Tobacco Factory, 1 Dill., 264; Fed. Cas. No. 16528) nor in the Supreme Court that without express provision by Congress these laws would extend to the Territories, because, being taxes or duties, they must constitutionally "be uniform throughout the United States" The debates in Congress show that section 107 was offered as an amendment or addition to the act in the Senate by Mr. Sherman, and was adopted without explanation or debate. (Cong. Globe, part 4, 2d session, 40th Cong., 1867-68, p. 3779.)

It is to be noticed that the act of 1868, supra, section 55, and the act of June 6, 1872 (18 Stat., 230), amending the same (sec. 12), in making it a misdemeanor intentionally to reland distilled spirits shipped for exportation used the phrase "within the jurisdiction of the United States."

Beginning with the passage of the act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat, 256), the large list of internal-revenue taxes was gradually reduced until the enactment of the war-revenue act of 1898, the language of which adds no specially significant phrase to the former legislation, although the construction given to it in Knowlton v. Moore (post) confirms our contention as to the purpose and scope of the rule of uniformity.

Direct taxes: Direct taxes do not, perhaps, present a close analogy, being imposed by the rule of apportionment "among the several States according to their respective numbers." The States and their respective quotas were necessarily specified in such laws, and there were no general expressions to render doubtful the divisions of territory in which direct taxes were intended to be laid. It is worthy of remark, however, that if the duties which are to be "uniform throughout the United States" must also apply universally throughout acquired and dependent territory, then quite as clearly must be applied universally the direct taxes which are to be "apportioned among the several States." The uniform-duties clause and the direct-tax provisions both show the scrupulous care of the framers of the Constitution for equality among the States, and neither rule looks beyond the States to apply a fixed and self-acting ordinance to regions which the future might annex, but were not then in the States, nor under the definite compact recognized by the Constitution as to the Northwest Territory.

How has Congress construed their power and function relative to direct taxes? The act of 1798 (1 Stat., 580) provided for valuations in the States, but not in the Northwest Territory, although this coterminous region was recognized as intimately connected territory of the United States, or even as a portion thereof, under the Constitution. So also the similar act of 1813 provided (3 Stat., 22), and the direct taxes of 1813 and 1815 (id., 53, 164) were so laid. On the other hand, a direct tax was expressly imposed by Congress in the District of Columbia by the act of 1815 (3 Stat., 216), which was before the court in Loughborough v. Blake, infra. The enactment itself is proof that the interposition of Congress was conceived to be necessary, not only to provide the collecting machinery in the District, but also to carry the constitutional provisions beyond the limits of the States in "laying a direct tax upon the United States." And the decision simply deter mined that Congress had this power.

The direct tax of 1861 (12 Stat., 292) was specifically apportioned among the existing States, Territories, and the District of Columbia,

and although the income tax imposed by the forty-ninth section of that act was levied upon the annual income of "every person residing in the United States," Congress was careful in subsequent sections to provide the machinery for the assessment and collection of that tax, not by any general phrase such as "throughout the United States," but in each of the States and Territories of the United States, and in the District of Columbia."

The census acts, upon which the direct-tax laws are based, show that in 1790 (1 Stat., 101) the marshals of the several districts (each one of the fourteen States then constituting a judicial district) were directed to take the enumeration. In 1800 (2 Stat., 11) the direction was given to the marshals of the several districts and the secretaries of the Northwest Territory and the Mississippi Territory. In 1810 (id., 564) the marshal of the District of Columbia and the secretaries of the additional territories were added. In 1820 (3 Stat., 548), marshals having then been provided for the Territories, those officers alone were specified, and so the law continued for several decades, the act of 1850 (9 Stat., 428) providing the machinery under which the subsequent censuses were taken until the establishment of the Census Office by the act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 473), which regulated the taking of the census" within each State or Territory."

Thus, while Congress has provided throughout the United States. and its Territories for the enumeration upon which direct taxes have been apportioned, except in 1790, when, indeed, the Northwest Territory was in large part wild and unoccupied, but little more so than some of the States, it never seems to have been supposed that such taxes must be levied beyond the States or apportioned to the Territories unless Congress saw fit so to provide.

ALASKA.

