At first there were a number of instances where the statements published in the press were not based on an actual reading of the report, but rather on a hasty glance at headings of sections of the report. One example was where I grouped certain specific recommendations under the heading "Legislative Restrictions." Apparently that heading was read at a glance and the conclusion reached that I was recommending an A. E. F., and it was so circulated on the press wires. I was doing nothing of the kind. So far as I could express myself, I was definitely trying to eliminate any such idea from my recommendations, because it involves a most important matter of public policy that should be settled only by the President as Commander in Chief, and the Congress. I specifically endeavored to keep all political questions entirely clear of the problem of the necessity for the readiness of the military forces for whatever service might be required of them.

I believe now that almost everyone is familiar with the administrative problem, the administrative impossibility of managing the Army under the present limitations. I have repeated in my report, I have repeated twice before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, I have repeated in conversations with legislators, and in informal discussions, the complications involved in the direct business of operating our Army.

At the present time, the situation is such that the problem is not soluble without legislative assistance and immediate assistance, at that. I am confronted every day by specific recommendations of the Staff to do things that have to be done involving shipping, availability of tonnage, occupation of garrisons, and many other considerations, and I am stymied as to a solution.

I have already spoken about the problem in Alaska and the problem in Hawaii, where National Guard units are involved. Those units happen to include all the various factors in this discussion. They include principally the National Guard on which there is a limitation of 12 months of service; they include Reserve officers whose service is also limited to 12 months, but which will be of varying dates of expiration to that of the National Guard units; and they include selectees on whose service there is a limitation of 12 months and, again, a different expiration date from that of the National Guard organization in which they are serving.

As another example, I was being pressed by the War Plans Division of the General Staff to commit myself to a plan for the development of the garrison in Trinidad. At first we could send troops down in small numbers only because of the lack of the necessary shelter to guard their health. Now, we have the shelter and the problem is to find proper units to send to Trinidad.

We have now in Trinidad, a National Guard organization whose term of service will soon approach its limit. We have_other units which make up a total of some 1,200 men. That small garrison should be reenforced immediately and brought up to an adequate size, not only because of Trinidad itself, but because of its location in the hemisphere defense plan and because of the necessity of having troops available in that immediate vicinity. The logical units for the purpose are hemmed about by the limitations I have mentioned and I declined (and that is the way it stands at the present time) to give my approval to the plan.

Now, the question is not merely a matter of a proper plan which may or may not be approved; it is a matter of ship tonnage, which is a very complicated affair, in which not only the Navy but the public interest is seriously concerned. At the moment we have an opportunity to use tonnage that can be diverted from some other purpose. We have the shelter ready for the troops, but I must not compromise the Army and, incidentally, the Navy by sending a unit down there that will have to be brought back in a very short time.

The same problem has developed with respect to other garrisons where the shelter has been completed and is ready for troops. What units are we to send?

I would like to ask you gentlemen to remember that we have only nine Infantry divisions in the Regular Army. That number is sufficient at the present time for our purpose, if we can use the other components as a part of the Army and not as a separate grouping which has to be given very different treatment from the remainder of the Army. Those nine divisions cannot carry the principal burden of this complex situation, because even they have in their ranks selectees under the limitation of 12 months' service; and they have in their ranks a large number of Reserve officers under the limitation of 12 months' service. The problem is not solvable, as I have said, under present limitations.

When I appeared before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs I referred to the problem we had in connection with the garrisoning of Iceland. Marines had to be sent. They did not belong there at all, as they were trained for another purpose, but it was impracticable to even consider sending any unit of the present Army for obvious reasons. One was secrecy, so necessary for the protection of those who went against the possibilities of hostile action, and the other was that we could not, at that distance from the United States, set up a command that required constant transfer of personnel in large numbers.

