being of humanity as are those of the tariff - protected, government - pampered, moral outlaws who are willing-who are eager to degrade and debase human beings to the level of the brute beast that their lust for gold may be gratified.

Referring to the operations of the Steel Trust in 1901 and prior to that year, the Stanley report, after specifying a number of steel mills, subsequently combined therein, states that Julian Ken

nedy, an engineer "of long experience in the construction and operation of steel works," acting for J. P. Morgan and Co., having visited and carefully inspected these plants, reported to Mr. Morgan that "after including everything of actual tangible value 'but nothing for good-will or the possible effects of combination,' the actual value of these plants did not exceed $19,000,000, and that the owners were demoralized and disheartened-that it was a buyer's, a consumer's market." "Undismayed by this dismal prospect," says the report, "J. P. Morgan and Company, with an amazing audacity, launched this new $19,000,000 monopoly on its course with a total capitalization of $80,000,000, and for their valued services in thus restraining the previously obnoxious and 'destructive competition,' received as compensation securities of this concern aggregating $20,000,000, or one million more than the total value of all the seventeen tube plants, one in need of reconstruction and six old style, 'isolated,' and 'not equipped with modern facilities,' or on the verge of being 'shut down and dismantled.'"

Continuing, the report says:

To the uninitiated this would appear to be an utterly impossible task. Ünder the circumstances, the sudden and instant prosperity of the National Tube Company is an object lesson of no little moment, illustrating the immense power of an absolute monopoly, no matter how inferior or defective or obsolete the plants, or how incapable the management and operation. With all the essential elements of failure, antiquated plants, badly located and burdened by this huge overcapitalization, nevertheless:

"The National Tube Company was one of the most successful concerns of the United States Steel Corporation, and by the time it was acquired by the latter its common stock had a high market value because of the company's earning power. For the year ending June 30, 1900, the profits of this company, after deducting all expenses, exceeded $14.600,000, and after deduction for depreciation, bad debts, etc., the net earnings were $13,878,000." This, it will be

seen, was at the rate of 35 per cent. on the $40.000.000 of preferred stock outstanding and the rate of 17 per cent. on the total capitalization of $80,000,000, or more than 73 per cent. of the actual value of the entire property."

Stock Not "Watered"-Just "Deluged." In this connection the following paragraph of the report relating to "overcapitalization" will prove interesting:

"watered" in the ordinary acceptance of In some instances stocks were not that term; they were literally deluged. The cost of constructing or reproducing the several plants constituting the combine was inconsequential as compared with the value of this new device for enjoying with immunity an old and hitherto forbidden privilege-an absolute monopoly in a valuable and necessary article of commerce.

Here we have before us the cold, hard facts that in this deal alone just one of the several involved in the organization of the Steel Trust, J. P. Morgan & Company lifted a clear $20,000,000 from an enterprise whose tangible value was only $19,000,000-and padded that $19,000,000 up to $80,000,000 intangible value. Then for just one year the "profits" on this imaginary investment amounted to $13,878,000; thirteen million eight hundred and seventy-eight thousand dollars coined from the sweat and blood of the underpaid and overworked toilers in these steel mills. Every penny of it, as well as all the fictitious investment value being clear money-"velvet"-for these "princes of finance" and "captains of industry." But that was only a fraction of their "rake off." The report tells us that the total amount of the fees realized by J. P. Morgan & Company and the underwriting syndicate for their services in the organization of the United States Steel Corporation was $62,500,000, and according to the testimony of Louis D. Brandeis, the distinguished conservator, before this Stanley Committee, the profits of this steel corporation in ten years, over and above a liberal return on the capital actually invested, has been $650,000,000, "which enormous profit." he said, "has been used to grind down its employes to the misery of their present condition."

How comes the monopoly that makes it possible for these few privileged individuals to appropriate to themselves such vast sums of money for which they give nothing to society in return? What has made it feasible for them to levy tribute in such fabulous amounts upon

the American people? What is it that has enthroned them as kings of finance, invested them with the awful power for evil which they hold through the possession and control of such huge accumulations of wealth and made the masses of the United States their prey? The answer, brothers, is the tariff-the robber tariff through which the people are compelled to pay tribute to these international money barons so their wives and daughters may wear diamonds on their heels; so they and their progeny may mingle with the stupid decadent aristocracy of foreign countries and acquire aristocratic titles; so they may dwell in pompous grandeur-in lordly magnificence in the castles of the ancient aristocracy of Europe; so they may "entertain" at $100,000 social functions, tender receptions to foreign ambassadors, one being recently given at Washington, at which the flowers alone (to be thrown out wilted the next morning) cost $10,000; so their pug dogs may wear diamondstudded collars and be cared for by trained nurses at salaries of $125.00 per month and board, etc., while children suffer and die from malnutrition and the effects of child labor; so they can spend millions on fads and whims of every kind, while most of the useful citizens from whom these hundreds and thousands of millions are being wrung, directly or indirectly, are struggling for a bare existence.

These conditions are the direct results of tariff-fostered monopoly.

