enterprising journalist acts promptly in gathering news. His information is frequently ex parte, and his comments and conclusions thereon are hurriedly announced. The demands of the public require this course of action at the hands of the journalist. But it is not demanded that he shall assume the duties of the judiciary. Imperfect as may be the conclusions of the courts in some cases, it would be a great mistake to substitute in their place the local comments, or even the editorial opinions, of the press. The injuries to public and private rights occasioned by the present methods of administering justice are as nothing to what would result if causes were determined without fair opportunity for hearing and trial. As was said by the wise man of old, "He that answereth a matter before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto him." Thoughtful citizens know very well that there is far more danger to our institutions, and far more danger to the rights of the people, and especially to the rights of litigants, to be apprehended from the power of the press over the courts than from the power of the courts over the press. It would be a strange anomaly in a free government, where judges are elected for comparatively short terms, and where the right of suffrage is practically universal, if the judges elected by the people were to become arbitrary oppressors of the people, or of any class of the people. Thoughtful citizens understand that the danger now threatening our institutions is that courts are not independent enough, instead of being too arbitrary; and that there is too great laxity instead of too great severity in the administration of justice, for public as well as for private good. The courts of this state have not been oppressors of the people. The power of punishing for contempt has been seldom resorted to. Since Colorado became a member of the federal Union, nearly seventeen years ago, only one case has reached this court where the publishers of a newspaper have been adjudged guilty of contempt for attempting to interfere with judicial proceedings. Other instances, perhaps, may have occurred where newspapers have gone beyond their legitimate limits, of which the courts, with their customary forbearance, have not thought proper to take notice. It is a matter of common observation that the courts of this country are reluctant to exercise the extraordinary power vested in them in regard to such matters. punishment therefor, neither do the pub- | party has had opportunity to be heard. The lishers of newspapers possess unlimited license to publish whatsoever they please. The liberty of the press is one thing. The "abuse of that liberty" is quite another. The former is guarantied by the constitution. The latter is as clearly interdicted. If the liberty of the press is abused, the offender may be held responsible therefor. Such is the common law; such is our constitutional provision; and such offenders may be dealt with summarily for contempt when their publications are calculated to impede, obstruct, or embarrass the administration of justice. It has not been deemed expedient by our people that any class of persons should be privileged to attack the courts, with the view to interfere with the rights of litigants, or to embarrass the administration of justice. Hence they have never adopted any constitutional provision granting such dangerous license. Nor do we believe that publishers of newspapers generally would approve of such license being granted. If they should, we are confident that the intelligent peopie of Colorado cannot be deceived or led into a course of action that would jeopardize their rights and interests as litigants, and imperil the safety of our free institutions. If courts of justice may be publicly assailed by libel and slander, or otherwise threatened and traduced in respect to causes, civil or criminal, pending before them for hearing or trial, then, indeed, no one's rights are any longer safe, and life, liberty, and property are held by a feeble tenure in this commonwealth. Do the good people of the state of Colorado desire that the judges whom they have chosen shall be threatened, maligned, intimidated, or dictated to, in respect to the trial or decision of causes? Is it desired that courts of justice shall sit in this state to register the behests of a public newspaper? Is it desirable that the law should be so framed that the publisher of a newspaper may interfere with the orderly administration of justice in the courts? If a publisher shall thus undertake to interfere, is it desirable that the courts shall be powerless to hold him responsible therefor in such time and manner as that the mischief he seeks to accomplish may be avoided, or summarily punished? In short, is it desirable that causes shall be tried and determined by the courts, or by the publisher of some newspaper? With all due respect for the profession of journalism, and with no desire to restrict or interfere with its sphere of usefulness, we must declare that the courts possess advantages superior to the journalist in the matter of hearing, trying, and determining causes affecting public and private rights. The law, as administered by the courts, gives each party an opportunity to present his cause by pleading and proof, each party having had previous notice of what the other claims. The court decides only after each 11. As a conclusion to their answer, respondents insist that it was their duty, as editor and manager of a newspaper, to examine, criticise, comment upon, or condemn publicly, in said paper, the proceedings and conduct of the persons mentioned in the said articles, and that said