and who then permits the tenant to remain in possession for some days, must be held to have known and acquiesced in the sales after that time.-STATE v. GRIM, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 351.

60. JUDICIAL SALE-Inadequate Price.-The fact that land was sold under a decree for an inadequate price is not ground for a resale, in the absence of fraud.-NIX v. DRAUGHAN, Ark., 19 S. W. Rep. 669.

61. JUDGMENT-Collateral Attack.-Where a guardian, as next friend of one of his wards, prosecutes to judg. ment proceedings for partition, the other ward cannot, in a suit on the guardian's bond for damages for a viotion of his duty, attack such judgment on the ground that it was erroneous.-STATE V. ROGERS, Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 199.

62. JUDGMENT Married Women.-A justice's judg ment and execution against a married woman constitute a good defense to an action of trespass brought by her against the constable and judgment creditor for seizing and selling her property under such execution, ⚫ where the judgment and execution are both regular on their face, and the justice's record does not disclose the fact of coverture.-BRECKWOLDT V. MORRIS, Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 300.

63. JUDGMENT Res Adjudicata.- Plaintiff, having made an oil lease to defendants, they to pay as rent a certain proportion of the oil produced on 90 acres of the land, and a larger proportion of that produced on the remainder, sued, after he had disposed of his interest in the land, for the amount due him under the contract as his share of the oil actually produced, and recovered judgment. Afterwards he sued for damages for breach of implie 1 covenant, claiming that they had produced oil only on the 90 acres, and had failed to operate for oil on the remainder of the land: Held, that the first action was a bar to the second, since the contract was entire.-HILL V. JOY, Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 293.

64. JUDGMENT-Res Adjudicata Replevin.-A judg. ment debtor conveyed both real and personal property to his wife, the two conveyances constituting only one transaction. The judgment creditor caused the personalty to be seized on execution, and it was replevied by the wife. The wife having obtained judgment in the replevin suit, a suit in equity was brought to subject the land to execution: Held, that the judgment in the replevin suit was conclusive as to the validity of the transfer of the real as well as of the personal property.-BAXTER V. MYERS, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 234.

65. LANDLORD AND TENANT- Dangerous Premises.The lessor of an hotel is not liable for injury to a guest by the fall of an awning known to be unsafe, unless bound by the lease to keep the awning in repair.-FELLOWS V. GILHUBER, Wis., 52 N. W. Rep. 307.

66. LIFE INSURANCE-Beneficiaries.-Where a policy of life insurance is payable to the wife of the insured, "for her sole use if living, in conformity with the stat. ute, and, if not living, to her children, or their guardian," and the wife and one of her three children die before the insured, the personal representative of the deceased child is entitled to nothing under the policy, since each child's interest is contingent, and could

vest only on her surviving her mother.-WALSH V. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO., N. Y., 31 N. E. Rep. 228.

67. LIMITATIONS.-A partnership debt, collected by a surviving partner while his deceased partner's estate was being administered, could have been collected by the administrator as a debt due the estate, and a hal share therein cannot, after six years, be recovered from the partner by decedent's child, then an infant.DANIELLS V. DANIELLS, Mich., 52 N. W. Rep. 302.

68. LIMITATIONS-Trespass on Land.-By Rev. St. 1881, § 292, barring in six years an action against a railroad company for a tortious entry on lands, the cause of action accrues when the unlawful entry is made, and the running of the statute is not affected by a change in the ownership of the railway.-PICKETT V. TOLEDO, ST. L. & K. C. R. Co., Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 200.

69. MASTER AND SERVANT-Contributory Negligence. -Where a blacksmith in defendant's service was sup. plied with an incompetent helper, and complained to defendant's foreman, and was assured by him that another helper would be employed as soon as a suitable one could be obtained, and plaintiff was thereafter injured through the incompetency of his helper, he cannot be charged with contributory negligence for having continued to work with such incompetent helper.WUST V. ERIE CITY IRON WORKS, Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 291.