Is it not therefore reasonable to infer that out of this $650,000,000, and the additional millions that are constantly flowing into their coffers, the steel magnates could well afford to spend enough money to influence the powers of government in perpetuating that one great factor that created and is maintaining their monopoly for them? And here the pertinent question suggests itself-Do the people rule?-a question to which the report of the Stanley Committee gives an emphatically negative reply. In this connection the following from the report of the committee is of interest:

reason.

imposition of any such duties for either As has been shown, this corporation has rendered infant or new industry in the steel business impossible by its control of ore-producing and transportation facilities, and the bulk of its labor is essentially foreign in every respect, except that it temporarily abides in this country while in the employ of the Steel Corporation. The corporation, nevertheless, has been keenly alive to the advantages accruing from the elimination of foreign competition by high or prohibitive duties, and it has been generous in its assistance and ardent in its encouragement of those whom it believed most inclined to impose or to maintain such duties, as is evidenced by the following correspondence.

[The correspondence which here follows in the report was between Steel Trust officials and certain national political committee officers, and pertained to immense contributions made to political campaign funds and the acknowledgment thereof.]

How the Tariff “Protects” American Labor.

Let us proceed to consider how the tariff "protects American labor." The story is best told in the chapter of the Stanley report entitled "Labor Unions," and which is as follows:

The attitude of the United States Steel Corporation toward organized labor was early determined. On June 17, 1901, six weeks after the Steel Corporation was organized and began operations, a meeting of the executive committee was held in New York City. At this meeting Mr. Charles Steele, then a member of the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company, and also a member of the executive committee of the Steel Corporation, was present. The question of the attitude of the corporation toward organized labor was extensively discussed at this meeting. As a final result of the deliberations of the executive committee, Mr. Steele brought forward the following proposition, which the records show was finally voted upon, and the president of the Steel Corporation instructed to convey it to the presidents of the subsidiary companies, to wit:

That we are unalterably opposed to subsidiary companies to take firm posi any extension of union labor and advise tion when these questions come up and say that they are not going to recognize it, that is, any extension of unions in mills where they do not now exist; that

Corporation.

An import duty imposed primarily for the purpose of protection has hitherto been defended either on the ground that it fosters infant industries or protects American labor. The United States Steel Corporation is not entitled to the

trouble and that they promptly report and confer with this corporation.

Following that declaration, the evidence clearly shows how American laborers felt. Justly or unjustly, they considered themselves persona non grata in the works of the United States Steel Corporation. Thereafter the great bulk

of American union laboring men in the iron and steel industry understood they were not wanted at the works of the United States Steel Corporation. The process of filling the places of these union laborers is interesting and important to observe. American laborers, loyal to their unions, could not be had. Something had to be done to get laborers. Southern Europe was appealed to. Hordes of laborers from Southern Europe poured into the United States. They were almost entirely from the agricultural classes, knew absolutely nothing about iron and steel manufacture, but were sufficient to fight the labor unions. They were absolutely unskilled, but they could work, especially as common laborers. In times of special necessity even advertisements for foreign help of this class were spread broadcast. A sample of these advertisements, which the evidence shows were caused to be circulated by subsidiary companies of the Steel Corporation, is as follows:

Wanted. Sixty tin house men, tinners, catchers, and helpers to work in open shops; Syrians, Poles, and Roumanians preferred; steady employment and good wages to men willing to work; fare paid and no fees charged for this work. Central Employment Bureau, 628 Pennsylvania avenue.

This advertisement appeared, as the evidence shows, in the Pittsburg GazetteTimes of July 14, 1909. (See page 3074 of hearings.)

The result is that about 80 per cent. of the unskilled laborers in the steel and iron business are foreigners of these classes. With the benefit of a skilled American foreman such a crew can work out results in unskilled labor production. The profits of this system of labor employment go to the Steel Corporation, while the displaced American workman shifted as best he could.

Following the elimination of union labor, and the introduction of the abovedescribed foreign laborers, an investigation was made as to the conditions of laborers, hours of labor, home life, etc. As to the hours of labor, the evidence before the committee was conclusive that long hours of labor prevailed in the iron and steel industry, especially in the unskilled departments. Under the direction of the United States Commissioner of Labor, a very careful and thorough investigation as to the hours of labor in the steel industry has been made. From this official report we quote without

This hardship of 12-hour days and a 7-day week is still further increased by the fact that every week or two weeks, as the case may be, when the employes on the day shift are transferred to the night shift, and vice versa, employes remain on duty without relief either 18 or 24 consecutive hours, according to the practice adopted for the change of shifts. The most common plan to effect this change of shift is to work one shift of employes on the day of change through the entire 24 hours, the succeeding shift working the regular 12 hours when it comes on duty.

(See page 2837, hearings.)

While we deem it unnecessary to quote the testimony of other witnesses, it is true, as the testimony shows, that they fully corroborate these statements of the United States Commissioner, and, in fact, some of the witnesses are much stronger in their statements.