In 1868 the customs, commerce, and navigation laws were extended over Alaska (Rev. Stat., sec. 1954), but not the internal-revenue laws, except so far as section 107 of the act of July 20, 1868, had that effect. Nor was any further change made in this respect by the act of 1884 (23 Stat., 24), which provided a civil government for Alaska but not fully organized Territorial government, under which civil status the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat., 1253), gives to the "district of Alaska" (meaning, doubtless, the judicial district) a code of criminal procedure. Section 477 of this act recognizes the wide application of the taxes on intoxicating liquors and impliedly directs their enforcement in Alaska as follows: That nothing in this act shall in any way repeal, conflict, or interfere with the public general laws of the United States imposing taxes on the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, for the purpose of revenue, and known as the internalrevenue laws.'" In practice, internal-revenue duties have been collected in Alaska upon liquors and tobacco since December, 1872, when the Territory was added to the internal-revenue district of Oregon by Executive order under the authority of sections 103 and 107 of the act of 1868, supra, for which action the laws embodied in section 3141, Revised Statutes, would also give authority.

So far as the internal-revenue records show, it seems that internal duties have in the past been collected in Alaska and the Indian Territory only upon the articles subjected to tax by section 107 of the act

of 1868; for which, perhaps, a practical reason also might be given, namely, that in the conditions prevailing in those Territories for a long period after 1868 no articles were produced subject to tax except those named in section 107, other such articles entering those districts tax paid.

OKLAHOMA.

A point was made on the former argument as to the sources from which the Government has acquired this Territory.

The "Indian country," defined in the act of June 30, 1834 (4 Stat.. 729), and described in United States v. 43 Gallons of Whisky (93 U. S., 188), and Bates v. Clark (95 U. S., 204), was narrowed under advancing civilization and by successive treaties which extinguished the Indian titles, and at the time of the adoption of the Revised Statutes, comprised the region known as the Indian Territory, the somewhat indefinite boundaries of which had been gradually defined as new States and Territories were erected. The previous laws, preserved in chapter 4 of Title XXVIII of the Revised Statutes, were applied to its government, and it was itself definitely bounded by the act of March 1, 1889 (25 Stat., 783; 1 Supp. R. S., 670, and note). By the act of May 2, 1890, the Territory of Oklahoma was erected and organized, and the limits defined to include a certain portion of the Indian Territory and the "Public Land Strip," with a provision for incorporating into the Territory the unoccupied portion of the "Cherokee Outlet," and lands remaining in the Indian Territory, whenever the respective Indian tribal owners should assent.

A question of long standing between the United States and Texas as to the title to what was known as "Greer County" being involved in that act, the dispute was settled by the decision in United States v. Teras (162 U. S., 1), which held that the title to that portion of Oklahoma Territory was in the United States, and that the tract had been acquired by the United States under the treaty with Spain of 1819. It is manifest from the reasoning of the opinion in that case and the authorities cited, and especially from the compromise act of September 9, 1850 (9 Stat., 446), by which the northern and western boundaries of Texas were defined, and all territory claimed by her exterior to said boundaries was relinquished, that all the land now included in the Territory of Oklahoma had been claimed by the United States against Spain and her successors in title and sovereignty, Mexico and Texas, as under the Louisiana purchase, and that the Territory of Oklahoma as now constituted was necessarily embraced either in the Louisiana purchase or under the treaty of 1819 with Spain, or under the cession of territory by Texas in 1850. All of this country lies far east of the cession by Mexico in 1848, and there seems to be no doubt that the entire territory was included in the Louisiana purchase, excepting the portion decided by United States v. Texas to have been acquired under the treaty with Spain, and excepting the "Public Land Strip," which apparently was part of the territory claimed by Texas exterior to her boundaries as settled, which she surrendered in 1850. It is evident that in one of these ways all of the Indian Territory and Oklahoma must have been acquired, since the three acquisitions in question (whatever may have been the variations in boundary lines and surveys) taken together covered the whole of that country. See The Louisiana Purchase" by the present Commissioner of the

* *

*

General Land Office, pages 36, 39. The passage on page 36 says that the Louisiana purchase proper embraces "all of the Indian Territory and part of Oklahoma Territory." It is learned from the Land Office that the only parts of Oklahoma Territory not included in the Louisiana purchase are those here stated to have been acquired under the treaty with Spain or through the cession by Texas.

The Indian Territory was added to the internal-revenue district of Kansas August 8, 1881, in the same way as Alaska was added to the district of Oregon; and Oklahoma, since its separation from the Indian Territory, remains in the Kansas district.