articles, and all of them, were published with just, legal, and proper motives, and without any intention whatever to reflect upon this honorable court. It would be a very pleasant way to dispose of this proceeding for us to accept these oft-repeated assurances that respondents did not intend or design, by their publications, to convey the impression that this court had been actuated by unworthy motives, or controlled by dishonorable influences, in the Connor Case. But it would be an affectation of credulity on our part to profess to believe such assurances. It is the province of the court to interpret and construe written language. In a case of this kind, if there were any doubt as to the meaning of respondents' published articles, we should certainly be glad to give them the benefit of the doubt. In re Woolley, 11 Bush, 95; People v. Freer, 1 Caines, 485. It is an elementary rule of construction that a writing consisting of common words shall be interpreted and construed according to the ordinary meaning of the words employed. The articles complained of contain only common words, and it would be a perversion of their ordinary meaning to hold that the words as used were not designed to charge and impute unworthy motives, dishonorable conduct, and a want of integrity, to this court, as has already been shown in a former part of this opinion. We should stultify ourselves, as juuges, to accept the construction which respondents now seek to give their language. We do not believe, nor can we, for the purpose of escaping an unpleasant responsibility, affect to believe, that persons capable of writing such articles did not intenu to convey the meaning which their own words import. The rule is elementary that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own voluntary act, and such rule is certainly applicable to words deliberately written or printed. 12. The learned counsel for respondents complains that the law relating to contempts by newspaper publications, like the law of libel, is very uncertain, and that there is a want of uniformity in the precedents and adjudicated cases. It is true the adjudicated cases are widely variant, but this is no fault of the law. It results rather from the fact that the forms of words, and other methods by which the motives and integrity of courts and individuals may be assailed and maligned, are so numerous that it is impossible that the law should be more specific. It would be idle to declare that particular words, or a particular method of defamation, should be unlawful, so long as other words and other methods, equally defamatory, may be resorted to. But we need not prolong this opinion. We are confident that respondents have for a long while understood the law relating to this subject, and that they have deliberately disregarded it in this instance. They had no reason for imputing dishonorable conduct, or a want of integrity, to this court, in respect to the Connor Case, and they knew they had no reason for SO doing. Nevertheless, they made such imputations, and suffered the same to be repeated in their newspaper. Where a wrongful act is willfully done the law presumes the wrongdoer to have been actuated by motives of malice. Knowing the customary forbearance of the courts in such matters, respondents doubtless thought this court would not undertake to protect itself from their assaults. Notwithstanding their attitude, we bave no desire to exercise great severity in the present case. We see no necessity for exhausting the power of the court in the present instance. But it must be understood that this court will not, from any personal consideration, shrink from the responsibility, however onerous, of protecting the administration of justice from embarrassment by assaults of the kind under consideration. Attacks upon the judicial integrity of this court, calculated to prejudice the rights of litigants in particular cases, or to impede, obstruct, or embarrass the administration of justice, cannot always be suffered to pass unnoticed. If we were to forbear too much in matters of this kind the confidence of the people might well be impaired in the firmness and stability, if not in the integrity, of the judiciary. As was said by Chief Justice Lawrence in deciding the case of People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 217: "We have personally felt great reluctance to taking notice of the publication, but our consciousness of the mischief that may be done in embarrassing the administration of justice, and impairing the moral authority of the judiciary throughout the state, if this article is to stand as an unpunished precedent, has compelled us to issue the rule, and now compels us to order an attachment." The facts and circumstances set forth in respondents' answer will not be disregarded so far as the same are entitled to any weight as matters of mitigation; but the answer is not, in the opinion of the court, sufficient, in law, as a defense or as a justification of the matters complained of against respondents. It is therefore ordered by the court that a writ of attachment issue, in due form, for the arrest of respondents, and each of them, and that they, and each of them, be brought forthwith before the court, that it may be inquired of them if anything further they have to say why they should not be found and adjudged guilty as charged, and punished accordingly. HAYT, C. J., and GODDARD, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. The foregoing opinion having been announced, the writ of attachment was issued, and respondent Stapleton was brought before the court in obedience thereto. In behalf of respondent Cooper, it was said