I might say that most arrangements in Iceland must be completed before October 1. That means that troops must have arrived by early September and have begun to move to their stations. To reach some of the stations they must arrive even before the 1st of September, in order to be able to reach the outlying points where they will remain isolated for the following 6 months. They must take with them supplies to last 3 or 4 months. Measured in ship tonnage Iceland is a long way from home. In other respects it is very close to the Western Hemisphere. Limitations imposed by law made it out of the question to send the unit that should have gone there, and, instead, marines had to be sent. Now we have the problem on our hands of relieving the marines and they should be relieved to free them for the duty for which they are specially trained. I do not know of a better example of the complications of the situation in which we find ourselves.

The Congress last August and September took a step in further developing our military policy as laid down in the National Defense Act of 1920 which even with its limitations put national defense on a much sounder basis than formerly. The law as it stands. on the books today points the way clearly to what the further moves should be.

I have been disturbed by suggestions that we go back to the Civil War proposition of bounties, or volunteers, and quack remedies or

compromises of that character. I beg of you gentlemen not to repeat the colossal errors of that day. You have the laws on the books; you have your future course defined in those laws. The answer is plain, as I see it. Are the national interests imperiled? Does a national emergency exist? As I said before and as I say now again, in my opinion a national emergency decidedly does exist; in the opinion of the War Department, it does; in the opinion of the President, it does. He has already declared an unlimited emergency which, however, does not affect the military forces, because under the laws governing the Army a national emergency must be declared by Congress.

Our book of rules on personnel is a most complicated affair. I never fully understand it; I have to have General Haislip and his corps of pick-and-shovel men explain to me almost continually the legal complications involved in any military action.

You have laid down for yourselves in the law a course of action which is logical, which is in contrast to the history of our past errors, and which meets the present situation. I am most concerned over temporizing, over expediency, over a patchwork solution, when direct action is so clearly indicated.

Under half measures it is exceedingly difficult to develop military forces because soldiers are only human; they read the papers. Like all of us humans, with a little encouragement they can feel very sorry for themselves. I have been one of them myself, have initimately associated with them. As an illustration I would like to recite an incident that occurred shortly after I joined my first regiment, almost 40 years ago. I found myself on the coast of Mindoro in the Philippines. An insurrection was going on and I was out with a detachment of the Thirtieth Infantry. We were quite isolated, and without any service to help morale. No town, no ice in the tropics, no pay for 4 months, and not even a book or magazine supplied.

I, as a 21-year-old lieutenant, became the commander of that section of the country, the highest command I held for about 30 years. Among other things, I had to coal the boats that arrived periodically, and one of those contracts to economize in funds, made by the Quartermaster Department in Manila protected the crew against handling the coal until it was delivered on the deck of the boat. That passed the buck to the soldiers as someone had to handle that coal. Their pay was $13 a month. They worked from the coal pile on the edge of the jungle to a little flat-bottom boat-we had only one-and rowed that through three-quarters of a mile of heavy surf to the ship, and laboriously transferred the coal to the deck of the ship. One day while working in a torrential rain a tall, lanky soldier from the mountains of Kentucky paused in the middle of his shoveling job, with this comment: "I didn't see nothing like this on that damned recruiting circular." My old first sergeant suppressed a laugh, and flashed back the order to "keep your mouth shut and shovel coal. That's your job." That gave me a lasting impression of the Regular Army; what discipline meant, what dependability meant in times of difficulty.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the first sergeant from Kentucky, too?

General MARSHALL. I may have moved him into that State from Tennessee, Judge, when I thought of your constitutents. [Laughter.] The first sergeant was from America. Almost any reaction can be

gotten from young men under given circumstances. There is always a certain degree of grousing that seems to be inherent in the soldier, but does not detract from discipline if it remains within the bounds of his unit. But there are times when the leader must command, "Keep your mouth shut and shovel coal; those are the orders."

There are many disagreeable tasks that our Army has accomplished without comment, without notice or appreciation, throughout a long period of years; there is a great deal that is going to be difficult and hard to do in this program. But today, to have the men stirred up and agitated by outside influences is a most unfortunate business because under those conditions soldiers are very apt to begin to feel sorry for themselves. The business of the soldier, as I have found it, involves mud, or extreme heat, and irritating dust. It involves missing meals, long marches, bad weather, insects, and discomforts. It involves a great many inconveniences; it interferes with social affairs. and sometimes it very seriously affects personal relationships. All of that is inevitable and is part of the life of a soldier. We have tried in every way in this expansion to avoid the worst of these, to an extent that has never before been attempted. The men have been kept in a perpetual state of agitation from this and that report or discussion. Yet we came out of the winter with the highest morale I have ever seen in United States forces.

