* *

Neither shall any person be eligible" to the office * fourteen years

of President "who shall not have been *

*

a resident within the United States." (Art. II, § 1, subd. 5.)

"The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States." (Art. II, § 1, subd. 4.) In the first two instances no reason suggests itself for believing that the words were used in the restricted sense. On the contrary, the subjects are eminently among those as to which the necessity for a general law embracing the whole territorial domain of the nation would be apparent.

That the "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies" should cover the entire country is obviously desirable. That the power to naturalize must be vested in the National Government was of pressing importance and necessity (Federalist No. XLII, ed. 1885, pp. 335, 336); that it must be uniform was almost a necessary consequence; that the power should be exercised in the territory then owned by the nation was most desirable, for naturalization was looked upon as an important stimulant to emigration, and it was a material object to increase the population in that region, the prospective value of whose land was expected to contribute so largely to the national resources.

One of the grievances against George III thought worthy of distinct mention in the Declaration of Independence was he had endeavored to prevent the population of these States, for that purpose obstructing the laws for the naturalization of foreigners," etc.

As to naturalization, moreover, the Constitution was understood by the Congress of 1795 to speak in this sense, for by an act "for carrying into complete effect the power given by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States," naturalization in the Territories and of residents of the Territories is expressly provided for. (1 St. at L., 414.)

Nor is it possible to suppose that it was intended to limit eligibility to the Presidential office to citizens residing within the States. Nor is any such suggestion to be found in the proceedings of the convention. (Mad. Jour., ed. 1893, pp. 585, 655.)

In the third instance, we see only the use of a convenient expression, broader than required, in a case not demanding accuracy or discrimination, because the context plainly showed the meaning.

7.

The United States and the States United.

Our conclusion from this examination of the Constitution is that in determining the meaning of the words "United States," as here used, we must discard the interpretation which would make them synonymous with the "States United." This being so, it is difficult to see how else they can be restricted in their meaning. To assume that they were intended to apply only to the lands then within the boundaries of the United States as then constituted is out of the question, unless we further assume that power was not given to extend those boundaries-even to adjacent territory. It is out of the question, because no reason for such a discrimination can be suggested, and because if it be

once admitted that "the United States" is here used with reference to the national boundaries, it must mean precisely that, whatever its boundaries from time to time may be.

8.

The words are qualificative, not restrictive.

But we are relieved from the need of seeking for any restriction on the plain meaning of these words by the fact that it has been determined, in Knowlton v. Moore, supra, that they were not used with a restrictive, but with a qualificative, purpose; to indicate that the uniformity prescribed was geographical, not intrinsic. Thus the objection, otherwise a serious one, that our construction that the entire clause, including "throughout the United States," has no other meaning than it would have if those words were omitted, is fully answered, and it appears that so far as the extent of the restriction is concerned, there is nothing to show that it is not exactly coterminous with the power restricted, and therefore, for this purpose, it may be read as merely providing that "all duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform."

9.

Conclusion.

Considering the clause in this light, even if we leave out of sight the considerations not applicable to the other prohibitory clauses in the Constitution, which superinduce the belief, as to this, that it was intended to be universal in its application, we submit that we were justified in the assertion, that it stands upon no other footing than they; for, though mandatory in form, it is strictly, and solely, prohibitive in effect; and when we consider the spirit we find that it and they can claim a common parentage in the spirit of justice, equality, and liberty which animated the founders of our nation.

IV.

WHEN THE TREATY OF PARIS TOOK EFFECT PORTO RICO CEASED TO BE A "FOREIGN COUNTRY," WITHIN THE MEANING OF THOSE WORDS

AS USED IN THE TARIFF ACT.

The conclusion reached in the courts below was erroneous, unless it be true not only that Congress has power to lay a duty on goods brought from Porto Rico to New York after annexation, but that it has actually done so. Whether it has done so or not depends upon the meaning of the words "imported from foreign countries," in the first section of the tariff act.

1.

The plain meaning of the words “imported from foreign countries.”

Whatever else may be the effect of the treaty of Paris, it certainly resulted in the cession of Porto Rico to the United States, and the

acceptance of that cession and consequent assumption of sovereignty over the island by the United States. It had been evacuated by the Spanish long prior to the exchange of ratifications. No disorder or insurrection has existed in the island. No other claim of dominion over it has been made on any part, and from the time of the exchange of ratifications it has been in the peaceable and undisputed possession and effective control of the United States, which then acquired as complete a title to it as to the ground upon which the Capitol at Washington stands, and has, by unquestioned right, exercised complete dominion over its inhabitants ever since; and from that time on the people of the island have neither been self-governing and independent, nor have they been the subjects of any other power, prince, or potentate.

Is a country of which all this is true "a foreign country" as regards ours, according to any possible sense in which these very simple and unambiguous words can be used?

2.

Extension of tariff law not in question.

It is to be observed, first and foremost, that the question now before us does not depend upon the extension of the operation of the tariff laws to a region in which they have not always applied. It is a question of the application of the tariff laws in the port of New York, and is essentially different from and simpler than that which would arise upon a shipment from a foreign country, or even from a home port within our former boundaries to Porto Rico. Does the tariff law, which undoubtedly applies here, fix a duty on these goods? That depends upon whether they were imported from a foreign country, and not upon any such question as whether the tariff act imposes duties on goods brought into Porto Rico from abroad, or whether the system for the collection of duties has been extended to Porto Rico.