by his counsel that he was temporarily absent from the state, and leave and time were asked in behalf of respondents to present something further in writing in their behalf. A brief time was granted, and thereupon respondent Stapleton presented the following: "Comes now William Stapleton, respondent above named, and for further answer and explanation touching the offense whereof, by the opinion of this honorable court, he has been adjudged guilty, respectfully submits the following: That he has read the opinion heretofore in this cause filed, and is now convinced that the objectionable language referred to therein was fairly and reasonably open to the construction put upon it by this honorable court, though no such construction was intended or thought of when the same was written and published. That he does not believe, and never did believe, that this court, or any member thereof, was in any anner improperly influenced in the Connors Case, or in any other case. That the articles referred to in the opinion were written hastily, incident to the hurry of the publication of a morning paper, and at a time wheu there was intense feeling occasioned by the action of a member of the city council of Denver in the organization of the board of aldermen. That the purpose of these articles was solely to call public attention to the conduct of parties occupying no official position whatever in connection with this court, and to prevent further improper influence upon the organization of said board of aldermen. That there was no intention to reflect in any manner upon this court, or upon any member thereof. That he very much regrets having permitted the publication of language seemingly, though unintentionally, calculated to question the motive or independence of this court, or the honorable justices composing the same. That there was no desire whatever to interfere in the slightest degree with the due and proper administration of justice. That respondent realizes the great importance of having a pure, unimpeded, and dignified administration of justice by this and all other courts. That neither respondent, nor any one else connected with the ownership. publication, or management of said paper, has ever intentionally or knowingly consented to the insertion therein of matter in any way tending to annoy or embarrass this court in the performance of its judicial duties, and that, in connection with the subjectmatter of the articles in question, there was never any justification for adverse criticism of this court, or for reflection upon the conduct of either of its members. Upon the foregoing statement, and the other matters herein appearing of record, respondent respectfully submits to the finding and judgment of the court. William Stapleton. "State of Colorado, County of Arapahoe,ss.: Subscribed and sworn to by the said William Stapleton, respondent in the aboveentitled cause, before me, a notary public in and for said county and state, this 18th day of May, 1893. [Seal.] Cyrus E. Cooper, Notary Public." PER CURIAM. In view of the acknowledgment, retraction, and regrets now expressed by Mr. Stapleton in writing, and under his oath, accompanied by the assurance that the matters thus expressed will be published by him as widely and as conspicuously as the articles complained of, it is the opinion of the court that in the present onstance further proceedings against him are unnecessary, and that severity of punishment is not required. It is therefore ordered by the court, all the justices concurring, that this proceeding be dismissed, as to Mr. Stapleton, and that he be discharged upon payment by him of his share of the costs herein, and, further, that the proceeding stand continued, as to respondent Cooper, until such time as he can be brought before the court. Subsequently, respondent Cooper, by leave of the court, presented his further answer under oath, which, omitting the formal parts, was as follows: "That this respondent did not cause or procure the publication of any of the objectionable articles mentioned in this proceeding, and that he had no knowledge whatever of any or either of them until after the same had been published in the Republican; that he did not nor has he ever approved of said articles, or either of them. so far as the same have any reference whatever to this honorable court; that he very much regrets the publication of language seemingly, though unintentionally, calculated to question the motive or independence of this court, or the honorable justices compesing the same; that this respondent has no desire whatever to interfere in the slightest degree with the due and proper administration of justice, and that he realizes the im portance of having a pure, unimpeded, and dignified administration of justice by this and all other courts; that this respondent has never intentionally or knowingly consented to the insertion in said paper of matter in any way tending to annoy or embar rass this court in the performance of its judicial duties; and that, in connection with the subject-matter of the articles in question. there never was, as respondent believes, any justification for adverse criticism of this court, or for reflection upon the conduct of either of its members." And thereupon it was ordered that, upon the payment of the residue of the costs herein, Mr. Cooper be discharged, and this proceeding dismissed. 18 Colo. 433 ELDER v. SCHUMACHER. (Supreme Court of Colorado. May 15, 1893.) DEED-VALIDITY-CAPACITY OF GRANTOR-RESCIS SION-EJECTMENT. 1. A deed of land from one who at the time of its alleged execution was mentally incapable of executing the same is void. Elliott, J., dissenting. 