Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 19, 1892. A correspondent, whose letter appears in another column, takes vigorous exception to our view of the case of O'Neil v. State of Vermont, upon which we commented in a recent issue. We there took the position that the technical refusal of the supreme court to assume jurisdiction was a wrong and a hardship upon the defendant, whose punishment for a single violation of the liquor law of Vermont, was not only out of proportion to the offense committed, but, as was conceded by the court, was in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "cruel and unusual” punishment. And we see no substantial reason offered by our esteemed correspondent which should alter our opinion. All law abiding citizens will admit, with him, the force of his argument against the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors, and will not deny that violators of the law should be punished. But beyond and above this is the constitutional mandate which says that even a convicted violator of the law shall not be subjected to a punishment which is cruel and unusual. logic of our friend carries him too far. Upon his theory a sentence of hanging imposed upon one who, in violation of law, had made a sale of liquor, would be justifiable. We submit that, in a court of law, a criminal has the right to demand, not only a constitutional trial, but also a constitutional punishment when found guilty. And the evil consequences resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquor, which our friend so warmly pictures, is no more far reaching than the failure of justice, through technicality and disregard of constitutional rights. The the decision of Judge Toney, of the Louisville equity court, in Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 34 Cent. L. J. 69. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in the case first noted, cite with approval the opinion of Judge Toney. The exact point decided by the Georgia court is that it is competent for a common carrier whose customers, at their option, have the privilege of unloading for themselves the vehicles in which their freights are shipped, to adopt and enforce a reasonable regulation as to the time within which the vehicles may be unloaded free of any expense for storage, and to fix a reasonable rate per day at which storage will thereafter be charged for the use of such vehicles so long as they remain unloaded, and that a rate of one dollar per day for each railroad car thus devoted to the use of storing freight is not necessarily unreasonable because cars are of different sizes and vary in capacity, nor because a fraction of a day is charged for as a whole day, nor because the customary rate of storage in warehouses or elevators is much lower; nor is it, as a matter of law, unreasonable for any cause. NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. CRIMINAL LAW-BIGAMY-PROOF OF FIRST MARRIAGE. One of the points decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Dale v. State, 15 S. E. Rep. 287, is that in a trial for bigamy the first marriage may be established by proof of a marriage in fact celebrated in another State of the Union, followed by cohabitation in that State, and the birth of children. These facts will authorize the jury to infer the validity of the marriage, even though the marriage laws of that State be not affirmatively proved, there being nothing in the evidence tending to show that the marriage was not regular and conformable to law. Simmons, J., says: One of the grounds mainly relied upon was the fourth, which complains that the evidence was insufficient to show a marriage valid under the laws of North Carolina. It is also complained of as error that the court instructed the jury that, if they were satisfied from the evidence that a marriage in fact was con tracted between the defendant Emma T. Horton at the time named in the indictment, and he afterwards lived with her, and acknowledged her to be his wife, this would be sufficient to authorize them in finding that he was legally married to her. It was contended that, as marriage was regulated in North Carolina by statute, it must be shown that the statute was complied with. There was evidence of a marriage ceremony in North Carolina, in the year 1867, between the defendant and Emma T. Horton; her brother, George P. Horton, testifying that the defendant was Nuthall, and that he saw him married to Emma by a minister, at Wadesboro in that State, at her father's house in the presence of the family and friends. There was also evidence that the marriage was followed by cohabitation of the parties, in the same State, for a number of years, resulting in the birth of several children. The witness Horton testified that the records of the marriage were destroyed. He also testified that marriage was regulated in North Carolina by statute; but there was no evidence as to what the statutory requirements were, or that there was any failure to comply with them. This evidence was sufficient to establish the marriage as prima facie valid. Where a marriage in this State is in question upon a trial for bigamy, proof by a witness who was present, of a marriage in fact, is sufficient, without evidence as to the authority of the person officiating, or of compliance with statutory requirements. Murphy v. State, 50 Ga. 150. By the common law and the law of this State, a mutual agreement to be husband and wife, by parties able to contract, followed by cohabitation, is recognized as a valid marriage. Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173; Clark v. Cassidy, 64 Ga. 662. The proof in this case showing a marriage valid under the common law or the law of this State, and there being no evidence as to the statutory requirements of North Carolina, or of any failure to comply with them, the jury were authorized to infer that the marriage was valid under the laws of that State. There is some conflict in the decisions of other courts on this subject, some holding that the prosecution must prove not only a marriage in fact, but a marriage valid under the law of the State in which it took place; but we think the better view is that the validity of the marriage will be presumed, in the absence of evidence tending to show that it was not regular and conformable to law. Mr. Bishop, in his New Commentaries on Marriage, Divorce & Separation (1891, volume 1, § 1115), says: "Whenever, in a proven transaction in any foreign country, two apparently marriageable persons are shown to have entered into any form of solemnization or contract which comprehends a present undertaking to be husband and wife, and nothing appears to cast discredit on the proceeding, the foreign law should be presumed prima facie to make them married." In Wharton on Criminal Evidence (section 169) it is said: "In any view, the judex fori will presume, until the contrary be proved, that a marriage abroad was in conformity with the lex loci contractus." The American and English Encyclopedia of Law (volume 2, p. 192, tit. "Bigamy") says: "A marriage sufficient in form to be valid under the laws of the State where the offense is prosecuted, though celebrated in another State, will be presumed to be sufficient under the laws of that State, when there is no evidence to the contrary." Among the cases which sustain this view, see the following: State v. Nadal, 69 Iowa, 478, 29 N. W. Rep. 451; Dumas v. State, 14 Tex. App. 464; State v. Patterson, 2 Ired. 346; Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126. The last of these cases it will be seen, is of later date than that of People v. Lambert, by the same court-5 Mich. 349 (1858)--which seems to be the case mainly relied on by counsel for the plaintiff in error. WILLS-LEGALITY OF A SPENDTHRIFT WILL. -The Supreme Court of Maine, in the case of Roberts v. Stevens, passed upon the legality of a spendthrift will. Upon that question the court say: Are they unlawful? There is neither any decision of this court nor statutory provision in this State pertaining to the subject. There is a conflict among the authorities in this country, though in England they all seem to be opposed to any such restrictions as the testator made. The latter authorities hold in substance that the interest of a life tenant cannot continue to exist without its incidents, among which is that of alienation; and that a creditor of a cestui que trust can reach in equity whatever the latter has the right to demand from his trustee. In Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429, money was vested in the names of trustees, the income to be paid into A's own hands to the extent that the same should "not be grantable, transferable or otherwise assignable by way of anticipation," with a gift over on A's death. On A's becoming bankrupt, the assignees were held entitled to his interest. This decision was preceded and followed by numerous others to the same purport. But while the decisions in several of the State courts are in accord with the English rules, others together with two of the Federal Supreme Court uphold such trusts. And the legislatures of four or five States sanction their validity by express statutes, though Kentucky by legislative enactment forbids them. Parsons v. Spencer, 83 Ky., 386. But whatever may be the decisions in England and some of the State courts, the other view held by the United States Supreme Court and other State courts is more in accordance with our own, which we think may be properly based upon either of two grounds. The general rule that rights incidental to ownership of property attach alike to equitable and legal estates has been materially modified by equity. In direct antagonism to, and for the avowed purpose of evading what were deemed certain harsh and unjust dogmas of the law, equity called into existence an estate which enabled a married woman to hold equitable interests in property independently of her hus band's control. But as this estate brought with it the enjoyment of all its incidents including the right of alienation, an unsatisfactory and imperfect protection was thereby afforded her because of the influence and moral coercion of her husband. It was therefore deemed essential to go further and modify this estate by inserting in settlements and wills a clause restraining the wife from anticipating or alienating her sepa rate property. This was first done in a certain settlement by advice of Lord Thurlow, who was a trustee. Pybus v. Smith, 3 Bro., C. C., § 340 (Perkins' ed.), and note. And the reason why she can be thus restrained, as stated by Cotton, L. J., is "because equity can modify the incidents of separate estate which is the creation of equity." Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R., 17 Ch. D. 454. This doctrine has been repeatedly stated in numerous cases. In Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Myl. & Cr. 377, Lord Cottonham, C., said: "The power to prohibit anticipation could only have been founded upon the power of this court to model and qualify an interest in property which itself had created." "The separate property and the prohibition of anticipation are equally creatures of equity and equally inconsistent with the ordinary rules of property. The one is only a restriction and qualification of the other." "When this court first established the separate estate, it violated the laws of property as between husband and wife; but it was thought beneficial and it prevailed. It being once settled that a wife might enjoy separate estate as a feme sole, the laws of property attached to the new estate; and it was found, as part of such law, that the power of alienation belonged to the wife and was destructive of the security intended for it. Equity again interfered, and by another violation of the laws of property, supported the validity of the prohibition against alienation." Thus the doctrine was placed upon the long and well-recognized broad ground that a court of chancery had the inherent power to modify its own creation. In the absence of any statute of decision in this State to the contrary, we have no hesitation in extending the principle to cases like the present. This view is sustained by a very able opinion of the supreme court in Missouri; and in closing this branch of the case we can do no better than adopt the language of Sherwood, J., in that case: "If the court of equity, in order to protect one class of trusts, creatures of its own creation, and by so doing to effectuate the intention of the author of the gift, exercises its own inherent power to model and qualify an interest in equitable property without regard to the rules which the law has established for regulating the enjoyment of property in other cases, it is difficult to see why, with a like object in view, i. e., the effectuation of the gift just as its author intended it to be effectuated, such court may not lay down and declare a rule, in such a case as this, which shall be equally effectual in preventing the intention of the donor from being thwarted, a rule which injures or defrauds no one, which violates no rule of public policy, and which gives stability and protection to a provision, which, originating in the warmest ties of affection, seeks to afford to the beneficiary a sure and unfailing refuge against the vicissitudes of fortune. If a court of equity, as already seen, will guard such a trust in one case with jealous solicitude, why should it fail to do so in another, in circumstances equally meritorious?" Lambert v. Haydel, 96 Mo. 439. Another view, arriving at the same result, is taken by the highest court in the country as well as the supreme courts of several of the States in the Union. Thus Miller, J., said: "We see no reason in the recognized nature and tenure of property and its transfer by will, why a testator who gives without any pecuniary return, who gets nothing of property value from the donee, may not attach to that gift the incident of continued use, of uninterrupted benefit of the gift during the life of the donee. Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property in securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills of life and the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so." Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 727. See also Hyde v. Woods, 94 U. S. 533. "Spendthrift trusts" were created in Pennsylvania in Chief Justice Gibson's time and have been approved by numerous decisions in that State, among the latest of which is Grothe's Appeal, supra. The court in Massachusetts has frequently held that the founder of a trust may give an equitable life tenant a qualified estate in income which he cannot alienate and his creditors cannot reach. In Broadway v. National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173, the court said: "By the creation of a trust like this, the property passes to the trustee with all its incidents and attributes un or misfortune of the beneficiary." See also Baker v. Brown, 146 Mass. 369; Sears v. Choate, Id. 395, 398; Maynard v. Cleaves, 149 Id. 307, 308; Slatterly v. Wason, 151 Id. 266. To the same purport see Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 543. LIABILITY OF TENANT FOR FAILING TO KEEP PREMISES IN REPAIR.