70. MASTER AND SERVANT-Fellow-servants.-A master held not responsible to a servant for the act of a fellow-servant, in negligently selecting a defective instrument-an iron hook-to which to attach a pulley to raise a heavy weight in a boiler shop, that being a proper detail of the work in which the servants were engaged.-LING V. St. PAUL, M. & M. RY. CO., Minn., 52 N. W. Rep. 378.

71. MASTER AND SERVANT- Negligence.-Where it is the custom of a railroad company to repair its cars on tracks on which no trains are switched, an employee, directed by the company's foreman to repair a car standing on a side track used for switching, has the right to assume that the company will use ordinary care in protecting him against the increased danger; and if he is injured without his fault, and through the failure of the company to cause signal flags to be so placed at a switch as to warn train men not to run cars on such track, the company is liable.-LOUISVILLE, E. & ST. L. C. R. Co. v. HANNING, Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 187.

72. MECHANICS' LIENS.-The fact that a claim for a lien includes charges for which no lien is given, will not defeat that portion of the claim for which a lien is provided, where the charges are separately stated.MAYNARD V. IVEY, Nev., 29 Pac. Rep. 1090.

73. MECHANIC'S LIEN.-When two defendants have made a joint contract with a builder for the erection of several buildings for a definite sum of money for all of them, some of which are to placed on a lot owned in severalty by one of the defendants, and others to be erected on another lót, owned in like manner by the other defendant, and a subcontractor furnishes lumber and other building material which is used for the erection of such buildings under an entire contract with the builder, and complies with the provisions of sections 5469. 5470, Comp. Laws, he is entitled to a joint lien until he has been fully paid for the lumber and material furnished under such contract.-FULLERTON V. LEONARD, S. Dak., 52 N. W. Rep. 325.

74. MECHANICS' LIENS- Estoppel.-In an action to foreclose a subcontractor's lien, it appeared the supervising architect, before giving the principal contractors an estimate for payment, asked one of the subcontractors if they were satisfied with the principal contractors, and that he answered that they were perfectly good. The owner of the building then paid the principal contractors the full amount of the contract price, but he was not misled by statements of the subcontractor, nor induced thereby to make such payment: Held, that such statements did not operate as an estoppel in pais against the subcontractors.-SIMONSEN V. STACHLEWICZ, Wis., 52 N. W. Rep. 310.

75. MORTGAGE-Estoppel.-Defendants were husband and wife. At the time of executing the mortgage the wife made affidavit that she had purchased certain property of plaintiff for her own benefit, and that the mortgage on other property was given for her own use to secure the purchase price, and not to secure any debt of her husband. Plaintiff, relying on her statements in the affidavit, sold her the property and took the mortgage to secure the note given therefor: Held, in an action to foreclose the mortgage, that she was estopped from claiming that she signed the note and mortgage as surety for her husband. TAYLOR V. HEARN, Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 201.

76. MORTGAGE-Evidence.-Evidence that the parties to a deed agreed that the land might be redeemed is not sufficient to prove that the deed was a mortgage, where there is no evidence of the existence of any mortgage debt.-FISHER V. GREEN, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 172. 77. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure.-In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the filing of a notice of lis pendens is constructive notice to a subsequent tenant of the mortgagor that the court, by the appointment of a receiver, may cut off whatever interest such tenant may acquire in the mortgaged premises, unless he should elect to attorn to the receiver, and pay to him all rents for the use of the premises after the date of appoint. ment, as the rights of the receiver are not affected by the provisions of the lease and the payment of the rent in advance to the mortgagor.-GAYNOR V. BLEWETT, Wis., 52 N. W. Rep. 313.

78. MORTGAGES-Validity.-A mortgage in good faith by a pre-emptor of land prior to the time of making his final proof is not a grant or conveyance within the prohibitory clause of Rev. St. U. S. § 2262, which provides that "any grant, except in the hands of bona fide purchasers, for a valuable consideration, shall be null and void, except as provided in § 2288."-NORRIS v. HEALD, Mont., 29 Pac. Rep. 1121.

79. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Defective Sidewalk.-A bill-board standing by a sidewalk, in such a decayed condition as to make it unsafe for persons to pass on the walk, renders the walk defective, within the mean. ing of Acts 22d Gen. Assem. ch. 25, § 1, which requires actions against municipal corporations for personal injury resulting from defective streets or sidewalks to be brought within six months, unless written notice specifying the place and circumstances of the injury be served on the corporation within 90 days after the injury occurred.-BLIVENS V. CITY OF SIOUX CITY, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 246.

80. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Grading Streets.-Under Const. 1870, art. 2, § 13, providing that "private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation," the owner of a city lot abutting on a street is entitled to recover damages from the city for injury to his property caused by grading the street, though the street has never been graded before.-CITY OF BLOOMINGTON V. POLLOCK, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 146.

81. NATIONAL BANKS Taxation.-Where a national bank is taxed for lands paid for out of its capital stock, the assessment upon its capital stock should be made after deducting from its cash value the value of such real estate.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF ALBIA V. CITY COUNCIL OF ALBIA, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 334.

82. NEGLIGENCE-Remote and Proximate Cause.-In an action to recover damages for personal injuries suffered in a buggy accident alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence in leaving a dead dog in the highway, it appeared that defendant's dog had died, and been properly placed by him out of the way, but was removed by some mischievous persons on to the highway, of which defendant was notified: Held, that plaintiff had failed to show negligence in the defendant.-DAVIS V. WILLIAMS, Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 204.

83. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT - Continuance.-In an action upon a note executed by defendant payable to her own order and by her indorsed in blank, an affida

vit for continuance on account of her illness, which states that defendant would testify that the note was for the accommodation of a third person, who was to use it as collateral, and return it to defendant at or before maturity, and that the plaintiff had notice of the character of such note, and of the purposes for which it was executed, is insufficient, since it fails to show any defense to the note.--HODGES V. NASH, III., 31 N. E. Rep. 151.

84. PARTNERSHIP-Commercial Paper.-A partnership organized "for the purpose of carrying on the business of sawing lumber, pickets, and lath," is "non-trading" in character, and an individual partner has no right, as a mattter of law, to execute a note in the name of the firm without the knowledge of his copartners, in the absence of express authority, or a course of dealing from which such authority can be presumed.-DoWLING V. NATIONAL EXCH. BANK OF BOSTON, U. S. S. C., 12 §. C. Rep. 928.

85. PARTNERSHIP-Evidence.-Proof that complainant and defendant made an agreement for the purchase for their joint benefit of a single tract of land, and the erection of a building thereon; that the land was bought and the building erected by defendant in his own name, with his own money, and on his own responsibility; and that complainant advanced no money, and assumed no liability on account of the transaction-is insufficient to show that they were copartners.-MORTON V. NELSON, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 168.

86. PARTY WALL-Mutual Support.-A person is liable in an action by another possessing an easement for support by a party wall resting partly on the land of each, for damages resulting from the removal of that support by persons doing work on his property which he had employed them to do.-BRIGGS V. KLOSSE, Ind., 31 N. E. Rep. 208.

87. PLEADING-Counter claim.-The test of a counterclaim is whether the defendant could have maintained. an independent action on the demand as set forth in it.-MCKINNEY V. SUNDBACK, S. Dak., 52 N. W. Rep. 322.

88. PRESUMPTIONS-LOSS of Records.-After the lapse of 30 years, the existence of a judgment and execution recited in a sheriff's deed will be presumed, on proof of the destruction of the records of the court from which the execution purported to issue.-GIDDINGS V. LEA, Tex., 19 S. W. Rep. 682.

89. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-A tenant in common of oil lands, who has been created agent by his co-tenants to receive their shares of royalities under a lease of the land, and who afterwards receives money due his cotenants, not mentioned in the instrument creating him agent, cannot treat his liability to account for such money as a common debt, but holds it as trustee, where he received it in consequence of the authority to receive the other moneys, and charged himself with it as trustee, with the knowledge and approval of his co-tenants.-SHEARMAN V. MORRISON, Penn., 24 Atl. Rep.

313.