At the present moment we are undergoing a very depressing, a dangerous experience. Yesterday afternoon I received a radiogram from General Drum that he had issued these orders as Commander of the First Army:

There appears to be an organized effort from some source outside the Army to have petitions signed by members of the military forces and sent to the Congress in an effort to oppose legislation proposed by the War Department to continue the service of the National Guard and the Reserve officers in the service. Any such action by those in military service violates the provisions of Army Regulations.

As you may have read in the press, some of those young men were led into this business. We cannot continue to ignore such actions. We must treat them as soldiers; we cannot have a political club and call it an army. I regard these disturbing activities from outside the Army, gentlemen, as sabotage of a dangerous character. I do not wish to be held responsible for the development of the Army under such conditions. We must enforce disciplinary measures to offset such influences, if the Army is to have any military value of dependability as an army. Without discipline an army is not only impotent, but it is a menace to the state.

I do not want to see our young men victimized, misled into unsoldierly conduct; I want to see them handled so that we can build up a splendid American Army. I cannot bear the burden of responsibility of maintaining the discipline and morale of our Army in periods of uncertainty and agitation such as is now going on. There is enough uncertainty at best in the military service, but today we have the additional legislative uncertainties, together with a broadcast of seeds of discontent. We ask you to reach a decision, to settle this matter, and leave us the opportunity to train and develop the Army for our national security. I realize the difficulties of your problem, but the logical solution, to my mind, is so unmistakable that I do not

see how sound, acceptable arguments can be developed against it, unless you definitely determine to change our military system and maintain a large professional Army.

At the moment I do not think of anything else to say. I would be glad to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you made a statement with respect to the difficulties of transportation or shipping facilities, and you were having difficulties with that, due to the demands of the South American commercial trade. That occurs to me as a problem that hooks into the efforts of the Government of the United States to maintain proper relations with the South American republics, which, as I understand, at this time is a rather difficult problem also. Now, that confronts you in one way from time to time?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would tell the committee just how far the members of the Army that are in the selectee list or under the Selective Service and Training Act have been infiltrated into the Regular Army, and how they are intertwined with each other in these various set-ups.

General MARSHALL. The number varies in the different divisions, from a low in the First Division of 1 percent of selectees, up to the Seventh_Division with 79 percent of selectees. There are only 9 regular Infantry divisions

The CHAIRMAN. Have those figures been given to the Senate committee in their hearings?

General HAISLIP. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I doubt if it is necessary to put them in this record.

General MARSHALL. In the armored divisions, selectees vary from 45 percent in the Second Armored Division, to 80 percent in the Fourth Armored Division.

In the Second Cavalry Division, they are 61 percent; in the First Cavalry Division, 37 percent.

The engineers have had a tremendous expansion because of the great increase of air forces and mechanized forces. Their expansion has been greater than 1,000 percent, so we find in engineer units as high as 85 percent selectees.

In that connection, in laboring with the possibilities of substituting an Army command in Iceland in place of Marines, I found, when it came to the engineers, there was no way I could meet the situation without virtually demolishing 10 to 12 units in order to get 3-year men. Even then, I would have had a unit that was not trained at all as a team. It would have been very unwise to send to that critical point a group of men who have had no unit training.

Apropos of this problem, there has been talk of a volunteer system or remedy. We have been getting volunteers as rapidly as we could, and we have not reached yet the number of 3-year men we need. Our most successful period of recruiting was during the debates on the Selective Training and Service Act, which gave a great impetus to volunteering; while at the same time there was a tremendous recruiting campaign being conducted by the Adjutant General's Department. That campaign produced somewhere around 39,000 a month, but we required a total of approximately 600,000. To date we have gotten 476,000.