-In Fellows v. Gilhuber, decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, it was held that the owner of a building leased to a tenant, where the tenant had covenanted in the lease to keep the premises in good repair, could not be held liable for an injury caused by neglect of the tenant in making repairs. The court says: impaired. He takes the whole legal title to the property, with the power of alienation; the cestui que trust takes the whole legal title to the accrued income at the moment it is paid to him." "We are not able to see that it would violate any principles of sound public policy to permit a testator to give to the object of his bounty such a qualified interest in the income of a trust fund, and thus provide against the improvidence v. There is nothing in the case but what admits squarely and fairly the application of the principle that the lessee, under such a lease, is liable for any injury oc. casioned by the want of repair of any part of the leasehold premises, and not the landlord. The lease requires the lessor to repair certain parts of the premises, and, by construction, excluding this awning, which affirmatively imposes upon the lessee the duty to repair it, besides the stipulation that he "shall keep the buildings in order at his own expense." This question was raised by the requests of the defendant to submit it specially to the jury, whether Davlin agreed to keep the buildings in repair or in order, etc. As we view the question, this fact is fatal to the recovery against the defendant. This has long been the doctrine of the common law, and in England has never been changed: Payne v. Rogers, 2 H. Bl. 350; Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term R. 667; Cheetham Hampson, 4 Term R. 318; Pretty v. Bickmore, L. R. 8 C. P. 401; Gwinnell v. Eamer, L. R. 10 C. P. 658; Robbins v. Jones, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 221; Nelson v. Brewery Co., 2 C. P. Div. 311. Most of the American follow the English authorities: Mellen v. Morrill, 126 Mass. 545; Leonard v. Storer, 115 Mass. 86; Bartlett v. Boston, G. L. Co., 117 Mass. 533; City of Lowell v. Spaulding, 4 Cush. 277. In Harris v. Cohen, 50 Mich. 324, 15 N. W. Rep. 493, the tenant is made liable even for a nuisance: Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393; Fisher v. Thirkell, 21 Mich. 1; Coke v. Gutkese, 80 Ky. 598; 2 Shear. & R. Neg. p. 587, Sec. 503; Thomp. Neg. 309, note. "A landlord who lets a house in a dangerous state is not liable to the tenant's customers or guests for accidents." Shear. & R. Neg. 711. "The landlord is not liable for injuries occasioned by a dangerous condition of the premises existing at the time of the lease, if there was no covenant to repair in the lease, but the tenant is." Ray Neg. Imp. Dut. 61 and cases cited. In New York at first it was so held: Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398. But subsequently, by a divided court, the doctrine is questioned and left unsettled in Edwards v. Railway Co., 98 N. Y. 245. But it would seem that the current of authorities in this country, as well as in England, is in favor of the principle, and on sound reasoning; and it being a new question in this court, we are at liberty to adopt it. By many of these cases it is held to make no difference whether the defective structure is a nuisance or not or whether it is an obstruction to a highway. The principle is evidently strengthened by the injured party being a guest of the lessee at the time of the accident. The court should have submitted to the jury the questions of the lease and its terms, as requested, with the view of enforcing this principle, by ordering nonsuit in the case. This relation of the defendant as landlord of the dangerous structure, by the terms of the lease, clearly precludes a recovery against her for the injuries of the plaintiff. FOREIGN JUDGMENT REVIVOR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-One of the points decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas, in Rice v. Moore, is that the revivor of a judgment in Ohio is merely a continuation of the original suit, so as to restore the judgment, and such revivor, made without an appearance by or personal service upon the defendant, who has been a resident of Kansas for more than five years after the rendition of the original judgment, will not remove the bar of the statute of limitations of this State. The court say: The question is whether the petition is sufficient, in view of the five years' statute of limitations prescribed by our statute (sec. 18, Civil Code; Burns v. Simpson, 9 Kan. 658; Mawhinney v. Done, 40 Kan., 676, 17 Pac. Rep. 44). Where it is apparent from the face of the petition that the debt or claim is barred, a demurrer is properly sustained (Zane v. Zane, 5 Kan. 134; Stanclift v. Norton, 11 Kan. 218). If there had been no revivor of the judgment in Ohio, we suppose it would be conceded, even if the judgment had not become dormant under the statutes of that State, no recovery could be had upon the judgment in this State, if Mr. Moore had been an actual resident of this State for five years-the full time of our limitation after the rendition of the judgment, authorities are to the effect that "remedies are to be governed by the laws of the country where the suit is brought." The laws of this State where the action is brought must govern the limitation. It was recently decided by this court in Bauserman v. Charlott (46 Kan. 480, 26 Pac. Rep. 1051) that, "where an action is brought in this State upon a judgment of a court of record of a sister State, which is in full force in that State, the statute of limitations of this State, and not that of the sister State, will control" (U. S. v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 