2. In an action to recover possession of land, the court has jurisdiction to determine whether a deed relied on to prove title is forged, and also whether the grantor in such deed had sufficient mental capacity to execute the same. Elliott, J., dissenting. 3. One who purchases land from a person who is mentally incapable of executing a deed thereof, with knowledge of such incapacity, will not, in an action to set aside the deed, be entitled to a return of the purchase price. Appeal from district court, Lake county. Action by Charles P. Schumacher against George W. Elder and another for possession of land and damages for its detention. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff, and defendant Elder appeals. Affirmed. The other facts fully appear in the following statement by HAYT, C. J.: This is a controversy in reference to the title to lots Nos. 27 and 28, in block 66, Stevens & Leiter's subdivision of United States survey No. 271, in the city of Leadville, county of Lake, and state of Colorado. The complaint is in the form usually adopted under the Code for possession and damages for the detention of real property. It is alleged therein that Charles P. Schumacher, the plaintiff, is the owner of the property in controversy. The defendant Dixon made default. He was merely a tenant, and had no interest in this controversy. The answer of appellant, George W. Elder, denies the ownership of appellee, and claims title in fee in himself. Afterwards appellee filed a replication, setting up the insolvency of F. W. De Walt, one of the appellant's former grantors, on the 5th day of September, A. D. 1882, when said F. W. De Walt deeded the property in controversy to his wife, L. M. De Walt; and, as a further reply, appellee alleges that the deed executed by Mrs. L. M. De Walt on January 4, 1883, to Mrs. Ellen K. Brewster, of said property, was not, and is not, the deed of the said L. M. De Walt; that, at the time of the execution of said deed, Mrs. L. M. De Walt was mentally wholly incapable of and incapacitated from executing or understanding any deed or contract; that she was wholly unconscious, and unable to know or understand anything that was transpiring about her; that said deed, if ever it existed, was a forgery. Upon the trial the following facts were admitted: First, the title to the property in F. W. De Walt, on September 5, A. D. 1882, and that on that date F. W. De Walt deeded the property to his wife, Mrs. L. M. De Walt. On January 4, 1883, Mrs. L. M. De Walt, by warranty deed, conveyed the property to Mrs. Ellen K. Brewster, her sister. This deed was acknowledged before a notary public, and recorded. It recites a consideration of $2,500. On the 18th day of April, A. D. 1884, Mrs. Ellen K. Brewster deeded the property to her sister Mrs. Annie McNaney, by warranty deed. This deed was duly acknowledged and recorded. On the 6th day of September, A. D. 1886, Mrs. Annie McNaney and B. McNaney, her husband, by quitclaim deed, conveyed to George W. Elder, appellant herein, the said property. This deed was also duly executed and acknowledged. Appellee, in support of his claim of title to the property, offered in evidence a record of the judgment in the case of J. Sam Browne, Receiver, v. F. W. De Walt. Judgment was entered in the district court of Lake county in favor of plaintiff for $42,455.68. Following the admission of this judgment, plaintiff offered in evidence the execution issued thereon, together with the return of the sheriff, showing a levy upon the property in controversy and other property. This levy was followed by sale and deed to the property by the sheriff to J. Sam Browne, receiver. Quitclaim deed from J. Sam Browne, receiver, to Clinton Reed, dated the 20th day of November, A. D. 1886. Also deed from Clinton Reed to Charles P. Schumacher, for said property, dated August 8, A. D. 1888. Mrs. De Walt was stricken with paralysis on January 2, A. D. 1883, and on January 24th of the same year died, without issue. The remaining facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. Belford & Wikoff, for aprellant. Reed and J. A. Ewing, for appellee. Clinton HAYT, C. J., (after stating the facts.) The sole controversy in this case grows out of the deed of Mrs. De Walt to her sister Mrs. Brewster. The contention of the plaintiff is that Mrs. De Walt, at the time of its execution, was non conpos mentis. It is claimed that no title passed by this deed, but that the title to the premises remained in Mrs. De Walt, notwithstanding the deed, at the time of her death, and that, dying without issue, the title vested in her husband, under the statute, thereby becoming subject to execution for his debts. No question was raised by the counsel below or in this court as to the sufficiency of the pleadings to raise the question of Mrs. De Walt's capacity at the time to execute the deed to Mrs. Brewster, and no evidence was introduced showing, or tending to show, that Mr. De Walt was insolvent at the time he deeded the property to Mrs. De Walt. In support of plaintiff's contention that Mrs. De Walt was of unsound and at the time she deeded the property to her sister Mrs. Brewster, the following evidence, inter alia, was offered and admitted: B. S. Galloway, a witness called on behalf of plaintiff, testified, inter alia, that he was a practicing physician, and attended Mrs. De Walt in her last illness; was called to her within a few minutes after she was stricken with paralysis, upon the 2d day of January, A. D. 1883. The witness, continuing, said: "I was called there within fifteen minutes after she was stricken down, and found her in an unconscious condition, apparently suffering a good