90. PRINCIPAL AND

AGENT.-Where defendant, who was agent to procure contracts for certain land "in accordance with printed contracts furnished," employed plaintiff to make the contracts, giving instructions for their execution different from the printed contracts, he is personally liable to plaintiff for the services.TAYLOR V. NOSTRAND, N. Y., 31 N. E. Rep. 246.

91. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Agency.-Where defendant purchased lumber of plaintiff for the purpose of building a house for third persons, and such third persons did not authorize such purchase, and he in purchasing made no bargain on their behalf, nor had the goods charged to them, but merely gave plaintiff or ders on such persons for some of the money due under his contract with them, defendant was not the agent of such persons.-ATLAS LUMBER CO. V. SCHENCK, Colo., 29 Pac. Rep. 1137.

92. PUBLIC LAND- Military Land Warrant.-Under Act Cong. Sept. 28, 1850, § 4, which declares that "all sales, mortgages, letters of attorney, or other instru

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ments" affecting the title to any military land warrant issued under said act "made or executed prior to the issue, shall be null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever," a power of attorney to sell land to be located with such a warrant is invalid when such power of attorney was given before the passage of Act Cong. March 22, 1852, making such warrants assignable, and before issuance of the certificate of location, though after the issuance of the warrant.-JOHNS V. WARREN, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 230.

93. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Control of Station.-A railroad company has a right to order that hacks shall not stand in front of the entrance to its station, and to remove a hackman who willfully disobeys such order, using as much force as may be necessary.-SMITH V. NEW YORK, L. E & W. R. Co., Penn., 24 Atl. Rep. 304.

94. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Contributory Negligence. -Where the servant has equal knowledge with the master of the construction and condition of the roadbed of a railroad company, and knows all the dangers and hazards incident to his work thereon, such servant assumes all the risks and hazards of his employment.-CLARK V. MISSOURI PAC. RY. Co., Kan., 29 Pac. Rep. 1138.

95. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Killing Stock.-The mere fact that a person on horseback engaged in driving cattle along a highway towards a railway crossing, did not ride forward as the cattle approached the same, and look for coming trains, is not conclusive evidence of negligence on the part of such person.-TUTHILL V. NORTHERN PAC. R. CO., Minn., 52 N. W. Rep. 384.

96. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Stock Killing Cases.-One who has a license from the lessee of land to pasture his sheep thereon cannot recover of a railroad company for sheep which pass onto the track, through an opening made by the lessee for his accommodation in the fence, which had been erected by the company under the provision of Civil Code, § 485, requiring railroad companies to fence their track.-MCCOY v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO., Cal., 29 Pac. Rep. 1110.

Priorities. Judgments 97. RAILROAD MORTGAGES obtained against a railroad company, by the owners of land abutting on a street, through which the road runs merely by consent of the city council, for damages to their land caused by the construction and operation of such road, are entitled to priority of payment over mortgage bonds out of the fund produced by a sale of the road to foreclose such mortgage, since the right of the owners of private property taken or damaged for public use to compensation therefor as guarantied by Const. 1870, art. 2, § 13, cannot be defeated by mortgag ing the property of the corporation that takes or damages the property.-PENN MUT. LIFE INS. CO. V. HEISS, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 138.

Citizenship. a removed

119

105. SALES ON

APPROVAL-Notice.-Where plaintiffs sold defendant school board certain furnaces on trial, under a written agreement which fixed a period within which the trial was to be made, defendant, in order to relieve itself of liability, must show that it gave notice of disapproval of the furnaces within the time fixed.BUTLER V. SCHOOL DIST. OF BOROUGH OF LEHIGHTON, Penn., 24 Atl. Rep. 308.

106. SCHOOL DISTRICTS-Contracts. A contract for building a school-house, void because made only by one member of the school board, may be ratified and made binding by the action of the school district in completing the building left unfinished by an absconding contractor; by furnishing the same with seats, desks, and other necessary school-house furniture; by occupying the same for school purposes; and by insur ing the same.-SCHOOL DIST. NO. 39 OF BROWN COUNTY V. SULLIVAN, Kan., 29 Pac. Rep. 1141.

