duras as the legal successor of Spain; for it had never been ceded by Spain to any third power, nor had it ever been so ceded by Honduras. Yet, in 1841, it was forcibly seized by Captain McDonald of the royal British navy, and presumably in accordance with instructions from his government. At any rate, the flag of Honduras was hauled down and that of Great Britain hoisted instead; and the little state of Honduras, unable to resist, had to quietly submit to the outrage.

The next aggression was some five years later. It occurred on the mainland of Nicaragua and Honduras, as detailed in the preceding chapter, and constitutes one of the darkest pages in British history. It is likewise one of the most humiliating episodes in the annals of the American diplomacy; for it led to that stupendous diplomatic blunder known as the "Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850." Even to this day, British statesmen stand in blank amazement at the stupidity of the slender majority of senators who unwittingly ratified that treaty under doubtful assurances which were never made to be kept. For, to adopt the language of Stephen A. Douglas, then a member of the Senate, "If there ever was an occasion when the Monroe Doctrine needed to be enforced, it was then."

It is indeed difficult to satisfactorily account for this supineness and apathy on the part of the Government of the United States. The Mosquito shore was an integral part of the Nicaraguan republic. According to the English geographer, Bonnycastle, already cited, the Mosquito country "lies along the eastern and northern shores" of the republics of Nicaragua and Honduras, and extends to the mouth of the river Segovia, about the 12th degree north latitude." "The town of San Juan de Nicaragua," he continues, "at the mouth of the San Juan river, is the principal port of Nicaragua on the

Caribbean." There were at the time he wrote, in 1820, "three portages between Lake Nicaragua and the mouth of the river;" and "these carrying places," as he calls them, "were defended by 36 guns mounted, with a small battery," - the whole being " enclosed on the land side by ditch and rampart." The Spanish garrison stationed there consisted of “one hundred infantry, sixteen artillery, and about sixteen militia." "The mouth of the

San Juan river," he continues, "is looked upon as the Key to the Central Americas," and that "with the possession of it and Realojo, on the opposite side of the lake, the Spanish colonies might be paralyzed by an enemy becoming the master of the ports of both oceans." Very true. And the observant author might have added that the old Spaniards (who comprehended the situation fully) had established the port of San Juan (now called "Greytown") as early as February 26, 1796, and certainly none would have been more surprised than they had it been announced that this part of San Juan was not within their domain and jurisdiction, but only part of the domain of an insignificant tribe of Indians; and that all communication with the great lake, and thence with the Pacific shore, must be by the permission of a savage Indian chief.

Of course the "Mosquito Kingdom," so capriciously set up by Great Britain after the close of our war with Mexico, had for its ultimate object British control of the isthmian transit. But this does not affect the merits of the case. That the Mosquito "king" was a myth, has been many times admitted by British statesmen themselves. Thus, Lord Palmerston, speaking of these same "Mosquito Indians," in 1850, said: "They had what is called a 'king,' who, by the bye, was about as much a king as you or I." This significant admission was made officially to the United States minister at London only a

few months after the ratification of the unfortunate Clayton-Bulwer treaty. And Lord John Russell, in an official note addressed to Mr. Crampton, in January 1853, denounced "this so-called Mosquito government as" a mere fiction," and "the so-called Mosquito 'king as "a mythical personage whose title to power is, to say the best of it, little more than nominal."

Even if we admit, for argument's sake, that this particular tribe of Indians had never been actually subdued by Spain, that would not alter the merits of the case. We would still be unable to justify England's action, or pretended action, in giving them the title and rank of an independent state or nation; for such action would still be an open violation of the most solemn treaty obligations. It would still be contrary to the established principles and practice of every European power that had ever acquired territory on this continent. Every one of those powers land herself

and none more conspicuously than Eng

had long before recognized the right of prior discovery and occupation, and the title of the discovering nation to vast areas of territory occupied by unsubdued Indian tribes. The Indian title, whatever it might have been, could be extinguished only by the authority of the nation in whose dominions they were found.

Nor was there anything in the character and history of this particular tribe of Indians that could constitute them an exception to this general rule. They were admitted to be savage and nomadic in character, immoral and brutal in their instincts, and wholly incapable of performing even the most ordinary duties of a sovereign state. They bore precisely the same relations to the Nicaraguan government that the Creeks and Muscogees and other wild tribes in North America sustained toward the government of the United States; and

when finally, after the Blue Fields incident of 1894, Great Britain withdrew her pretended "Protectorate over them, they at once resumed their normal relations to the Nicaraguan government.

It is fair to assume that the question of British "protectorates," and of British dominion in any form, in Central America is now practically settled; and it is likely to be our own fault if that question is ever revived. The incidents of the past are not recalled here for the purpose of rekindling old prejudices, nor of exciting present distrust of the British nation; but as a warning to ourselves, to the end that such diplomatic blunders as that of 1850 be not repeated. Every AngloAmerican feels a just pride in his British ancestry, and in that exalted type of English civilization which has made the United States the dominant power of the Western World. There is every conceivable reason why the Great Republic and the Great British Empire should be close friends. There is no conceivable reason why they should ever become enemies. The two peoples had a common origin, speak the same language, profess the same religion, and have a common system of jurisprudence. Their interests and aspirations are identical. And whilst they may be generous rivals in the world's commerce, they have a common destiny. They should assiduously cultivate and carefully maintain the closest friendship. But the conditions of such a friendship must be observed; for it can be lasting only when supported by mutual respect and a strict observance of the principles of justice and humanity. There must be justice between each other and with respect to weaker powers; and there should be shown by both a humane spirit with respect to inferior races struggling in adversity to reach a higher plane of civilization.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE DISPUTED EL DORADO

N the northeastern end of the South American continent, bounded on the south by the river

Amazon, north and east by the Atlantic ocean, west and northwest by the continuous water-way formed by the Orinoco river, the Casequiera channel, and the Rio Negro, is a vast expanse of rich and beautiful, though as yet but sparsely populated country known by the general name of Guayana.1 Being thus entirely surrounded by water, it is essentially an immense island, having an area larger than that of France and Spain combined; and, although within the line of the tropics, such is its peculiar topographical conformation that it has great diversity of climate and soil, and is capable of producing almost every species of cereal and vegetable found in the three great zones of the earth. Its natural wealth of mine and forest, though hitherto little developed or disturbed, is now known to be almost incalculable; while its favorable geographical position, fertile soil, fine marine harbors, navigable inlets, network of cross channels and great rivers, combine to make it a country of great commercial possibilities.

The Spaniards, who were the first to discover and explore this region, early in the sixteenth century, gave it the name of Guayana, though they often referred to it

1 So called from the earliest discovery by the Spaniards, but sometimes anglicized as Guiana or Guinea, and therefore sometimes confounded with the name of a country in Africa.