deal of pain, and entirely paralyzed. I think it was on the left side.. She died on the 24th day of the same month, from that trouble. *** She did not have her reasoning faculties during that time. There were times when she would apparently understand some things that were said to her, but the greater part of it she knew nothing that was going on about her. She was not of sound mind, I should judge, not any of the time. I attended her up until her death." On crossexamination the witness said that he was called to attend Mrs. De Walt on the 2d of January, in the evening, between 6 and 7 o'clock; that he found at her bedside Mrs. Tomkins, one of her sisters, Mr. De Walt, Mr. Tomkins, and Mrs. Brewster. The witness further testified that during her sickness there were times that she would apparently understand what was said to her. "I was not there all the time, and was very glad not to be. There might have been a great many times that she understood what was said to her, in my absence." Upon redirect examination, the witness said: "She had no feeling on the side that was paralyzed. I would occasionally pinch the limbs to see if there was any sensation left. I believe they were burned at one time, and hot applications applied to her, and it was so hot that it would burn her, and she did not know anything about it." Dr. D. H. Dougan testifies that he was called to attend Mrs. De Walt on the 2d day of January, A. D. 1883, in consultation with Dr. Galloway; that he was there within, probably, half an hour of the time of her attack; that he saw her every day for the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th days, and after that at irregular intervals until her death. "On my arrival I found her suffering from apoplexy. She was totally unconscious; paralyzed on one side; and the condition was one that suggested danger of death within a few hours. She remained paralyzed until her death, on one side, and her mental condition, my recollection is, cleared up to some extent during her illness; that is to say, at first she was absolutely unable to express any wish or want, or to respond to any question, but there were days during her illness when she would answer 'Yes,' if you asked her if she wanted water, and show some degree of intelligence." The witness further testified that, according to the best of his judgment, there was no time during her illness when she was of sound mind. "I should say she had the most intelligence about the middle period of her illness." He also testified, in answer to further inquiry, that he did not think that, at any time during her sickness, her mind was in such condition that she had sufficient mental capacity to make a contract. Louise S. Call, a witness for the plaintiff, testified as follows: "I knew Mrs. De Walt in her lifetime; was her nurse during her last illness; v.33P.no.4-12 Colo.Rep. 33-35 P.-5 was with her constantly. I should think that she was in a semiconscious condition. I don't think she realized or knew anything. She realized nothing. She knew no one perfectly. When I first went into her room she was very averse. She did not like to have any strangers come in. It made her very nervous and hysterical if they did, and they hesitated about having me come in; but as soon as I went in she thought I was an old schoolmate friend of hers, Ella Bickford, and she called me 'Ella' all the time I was there, and became very much attached to me, and wanted me to stay with her all the time, and would hardly let me go up stairs to get a little rest. I had to lay down by the side of her, and she imagined her sickness was caused from a different cause altogether. She thought there was a child, and that it had been taken away from her, and she craved constantly for the baby. They never had any children. I know that she was never able to give herself a drink of water. She could not raise her hand to her head. I am very positive it was the right side that was paralyzed, because I know she was perfectly helpless. She was not in a condition to sign her name, or to realize what any one was saying, if they should have made a request of that kind. She could not do it, possibly. * * * She never connected any sentences; very seldom ever. Mrs. Brewster was with her, and Mrs. Tomkins, all the time." On cross-examination this witness said: "I cannot really remember the date when I went there, exactly; but she had not been sick but a very few days, four or five days, when I went there." The only other witness called to testify as to the mental condition of Mrs. De Walt during her sickness was H. H. Tomkins. This witness testified, among other things, as follows: "I have known Mrs. De Walt all my life, nearly. I did not visit very much at the house during her illness. I was there probably- Well, immediately preceding her death I was there every day. I called at the house several times, but I did not see Mrs. De Walt but twice, I think. The first time, I think, was they told me she was getting better; I could go in and see her. It was about ten days or two weeks, I should judge, after she was taken sick, or had this stroke, I saw her. She was in bed. * * * She recognized me. I had a conversation with her. She comprehended what I said, and I comprehended what she said. I could not say how many days that was before she died. I think she died, if I recollect right, about a week afterwards." The foregoing is the substance of all the testimony offered with reference to the mental condition of Mrs. De Walt during her last sickness, except that her attending physician testified that the usual rule in such cases was for the patient to be at her best about the middle of the sickness, |