The question is, then, not whether this or that provision of law is presumed to be in force in "our new possessions," but whether any provision exists in the law which undoubtedly operates in the port of New York making goods dutiable when brought here from Porto Rico.

3..

The imposition of the duty must be clearly established.

It is a well-recognized principle of tariff law that duties are imposed only by clear and express provision of law, and that in case of doubt the presumption is against the Government.

The Liverpool Hero, 2 Gall., 184, 188.

U. S. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, 373, 374.
Adams et al. v. Bancroft, 3 Sumn., 384, 387.
Poners v. Barney, 5 Blatch., 202, 203.

U. S. v. Ullman, 4 Ben., 547, 553.

Phil. & Read. R. R. Co. v. Kenney, 18 Int. Rev. Rec., 92, 93.
U. S. v. Isham, 17 Wall., 496, 504.

Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S., 609, 616.

Am. Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S., 468, 474.

4.

Further as to the meaning of these words.

Admitting every theory which fancy or interest can suggest for the purpose of differentiating between an outlying possession on the one hand and what are generally known as the territories on the other (and it may be observed that all such imagined differences tend to make the national dominion less restricted in the former than in the latter case), it would seem impossible to deny that, whether on an equal or on an inferior footing, Porto Rico is, in the strictest or the loosest sense of the word, a portion of "the American Empire.”

"The usage of the world is, if a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupation, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed." (Per Marshall, C. J., in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, supra.) But surely it can not be said that Porto Rico is at the same time a part of the nation to which it has been annexed and a foreign country. Nor can it be said that goods brought from one to another part of the same country are "imported," according to the signification of that term in American jurisprudence. In view of the well-settled meaning of that word, the addition of "from foreign countries," borrowed from earlier tariff acts, is, indeed, tautological.

Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall., 123.

It was held in this case that the provisions of the Constitution forbidding any State, without the consent of the Congress, to "levy any imposts or duties in imports or exports" did not apply to a tax on goods brought into one State from another, and the court said (per Miller, J.) that

"in the ordinary use of these terms at this day, no one would for a moment think of them as having relation to any other articles than those brought from a country foreign to the United States" (p. 131).

And here, at least, we presume that the expression is not used for tariff purposes," but in common parlance.

See also

156 U. S., 577.

5.

Pittsburgh and Southern Coal Co. v. Bates.

Fleming v. Page.

But we are told, in substance, that the meaning of the words is not the same in a tariff act as elsewhere, and that they there signify any region, whether under our dominion or not, which is not included in a collection district of our own; that under our revenue laws every port is regarded as a foreign one, unless the custom-house from which the vessel clears is within a collection district established by act of

Congress, and officers granting the clearance exercise their functions under the authority and control of the laws of the United States" (Op. of Bd. of Genl. Apprs., R., p. 14, 15).

However startling this assertion may seem, it is yet deserving of attentive and respectful consideration, being, as it is, a quotation from an opinion of this court, rendered by Chief Justice Taney:

Fleming v. Page, 9 How., 603–617.

This was an action to recover duties paid on goods imported during the war with Mexico from Tampico, which was in the military occupation of the United States, into the port of Philadelphia. The question presented to the court was, whether Tampico, during such military occupation, was, for the time being, a foreign port. The court held, of course, that the occupation of that part of Mexico by conquest did not permanently annex it to the United States; that "the law declaring the war" did not "imply an authority to the President to enlarge the limits of the United States by subjugating the enemy's country," and that the transfer of the title to foreign territory could "be done only by the treaty-making power of the legislative authority." and was not a part of the power conferred upon the President by the declaration of war:" that his conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union, nor extend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the legislative power:" and that while foreign nations, under the rules of international law, were "bound to regard the country, while our possession continued, as the territory of the United States and to respect it as such yet it was not a part of this Union," for "the relation in which the port of Tampico stood to the United States while it was occupied by their arms did not depend upon the laws of nations, but upon our own Constitution and acts of Congress" (pp. 614, 615); and the learned judge continued thus (p. 615):

營 * *

* * *

"The country from which these goods were imported was invaded and subdued, and occupied as the territory of a foreign hostile nation, as a portion of Mexico, and was held in possession in order to distress and harass the enemy. While it was occupied by our troops, they were in an enemy's country, and not in their own; the inhabitants were still foreigners and enemies. But the boundaries of the United States as they existed when war was declared against Mexico were not extended by the conquest; nor could they be regulated by the varying incidents of war, and be enlarged or diminished as the armies on either side advanced or retreated. They remained unchanged. And every place which was out of the limits of the United States, as previously established by the political authorities of the Government was still foreign; nor did our laws extend over it. Tampico was therefore a foreign port when this shipment was made."

This was the ratio decidendi of the case, and no one will deny that it is absolutely conclusive. We have already alluded to this part of Judge Taney's opinion, upon which, far from regarding it as in any possible aspect injurious to our case, we rely as clearly marking the distinction-apparently overlooked by the learned judge who sat in the circuit court (R., p. 22)-between a temporary military occupation by a branch of the Government having no power to "enlarge the bounda