372). It is contended, however, as the judg ment was revived in Ohio in January, 1889-a few months only before this action was commenced-that the bar of the statute of limitations is not effective. A scire facias to revive a judgment is not a new suit, but the continuation of an old one (Freem. Judgm. sec. 444; Elsasser v. Haines, 52 N. J. Law, 10, 18 Atl. Rep. 1095). In Irwin v. Nixon, 11 Pa. St. 425, it is said to be "a common, plain and familiar principle that a scire facias to revive a judgment continuation of the original action, and the execution thereon is an execution on the former judgment. The judgment on the scire facias is not judgment, giving vitality only from that time, but it is the revival of the original judgment, giving, or rather continuing, the vitality of the original judgment, with all its incidents, from the time of its rendition](Lessee of Penn. v. Klyne, 1 Pet. C. C. 448; 2 T. & H. 379). Hence the proceeding in Ohio in January, 1889, must be regarded as a continuation only of the former suit or judgment. This seems to be admitted in the brief of counsel for plaintiff, for it is stated that "reviving a judgment is the act by which a judgment has lain dormant or without any action upon it for a y ear and a day is, at common law, again restored to is but a a new its original force." The revivor of the Ohio judgment removes its dormant quality only, but does not affect the statute of limitations in this State, or in any way prevent its running against the judgment rendered in 1879. We think, within the provisions of our Civil Code concerning limitations, the action upon the judgment ought to have been brought within five years after its rendition, if, during all of that time, Moore was personally present within this State. If brought after five years, it is too late. If, however, it be claimed that the revivor in Ohio is not a mere order that execution issue, but a new judgment, and therefore of full force as a new judgment of the date of January, 1889, no action can be brought thereon in this State, because Moore was not personally served in the proceed. ing for revivor, nor enter any appearance therein. Kay v. Walter, 28 Kan. 112. In the last case this court decided that a judgment rendered in Pennsyl vania on May 26, 1864, and revived in 1867, and again in 1877, but sued on in this State in 1881, "was unquestionably barred by the five years' statute of limitations." In the case of Hepler v. Davis (Neb., 49 N. W. Rep. 458) a judgment was recovered against A, in Illinois, in 1879. A removed to Nebraska soon afterwards and continued to reside in that State. In 1888 the judgment was revived in Illinois, without personal service upon A, or an appearance by him. In December, 1888, nine years after the judgment was rendered, an action was brought upon it in Nebraska. In that State, as in ours, the limitation of five years as to judgments exists. It was held in that case, Maxwell, J., delivering the opinion, that an action upon a judgment of a sister State must be brought in Nebraska within five years, or it will be barred, and that the alleged revivor of the judgment in Illinois in 1888 did not remove the bar of the statute of Nebraska. That case is very similar to this one. See, also, Eaton v. Hasty, 6 Neb. 419; Tessier v. Englehart, 18 Neb. 167, 24 N. W. Rep. 734; Marx v. Kilpatrick, 25 Neb. 107, 41 N. W. Rep. 111. Moore having resided in this State for five years after the original judgment against him was rendered and before the alleged revivor, or the commencement of this action, our statute of limitations prevents any action upon the judg ment from being maintained. ELECTRIC WIRES - DEFECTIVE INSULATION -NEGLIGENCE.-The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in the recent case of Clements v. Louisiana Electric Light Co., made an application of the doctrine of contributory negligence to the subject of electric wires. The injury complained of was occasioned by running against electric wires properly insulated, and the court held the company liable. The syllabus of the case, made by the court, is as follows: 1. The violation of a duty specified by law is negli gence; therefore, when a city ordinance under which an electric lighting company is operated requires it to have the "splices" on its wires perfectly insulated, the failure to do so is negligence. 2. A person whose occupation brings him in proximity to the company's wires has a right to believe that the wires have been insulated and the ordinance complied with. He is required to look for patent defects in the insulation only. If not aware of a latent defect, he comes in contact with the wire and is injured without fault on his part, the company is responsible. 3. When the action of both parties must have concurred to produce the injury, it dovolves upon the plaintiff to show that he was not himself guilty of neg ligence. 4. This proof need not be direct, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. 5. Where an electric wire is stretched over a roof, and a party goes on the roof to repair it, and the wire is of that height above the roof that the chances are that he will come in contact with it by going under it or stepping over it, it is not negligence to pursue either mode of crossing, if he exercises all necessary and prudent care to protect himself in proportion to the danger. 