Mar. 1910] Opinion Per PARKER, J. to continue to hold the same, which the sheriff did, and thereupon this action was instituted seeking to compel the sheriff to deliver the property to the relators. A trial before the court resulted in judgment in favor of the relators, from which the sheriff has appealed. It is contended by learned counsel for appellant that the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that respondents were farmers at the time of the attachment, within the meaning of subd. 5, of section 563, and that they are not entitled to the team, harness, and wagon, claimed by them as farmers. There was competent evidence tending to show the following: The respondent John McKee had been engaged in farming as a livelihood for twenty years past, and since 1903 had been living on a homestead in Benton county, until the fall of 1908. While living on his homestead, he had no stock or farming implements, and was unable to buy any. He worked some upon his own land and also worked for his neighbors. He caused some fifteen acres or more of his land to be brought under a state of cultivation, and rented his land taking a share of the crop in payment, but continued to live upon it until the fall of 1908, when he moved with his family into the town of Prosser to enable his children to go to school. In the spring of 1909 he traded his homestead for the property here involved and $368 in money. This money was mostly consumed in the payment of debts, and the balance was consumed in purchasing supplies for his family and stock. About this time he made arrangements for leasing a ranch in Franklin county, intending to go there and farm upon it. He was still living in Prosser when the property was seized by the sheriff. While there are circumstances shown tending to contradict some of these facts, we think the evidence was sufficient to warrant the trial court in believing them, as it must have done in rendering the judgment it did. Counsel argues that since respondents were not the owners of or living upon, a farm, or actually engaged in farming 4-58 WASH. Opinion Per PARKER, J. [58 Wash. at the time of the attachment, they cannot successfully claim exemptions as farmers, claiming they were not then farmers within the meaning of subd. 5, of section 563, which reads: "To a farmer, one span of horses or mules, with harness, or two yoke of oxen, with yokes and chains, and one wagon; also farming utensils actually used about the farm, not exceeding in value five hundred dollars in coin." Our attention is particularly directed to the words, "actually used about the farm." We do not think that the spirit of our exemption laws contemplate such a strict construction as counsel seeks to apply to this provision. If a man has for years made farming his principal occupation, and intends to do so in the near future, we think the mere fact that he may not be so engaged, and his team, wagon, and harness are not being used in farming at the time of the levy thereon, he is not thereby deprived of his exemption right under this provision. Pease v. Price, 101 Iowa 57, 69 N. W. 1120; Cleveland v. Andrews, 5 Idaho 65, 46 Pac. 1025, 95 Am. St. 165; Spence v. Smith, 121 Cal. 536, 53 Pac. 653, 66 Am. St. 62; Hickman v. Cruise, 72 Iowa 528, 34 N. W. 316, 2 Am. St. 256. Following the general rule, this court has liberally construed our exemptions in favor of the poor debtor. Mikkleson v. Parker, 3 Wash. Ter. 527, 19 Pac. 31; Dennis v. Kass & Co., 11 Wash. 353, 39 Pac. 656, 48 Am. St. 880; Puget Sound Dressed Beef & Packing Co. v. Jeffs, 11 Wash. 466, 39 Pac. 962, 48 Am. St. 885, 27 L. R. A. 808; Geiger v. Kobilka, 26 Wash. 171, 66 Pac. 423, 90 Am. St. 733; 18 Cyc. 1380. It is further contended that respondents are about to leave the state with intent to defraud their creditors, and are thus deprived of the right of exemptions under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 571. This presents only a question of fact, which we think the evidence justified the learned trial court in resolving against appellant. Some contention is made upon the question of the value of the property claimed as exempt. Section 572 of Rem. & Bal. Code, provides for an appraise ment upon the claim of exemption being made upon demand of the creditor. Such appraisement having been waived, as we have noticed, we think the trial court was not called upon to consider the question of value. We conclude that the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered. RUDKIN, C. J., CROW, DUNBAR, and MOUNT, JJ., concur. [No. 8442. Department Two. March 26, 1910.] R. J. HUSTON, Appellant, v. HILEN HARRINGTON, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACTS-UNCERTAINTY-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. A contract whereby defendant agreed to sell certain corporate stock to the plaintiff, or to whomsoever he may direct, for the sum of not less than $30,000 and as much more as it may be sold for to any other person than the plaintiff, is one of agency, in which the price is left uncertain where no sale was made to a third person, and therefore cannot be specifically enforced. SAME CONTRACTS-CONFIDENTIAL RELATION. A contract by defendant to sell to plaintiff certain corporate stock will not be specifically enforced where the plaintiff was acting as defendant's confidential agent in sole charge of the business, and failed to fully inform the defendant of the condition of the property and of an increase in its rental value, and part of the tender to defendant was from money belonging to the corporation paid in advance upon such increased rentals. Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Main, J., entered June 17, 1909, in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, dismissing an action for specific performance. Affirmed. Austin E. Griffiths (Paul Shaffrath, of counsel), for appellant. Shank & Smith and James McNeny, for respondent. 'Reported in 107 Pac. 874. Opinion Per MOUNT, J. [58 Wash. MOUNT, J.-This action was brought by the appellant to enforce specific performance of a written contract. The cause was tried upon its merits. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action, and awarded an affirmative judgment in favor of the defendant. No findings of fact were made by the trial court. The plaintiff appeals. The contract is a follows: "In consideration of fifty ($50) dollars, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I do agree to sell to R. J. Huston or to whomsoever he may direct, my entire stock and all my interest in Vashon Investment Co. Inc., at any time within six months from this date or thereafter until I shall have given him ten days' notice in writing to the contrary, and upon the payment to me of the sum of not less than thirty thousand ($30,000) dollars and as much more than said sum as said stock and interest may be sold for to any person other than the said R. J. Huston. The payment of said sum of thirty thousand ($30,000) dollars or more to be not less than half cash and the balance in two equal annual payments with interest thereon, at seven per cent per annum, payable semiannually. I further agree that the said R. J. Huston shall have the privilege to take for himself or sell to another all of my said stock and all interest in and to said Vashon Investment Co. at the price and upon the terms as above provided and in either event to allow him the usual commission of five per cent on the first ten thousand ($10,000) dollars of the purchase price and two and one-half per cent on the balance of said purchase price. It is understood that the property of the Vashon Investment Co. is a certain lease-hold interest upon lot seven block, twenty-four of the A. A. Denny's addition to the city of Seattle. Said lease executed by Morgan J. Carkeek and wife in favor of Hilen Harrington for a period of twenty-five years, bearing date April 1, 1905, and I further agree to execute any assignment of said lease that may be necessary or required by the purchaser to validate the sale above provided for. "Dated at Seattle this 2nd of November 1908. "Hilen Harrington." It is not claimed by the appellant that the property was sold to any other person, but it is claimed that this is a Mar. 1910] Opinion Per MOUNT, J. specific agreement to sell to R. J. Huston for $30,000. It is shown that Mr. Huston tendered to respondent on March 22, 1899, $15,000 in cash, together with two notes for $7,500 each, due in one and two years, and that respondent refused the tender. The evidence also shows that before the tender was made, respondent offered to take from Mr. Huston $30,000 for the stock, but in addition thereto respondent insisted that he was entitled to the earnings on the stock up to that time. Mr. Huston insisted that the earnings followed the stock. They disagreed upon this point, and this action followed. The evidence also shows that the Vashon Investment Company was organized by the appellant and respondent. The appellant was at all times the active head thereof. The stock was all held by them about equally, with the exception of a few shares held by third parties. The appellant had the whole management and control of the business of the corporation, which consisted of a twenty-five-year lease of the lot mentioned in the contract above set out, upon which lot the company had erected a three-story block which it leased at a monthly rental to tenants. Respondent knew nothing of the business of the company, but relied wholly upon the appellant. Prior to the time the contract was entered into, the respondent had offered to sell all of his stock in the company at $30,000. The appellant had been negotiating a sale of the property of the corporation at $100,000, which would make the value of respondent's stock about $50,000. Appellant was also negotiating for other tenants of the building, for a long time at a larger rental than the corporation had theretofore been receiving. Respondent did not know, and was not informed, of the contemplated advance in the rental value. The appellant, learning that respondent had offered his stock at $30,000, called upon him and told him in substance that this offer of one-half of the stock of the corporation at that price would injure the sale of the whole property; that he could sell respondent's stock at a much greater sum. The |