We have seen that the one hundred and seventh section of the internal-revenue act of July 20, 1868, was construed in the Cherokee tobacco case to carry the internal-revenue laws as to distilled spirits, fermented liquors, tobacco, snuff, and cigars to the Indian Territory as then constituted. The Oklahoma act of 1890 contains (sec. 28) a provision generally applied in express terms to all the Territories as they are organized, namely, "That the Constitution and all the laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except so far as modified by this act, have the same force and effect as elsewhere within the United States." This is in accordance with section 1891 of the Revised Statutes, which applies this provision to "all the organized Territories and in every Territory hereafter organized as elsewhere within the United States." It is evident that the internal-revenue laws are not inapplicable in an organized Territory, and such provisions taken in connection with the authority conferred upon the President by section 3141, Revised Statutes, are the ground upon which all the internal-revenue laws are executed in the organized Territories; while section 107 of the act of 1868, supra, is the original basis for collecting the tax upon distilled spirits, fermented liquors, tobacco, snuff, and cigars in the Territory of Alaska, thus far not fully organized in the legal sense, to which, however, the act of 1899 extended the taxes on intoxicating liquors.

It seems that in practice at the present time taxes accruing under the war-revenue act, as well as all internal-revenue taxes, are collected in Alaska and the Indian Territory. This practice is based partly on section 107 (ante), reenacted as section 3448, Revised Statutes, and, as to Alaska, under the act of 1899 (supra), and partly on the ruling of the internal-revenue authorities that these laws operate with respect to Alaska so as to subject to stamp tax articles not produced in the Territory but destined for consumption there. The practice means no more than that now, as in former years, the growth and manufacture of tobacco and production of spirits in the Indian Territory and the sale of these articles in Alaska are properly made to bear their burdens under the law; and substantially that other articles subject to tax before the war-revenue act of 1898 are not produced in those Territories, but must enter them correctly stamped or tax paid. And taxes are levied there under the latter act because its language, construed in the light of its evident purpose and spirit, has been held by the Treasury Department to carry its provisions over those two Territories.

HAWAII, PORTO RICO.

On this review of the status of the Territories in respect to the internal-revenue laws, and of the varying action by Congress under

different circumstances-always in strict conformity to the doctrine that these laws do not, without special provision, of themselves or by force of the Constitution, apply to the Territorial possessions or dominion of the United States-it is logical and consistent to find Congress recognizing in the Alaska act of 1899, as above shown, the validity of the internal duties of most general importance, as previ ously extended there and established in practice; providing that the Constitution and, with certain exceptions, the laws of the United States shall have equal force and effect in Hawaii, and that the Territory shall constitute an internal-revenue district (secs. 5, 87, act of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat., 141); and recognizing in section 3 of the act of April 12, 1900 (id., 77), the internal-revenue taxes of Porto Rico, and in section 14 excepting our internal-revenue laws from those statutes of the United States which are to have the same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the United States.

Thus, finally, in the case of the internal-revenue laws to a striking degree, and also in the case of the direct-tax laws-a somewhat analogous instance-Congress has uniformly and specifically legislated for the Territory or Territories of the United States whenever it was their intention to execute those laws beyond the limits of the States; and the only case in which their action has been challenged or questioned was the Cherokee tobacco case, wherein the legislation was resisted, not on grounds which drew in question the constitutional authority of Congress as now presented, but simply because the Indian treaty estab lished a lawful exemption which, it was claimed, had not been repealed by Congress. Administrative practice, dealing through a long period of time with many novel, different, and peculiar conditions, has fol lowed this view of the matter with substantial consistency; and no decisions on these laws can be found in which the soundness of the Government view is doubted or controverted, much less overthrown. Counsel for Armstrong contend that the term "United States' means the United States Government, composed of States and outlying territories and embracing the people residing in both the States and outlying territories (p. 33).

In this contention they entirely disregard the fact that the term "United States" is used sometimes in a geographical sense, sometimes in a sense describing the governing entity, and sometimes as describing the States of the Union.

It is also asserted that the theory of our Government is that duties are to be levied and collected upon the products of foreign countries. "Until now whoever dreamed that we could collect duties upon our own people."

The States, in the days of the Confederation, levied duties upon goods brought from one State into another. The States are still denominated foreign so far as the judgments of their courts are con

cerned.

The quality of "foreign," in connection with tariff laws, is one inserted only by the statute. Great Britain always imposed duties on merchandise brought into her home ports from the colonies, and does so now. Many of her colonies impose duties ad libitum upon imports from the home country.

The question is not one of domestic and of foreign ports, but one relating to the States and to Territories, the former being the constit uent parts of the Union and the latter being territory belonging to the

United States.