SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Brief for Respondent-Appellee.

CHRISTIAN HUUS, LIBELLANT-APPELLANT, AGAINST NEW YORK AND PORTO RICO STEAMSHIP COMPANY, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This action was brought by libellant to recover spoken pilotage, amounting to the sum of $74.34. The United States district court of the southern district of New York dismissed the libel with costs (transcript of record). From such decree the libellant appealed to the circuit court of appeals, which court, without hearing the case, certified the questions involved to the Supreme Court of the United States. The parties agreed that the following are the facts:

Libellant, on the twenty-fifth day of June, 1900, offered his services as Sandy Hook pilot to the master of the American-built steamship Ponce, hailing from New York and belonging to the New York and Porto Rico Steamship Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York, to take such vessel into the harbor of New York by way of Sandy Hook-the said vessel being at such time bound from the port of San Juan in the island of Porto Rico. Said libellant was a Sandy Hook pilot, duly licensed under the laws of the State of New York, and competent to act as such.

He was the first and only pilot offering his services.

The master of the vessel declined the service of such pilot, and himself brought his vessel into the port of New York by the way of Sandy Hook.

The aforesaid amount is the regular spoken pilotage prescribed by statute for vessels of the draught of the Ponce, and such amount was demanded from the owner of the vessel and payment thereof refused.

The said steamship Ponce was at the time in question enrolled under the laws of the United States, and licensed to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, and her master was duly licensed to act as a pilot in the bay and harbor of New York by the inspectors of steamboats under the laws of the United States.

The said vessel at the times mentioned was engaged in trade between of Porto Rico and the port of New York, and laden with a merchandise shipped at San Juan and including sugar for at New York.

nd vessel at the times mentioned was not a registered vessel and under the license aforesaid. (Transcript of record.) ppellee contends that upon the above-agreed facts no pilotage the libellant and in support of such contention respectfully The following "points.

POINTS.

POINT I.

The New York statute under which the libellant claims "spoken pilotage" expressly excepts vessels "licensed and engaged in the coasting trade" from State pilotage charges; respondent's vessel, the "Ponce," was so licensed and engaged, and is therefore excepted from the act upon which libellant relies.

POINT II.

Congress has emphatically prohibited any State from levying pilot charges upon any coastwise seagoing steam vessel under the control of a pilot licensed by the inspectors of steamboats; the "Ponce" was a coastwise seagoing steam vessel and licensed for the coasting trade and was under control of a pilot having a license from said inspectors, and therefore the Federal statute protects her from compulsory pilotage claimed by virtue of any State statute.

POINT III.

Even disclaiming the special exemptions and immunities of a licensed steam vessel engaged in the coasting trade, and studying only the naked language claimed by appellants to impose compulsory pilotage charges upon the vessel of the respondent, no words can be found in the New York act subjecting the "Ponce," or any other licensed American steam vessel, to compulsory pilotage unless she be proceeding “from a foreign port.'

It is submitted that San Juan, Porto Rico, whence she was returning to her home port, New York, was not upon June 25, 1900, a foreign port, but was a port of the United States; that, therefore, it is immaterial what adjective finally be applied to trade between Porto Rico and New York, whether it be held coasting trade or otherwise, for the reason that prior to June 25, 1900, the port of San Juan, Porto Rico, became an American port.

POINT IV.

An examination of the cases and decisions cited by appellant's counsel as opposed to the decision of Judge Brown, from which appellant appeals to this court, shows that they are based on facts and questions wholly irrelevant to the matter under discussion here.

POINT V.

None of the points contended for by the counsel for the appellants answer the convincing arguments of Judge Brown's decision.

POINT VI.

It is respectfully submitted that the libel was rightfully dismissed, with costs, for the following reasons:

1. That Porto Rican ports have not been foreign ports since May

1st, 1900.

2. That vessels engaged in trade between Porto Rican ports and other ports of the United States are engaged in the coasting trade in the sense