107. SCHOOL DISTRICTS-Powers of President.-Code, § 1740, providing that the president of a school board "shall appear in behalf of his district in all suits brought by or against the same," does not authorize such officer to bring suits on his own motion.-INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. No. 6 OF CEDAR TP. V. WIRTNER, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 243.

108. SETTLEMENT-Burden of Proof.-In an action for a breach of contract in failing to properly pasture plaintiffs' cattle, and to recover a sum alleged to have been paid under protest for a release of the cattle, where defendant admits the payment, but pleads that it was made in full settlement for the pasturing, the presumption is in favor of a settlement, and the burden of proof is on plaintiffs to overcome it.-SEWELL V. MEAD, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 227.

109. STATUTES-Change in Revision.-A change in the phraseology of a statute made by means of a general revision of the entire body of the law cannot be regarded as so clearly indicative of a special design and purpose on the part of the legislature as when the change is made by direct amendment.-HUGO V. MILLER, Minn., 52 N. W. Rep. 381.

110. TAXATION-Correction of Assessment.-By Code, § 841, which provides that "the county auditor may correct any clerical or other error in the assessment or tax book, and, when such correction affecting the amount of tax is made after the book shall have passed into the hands of the treasurer, he shall" make the

necessary debits and credits, "and report the same to the supervisors," the auditor has power to correct the tax book when in the hands of the county treasurer.RIDLEY V. DOUGHTY, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 350.

111. TAXATION-Foreign Corporations.-A foreign corporation which does some of its manufacturing in New York, though the greater portion is done in another State, is within the exception of Laws 1880, ch. 542, § 3, as amended by Laws 1885, ch. 359, providing that any foreign corporation, doing business in New York shall be taxable there, except manufacturing corporations "carrying on inanufacture within this State."-PEOPLE V. WEMPLE, N. Y., 31 N. E. Rep. 238.

112. TAXATION-Foreign Insurance Companies — Act Jan. 29, 1879, §§ 7, 53, as amended by Laws 1881, ch. 96, $ 18, declaring taxable "the privilege of opening and establishing an office or agency for the insurance of fire, life or accident in the taxing district, for companies not chartered by the laws of the State of Tennessee," does not impose a tax upon foreign companies, but upon agents who establish offices for doing the business of representing them, and consequently is unaffected by the revenue acts of 1887, 1889 and 1891, which provide that foreign insurance companies shall pay 2 per cent. on gross premium receipts "in lieu of all other taxes."- CITY OF MEMPHIS V. CARRINGTON, Tenn., 19 S. W. Rep. 673.

113. TAXATION-Township Boundarjes.-Where, pending an appeal to the supreme court involving the validity of a certain tax levied on all taxable property in a township for the purpose of meeting an appro priation voted by it, the boundaries of such township are changed, and thereby certain real estate in another township is attached to the township whose property is sought to be taxed, and the supreme court declares the tax valid, the real estate so attached is subject to such tax.-LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. Co. v. SMITH, Ind., 31 N E. Rep. 196.

114. TAX TITLES- Redemption.-Under Rev. St. 1874, ch. 120, § 216, which provided that notice of the time in which to redeem land from tax sale must be served "upon the person in whose name the same was taxed or specially assessed," proof of service of such notice on the person in whose name the land was taxed is insufficient to sustain a sale for a special assessment, even where it does not appear whether the land was specially assessed in the name of any person or not -GAGE V. WEBB, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 130.

115. TRIAL-Discharge of Juror.-In this state, when, during the trial of a criminal case, and before the case has been finally submitted to the jury, a juror becomes sick and unable to sit further in the case, the court may order such juror discharged, and a new juror sworn to complete the panel, and the trial begin anew; or the court may discharge the entire jury, and then or subsequently impanel another jury to try the case. -STATE V. HASLEDAHL, N. Dak., 52 N. W. Rep. 315.

116. TRIAL-Parol Instructions.-Code, § 187, subd. 6, providing that the instructions which may be necessary in a case shall be given in writing before argument, does not allow the giving of parol instructions, although the same be taken by a stenographer, and afterwards extended.-BROWN V CRAWFORD, Colo., 29 Pac. Rep. 1137.