As to the daily lives and conditions of living of these laborers, the testimony taken is voluminous, far too extensive to even summarize in this report. The testimony certainly shows conditions undesirable, and far below what is ordinarily understood to be the American standard of living among laborers in our country. Some of the details are revolting both as to sanitary and moral conditions. Taking the ordinary family as a unit, the wages paid, even if the head of the family is constantly employed, are barely enough to provide subsistence.

In this connection Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, above referred to, said in his testimony before the Stanley Committee:

"The Associated Charities of Pittsburg have computed the cost of bare existence for a family of a husband, a wife and three children in that city at $768 a year. By working twelve hours a day, 365 days a year, 65 per cent. of the steel workers there earn $1.50 less than the amount actually required for the bare cost of living.'

The steel laborers, he said, were worse off than slaves, their condition of living being deplorable, and the corporation did not take the personal interest in them that slave owners did in their human property.

"The horrible conditions among its employes," he said, "are the result of a compulsory elimination from the rights of men-of unionism."

Miss Margaret F. Byington, a Pittsburg Social Survey worker, in testifying before the Stanley Committee, related her experiences amongst steel laborers at Homestead, Pa., as follows:

"Down in the shadow of the clanging steel mills, in the smoke and grime of industrial hubbub, the tiny, white-faced children pursue their joyless playing in

filthy courtyards where sunshine seldom penetrates the thick black smoke that hangs between the red brick walls.

"Old-young, bent, disease stricken women spend their days in dirty, crowded, half-furnished rooms, windowless and unventilated. Three, four, or even five people, often sleep in the same room. I have even seen four double beds in a room 12 x 14 feet."

Miss Byington showed tables representing the expenses of ninety families of workers at Homestead, kept for her by the housewives.

"My investigations have shown," she said, "that it is impossible to maintain a normal standard of living on less than $15.00 a week. At present 65 per cent. of the employes of the Homestead plant are day laborers, who are paid about $10.50 per week."

Brothers, let us here compare these living conditions, these home surroundings, with the regal splendor in which those idling, arrogant, sensual parasites, the steel magnates and their families, live, move and have their being, and then let us think deeply of the words of Goldsmith:

"Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a

prey,

Where wealth accumulates, and men decay."

Should not every American possessing a spark of patriotism be deeply concerned because of this menace which threatens the future of his country?

The Company Supply Store.

Another chapter of the report is entitled "The Company's Supply Store." Like similar concerns, the Steel Trust realizes great profit in exploiting the necessities of its employes. The chapter on The Company Store is as follows:

"As bearing on the question of employes, the policy of the Steel Corporation in regard to the establishment of the company supply stores is important. The evidence before the committee shows that it is the custom of the company where steel and iron plants are established and towns and villages grow up around the company's plants, through a subsidiary company known as the Union Supply Company, to open stores to supply its employes with groceries, provisions, and almost every article of household necessity, together with powder, fuse, and other supplies-in fact, everything the employes need, either to live or conduct their operations as employes of the company.

"The local grocer, baker. meat and

fish dealer, apothecary, blacksmith, carpenter, coal, wood, and other dealers are thus brought into direct competition with the Steel Corporation stores. It may be said that this is only the application of fair and free competition. But this is not wholly so. The company stores have great advantages. They deal with their own employes, who constitute 90 per cent. of their custom. To be sure the employes are not obliged by any law or rule of the company to buy at the company store, but it is undoubtedly true that they all understand they will be the better considered for doing so.

what is coming in wages every day and "The company supply store knows just week to each employe who deals at the company store. No other local competitor has the benefit of this information. This enables the company supply store to extend credit only to the extent of wages actually due or earned. The result is practically an actual cash business, with no losses in bad debts.

does not attempt to maintain these sup"The fact that the Steel Corporation ply stores except where it deals with its own employes shows pretty conclusively that it has no desire to engage in such trade under ordinary conditions in ordinary competition. It limits its stores to places where it deals almost wholly with its own employes.

"The profits made and dividends declared to the Steel Corporation by this system of supply stores, we think, are pertinent and sufficient to show a prosperity entirely out of the ordinary.

"This supply company was organized in March, 1902, about a year after the Steel Corporation itself. Its capital stock is $500,000. Its corporate name is Union Supply Company, and it is one of the subsidiary companies of the United States Steel Corporation.

"In 1903, this $500,000 subsidiary corporation declared a dividend of $250,000 and in subsequent years as follows: 1904, $250,000; 1905, $405,000; 1906, $805,000; 1907, $500,000; 1908. $320,000; 1909, $440,000, and 1910, $520,000.

"It will thus be seen that this corporation earned and paid its parent company, the United States Steel Corporation, in dividends a total of $3,490,000 in eight years on retail supplies sold almost wholly to its own employes."

A summary of findings of fact in a minority report of the committee tells us that the United States Steel Corporation "was capitalized at $1,400,000,000, of which nearly one-half was 'water.'

"That the corporation controls a little over one-half the crude and finished steel business of the United States.

"That the corporation and all the independents have an understanding as to prices.

"That the system of interlocking direc