6. When a person is employed in the presence of a known danger, to constitute contributory negligence, it must be shown that plaintiff voluntarily and unnecessarily exposed himself to the danger. COLLISIONS STREET RAILROAD NEGLIGENCE-ELECTRIC RAILWAY.-That the introduction of rapid street railway transit, either by cable or electricity, renders necessary, on the part of travelers, at crossings, a greater degree of care to avoid injury, is illustrated by the case of Carson v. Federal St., etc. Ry. Co., recently decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. It was there held gross negligence to drive in front of a moving electric street car so near as to make a collision inevitable, and that such conduct defeats an action to recover damages. In that case the servant of the plaintiff, while passing along a street at right angles with the tracks, drove in front of a moving electric street car, withlooking for the approach of the car. The driver testified, however, that he listened for the sound of a gong, but the court decided that he was guilty of contributory negligence and could not recover. The introduction of electricity as a motive power on street railways has already occasioned considerable litigation. In commenting upon the increased care made necessary by the use of electricity the court says: The street railway has become a business necessity in all great cities. Greater and better facilities and a higher rate of speed are being constantly demanded. The movement of cars by cable or electricity along crowded streets is attended with danger, and renders a higher measure of care necessary, both on the part of the street railways, and those using the streets in the ordinary manner. It is the duty of the railway companies to be watchful and attentive, and to use all reasonable precautions to give notice of their approach to crossings and places of danger. Their failure to exercise the care which the rate of speed and the condition of the street demand, is negligence. On the other hand, new appliances rendered necessary by the advance of business and population in a given city impose new duties on the public. The street railway has a right to the use of its track, subject the right of crossing by the public at street intersections; and one approaching such a place of crossing must take notice of it, and exercise a reasonable measure of care to avoid contact with a moving car. It may not be necessary to stop on approaching such a crossing, for the rate of speed of the most rapid of these surface cars is ordinarily from six to nine miles per hour; but it is necessary to look before driving upon the track. If, by looking, the plaintiff could have seen and so avoided an approaching train, and this appears from his own evidence, he may be properly nonsuited. Marland v. R. R. 123 Pa. 487. EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY OF TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY OF OPERATOR.In Oskamp v. Gadsden, decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, defendant called at the public telephone station at Schuyler, and asked the operator to request plaintiffs to step to the telephone in their place of business in Omaha, as he desired to converse with them. H, one of the plaintiffs, answered the call, but, owing to the conditions of the atmosphere, the parties were unable to communicate directly with each other. The telephone operator at Fremont, an intermediate station, proposed to and did transmit defendant's message to plaintiffs, offering to sell them a quantity of hay, and he also repeated to the defendant their answer, accepting the proposition. In an action for a breach of the contract, it was held that the conversation was admissible in evidence, and that it was competent for the defendant to state the contents of plaintiffs' answer to his message, as repeated by the operator at Fremont at the time it came over the wire. The court said, inter alia: Error is assigned because the court admitted the testimony of the defendant as to the conversation over the telephone between the witness and Mr. Haines, one of the plaintiffs, as repeated over the wire by Mrs. Cummings, the telephone operator at Fremont. It is contended that the testimony of the witness of what the operator repeated to him as the conversation progressed as being said by Mr. Haines is irrelevant and hearsay. The question thus presented is a new one to this court, and they are but few decided cases which aid us in our investigation. But upon principle it seems to us that the testimony is competent, and its admission violated no rule of evidence. It was admissible on the ground of agency. The operator at Fremont was the agent of defendant in communicating defendant's message to Haines, and she was also the latter's agent in transmitting or reporting his answer thereto to defendant. The books on evidence, as well as the adjudicated cases, lay down the rule that the statements of an agent within the line of his authority are admissible in evidence against his principal. Likewise, it has been held that, where a conversation is carried on between persons of different nationalities |