117. TROVER-Shares of Stock.-Trover for the value of stock of a mining corporation, deposited with its treasurer for delivery to the holder on his performance of certain mining work, will lie against the treasurer personally for fraudulently withholding it when demanded upon performance of the work.-MCDONALD V. MCKINNON, Mich., 52 N. W. Rep. 303.

118. VENDOR AND VENDEE-Action for Price.-In an action for the price of land, when the deed was depos ited in escrow till the money be paid, and in the meantime the vendee entered into possession, payment cannot be resisted on the ground that the title was incumbered, but the vendee must look to the covenants in the deed for indemnity against a prior lien.-HEARD

V. MORNING STAR LODGE KNIGHTS OF HONOR, Ark., 19 S. W. Rep. 711.

119. VENDOR AND VENDEE-Taxes Paid.-A grantee by mesne conveyances under a void tax sale cannot es tablish a lien against the land for taxes paid by his grantors prior to a purchase by defendant in good faith from the real owner.-BROWN V. POOLE, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 349.

120. WILL-Construction.-A testator devised land to his daughter, "to have and to enjoy the rents, issue, and profits and income, for and during the term of her natural life-time, and on her demise the said estate shall descend to and vest in such heirs of her body be gotten, in fee-simple." The will further provided that, in case said daughter should die leaving the testator surviving her, and without heirs of her body begotten. or in case she should survive the testator, and "shall die upon entering upon the enjoyment of said estate for life, as before provided, without leaving any such heirs of her body begotten as aforesaid," the estate should go to the heirs of the testator: Held, that the daughter took only a life estate.-KIENE V. GMEHLE, Iowa, 52 N. W. Rep. 232.

121. WILL-Construction. A testator made his widow sole executrix, and declared, "All my honest debts are to be paid out of my real or personal estate that can be best spared, in the opinion of my executrix." Less than a year after the testator's death the widow sold some of his land by a deed which made no reference to the will: Held, that after the lapse of 25 years, and the death of both the widow and her grantee, it would be presumed that the sale was made for the purpose of paying the testator's debts, and that the deed would pass title, although no debts were proved up against the estate.-GRIFFIN V. GRIFFIN, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 131.

122. WILL-Construction.-A testatrix by her will be queathed to her daughter certain property "in trust for her sole use and benefit, and of her children and their children thereafter. But, in the event that my daughter should die and leave no children as heirs to the within mentioned property, then it is my will and desire that all of said property should go to my brother." The daughter survived the testatrix and had several children: Held, that the daughter took a life estate, with remainder in fee to her children.-SCHAE FER V. SCHAEFER, Ill., 31 N. E. Rep. 136.

123. WILL-Construction -A will devised "unto my son, upon his arrival at the age of twenty-one years, the three-fifths of my estate. If either of my children should die without issue, their share of my estate shall revert to my estate, and the surviving child shall take the share of the deceased one:" Held, that the son surviving the testator took an estate in fee-simple, the provision as to death without issue referring only to death before the testator.-IN RE ROBINSON'S ESTATE, Pa., 24 Atl. Rep. 297.

124. WILLS Undue Influence-Witness.- A person who appreciates the varying moods of another, and who is able to judge of his acts with full knowledge of his peculiarities, would be an “intimate acquaintance," within the meaning of Code Civil Proc. § 1870, subd. 10, making competent "the opinion of an intimate acquaintance respecting the mental sanity of a person, the reason of the opinion being given."-CARPENTER V. BAILEY, Cal., 29 Pac. Rep. 1101.

125. WITNESS Impeachment. Declarations and statements made by an agent of an insurance company, in conversations with others, that "he had ac cepted a risk;" that "he had taken a premium note;" that "the policy was not issued on account of his neg. ligence," can be used as impeaching evidence in cases when the agent testifies, and his attention is called to the time at which, the place where, and persons with whom these conversations occurred, and he denies them; but a party who brings an action against an insurance company, on a verbal contract, cannot make his case in chief by proving such statements and declarations by other persons.-GERMAN FIRE INS. CO. V. SCHROEDER, Kan., 29 Pac. Rep. 1078.